Intl. Refugee Assistance v. Donald J. Trump

Filing 91

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF by Amici Curiae, Civil Rights Organizations in Support of Appellees in electronic and paper format. Method of Filing Paper Copies: mail. Date Paper Copies Mailed, Dispatched, or Delivered to Court: 11/17/2017. [1000194348] [17-2231, 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240] Lynne Bernabei [Entered: 11/17/2017 10:36 AM]

Case Nos. 17-2231 (L), 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240 (Consolidated)
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL.,
Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, No. 17-cv-00361 (Chuang, J.)

AMICI CURIAE BRIEF
BY CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES
FOR AFFIRMANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

BERNABEI & KABAT, PLLC
Lynne Bernabei (D.C. Bar No. 938936)
[e-mail]
Alan R. Kabat (D.C. Bar No. 464258)
[e-mail]
1400 – 16th Street N.W., Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20036-2223
[phone]
[phone] (Fax)
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People;
Advocates for Youth;
Center for Reproductive Rights;
Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law;
The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law;
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
Mississippi Center for Justice;
National Center for Lesbian Rights;
National Urban League;
People for the American Way Foundation;
Southern Coalition for Social Justice; and
The Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTEREST OF AMICI .

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .

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ARGUMENT

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Social Categorization and Stereotyping Creates Dangerous Conditions for
Members of Minority Groups .
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A. Stereotyping Minorities Creates a Climate for Discrimination

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B. The Executive Order Is the Product of Centuries of Discriminatory
Stereotypes About Muslims
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C. The Executive Order Is Based on Stereotypes About Muslims as
“Anti-American” and “Terrorists”
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D. Government Legitimization of Muslim Stereotypes Has Encouraged
Violence Against Muslims, and Inhibited Millions of Muslims in the
Practice of Their Religion
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1. Government Stereotyping Leads to Violence and Discrimination

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2. The President’s Statements Have Encouraged Violence

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3. Stereotyping and Discrimination Harms All Americans, Not Just
Those Directly Affected by Specific Acts
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CONCLUSION

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Ahmed v. Johnson,
752 F.3d 490 (1st Cir. 2014) .

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4

Aziz v. Trump,
234 F. Supp. 3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017)

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13

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) .
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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985) .
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3, 18

Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480, Temporary Restraining Order,
2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017)
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13

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Glassroth v. Moore,
335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003)

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. 11-12

Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971) .

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3-4

Hassan v. City of New York,
804 F.3d 277 (2d Cir. 2016) .

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4

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. 10, 14

Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,
857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc),
vacated as moot, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017)

James Madison Project v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:17-cv-00144,
Def. Supp. Mem. (ECF No. 29) (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2017)
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Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) .

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Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967)

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Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984) .

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19

McCreary County v. Amer. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky,
545 U.S. 844 (2005) .
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14

Miller-El v. Dretke,
545 U.S. 231 (2005) .

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3

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) .
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Reynolds v. City of Chicago,
296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002)

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Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290 (2000) .
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Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,
576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015)

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2-3

Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) .

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4

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Tootkaboni v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-10154, Temporary Restraining Order,
2017 WL 386550 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2017)
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13

Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project,
138 S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) .

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14

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20

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United States v. Allen, et al.,
No. 6:16-cr-10141, Criminal Complaint (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2016)

United States v. Perez,
No. 6:17-cr-00035, Superseding Indictment (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2017)
iii

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United States v. Purinton,
No. 2:17-cr-20028, Indictment (D. Kan. June 9, 2017) .

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United States v. Stephens,
421 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2005)

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United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)

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United States v. Yonkers Board of Educ.,
837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987)
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11

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Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-141, Temporary Restraining Order,
2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017),
motion for stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) .
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Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977) .
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EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Executive Order No. 13,769, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into the United States,” 82 FED. REG. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017)
. 12-13
Executive Order No. 13,780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into the United States,” 82 FED. REG. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017)
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13
Executive Proclamation 9,645, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and
Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by
Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,” 82 FED. REG. 45,161
(Sept. 27, 2017) .
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1, 14

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 61st Cong. 383 (1910)
(statement of Rep. John L. Burnett, Alabama)
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158 CONG. REC. S5,106 (daily ed. July 18, 2012)
(statement of Sen. John McCain)
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iv

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6-7

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OTHER AUTHORITIES
Abigail Hauslohner, Anti-Muslim Discrimination on Rise in U.S., Study
Finds, WASHINGTON POST, July 26, 2017, at A-3 .
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16

Albert Samaha & Talal Ansari, Four Mosques Have Burned in Seven
Weeks – Leaving Many Muslims and Advocates Stunned, BuzzfeedNews
(Feb. 28, 2017)
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Anonymous, Fire Destroys Texas Mosque in Early Hours, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2017, at A4
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Anonymous, 2nd Florida Mosque Hit by Arson in Past 6 Months, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 2017, at A6 .
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Audra D. S. Burch, Facing a Void Left by Hate, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2017,
at A1, A12-A13 .
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20

Barbara Perry, Anti-Muslim Violence in the Post-9/11 Era: Motive Forces,
4 HATE CRIMES 172 (Barbara Perry & Randy Blazak, eds. 2009)
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7-8
Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH.
U. J. L. & POL. 71 (2010) .
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Christine Wang, “Trump Website Takes Down Muslim Ban Statement after
Reporter Grills Spicer in Briefing,” CNBC.com (May 8, 2017) .
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Cleve R. Wootson, Sikh Man, 39, Shot in Suspected Hate Crime, WASH.
POST, Mar. 5, 2017, at A-3
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Dalia Lithwick & Jeremy Stahl, Sneak Attack: Trump Is Trying to Secretly
Push Through Another Muslim Ban, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2017)
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Ellen Barry, U.S. and Indian Officials Condemn Shooting of Sikh,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2017, at A-9
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Erik Love, ISLAMOPHOBIA AND RACISM IN AMERICA (2017)

