Organizacion Miss America v. Juan Urquidi, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellants Texas Pageant Productions, LLC and Juan Arturo Ramirez Urquidi. Decision: Affirmed in part, Vacated in part and Remanded. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.--[Edited 10/04/2017 by DC]

Case: 17-11479

Date Filed: 10/04/2017

Page: 1 of 8

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-11479
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-22225-KMM

ORGANIZACION MISS AMERICA LATINA, INC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JUAN ARTURO RAMIREZ URQUIDI,
TEXAS PAGEANT PRODUCTIONS, LLC,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(October 4, 2017)

Case: 17-11479

Date Filed: 10/04/2017

Page: 2 of 8

Before JULIE CARNES, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-appellee Organizacion Miss America Latina, Inc. (“OMAL”)
brought suit in the Southern District of Florida against Appellants Juan Arturo
Ramirez Urquidi (Ramirez) and Texas Pageant Productions, LLC (“TPP”) for
breach of contract and service mark infringement under the Lanham Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 1117. The district court entered a default judgment against Appellants.
Appellants moved to set aside the default judgment, and the district court denied
that motion. Appellants timely appealed to this court. Appellants raise three issues
on appeal: (1) that the district court erred in refusing to set aside the default
judgment; (2) that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction against TPP; and
(3) that the district court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing to determine
damages.
We review the district court’s refusal to set aside the default judgment under
Rule 60 and hold an evidentiary hearing under Rule 55 for abuse of discretion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, 60. However, we review the issue of whether personal
jurisdiction is present, even in a motion to set aside a default judgment, de novo.
Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009).
We affirm in part and vacate in part.
I.

Background
2

Case: 17-11479

Date Filed: 10/04/2017

Page: 3 of 8

In 2013, Ramirez entered into a license agreement with OMAL to conduct
local and state beauty pageants in Texas. This agreement was for 2013 and 2014.
In 2015, Ramirez and OMAL entered into another agreement for the year 2015.
Ramirez failed to pay the licensing fee in 2015 and the agreement was terminated
by OMAL in early 2016. On February 23, 2016, Ramirez responded to an email
from OMAL recognizing the termination of the agreement and promising to cease
using OMAL’s logos. On March 1, 2016, and March 22, 2016, OMAL sent
additional demands that Appellants cease and desist using OMAL’s trademarks.
OMAL brought suit against Appellants on June 16, 2016.
On July 13, 2016, the clerk entered a default as to both defendantsappellants. On August 4, 2016, the court entered a default judgment against
Appellants. On August 22, 2016, Appellants appeared via their attorney and
subsequently filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. On March 28, 2017,
the court denied the motion to set aside the default judgment against defendantsappellants.
II. Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
A court may “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “The determination of what constitutes
excusable neglect is generally an equitable one, taking into account the totality of
3

Case: 17-11479

Date Filed: 10/04/2017

Page: 4 of 8

the circumstances.” Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 934 (11th Cir.
2007). Additionally, if the court finds that a party “display[ed] either an
intentional or reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings, the court need make
no other findings” before denying the motion to set aside a default judgment.
Compania Interamericana Export-Import v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion,
88 F.3d 948, 951–52 (11th Cir. 1996).
The court below found that Ramirez had “received several written demands”
from OMAL, and that he had “agreed to cease and desist” in an email Ramirez sent
to OMAL on February 23, 2016. The court further found that Ramirez had
“frequent engagement with Plaintiff” prior to OMAL filing the lawsuit. This
frequent engagement prior to the lawsuit led the court to conclude that Ramirez
“was being intentionally evasive in failing to respond in a timely fashion to the
complaint.” Therefore, the court found that Appellants acted with reckless
disregard for the judicial proceedings.
Appellants argue that the court abused its discretion in relying on “opposing
counsel’s self-serving statements” and that Ramirez’s “only fault was an inability
to organize a defense timely enough to respond to the Complaint.” However, the
lower court has wide discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to
set aside a default judgment. The lower court acted within its discretion in finding
that Appellants was intentionally evasive and that his evasiveness amounted to
4

