Carl Payne v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Carl Jeffrey Payne. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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Date Filed: 10/04/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-11808
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:15-cv-00517-JSM-PRL
CARL JEFFREY PAYNE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(October 4, 2017)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal requires us to decide whether the district court erred when it
granted summary judgment in favor of J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., on the ground

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that J.B. Hunt was immune from Carl Jeffery Payne’s personal injury claim under
the Florida workers’ compensation statute. See Fla. Stat. § 440.11. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Payne was a delivery driver for J.B. Hunt. Payne suffered from diabetes,
gout, and rheumatoid arthritis, and on April 3, 2014, Payne developed blisters on
his feet while making a delivery. Payne contends that his damp work boots and
unsafe work conditions caused the injury and that J.B. Hunt was indifferent to
Payne’s complaints. The blisters did not heal. Payne went to the hospital on July
21, 2014, and doctors amputated Payne’s left big toe.
Payne then filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. AIG, the
insurance carrier, denied the claim on July 30, 2014. The adjuster, Evelyn Wallace,
gave two reasons for the denial: Wallace explained that Payne had not given notice
within 30 days of his injury; and Wallace found that “[w]ork is not the major
Contributing Cause of claimant’s injuries, or disability.”
On November 6, 2014, Payne filed a petition for workers’ compensation
benefits. He demanded temporary total disability and reimbursement and
authorization of medical expenses. The petition also asserted “compensability . . .
of the entire claim” and requested “penalties, interest and costs” and “attorney
fees.” AIG denied this petition as follows: “This is a total denied claim, therefore