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Jack McDevitt, et al., Consequences for Victims: A Comparison of Bias- and
Non-Bias-Motivated Assaults, 45 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 697 (2001) 23
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Jack Moore, Trump’s Failure to Condemn Minnesota Mosque Attacks Stirs
Social Media Anger, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 17, 2017) .
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Jane Onyanga-Omara, British PM Criticizes Trump’s Travel Ban; Theresa
May Calls Controversial Move “Divisive and Wrong,” USA TODAY,
Feb. 2, 2017, at 5A
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Jeffrey L. Thomas, SCAPEGOATING ISLAM: INTOLERANCE, SECURITY, AND
THE AMERICAN MUSLIM (2015) .
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6, 23-24
Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Battling Bias: How Can We Blunt Prejudice
Against Immigrants?, 350 SCIENCE 687 (May 19, 2017) .
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Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban all Muslim Travel to U.S.,
CNN POLITICS (Dec. 8, 2015) .
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10

Jill Colvin & Steve Peoples, “Trump’s First TV Ad Pushes Proposal to
Ban Muslims from Entering U.S.,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto),
Jan. 5, 2016, at A-9
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10

John Eligon, et al., Drinks at a Bar, Ethnic Insults, then Gunshots,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017, A1, A17 .
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20

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Kurtis Lee, U.S. Muslims on Edge after Bombing; the FBI Is Leading the
Investigation into an Attack that Damaged a Minnesota Mosque, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2017, at A-10
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22
Matt Stevens, Justice Dept. Calls Killing in Kansas a Hate Crime,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2017, at A18 .
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Nick Corasaniti, Minnesota Mosque Shaken by an Early-Morning Blast,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2017, at A-19 .
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N.Y. TIMES, Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech
(April 27, 2016) .
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Peter Gottschalk & Gabriel Greenberg, Common Heritage, Uncommon Fear:
Islamophobia in the United States and British India, 1687-1947, in
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF INTOLERANCE (2013) .
6
vi

Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, Muslim-Western Tensions
Persist (July 21, 2011) .
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Pew Research Center, U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society,
but Continue to Believe in the American Dream (July 26, 2017) .
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Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) .
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Robert J. Allison, THE CRESCENT OBSCURED: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
MUSLIM WORLD 1776-1815 (1995) .
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Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the ‘War of Ideas:’ A Critique of Countering Violent
Extremism Programs, 52 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 255 (2017) .
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8, 9
Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes
about Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483 (2004) .
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5
Sheryll Cashin, To Be Muslim or Muslim-Looking in America: A Comparative
Exploration of Racial and Religious Prejudice in the 21st Century,
2 DUKE FORUM L. & SOC. CHANGE 125 (2010)
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8
Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 371 (1963)
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5

Susan T. Fiske, et al, Policy Forum: Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy
Prisoners, 206 SCIENCE 1482-1483 (Nov. 26, 2004)
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17

Taylor Goldenstein, Blaze Completely Destroys Islamic Center’s Building,
AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan, 8, 2017, at B1
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22
Thomas S. Kidd, “Is It Worse to Follow Mahomet than the Devil?” Early
American Uses of Islam, 72 CHURCH HISTORY 766 (2003)
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6

Thomas S. Kidd, AMERICAN CHRISTIANS AND ISLAM: EVANGELICAL CULTURE
AND MUSLIMS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE AGE OF TERRORISM (2009) 6
Todd H. Green, THE FEAR OF ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMOPHOBIA
IN THE WEST (2015)
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vii

9

Tony Marrero, Mosque Fire Deliberately Set, TAMPA BAY TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2017, at 1.
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U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Victoria Man Charged
with Hate Crime in Burning of Mosque (June 22, 2017) .
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21

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, HATE
CRIME VICTIMIZATION, 2004-2015 (2017) .
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9

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, HATE
CRIMES REPORTED BY VICTIMS AND POLICE (2005) .
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9

viii

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
Advocates for Youth, Center for Reproductive Rights, Chicago Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental
Health Law, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Mississippi Center for
Justice, National Center for Lesbian Rights, National Urban League, People for the
American Way Foundation, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, and Washington
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, are national and regional
civil rights groups interested in the promotion of civil liberties throughout the
country, and the elimination of discrimination in any form.1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In promotion of their interests, amici respectfully submit this brief to
advance a key argument in support of affirming the district court’s ruling. Amici
submit that the balance of equities and public interest weigh heavily in favor of
enjoining President Trump’s September 24, 2017 Executive Order, “Enhancing
Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United
States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats” (the “Executive Order”), as it
1

Amici submit this brief pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2); all parties have
consented to its filing. No counsel for any party participated in the authoring of
this document, in whole or in part; no party or party’s counsel contributed any
money that was intended to fund preparation or submission of the brief; and no
person, other than amici curiae, their members and their counsel, contributed
money that was intended to fund preparation or submission of the brief.
1

improperly promotes social categorization and stereotyping that endangers the
lives and well-being of individuals of the Muslim faith. The Executive Order is the
product of several centuries of Muslim stereotyping in this country, and harms
even those who are not the direct victims of specific attacks on immigrants. Here,
the evidence demonstrates that, regardless of the Government’s post-hoc
explanations, the Executive Order was motivated by animus toward Muslims and
singled out, as a proxy, those born in the targeted majority-Muslim countries.
ARGUMENT
Social Categorization and Stereotyping Creates
Dangerous Conditions for Members of Minority Groups.
A.

Stereotyping Minorities Creates a Climate for Discrimination.

