Gregory Eddins v. State of Alabama, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Gregory James Eddins. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 17-10223

Date Filed: 10/30/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-10223
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-00067-MHH-HGD
GREGORY JAMES EDDINS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
STATE OF ALABAMA,
CHERYL PRICE,
Warden III,
LLOYD HICKS,
Warden I,
ROY RODHAM,
MD,
JAMES BUTLER, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(October 30, 2017)

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Date Filed: 10/30/2017

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Before MARCUS, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Eddins, an Alabama inmate proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for relief from
the court’s dismissal of his amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. In his appeal,
Eddins argues that the district court erred in dismissing his amended complaint and
abused its discretion in denying his Rule 60(b) motion. After careful
consideration, we affirm the district court.
I.
Eddins filed a pro se § 1983 complaint against the state of Alabama in
January 2014. He later amended his complaint, alleging, among other things, that
the wardens and medical care providers at the Donaldson Correctional Facility had
failed to provide him with treatment for his diabetes and thus were deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The denial
of treatment, he alleged, could result in his death, loss of a limb, or blindness.
Eddins named as defendants in their official and individual capacities wardens
Cheryl Price and Lyod Hicks, along with medical providers Roy Rodham, M.D.;
James Butler, NP; and the Director of Nursing, Mrs. Claybourn. Based on these
allegations, Eddins sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages.
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A magistrate judge recommended that Eddins’s amended complaint be
dismissed “as frivolous and/or for failure to state any claims upon which relief may
be granted . . . .” Doc. 12 at 12. 1 Over Eddins’s objections, the district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed the amended
complaint. As relevant here, the district court found that Eddins had not alleged
any injury based on his untreated diabetes and thus had failed to plead an essential
element of an Eighth Amendment claim. The court also noted that insofar as
Eddins based his claim on the potential for future injury, his claim was not ripe.
The court entered a final judgment on September 24, 2015.
Although Eddins initiated an appeal of the district court’s order, he never
pursued it, and it was eventually dismissed. He filed an untimely notice of appeal
on November 16, 2015, 2 asserting that he had not received notice of the district
court’s final judgment. We remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether Eddins was entitled to reopen the appeal period, and the district court
determined he was. But Eddins failed to move for leave to proceed on appeal
within the required time period, so we dismissed his appeal for want of
prosecution.

1

Citations to “Doc.” refer to docket entries in the district court record in this case.

2

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (requiring a notice of appeal to be filed “within 30 days
after entry of the judgment or order appealed from”).

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After we dismissed his appeal, Eddins filed a motion in the district court for
relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2), based on
newly discovered evidence. Eddins asserted that, following the district court’s
dismissal of his amended complaint, his former attorney had “presented him with”
evidence concerning his diabetic condition. Doc. 35 at 1. Eddins argued that this
new evidence revealed he may have hypoglycemia, his eyesight was diminishing,
he had tested positively for diabetes, and defendants Rodham, Butler, and
Claybourn were aware of his condition.
Eddins attached various medical records to support his motion, which
spanned from 2013 to March 2015, including: a March 2015 “progress note” from
Rodham, indicating that Eddins had been treated for eye pain and that he might
have hypoglycemia; results from several blood glucose tests conducted between
2013 and March 2015; nurses’ notes from 2013 to January 2015 stating that Eddins
was suffering from eye pain and blurry vision; entries from 2013 in Eddins’s
personal “Medical Journal” describing his various symptoms; and two grievance
forms from January and March 2015, in which Eddins complained about receiving
inadequate treatment. The district court denied Eddins’s Rule 60(b) motion,
finding that the evidence was not newly discovered because he possessed “actual
knowledge” of all of the newly presented evidence prior to the court’s entry of
final judgment. Doc. 36 at 5-6.
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Eddins appealed. In his appeal, Eddins challenges the denial of his Rule
60(b)(2) motion.3
II.
We review the denial of a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)
for an abuse of discretion. Maradiaga v. United States, 679 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th
Cir. 2012). The abuse of discretion standard requires us to affirm unless we find
that the district court made a clear error of judgment or applied the wrong legal
standard. Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir.
2009). “An appeal of a ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion . . . is narrow in scope,
addressing only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief,” not the merits of “the
underlying judgment for review.” Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Northwestern
Nat’l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).

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Eddins also argues that the district court erred in denying his § 1983 claim for failing to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This challenge, however, is beyond the scope
of Eddins’s appeal. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) requires that a notice of
appeal be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order being appealed. Eddins’s
notice of appeal was filed more than one year after the dismissal of his amended complaint.
Accordingly, the instant notice of appeal is untimely as to the district court’s dismissal order.
Although Eddins timely appealed the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion, which we consider below,
that appeal “may not be used to challenge mistakes of law which could have been raised on
direct appeal.” Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw’ern Nat’l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th
Cir. 1999). Therefore, we do not consider the district court’s dismissal of Eddins’s amended
complaint.

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III.
Eddins argues that the district court abused its discretion in deciding that the
evidence he presented was not newly discovered for the purposes of Rule 60(b).
We disagree.
Rule 60(b) allows for relief from judgment in certain circumstances,
including where a party “discover[s] evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(2). To obtain relief under Rule 60(b) based on newly discovered evidence,
the movant must satisfy a five-part test:
(1) [T]he evidence must be newly discovered since the trial; (2) due
diligence on the part of the movant to discover the new evidence must
be shown; (3) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or
impeaching; (4) the evidence must be material; and (5) the evidence
must be such that a new trial would probably produce a new result.
Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000). Because
granting a Rule 60(b) motion is an “extraordinary” measure, these five
requirements “must be strictly met.” Id. With respect to the first requirement, we
have held that a movant may not use a Rule 60(b) motion to “present evidence that
could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Consorcio Ecuatoriano de
Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc., 747 F.3d 1262, 1275
(11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir.
2010)).
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Eddins argues that the evidence he presented in his 60(b) motion was “newly
discovered” because he received the documents in April 2016, after the district
court dismissed his amended complaint. As the district court found, however, none
of this evidence was “newly discovered” for purposes of Rule 60(b). Eddins could
have relied in his initial complaint upon his 2013 journal entries, which existed
long before the entry of judgment in his case. Similarly, while his case was still
pending, Eddins was aware of his eye examinations, the progress note, and his
glucose tests—the most recent of which was completed in March 2015. As the
district court explained, even if Eddins could not access the documentation of his
most recent medical records prior to the entry of judgment, he was aware of the
exams and appointments and thus could have described them in his allegations.
Because the evidence Eddins presented could have been raised prior to the
district court’s entry of judgment, the district court correctly concluded that Eddins
failed to satisfy the requirements for a motion for relief from judgment based on
newly discovered evidence. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of his
Rule 60(b) motion.
AFFIRMED.

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