USA v. Rodane Lamb

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Rodane Lamb. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-17692

Date Filed: 08/21/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-17692
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:15-cr-00041-WTH-PRL-5

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RODANE LAMB,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(August 21, 2017)
Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Rodane Lamb appeals his jury conviction and 144-month sentence for
conspiring to distribute 5 or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

Case: 16-17692

Date Filed: 08/21/2017

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§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred
in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence.
After careful review, we affirm.
We review de novo whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a criminal
conviction, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
and drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. United
States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009). The evidence is sufficient
if a reasonable trier of fact could determine that it established the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1284-85. Similarly, the district court’s denial of
a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo. United States v. Holmes,
814 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 294 (2016).
Where the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal before the district
court does not encompass his appellate argument for insufficiency of the evidence,
we review for plain error. United States v. Hunerlach, 197 F.3d 1059, 1068 (11th
Cir. 1999). To establish plain error, the defendant must show (1) an error, (2) that
is plain, and (3) that affected his substantial rights. United States v. Turner, 474
F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). If the defendant satisfies these conditions, we
may exercise our discretion to recognize the error only if it seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.

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To prove participation in a conspiracy to distribute drugs, the evidence must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed between two or more
persons to distribute drugs, that the accused knew of the conspiracy, and, with this
knowledge, the accused voluntarily became a part of the conspiracy. United States
v. Green, 40 F.3d 1167, 1173 (11th Cir. 1994). Proof may be established through
circumstantial evidence or from inferences drawn from the conduct of an
individual or confederates. Id. The government does not have to prove that the
alleged conspirator knew all of the details of the conspiracy or that he participated
in every phase of the scheme. United States v. Guerrero, 935 F.2d 189, 192 (11th
Cir. 1991). A common purpose and plan may be inferred from the circumstances.
United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1365 (11th Cir. 2001).
For starters, we review Lamb’s argument that the evidence was insufficient
to show a conspiracy for plain error, because he did not raise that argument before
the district court. See Hunerlach, 197 F.3d at 1068. Regardless of the standard we
apply, however, we can find no error, much less plain error. According to the coconspirators’ trial testimony, they worked with Lamb, they split money with Lamb,
they jointly participated in shipping money back and forth between Florida and
California, Lamb assisted in packaging cocaine for sale, and Lamb bought cocaine
for his own use and on behalf of others. For instance, Terrell Brown described
Lamb as his partner, and explained that Lamb purchased cocaine for both of them,
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and “with that agreement,” they both sold their own cocaine. Cherish Brown
testified that Lamb visited her house several times in 2013 and 2014 to count cash,
package cocaine, and receive shipments of cocaine. Jose Huerta testified that he,
Lamb, and Terrell Brown rented a California apartment to facilitate their drug
sales. Huerta also said that in California in 2014, he witnessed John Luckett and
Lamb split money that had come in the mail, with Lamb receiving about $70,000
or $80,000. In addition, postal employees testified that large sums of money were
sent between Florida and California, some of it was addressed to Lamb, some of it
was to and from Terrell Brown or other people with the last name Brown, and a
person identifying himself as Lamb called about one of the packages.
As the record reveals, the testimony of government witnesses and Lamb’s
co-conspirators was sufficient for a reasonable juror to determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that: (1) a conspiracy to distribute cocaine existed between Lamb,
Huerta, Terrell Brown, Cherish Brown, and Luckett; (2) Lamb knew of the
conspiracy; and (3) with that knowledge, he voluntarily became part of the
conspiracy. See Green, 40 F.3d at 1173. Moreover, based on this testimony, the
jury could infer that Lamb knew sufficient details of the conspiracy to indicate that
he was voluntarily a part of it, and not just a customer of Huerta or Terrell Brown
or an independent drug seller. And, as we’ve said, the government did not need to
prove that Lamb was the leader or knew every detail of the conspiracy. Guerrero,
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935 F.2d at 192.

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Thus, the government presented sufficient evidence of the

conspiracy, and the district court did not commit error, much less plain error, by
denying Lamb’s motion for judgment of acquittal. See Hunerlach, 197 F.3d at
1068; Holmes, 814 F.3d at 1250.
As for Lamb’s argument that the evidence was insufficient as to the amount
of cocaine, we review it de novo because he raised that argument before the district
court. See Jiminez, 564 F.3d at 1284. But once again, we can find no error
because there was more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to decide
that the conspiracy involved five kilograms or more of cocaine. As the record
shows, Huerta testified that Lamb would usually buy between 12 and 15
kilograms, law enforcement saw Terrell Brown and Lamb driving around together
on the same day Huerta had the 40 kilograms of cocaine in Florida to deliver to
Terrell Brown, and the jury was shown the 40 kilograms that had been recovered.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and drawing
all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict, the evidence was
sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to determine that, between 2012 and August
5, 2015, Lamb conspired to distribute cocaine in the amount of five kilograms or
more, as charged in the indictment. See Jiminez, 564 F.3d at 1284-85.
AFFIRMED.

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