The balance of equities and public interest in this case weigh in favor of
enjoining the Executive Order due to the discrimination it promotes. As the courts
have long recognized, laws such as the Executive Order improperly promote social
categorization and stereotyping of Muslims that lead to the endangerment of the
lives of those who practice Islam, a minority religion.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that discriminatory stereotypes can
improperly affect decision making. Most recently, the Court recognized that
disparate impact liability prevents segregated housing patterns that might otherwise
result from the role of “covert and illicit stereotyping.” Texas Dep’t of Hous. &

2

Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015);
see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 268 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(recognizing that “subtle forms of bias are automatic, unconscious, and
unintentional and escape notice, even the notice of those enacting the bias”).
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court recognized the role that sex
stereotyping plays in discrimination cases, explaining that “stereotyped remarks
can certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in an adverse employment
decision. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
In Windsor, the Supreme Court emphasized that laws whose “purpose and
effect” is “disapproval of” a “class” of people “impose a disadvantage, a separate
status, and so a stigma” on the targeted group. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2693 (2013). The law at issue in that case, the federal Defense of Marriage
Act, targeted same-sex couples for discrimination and stigma, just as the
challenged Executive Order today singles out Muslim individuals for ill-treatment.
Similarly, in Cleburne, the Supreme Court explained that “race, alienage,
and national origin” are “so seldom relevant” to state interests, meaning that “such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in
the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.” City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). In Griggs, the Supreme Court
held that the “absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment

3

procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
The courts in other circuits also recognize that social categorization and
stereotyping create fertile grounds for discrimination, including in housing,
employment decisions, and police actions. See, e.g., Hassan v. City of New York,
804 F.3d 277, 306 (3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting “appeals to ‘common sense’ which
might be infected by stereotypes” as insufficient to justify police surveillance of
Muslim individuals, businesses, and institutions) (quoting Reynolds v. Chicago,
296 F.3d 524, 526 (7th Cir. 2002)); Ahmed v. Johnson, 752 F.3d 490, 503 (1st Cir.
2014) (finding “lack of explicitly discriminatory behaviors” does not preclude a
finding of “unlawful animus” in employment discrimination because “unlawful
discrimination can stem from stereotypes and other types of cognitive biases, as
well as from conscious animus”) (quoting Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183
F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999)); United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 515 (7th Cir.
2005) (recognizing that racial stereotyping continues to play a role in jury selection
and the outcome of trials); Thomas, 183 F.3d at 42 (holding that Title VII’s ban on
“disparate treatment because of race” includes “acts based on conscious racial
animus” and “employer decisions that are based on stereotyped thinking”).
Relevant research shows that a psychological triggering phenomenon known

4

as “priming” exacerbates stereotyping and makes it more extreme. Priming occurs
when “subtle influences . . . increase the ease with which certain information
comes to mind.” Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 69 (2008). In the case of
racial stereotyping, which shares many attributes with stereotyping of Muslims,
priming an individual with race-based stereotypes can influence later decisions by
that individual. Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial
Stereotypes about Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 489 (2004).
Social science research repeatedly demonstrates that individuals have a
persistent tendency to defer blindly to priming from authority figures. See Stanley
Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371,
375-76 (1963). Therefore, as the Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) and Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 8-12 (1967), demonstrate, discrimination with the sanction of law raises
unique and particular dangers.
B.

The Executive Order Is the Product of Centuries of
Discriminatory Stereotypes About Muslims.

This country has had a long history of official stereotyping of Muslims as
un-American and unworthy of becoming Americans. During the Colonial era, two
of the most outspoken public figures who disseminated stereotypes of Muslims
(then known as “Mahometans”) were Cotton Mather and Aaron Burr – they
5

consistently referred to “Mahometans” in highly derogatory terms, including
denouncing “that false Prophet and great Imposter Mahomet.”2
Even after this country became independent, prejudice against Muslims, as
expressed through consistent stereotyping, continued throughout the nineteenth
century and into the twentieth century.3 For example, in discussing immigration
legislation in 1910, Representative Burnett of Alabama repeatedly referred to
“Syrians” – then a catch-all term for Middle Eastern immigrants who were
Muslims – in derogatory terms, and made clear that he and his colleagues viewed
those immigrants as “the dirty Syrian[s] of today,” and among “the least desirable”
aliens, because “the Syrians are the same way, mixed up with the Arabians and the
people of African and western Asiatic countries, until they are not our kind of
people; and they are not the kind of people from which those who settled this

2

Thomas S. Kidd, AMERICAN CHRISTIANS AND ISLAM: EVANGELICAL CULTURE
AND MUSLIMS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE AGE OF TERRORISM 12 (2009);
Thomas S. Kidd, “Is It Worse to Follow Mahomet than the Devil?” Early
American Uses of Islam, 72 CHURCH HISTORY 766, 771-73, 779-80 (2003).
3

See, e.g., Erik Love, ISLAMOPHOBIA AND RACISM IN AMERICA 41, 86-89 (2017);
Jeffrey L. Thomas, SCAPEGOATING ISLAM: INTOLERANCE, SECURITY, AND THE
AMERICAN MUSLIM 1-14 (2015); Peter Gottschalk & Gabriel Greenberg, Common
Heritage, Uncommon Fear: Islamophobia in the United States and British India,
1687-1947, in ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF INTOLERANCE (Carl
W. Ernst ed. 2013); Robert J. Allison, THE CRESCENT OBSCURED: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 1776-1815 (1995).

6

country sprang.”4 As set forth in Section C, infra, these are the same kind of
statements recently made about Muslims.
In this century, the stereotyping of Muslims has continued unabated, leading
to increased discrimination against Muslims, rising to the level of violence. Even
prior to the Executive Orders in 2017, commentators documented and denounced
the ongoing stereotyping of Muslims and the ensuing discrimination and violence.
Professor Perry recognized that “many commentators have suggested that
Arabs generally and Muslims specifically may represent the last ‘legitimate’
subjects of slanderous imagery and stereotypes.” Barbara Perry, Anti-Muslim
Violence in the Post-9/11 Era: Motive Forces, 4 HATE CRIMES 172, 176 (Barbara
Perry & Randy Blazak, eds. 2009). Political leaders have an outsized impact in
fostering this stereotyping and its ensuing discrimination and violence: “Even
more powerful in providing justifications for anti-Muslim violence is the explicit
exploitation of public images and related fears by political leaders. To the extent
that this is so, there emerges a climate that bestows ‘permission to hate.’” Id. at
181. Thus, she concluded that:
[S]tate practices provide a context and a framework for the broader
demonization and marginalization of minority groups. Through its
rhetoric and policies, the state absorbs and reflects back onto the public
4

HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, 61st Cong. 383, 386, 393, 396 (1910) (statement of Rep.
John L. Burnett, Alabama).
7

hostile and negative perceptions of the Other – in this case, Muslims.
Public expressions of racism by state actors are constituted of and by
public sentiments of intolerance, dislike, or suspicion of particular
groups. Thus, the state seems to reaffirm the legitimacy of such
beliefs, while at the same time giving them public voice.
Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
Professor Aziz, who testified to Congress on this issue, wrote, “In the United
States, numerous polls show a rise in anti-Muslim bias that is manifesting into
tangible hate crimes, mosque vandalism, employment discrimination, and bullying
of Muslim kids in schools.” Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the “War of Ideas:” A Critique
of Countering Violent Extremism Programs, 52 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 255, 265 (2017).
Professor Cashin wrote that “Explicit, public anti-Muslim comments do not
appear to engender similar widespread outrage” as do racist remarks, and instead
“appear to be on the rise,” because of the lack of public rejection of such views.
Sheryll Cashin, To Be Muslim or Muslim-Looking in America: A Comparative
Exploration of Racial and Religious Prejudice in the 21st Century, 2 DUKE FORUM
L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 127-28 (2010). “In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, it is more
socially acceptable to express explicit bias against Arabs or Muslims than against
blacks or other racial/ethnic groups.” Id. at 132.
Muslim stereotyping has manifested in the form of violence against
Muslims, or even those who are erroneously perceived as being Muslims (such as
Sikhs). Although the serious under-reporting of such crimes causes the available
8

statistics to understate the actual prevalence of anti-Muslim violence,5 it is welldocumented throughout 2016,6 and continuing into 2017. See Section D.2, infra.
Thus, from Colonial times to the present, this country has had a long and
deliberate political tradition of officially stereotyping Muslims – a history that
created an atmosphere that legitimizes and encourages discrimination and violence
against Muslims.
C.

The Executive Order Is Based on Stereotypes About Muslims as
“Anti-American” and “Terrorists.”

As in the cases cited above, the Muslim ban bears the imprimatur of the
Executive Branch and engenders precisely the type of discriminatory harms that
the Supreme Court has held cannot withstand constitutional muster. Since
December 7, 2015, when then-candidate Donald Trump issued a written statement
calling for a “total and complete shutdown on Muslims entering the United States”
in the wake of the terror attack in San Bernardino, California, a “Muslim ban” has

5

Todd H. Green, THE FEAR OF ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE
WEST 282-84 (2015) (discussing statistics on crimes against Muslims and
problems with underreporting); see generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Special Report, HATE CRIME VICTIMIZATION, 2004-2015 (2017)
(noting problems with underreporting and different methodologies for categorizing
these crimes); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report,
HATE CRIMES REPORTED BY VICTIMS AND POLICE (2005) (same).
6

See, e.g., Aziz, 52 TEXAS INT’L L.J., supra, at 266-68 & nn. 65-80 (collecting
examples from 2015 and 2016 of violence against Muslims).

9

been a major item on his policy agenda.7 At that time, his campaign characterized
a bar on Muslim entry into the United States as a way to stop this country from
being the “victims of the horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad.”8
He did so with no evidence other than extensive stereotyping.
Mr. Trump’s labeling of Muslims as “terrorists” has been relentless. On
January 4, 2016, the Trump campaign premiered its first television advertisement,
in which Trump “call[ed] for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering
the United States” until doubts about “radical Islamic terrorism” can be “figure[d]
out.”9 The link the Presidential candidate drew between “radical Islamic
terrorism” and all individual Muslims entering the United States was stated with no
supporting evidence. Subsequently, candidate Trump, in a major foreign policy
speech on April 27, 2016, stated that “The struggle against radical Islam also takes
place in our homeland. . . . We must stop importing extremism through senseless
7

Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575-76 & n.5 (4th Cir.
2017) (en banc), vacated as moot, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017)); see
also Christine Wang, “Trump Website Takes Down Muslim Ban Statement After
Reporter Grills Spicer in Briefing,” CNBC.COM (May 8, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/08/trump-website-takes-down-muslim-banstatement-after-reporter-grills-spicer-in-briefing.html.
8

Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 575 n.5.

9

Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban all Muslim Travel to United States, CNN
POLITICS (Dec. 8, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trumpmuslim-ban-immigration; see also Jill Colvin and Steve Peoples, “Trump’s First
TV Ad Pushes Proposal to Ban Muslims from Entering U.S.,” The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), Jan. 5, 2016, at A-9.
10

immigration policies.”10 Again, he made these statements, relying entirely on
stereotypes, and presenting no evidence or facts to support these claims.11
As a matter of law, this Court can rely on campaign statements as part of its
analysis of whether the Executive Orders reflect illegal stereotyping and bias
against Muslims. For example, the Second Circuit held that campaign statements
by the successful candidate for Mayor of Yonkers – in which he “promised … to
impose a moratorium on all subsidized housing in Yonkers” – was evidence of the
“intent to preserve the existing racial imbalance” in that city. United States v.
Yonkers Board of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1191, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987). Similarly, the
Eleventh Circuit held that campaign promises by Roy Moore, made while running
for the position of Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, i.e., that he would
install the Ten Commandments monument in the courthouse rotunda, could be
used as evidence of his intent to violate the Establishment Clause. Glassroth v.
Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285-87, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003). More generally, “the
10

N.Y. TIMES, Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech (April 27,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreignpolicy.html.
11