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no indemnity or medical bills will be paid or authorized.” Payne voluntarily
dismissed his petition for benefits before adjudication.
Payne then filed this tort action against J.B. Hunt, which asserted a defense
of workers’ compensation immunity. Under Florida law, workers’ compensation is
the exclusive remedy for employees who suffer injuries in the course and scope of
their employment. See Fla. Stat. § 440.11. Payne responded that J.B. Hunt was
estopped from raising this defense.
According to Payne, J.B. Hunt had refused to pay workers’ compensation on
the ground that Payne was not injured in the scope and course of his employment.
Payne highlighted that although his petition for benefits requested
“[c]ompensability of the Entire Claim,” “[t]he adjuster did not file a response
indicating that compensability was accepted.” According to Payne, this lack of
response, coupled with the adjuster’s later testimony that “compensability meant
that there was an accident or injury that occurred in the course of employment,”
supports the conclusion that J.B. Hunt denied Payne’s claim because the injury did
not occur within the course or scope of Payne’s employment. Payne also pointed to
Wallace’s statement during her deposition that Payne did not have an accident on
the job. Payne contended that these earlier representations about whether the injury
occurred within the scope of Payne’s employment prevented J.B. Hunt from
asserting workers’ compensation immunity.
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of J.B. Hunt based on
workers’ compensation immunity. The district court determined that J.B. Hunt
“denied the workers’ compensation claim because there was late notice and
because work was not the major contributing cause of [Payne’s] injury.” As “these
bases for denial are consistent with—as opposed to irreconcilable with—[Payne]
being injured during the course and scope of employment,” the court concluded
that J.B. Hunt was “entitled to rely on workers’ compensation immunity as a
defense.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews de novo summary judgment rulings and draws all
inferences and reviews all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56.
III. DISCUSSION
“In this diversity action initiated in Florida, we apply the substantive law of
the forum state.” James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 540 F.3d
1270, 1274 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008). In Florida, workers’ compensation is the
exclusive remedy for employees injured in the course and scope of their
employment. Fla. Stat. § 440.11. But “[i]f an employer takes the position in a
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workers’ compensation proceeding that the employee is not owed workers’
compensation because the injury did not occur in the course and scope of
employment . . . the employer may be subsequently estopped from claiming
immunity . . . .” Gil v. Tenet Healthsystem N. Shore, Inc., 204 So. 3d 125, 127 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). To invoke estoppel, a
plaintiff must establish the following:
(1) a representation by the party estopped to the party claiming the estoppel
as to some material fact, which representation is contrary to the condition of
affairs later asserted by the estopped party; (2) a reliance upon this
representation by the party claiming the estoppel; and (3) a change in the
position of the party claiming the estoppel to his detriment, caused by the
representation and his reliance thereon.
Ocean Reef Club, Inc. v. Wilczewski, 99 So. 3d 1, 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
And “[i]f the language employed in the notice of denial could give rise to more
than one interpretation, such that it cannot be fairly determined whether the
employer’s positions are inconsistent, summary judgment is inappropriate” to
resolve that factual issue. Gil, 204 So. 3d at 128 (alteration in original).
J.B. Hunt is entitled to immunity. On July 30, 2014, AIG rejected Payne’s
claim in a document that gave two reasons for the denial: “No Notice provide[d]
within 30 days after the accident,” and “Work is not the major Contributing Cause
of claimant’s injuries, or disability.” And on November 7, 2014, AIG denied
Payne’s petition, stating that “[t]his is a total denied claim, therefore no indemnity
or medical bills will be paid or authorized.” J.B. Hunt never denied that Payne was
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injured in the course and scope of his employment. Payne later stated during his
deposition that he understood that his claim was denied “because . . . the diabetic
state [he] was in years ago had something to do with this.”
Payne’s efforts to find ambiguity in the language of the denials are
unpersuasive. He contends that the July 30, 2014 statement that “[w]ork is not the
major Contributing Cause of claimant’s injuries” could be interpreted as an
assertion that the injury occurred outside the scope of Payne’s employment. He
directs us to Gil, 204 So. 3d at 126, 128, where the Florida Fourth District Court of
Appeal found ambiguity in a denial that stated, “Entire claim denied as claimant’s
employment is not the major contributing cause for his death.” The court reasoned
that this assertion left “unclear whether the [employer] denied benefits because the
injury occurred outside the scope of the decedent’s employment or whether the
[employer] denied benefits because the injury received in the course of [the
decedent’s] employment did not result in the decedent’s subsequent injury.” Id. at
128. This ambiguity foreclosed summary judgment on whether the employer was
entitled to immunity. Id. But in Gil, the employer had told the decedent’s widow
“that her husband’s illness was not a work related illness,” and the widow had
dismissed her workers’ compensation petition after the denial “confused her” and
“it [became] clear to [her] that this was just another denial of any workers

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compensation benefits because it was not a work related illness.” Id. at 126 (second
alteration in original).
Payne had no reason to conclude that J.B. Hunt denied the claim because the
injury was unrelated to Payne’s work. The July 2014 denial stated only that work
was not a major contributing cause of the injury. Indeed, Payne stated during his
deposition that he understood that the denial was based on his preexisting medical
conditions, and Wallace confirmed that she never told “the claimant or his
representatives . . . [t]hat [she was] denying this claim based upon the fact the
accident was not within the course and scope of [Payne’s] employment.” Payne’s
motion for summary judgment did not even argue that the July 2014 denial led
Payne to believe that the injury occurred outside the scope of his employment.
Perhaps the denial could have been clearer that the injury was within the scope of
Payne’s employment but was noncompensable because Payne’s medical conditions
were the cause of his injury. But J.B. Hunt never represented that the injury
occurred outside the scope of Payne’s employment, and Payne offers no evidence
that he misunderstood the reasons for the denial.
Payne also attempts to string together excerpts of Wallace’s deposition
testimony to imply that Wallace based the denial on the finding that the injury
occurred outside the scope of Payne’s employment. But Wallace testified that she
did not “ever deny the claim based upon the fact that the accident did not occur
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within the course and scope of employment,” and she explained that she “would
have . . . listed in [the] denial” if she “had felt at the time that [Payne] did not have
an injury or accident while in the course and scope of his employment.” Payne
cannot establish ambiguity by mischaracterizing excerpts of Wallace’s deposition.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of J.B. Hunt.

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