USA v. Stephen Hamlin

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Stephen Lee Hamlin. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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Date Filed: 05/05/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-16958
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cr-00057-JES-MRM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEPHEN LEE HAMLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(May 5, 2017)
Before TJOFLAT, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Stephen Hamlin appeals his 18-month sentence imposed after the district
court revoked his supervised release. On appeal, Hamlin asserts that the district
court failed to explain the sentence and its upward variance from the guideline
range of 8 to 14 months’ imprisonment. Hamlin also contests the substantive
unreasonableness of the sentence.
The district court adequately explained the sentence by specifically noting
that Hamlin was unamenable to supervision and repeatedly violated the terms of
his supervised release. Additionally, when resetting sentencing, the court warned
Hamlin that additional violations could result in harsher punishment. Furthermore,
the sentence is substantively reasonable because Hamlin repeatedly failed to
comply with his supervised release despite opportunities to prove his ability to do
so, and failed to appear at his reset sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
Generally, we review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a
sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We first ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error. Id. Procedural error includes inadequate explanations
of the chosen sentence or improper calculations of the defendant’s offense level.
Id. However, we review an objection to procedural reasonableness not made at the
time of sentencing for plain error. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303,
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1307 (11th Cir. 2014). For us to correct a plain error: (1) there must be error; (2)
the error must be plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights. Id. The
party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing the
unreasonableness of the sentence. United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219
(11th Cir. 2009).
“[T]he district court must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow
for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.”
(quotation omitted). United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir.
2008). “The length and amount of detail of the judge’s reasoning required depends
on the circumstances.” Id. “While a sentencing [court] is not required to state on
the record that it has explicitly considered each of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors
or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors, the sentencing [court] should set forth
enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments
and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.”
Id. (citations and alterations omitted).
Similarly, § 3553(c) compels a court at the time of sentencing to “state in
open court the reasons for its imposition of [a] particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c). If a sentence is outside the guideline range, the district court must
state “the specific reason” for the imposition of the upward variance. Id.
§ 3553(c)(2). Unlike procedural reasonableness arguments raised under § 3553(a)
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for the first time on appeal, arguments raised under § 3553(c)(2) are always
reviewed de novo. United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990, 996-97 (11th Cir. 2016).
The district court provided sufficient and specific reasons for varying
upward from the guideline range.1 The district court identified several reasons
supporting the upward variance at the time it imposed sentence. Most
prominently, the district court stated that Hamlin was not amenable to supervised
release. Immediately subsequent to that statement, the district court imposed a
sentence with more prison time than indicated by the guideline range, but no
additional supervised-release period. Furthermore, the district court found that
Hamlin failed to appear at the reset sentencing and previously violated his
supervised release several times. Thus, after listening to both parties about the
facts and their various recommended sentences, the district court clearly articulated
its reason for imposing the upward variance—Hamlin’s repeated failure to comply
with the supervised release terms and the court’s order to appear necessitated an
18-month total sentence without a supervised release period.
As to procedural reasonableness under § 3553(a) and considering the
circumstances surrounding the sentence, the district court previously informed
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Hamlin did not object to the district court’s explanation of the sentence under § 3553(a); thus,
to the extent that he bases his argument on that provision, we review the district court’s
explanation for plain error only. To the extent he raised arguments solely under § 3553(c)(2), we
review the district court’s identification of the reasons for its upward variance de novo.
Regardless of the standard of review, the district court provided sufficient and specific reasons
for varying upward from the guideline range.
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Hamlin of its predisposition to imposing a lengthy sentence of imprisonment if he
failed to comply with his supervised-release terms in the interim between his first
sentencing hearing and reset sentencing hearing, rendering it unnecessary for the
district court to provide Hamlin with a lengthy and repetitive discourse on its
reasons for imposing the sentence. Accordingly, the district court adequately
explained its reasons for imposing an 18-month upward variance sentence after
revoking Hamlin’s supervised release.
II.
After determining the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, we review its
substantive reasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The party challenging the
sentence bears the burden of showing its unreasonableness in light of the record
and the applicable § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c); United States v.
Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1236 (11th Cir. 2009).
The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the need to deter criminal conduct, protect the public from the
defendant’s future conduct, and provide correctional treatment in the most
effective manner. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(c) (listing the appropriate

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factors to be considered when imposing sentence after revocation of supervised
release).
We do not reweigh relevant factors, nor do we remand for resentencing
unless the district court committed a clear error of judgment “by arriving at a
sentence outside the reasonable range of sentences.” Langston, 590 F.3d at 1237.
The district court retains sound discretion regarding the weight given to any
specific factor, and a district court does not commit reversible error simply because
it attaches significant weight to a single § 3553(a) factor. United States v.
Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).
As an initial matter, we need not determine whether Hamlin preserved his
argument regarding the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Regardless of
the standard of review, Hamlin’s sentence is reasonable. Hamlin’s history and
characteristics necessitated the sentence he received. Several reasons support the
district court’s sentence, including Hamlin’s repeated failure to comply with the
terms of his release and his failure to appear at his reset sentencing. The court
offered its trust to Hamlin by resetting sentencing and providing Hamlin the
opportunity to prove that he could comply with the terms of his release. Hamlin
was unable to do so. Hamlin’s laundry list of excuses for his failure to comply
with the terms of his release, and his failure to recognize that the keystone of
supervised release is supervision—meaning staying in contact with the probation
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office—further support the district court’s sentence. Finally, though Hamlin has
appeared to have made efforts to rehabilitate himself, those efforts did not absolve
him of his supervised-release requirements. As the district court observed,
Hamlin’s failures suggested that he was not amenable to supervised release.
Moreover, when considered holistically, the district court’s sentence and the
extent of the upward variance are consistent with its reasoning. Rather than extend
Hamlin’s supervised release and provide less jail time, the court viewed additional
supervised release as unhelpful. Thus, the court concluded that increased jail time
with no subsequent term of supervised release would be more appropriate for
Hamlin due to his prior struggles with the terms of his supervised release.
Accordingly, Hamlin’s 18-month sentence was within the range of reasonable
sentences and the district court did not err in judgment by imposing it. See
Langston, 590 F.3d at 1237.
For all those reasons, the district court’s sentence was reasonable. Hamlin’s
sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release is AFFIRMED.

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