Although President Trump has publicly labeled Muslims as dangerous
“terrorists,” he has failed to condemn the hate crimes perpetuated against them
over the past year. See, e.g., Jack Moore, Trump’s Failure to Condemn Minnesota
Mosque Attacks Stirs Social Media Anger, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 17, 2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/trump-failure-condemn-minnesota-mosque-attackstirs-social-media-anger-647694 (President Trump’s silence following a January
2017 shooting at a Quebec mosque, June 2017 attacks in Virginia and London, and
an August 2017 bomb attack at a mosque in Minnesota).
11

historical background of the decision [to discriminate] is one evidentiary source,
particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.”
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
267 (1977) (citations omitted). Here, as in Yonkers, Glassroth, and Village of
Arlington Heights, evidence of candidate-Trump’s campaign statements and
campaign promises is probative evidence of the intent to discriminate against
Muslims – an intent that was implemented just one week after the Inauguration,
when he issued the first of a series of Executive Orders that all shared the same
goals: to fulfill his campaign pledge.
On January 27, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13,769,
entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States.” 82 FED. REG. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017). Among other immigration restrictions,
Executive Order 13,769 temporarily banned all nationals from seven majorityMuslim countries from entering the United States: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan,
Yemen, Libya, and Somalia.
While many surrogates of the current Administration pushed back at the
characterization of E.O. 13,769 as a “Muslim ban,” the President embraced it. He
told the public via Twitter, “[c]all it what you want, [E.O. 13,769] is about keeping

12

bad people (with bad intentions) out of country!”12 Throughout his campaign, and
now in office, President Trump has consistently labeled Muslims as “bad people”
who must be kept out of America in the interest of national security.
After multiple lower courts enjoined enforcement of E.O. 13,769,13 the
Trump Administration announced plans to revise the order. On March 6, 2017, the
Administration issued Executive Order 13,780, “Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” 82 FED. REG. 13,209 (Mar. 9,
2017). The revised Executive Order preserved several core provisions of the prior
Order: it suspended the United States Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days,
and it suspended the entry into the United States of nationals of six of the seven
majority-Muslim countries designated in E.O. 13,769 for 90 days. See E.O.
13,780, §§ 6(a); 2(c). As did E.O. 13,769, the redrafted Order targeted only
majority-Muslim countries, as proxies for all Muslims. This Court upheld the
12

Jane Onyanga-Omara, British PM Criticizes Trump’s Travel Ban; Theresa May
Calls Controversial Move “Divisive and Wrong,” USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2017, at
5A. The Department of Justice recently informed a district court that Trump’s
tweets (Twitter postings) are “official statements of the President of the United
States,” since “a tweet can be the equivalent of a public statement or speech.”
James Madison Project v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:17-cv-00144, Def. Supp. Mem.,
at 2, 5-6 & n.4 (ECF No. 29) (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2017).
13

Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-141, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL
462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), motion for stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th
Cir. 2017); Tootkaboni v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-10154, Temporary Restraining
Order, 2017 WL 386550 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2017); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17cv-480, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017);
Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017) (preliminary injunction).
13

district court’s decision enjoining the second Executive Order. Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). The
Supreme Court vacated this Court’s decision as moot in light of the expiration of
the second Executive Order. Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project,
138 S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017).
President Trump then issued the third iteration of the Executive Order on
September 24, 2017. See 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017). Although that
order purported to expand its scope into non-Muslim countries by including North
Korea and Venezuela, this country has hardly any visitors from North Korea, and
the order as to Venezuela was limited to certain high-level officials. Id.
The third version of the Executive Order continues to target Muslims. The
district court correctly found that “the inclusion of two non-majority Muslim
nations, North Korea and Venezuela, does not persuasively show a lack of
religious purpose behind the Proclamation,” requiring the court to “assess whether,
as has occurred in other Establishment Clause cases, the insertion of these
countries was ‘a litigating position’ rather than an earnest effort to ‘cast off’ the
prior ‘unmistakable’ objective.” See JA 1066 (quoting McCreary County v. Amer.
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 871-72 (2005)).14 The district
court thus granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction as to this third
14

The district court’s opinion is reported at 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17,
2017).
14

iteration of the travel ban. See JA 993-1083. The district court reviewed the
record of Trump’s campaign statements, see JA 1059, and the statements that he
made after taking office, see JA 1060, 1062, JA 1067, JA 1073-1074, to conclude
that the “primary purpose” of the travel ban was “the desire to impose a Muslim
ban.” See JA 1075.
Thus, “approximately 80 percent of all the Muslim refugees who resettled in
the United States over the past two years were from the [nine] targeted countries.
Perhaps more tellingly, of the refugees who came to the U.S. over the last two
years from all of the other countries . . . approximately 70 percent were Christian
and just 16 percent were Muslim.”15
The government’s intent to ban Muslims will exacerbate widespread
discrimination that Muslims already face. The official action of marking a group,
Muslims, as a dangerous “fifth column,” drives societal biases against them and
creates conditions where violence against them is seen as more acceptable because
they are perceived, in President Trump’s words, to be “bad people.”
In 2011, the Pew Research Center surveyed Western cultures to determine
which characteristics Western populations associate with people in the Muslim

15

Dalia Lithwick & Jeremy Stahl, Sneak Attack: Trump Is Trying to Secretly Push
Through Another Muslim Ban, SLATE, JURISPRUDENCE (Nov. 10, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/11/trump_is_t
rying_to_secretly_sneak_through_another_muslim_ban.html.

15

world. That survey found that about half of the respondents characterized Muslims
as “violent,” and more than half characterized Muslims as “fanatical.”16
Thus, it is no surprise that the Pew Research Center’s 2017 survey of
Muslims in this country found that discrimination against them was increasing, and
that they are even more concerned in light of the President’s Executive Orders.17
In a recent news analysis discussing ongoing social science research relating
to stereotyping against the most recent Muslim immigrants in this country and
Canada, Science magazine recognized that “Prejudice of course can be directed
against any group by any other. But immigrants, and even more so refugees and
asylum seekers, may be especially vulnerable because of their tenuous place in a
larger society.” Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Battling Bias: How Can We Blunt
Prejudice Against Immigrants?, 350 SCIENCE 687, 688 (May 19, 2017). This
applies with even greater force to child immigrants and refugees, who are even
more vulnerable than their parents. (The recent escalation of deportation orders
similarly harms child immigrants and refugees.)