Case: 17-11479

Date Filed: 10/04/2017

Page: 5 of 8

reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings. Appellants further argue that the
court abused its discretion by not properly evaluating his defense that the contract
he entered into with OMAL was actually a franchise rather than a license.
However, once the court found that Appellants demonstrated a reckless disregard
for the judicial proceedings, it “need make no other findings” before denying the
motion to set aside the default judgment. Compania Interamericana, 88 F.3d at
952. Because the court acted well within its discretion in finding that Appellants
exhibited reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings, it did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default judgment.
III. Personal Jurisdiction over TPP
In order to constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant,
the defendant must “have certain minimum contacts” with the forum state. Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Wash., 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945). The district court held that “personal
jurisdiction over TPP is valid because Ramirez is a member of the LLC.”
Appellants argue that there is no connection between TPP and Florida, the
forum state. They point out that TPP never signed a contract with OMAL, and that
any alleged infringement upon OMAL’s trademarks by TPP occurred in Texas, not
Florida. Appellants further contend that Ramirez’s membership in TPP makes TPP
a resident of Texas (the residence of Ramirez) but does not expose TPP to suit in
Florida simply because a member of the LLC signed a contract in that state.
5

Case: 17-11479

Date Filed: 10/04/2017

Page: 6 of 8

OMAL argues that through the “agency relationship [between Ramirez and
TPP], TPP had sufficient contacts with Florida to bring it within this Court’s
jurisdiction.” OMAL quotes Florida’s statute enumerating actions through which a
person, acting personally or as agent for another, “submits himself . . . to the
jurisdiction of the courts of [Florida].” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a). OMAL argues that
TPP, “on whose behalf Ramirez did any of the enumerated acts, submitted itself to
the jurisdiction of Florida courts.” However, OMAL does not specifically allege
any acts undertaken by Ramirez on behalf of TPP that fall within that statute.
Moreover, TPP never signed a contract with OMAL and is never mentioned in the
communications between Appellants and OMAL.
We agree with Appellants that the lower court applied the wrong standard in
evaluating personal jurisdiction over TPP. Ramirez, acting as an individual, does
not, without more, subject TPP to the personal jurisdiction of Florida courts. We
have established in the context of diversity jurisdiction that a “limited liability
company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen.”
Rolling Greens MHP v. Comcast, 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004). Ramirez
is a citizen of Texas and is the only member of TTP; therefore, TTP is a citizen of
Texas. The instant record does not establish that TPP is a citizen of Florida and
OMAL has not alleged any specific activities TPP has performed (or that Ramirez

6

Case: 17-11479

Date Filed: 10/04/2017

Page: 7 of 8

has performed on behalf of TPP) that would expose it to the jurisdiction of Florida
courts. The lower court erred in holding that it had personal jurisdiction over TPP.
IV. Refusal to Hold Evidentiary Hearing
We review the district court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on
damages for abuse of discretion. Holding an evidentiary hearing after a default
judgment is governed by Rule 55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). We have held that, despite
Rule 55’s permissive language, “judgment of default awarding cash damages [can]
not properly be entered ‘without a hearing unless the amount claimed is a
liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical calculation.’” Adolph Coors Co. v.
Movement Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985)
(quoting United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979)). The
district court imposed damages without holding an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, Appellants contend that “damages under the Lanham Act . . . are
generally neither liquidated nor capable of ascertainable mathematical calculation”
and so an evidentiary hearing was required in this case. OMAL responds that they
“elected to recover an award of statutory damages” that was calculable.
Specifically, OMAL alleged forty counterfeit imitations under the Lanham Act,
and the statutory damage amount was multiplied by the forty violations to reach
the total award amount of $2,160,000.00.

7

Case: 17-11479

Date Filed: 10/04/2017

Page: 8 of 8

Significantly, Appellants failed to respond to OMAL’s motion for entry of
default final judgment, thus failing to respond to OMAL’s requested damages,
which the district court adopted.1 Moreover, we agree with OMAL that the
damages in this case were capable of mathematical calculation. The statutory
damages chosen by the judge were an ascertainable value per violation, simply
multiplied by the number of violations. Appellants challenge neither number even
on appeal. Additionally, the damages for breach of contract were ascertainable –
i.e. the money not paid by Appellants or wrongly collected by Appellants. In both
of these damage awards the amounts were capable of mathematical calculation.
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary
hearing on damages.
V. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the district court’s denial of the motion to vacate the
default judgment is affirmed, as is the district court’s decision not to hold an
evidentiary hearing on damages. However, the district court’s judgment against
TPP is vacated for lack of personal jurisdiction, The case is remanded to the
district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
1

Appellants did not challenge OMAL’s requested damages until they later filed their “motion to
set aside Final Default Judgment,” and even then they did not request an evidentiary hearing.
8