USA v. Manila Chicago

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Manila Chicago. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-16397

Date Filed: 09/29/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-16397
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00168-CG-B-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MANILA CHICAGO,
a.k.a. Coung V. Nguyen,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(September 29, 2017)
Before MARTIN, JULIE CARNES, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, arguing that the court abused its discretion by not allowing him to
effectively argue his motion. We affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND
Defendant Manila Chicago (“Defendant”) was indicted by a federal grand

jury on 16 counts of various drug, gun, and money laundering charges. Based on
an evaluation conducted by the Bureau of Prisons, the district court found that
Defendant was competent to stand trial. Defendant subsequently entered into a
plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count each of drug
trafficking, using a firearm in relation to drug trafficking, and money laundering.
In return, the Government agreed to drop the remaining charges, not pursue
additional charges related to the underlying facts of the indictment, and
recommend a sentence at the low end of the sentencing guidelines.
In his change of plea hearing, Defendant acknowledged that he had
discussed the charges pending against him with his attorney and that he was
prepared to plead guilty. Defendant further acknowledged that he had read and
discussed the plea agreement and factual resume with his attorney, that he
understood what was in the plea agreement, and that he was pleading guilty of his
own free will and was not coerced or threatened. Defendant stated that he was
fully satisfied with his attorney’s representation of him. After reviewing the
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charges with Defendant and the possible sentences and related effects of pleading
guilty to a felony, the court found that Defendant was
fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea; that he is
aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea;
that the plea of guilty is a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an
independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of
the offenses.
The court subsequently accepted Defendant’s guilty plea.
During his sentencing hearing, however, Defendant made a statement to the
court in which he claimed he did not understand parts of his plea agreement and
signed the agreement because his attorney told him to. Defendant specifically
claimed that the money laundering charge against him was “a lie.” The district
court understood Defendant’s statements to be an attempt to withdraw at least a
portion of his guilty plea, but, because of Defendant’s assurances at the change of
plea hearing, the court denied Defendant’s request. The court subsequently
sentenced Defendant to 111 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the district court erred by not allowing him to “effectively argue” his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

We review a district court’s denial of a request to withdraw a guilty plea for
abuse of discretion, and there is no abuse of discretion unless the denial is
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“arbitrary or unreasonable.” United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1328 n.8 (11th
Cir.2001)).
B.

Whether Defendant Has Shown a Fair and Just Reason for
Requesting to Withdraw His Guilty Plea

A criminal defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after the court accepts it,
but before he is sentenced, if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for
requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). In determining whether
a defendant has shown a fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea, a court may
consider the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea,” including
“(1) whether close assistance of counsel was available; (2) whether the plea was
knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources would be conserved; and
(4) whether the government would be prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to
withdraw his plea.” Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298 (quoting United States v. Buckles,
843 F.2d 469, 471–72 (11th Cir. 1988)). If a defendant cannot satisfy the first two
of these factors, however, a court need not give “considerable weight” or
“particular attention” to the remaining factors. See United States v. GonzalezMercado, 808 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1987). Additionally, the timing of the
motion to withdraw is relevant because “[a] swift change of heart is itself strong
indication that the plea was entered in haste and confusion.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. None of the relevant factors
mentioned above tilt in his favor.
1.

Close Assistance of Counsel

Defendant testified at his change of plea hearing that he had discussed the
charges, possible defenses, the plea agreement, and the factual resume with his
attorney, that he understood the plea agreement, and that he was fully satisfied with
his representation, despite a previous argument. There is a strong presumption that
these statements are true. See Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d at 800 n.8. Defendant
also acknowledged that by signing the plea agreement—which Defendant’s
counsel spent a “long time” reviewing with Defendant to ensure that Defendant
understood “every word”—he had the benefit of legal counsel in negotiating the
plea and that he was “completely satisfied” with the legal advice of his attorney.
In addition, the district court was able to observe that Defendant’s counsel had
multiple off-the-record conversations with him through an interpreter during the
plea hearing, apparently to make sure that Defendant adequately understood the
court’s questions.
Although Defendant did later argue at his sentencing hearing that he did not
understand the plea agreement but had simply signed because his attorney told him
to, it is for the district court to decide “[t]he good faith, credibility and weight of a
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defendant’s assertions in support of a motion” to withdraw a guilty plea. Brehm,
442 F.3d at 1298 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court implicitly
discounted these assertions by Defendant, noting that it was convinced that
Defendant knew he was pleading guilty at the plea hearing based on Defendant’s
responses to the court’s questions. Given Defendant’s affirmative responses that
he received assistance from counsel and was satisfied with that assistance, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Defendant had entered
his guilty plea with the “close assistance of counsel.” Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298.
2.