16

Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, Muslim-Western Tensions
Persist (July 21, 2011), http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/21/muslim-westerntensions-persist/#.
17

Pew Research Center, U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society,
but Continue to Believe in the American Dream (July 26, 2017)
http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-centers-2017survey-of-us-muslims/; see also Abigail Hauslohner, Anti-Muslim Discrimination
on Rise in U.S., Study Finds, WASHINGTON POST, July 26, 2017, at A-3.
16

Recent social science research demonstrates both the already-existing
climate of prejudice against Muslims and Arabs and the unconscious nature of that
bias. “Non-Arab and non-Muslim test takers manifested strong implicit bias
against Muslims. These results are in sharp contrast to self-reported attitudes.”
Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U. J.
L. & POL. 71, 93 (2010). A “sample of U.S. citizens on average viewed Muslims
and Arabs as not sharing their interests and stereotyped them as not especially
sincere, honest, friendly, or warm.” Susan T. Fiske, et al., Policy Forum: Why
Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prisoners, 206 SCIENCE 1482-83 (Nov. 26, 2004).
D.

Government Legitimization of Muslim Stereotypes Has
Encouraged Violence Against Muslims, and Inhibited Millions of
Muslims in the Practice of Their Religion.

There can be no doubt that, given its origin and history, the Executive Order
is based on the social categorization of Muslims as “anti-American,” “terrorists,”
those with “hatred for Americans,” and “bad people.” In this case, President
Trump’s repeated, unsubstantiated claims that Muslims are dangerous, and should
be barred from entering the country, are just the “cue” needed to release otherwise
suppressed and legally prohibited violence against Muslims. The President’s
deliberate stereotyping of Muslims as “dangerous” and “terrorists” and his ban on
the immigration of Muslims, place an official “imprimatur” on those stereotypes,
magnifying their effect.

17

The Supreme Court, in Cleburne, held that a city council’s insistence that a
group home for individuals with intellectual disabilities obtain a special-use permit
to operate was premised on unsubstantiated “negative attitudes or fears” of nearby
property owners, which were impermissible bases for disparate treatment. City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). Although “‘[p]rivate
biases may be outside the reach of the law . . . the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.’” Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984)). Here, too, the law cannot give effect to private biases against Muslims.
1.

Government Stereotyping Leads to Violence and Discrimination.

When someone in a position of authority, as President Trump, categorizes
Muslims as dangerous and terrorists, he communicates that they are “outsiders”
and not full members of the political community. By way of comparison, the
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a school-sponsored religious message,
delivered over the school’s public address system, by a speaker representing the
student body, under the supervision of the faculty, and pursuant to a school policy.
Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000). The Supreme
Court’s reasoning was based on its view that the school policy created two classes
of people—those who adhered to the favored religion, and those who did not. Id.
The President’s steadfast support of what he calls a “Muslim ban” similarly
sends the message that those who adhere to Islam are not part of American society,

18

as opposed to Christians and other non-Muslims, who are favored by the ban. In
doing so, he “sends a message to non-adherents [to the Christian faith] that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J.
concurring); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“When
homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination in
both the public and in the private spheres.”). The Executive Order and the
President’s statements characterize Muslims as homogenous and a national threat
and thereby engender a climate conducive to violence against Muslims.
2.

The President’s Statements Have Encouraged Violence.

This Administration tolerated, if not encouraged, crimes against Muslims,
through its determination to implement the travel ban affecting them – in effect
telling all Muslims (whether born here or abroad) – that they do not belong here.
Starting in February 2016, only two months after then-candidate Trump’s
December 7, 2015 and January 4, 2016 statements (supra), three nationalists in
Kansas (the “Crusaders,” a militia group) engaged in a conspiracy to use weapons
of mass destruction “to carry out a violent attack against Muslims in their
community” through “destroy[ing] an apartment complex in Garden City, Kansas,

19

which contains a mosque and is home to many Muslims.”18 They openly discussed
going to apartment buildings known to house refugees to “start kicking in the doors
of the Somali apartments, and kill them one by one,” and then expanded their
target to include “city/county commission meetings, local public officials,
landlords who rent property to Muslim refugees, and organizations providing
assistance to Muslim refugees,” since “the only good Muslim is a dead Muslim.”19
The February 22, 2017 shooting of Srinivas Kuchibhotla, Alok Madasani,
and Ian Grillot in Olathe, Kansas is the most horrifying example of the social
categorization of Muslims as enemies of the American people.20 Kuchibhotla and
Madasani, two engineers at a local technology company, and both Indian
immigrants, had gathered with co-workers at a bar near their office to watch a local
college basketball game. Also at that bar was Adam Purinton, who mistook both
Kuchibhotla and Madasani as Iranians (which is one of the nationalities targeted by
the Executive Order and its predecessor as barred from entry into the United
18

United States v. Allen, et al., No. 6:16-cr-10141, Criminal Complaint, at ¶¶ 2, 9
(ECF No. 1) (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2016); see also Second Superseding Indictment
(ECF No. 89) (D. Kan. Mar. 16, 2017).

19

United States v. Allen, et al., No. 6:16-cr-10141, Criminal Complaint, at ¶¶ 13,
19 (ECF No. 1) (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2016).
20

Audra D. S. Burch, Facing a Void Left by Hate, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2017, at A1,
A12-A13; Matt Stevens, Justice Dept. Calls Killing in Kansas a Hate Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2017, at A18; John Eligon, et al., Drinks at a Bar, Ethnic Insults,
then Gunshots, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017, A1, A17; see also United States v.
Purinton, No. 2:17-cr-20028, Indictment (D. Kan. June 9, 2017).
20

States). Purinton approached and shot at Kuchibhotla and Madasani, telling them
to “get out of our country!” Kuchibhotla was killed, and Madasani was wounded.
Ian Grillot, a patrolman present at the scene, was wounded while attempting to
intervene. Purinton fled across the state border into Missouri and told a bartender
in a second bar that he needed to hide out because he had just shot two “Iranians.”
Putting aside Purinton’s stereotyped view that his victims were Iranians simply
because they were foreign-born immigrants, his actions demonstrate the danger
that social categorization can cause by exaggerating both the distance between ingroups (“real Americans”) and out-groups (“Iranians”), as well the homogeneity of
the out-group. The Administration’s travel ban against Muslims does just that.
In addition, a rash of arsons and vandalism at mosques has occurred
following the issuance of E.O. 13,769. On January 28, 2017, one day after the first
Order, a fire destroyed the Islamic Center of Victoria, Texas.21 On February 24,
2017, a blaze broke out at the Daarus Salaam Mosque near Tampa, Florida.22

21

U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Victoria Man Charged with
Hate Crime in Burning of Mosque (June 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usaosdtx/pr/victoria-man-charged-hate-crime-burning-mosque; Anonymous, Fire
Destroys Texas Mosque in Early Hours, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2017, at A4; see also
United States v. Perez, No. 6:17-cr-00035, Superseding Indictment (S.D. Tex. June
22, 2017).
22

Tony Marrero, Mosque Fire Deliberately Set, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017,
at 1; Anonymous, 2nd Florida Mosque Hit by Arson in Past 6 Months, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 2017, at A6.

21

Combined with two arsons of mosques shortly before President Trump’s
inauguration, the United States has seen an unprecedented surge of hate crimes
against the Muslim community.23
Other recent attacks on mosques in the United States include an explosion at
a mosque in Bloomington, Minnesota in August 2017.24
On March 3, 2017, a Sikh man was shot in his Kent, Washington driveway
when a man approached him and said “go back to your own country.”25
It is undeniable that the public interest in this country is best served by
tolerance of different religions as the Constitution requires, and tolerance of both
foreign-born and American-born adherents of different religions. The public
interest is not served by discriminatory stereotyping against Muslims that
legitimizes or encourages discrimination and violence in our country, or by a law
which gives effect to private biases.
23

Albert Samaha & Talal Ansari, Four Mosques Have Burned in Seven Weeks –
Leaving Many Muslims and Advocates Stunned, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertsamaha/four-mosques-burn-as-2017-begins;
Taylor Goldenstein, Blaze Completely Destroys Islamic Center’s Building, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan. 8, 2017, at B1.
24

Nick Corasaniti, Minnesota Mosque Shaken by an Early-Morning Blast, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2017, at A-19; Kurtis Lee, U.S. Muslims on Edge after Bombing;
the FBI Is Leading the Investigation into an Attack that Damaged a Minnesota
Mosque, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2017, at A-10.
25

Ellen Barry, U.S. and Indian Officials Condemn Shooting of Sikh, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2017, at A-9; Cleve R. Wootson, Sikh Man, 39, Shot in Suspected Hate
Crime, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2017, at A-3.
22

The insidious effect of the Muslim ban does not impact only those persons
seeking to enter the United States from the seven designated countries. Instead, by
promoting social stereotypes and priming individuals to act on those stereotypes,
the ban creates fertile grounds for violence against all minorities. The Executive
Order fundamentally threatens the American ideal of a diverse society working
across divisions for the greater societal good.
3.

Stereotyping and Discrimination Harms All Americans, Not Just
Those Directly Affected by Specific Acts.

Social science research has consistently demonstrated that stereotyping of
any group harms all individuals in that group, even those who are not directly
affected by specific acts of violence or discrimination. For example, Professor
McDevitt and several other researchers recognized that:
Because bias crimes have the unique impact of reaching far beyond
the primary victim, due to the dimension of victim interchangeability,
every member of the minority group who is aware of the crime is
affected by a solitary crime against one individual minority member.
Jack McDevitt, et al., Consequences for Victims: A Comparison of Bias- and NonBias-Motivated Assaults, 45 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 697, 712 (2001).
Similarly, violent crimes on the basis of religious stereotypes, i.e., against
Muslims, have the same broader impact as do terrorist crimes:
Nonetheless, terrorism and violent hate crimes . . . have at least one
basic characteristic in common: the violence inflicted on the victims is

23

also aimed at a larger community. . . . hate crimes directly target
individual members of a social group but indirectly send a message of
intolerance to the entire group. The victims of hate crimes are
selected because of their symbolic value as representatives of the
entire social group.
Jeffrey Thomas, SCAPEGOATING ISLAM: INTOLERANCE, SECURITY, AND THE
AMERICAN MUSLIM 137 (2015).
Senator John McCain recently recognized this fundamental principle when
he criticized several fellow members of Congress who had made ad hominem
attacks on a former government official due to that person’s Muslim heritage:
When anyone—not least a member of Congress—launches specious and
degrading attacks against fellow Americans on the basis of nothing more
than fear of who they are and ignorance of what they stand for, it
defames the spirit of our Nation, and we all grow poorer because of it.
158 CONG. REC. S5106 (daily ed. July 18, 2012) (statement of Sen. John McCain).
Here, too, the latest Executive Order and the underlying statements by the
President have only encouraged stereotyping of Muslims, which has adversely
affected all Muslims, young and old, natives and recent immigrants, and has
harmed our society as a whole.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in the briefs of the Appellees,
amici curiae respectfully request that this Court affirm the district court’s ruling
and uphold the preliminary injunction.
24

Respectfully submitted on November 17, 2017,

/s/ Lynne Bernabei
_________________________
Lynne Bernabei
Alan R. Kabat
Bernabei & Kabat, PLLC
1400 – 16th Street N.W., Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20036-2223
[phone]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Counsel for Amici Curiae

25

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it uses
a proportionally spaced typeface (Times New Roman) in 14-point. It was prepared
using Microsoft Word. It complies with the type-volume limits of Fed. R. App. P.
29(a)(5) because it contains 5,888 words, which is less than half of the 13,000
words allowed for principal briefs under Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(i).