Knowing and Voluntary Plea

To determine whether a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, a court must
address “three core concerns”: “(1) the guilty plea must be free from coercion;
(2) the defendant must understand the nature of the charges; and (3) the defendant
must know and understand the consequences of his guilty plea.” United States v.
Hernandez-Fraire, 208 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The district court is entitled to rely on a defendant’s statements during
the plea hearing to determine whether these concerns are met. See United States v.
Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994).
Defendant testified that nobody had threatened him or otherwise forced him
to plead guilty, and that he was pleading guilty of his own free will because he was
guilty. The district court also confirmed that Defendant understood the nature of
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the charges against him and the consequences of a guilty plea. Because the district
court satisfied the “core concerns” through its questioning of Defendant at the plea
hearing, the court did all that was required to determine that Defendant entered his
guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily.
3.

Conservation of Judicial Resources

As the Government argues, allowing Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea
would not conserve judicial resources because Defendant moved to withdraw his
plea three months after it was entered, and the case had already been removed from
the trial docket. Thus, accepting the motion would consume greater judicial
resources. Defendant offers no arguments to the contrary.
4.

Prejudice to the Government

Defendant argues that the Government would not be prejudiced by the
withdrawal of his plea, and in any case, further argument on the motion is
necessary to determine the issue. The court does not need to find prejudice to the
government before denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, however. Buckles,
843 F.2d at 474. Thus, that the district court did not explicitly consider whether
the Government would be prejudiced before denying Defendant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea does not show that the court abused its discretion.

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5.

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Timing of Motion to Withdraw

Defendant argues that because only 92 days elapsed between his guilty plea
and his motion to withdraw it, he should not be precluded from withdrawing his
plea. While Defendant is correct that a 92-day interim period is not a per se bar to
withdrawing his guilty plea, “[t]he longer the delay between the entry of the plea
and the motion to withdraw it, the more substantial the reasons must be as to why
the defendant seeks withdrawal.” Buckles, 843 F.2d at 473. Ninety-two days does
not suggest a “swift change of heart” indicating “haste and confusion” in entering
the guilty plea. See Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d at 797, 801 (noting that there
was no “swift change” when a guilty plea was entered and defendant moved to
withdraw it 27 days later). In addition, as the district court suggested, that
Defendant only sought to withdraw his guilty plea after his sentence had been
calculated under the guidelines suggests that he wanted to withdraw his plea only
because he was dissatisfied with this sentence calculation. See id. at 801 (“[T]he
fact that the appellant's motion to withdraw fell on the heels of imposition of
stricter sentences than those recommended in the plea agreement . . . suggests that
the appellant withdrew his plea in anticipation of a harsher sanction than that
recommended in his plea agreement.”). The timing of Defendant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea does not indicate that Defendant has a fair and just reason
for attempting to withdraw his plea.
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6.

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Possible Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant also argues that allowing him to “pursue his motion” would allow
the district court to determine whether his Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel was violated. Defendant notes that the record suggests he
had several complaints against his attorney, and this may provide a basis for
withdrawing his guilty plea. The district court was aware of Defendant’s strained
relationship with his attorney, however, and Defendant still testified to his full
satisfaction with his representation. Furthermore, this Court has held that “even if
the record contains some indication of deficiencies in counsel’s performance,”
claims for ineffective assistance of counsel not entertained by the district court are
not generally considered on direct appeal, and that “[t]he preferred means for
deciding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion.” United States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Defendant’s arguments about the
possibility of a Sixth Amendment violation do not show that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
7.

Necessity of a Hearing on the Motion

Defendant argues that there should have been a more thorough hearing on
his motion to withdraw his plea because it was not possible otherwise to determine
whether Defendant actually satisfied the criteria for allowing a withdrawal. The
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court is entitled to rely on the statements Defendant made during his change of
plea hearing, however, and based on the extensive inquiries made by the court
then, the court was not required to conduct a more extensive hearing on the matter
before denying Defendant’s motion. In addition, the court was aware of the
difficult attorney-client relationship between Defendant and his attorney, and so
was able to assess the credibility of Defendant’s claim that his attorney had forced
him to sign the plea agreement. Given the information it already had, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by failing to accept additional testimony or
evidence in support of Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
III.

CONCLUSION
Defendant has not made the required showing that there is a fair and just

reason to withdraw his guilty plea, and so the district court’s rejection of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea is AFFIRMED.

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