/s/ Alan R. Kabat
Alan R. Kabat

26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on November 17, 2017, I electronically filed the
foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.
Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be
accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

/s/ Alan R. Kabat
Alan R. Kabat

27

________________________________

UNITED SLATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
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party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus ease.
Corporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are
required to file disclosure statements.
f counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
No.

1 7-2231L

Caption: lnternaUonaiRefugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.

-

Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 261,
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

(name of partv/arnicus)

makes the following disclosure:
Amicus Curiae
who is
(appel lant/appellee/petitioner/respondent!arni cus/intervenor)
,

E YES NO

1.

[s party/arnicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity?

2.

YES NO
Does party/amieus have any parent corporations?
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:

3.

is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or
NO
YES
other publicly held entity’?
all such owners:
If yes, identify

D

09129/2016SCC

-1

-

__

4.

5.

6.

s there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))? EYESNO
If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:

DYES D NO
Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)
yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could he affected
If
sul,stantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?
If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:

--

/

-‘

-

Signature:

----.

.

/

z-i

/

i.
)‘—-

--S

//

/

7

_,_/___‘_/__

EYESNO

/

/

/
/

/

Date: f\J

Counsel Ihr: National Assn. Adv. Colored People

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
**************************

I_Th the foregoing document was seed on all parties or their
I certify that on
counsel of record through the CM!ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

/V

ft.
(signature)
-2-

/‘
(date)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTIl CIRCUIT
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS
Disclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus
case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent
party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate defendarns in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are
required to file disclosure statements.
If counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
No.

17-2231 L

Caption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.

Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,
Advocates for Youth
(name of party/amicus)

Amicus Curiae
who is
makes the following disclosure:
(appellantlappellee/petitioner/respondentJamicus/intervenor)
,

I.

Is party/arnicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? JYESZ1NO

2.

Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?
YES L2INO
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:

3.

Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or
other publicly held entity?
EYESENO
If yes, identify all such owners:

L1

09/29/2016 SCC

-

1

-

________________________________________

_______

4.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26. l(a)(2)(B))? EYES El NO
If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:

5.

Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)
DYES E NO
If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

6.

Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?
If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:

Signature:

EYES El NO

Date:

Counsel for: Advocates for Youth

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
** *** * ** * **** * * * *****

I

I certify that on
the foregoing document was seed on all parties or their
counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

1
(signature)

(date)
-2-

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTI-IER INTERESTS
Disclosures must be filed on behalf’ of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus
case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent
party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case, In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all pat’tes to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amid curiae are
required to file disclosure statements.
If counsel is not a registered BCE filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
No.

17-2231_L

Caption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.

Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,
Center for Reproductive Rights
(name of party/a11ic1Is)

Amicus Curiae
who is
makes the following disclosure:
(appellant/a ppel lee/petitioner/respondent/am icus/intervenor)
,

I.

Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity’?

YES NO

2.

YES NO
Does party/arnicus have any parent corporations?
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:

3.

Is I O% or more of the stock of a partv/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or
YESNO
other 1blicly held entity’?
If yes, identify all such owners:

D

09/29/2016 SCC

-

I

-

_______________________________

4.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
flnancial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? EYESNO
If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:

5.

DYES D i’O
Is patty a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)
If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

6.

Does this case arise out of a bankruplcy proceeding’?
If yes, identily any trustee and the members olany creditors’ committee:

Date:

Signature:

Dys NO

( (“

1

Counsel for: Center for Reproductive Rights

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
ithe foregoing document was served on all parties or their
I certify that on
counsel of record through the CM/ECF system i F they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

(date)

(signature)
-2-

______

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS
Disclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus
case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent
party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are
required to file disclosure statements.
If counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
No.

17-2231L

Caption:

teLflahOnaI Refugee Assistance Project et aL

V.

Trump et al.

Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,
Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
(name of party/arnicus)

Amicus Curiae
makes the following disclosure:
who is
dent/amicus/intervenor)
(appel lan t/appel lee/peti tioner/respon
.

YES NO

I.

Is party/am icus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity?

2.

YES NO
Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?
including all generations of parent corporations:
If yes, identify all parent corporations,

3.

Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or
DYESNO
other publicly held entity?
If yes, identify all such owners:

D

09’29/20t6 SC’C

-

I

-

4.

5.

6.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
NO
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1 (a)(2)(B))? DYES
of interest:
If yes, identify entity and nature

DYES D NO
Is party a trade association? (arnici curiae do not complete this question)
whose stock or equity value could he affected
If yes. identify any publicly held member
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

DYESNO

Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?
If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:

Date:

N-

Signature:

-

Counsel for: Chicago Lawyers Comm. for Civil

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
the foregoing document was served on all parties or their
I certify that on
by
counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not,
listed below:
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses

li2.

((JL
(date)

(signature)
-2-

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS
Disclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus
case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent
party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are
required to file disclosure statements.
If counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
No.

17-2231 L

Caption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.

Pursuant to FRAP 26. 1 and Local Rule 26.1,
Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law

(name of party/amicus)

Amicus Curiae
makes the following disclosure:
who is
(appellantlappellee/petitioner/respondentlarnicus/intervenor)
,

1.

Is party/ainicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity?

2.

YES NO
Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:

3.

Is lO% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or
other publicly held entity?
EYESENO
If yes, identify all such owners:

09/29/20 16 SCC

-

1

-

YES ENO

4.

5.

6.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))? flYESNO
If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:

EYES E NO
Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)
If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?
If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:

IYES1J NO

Date:________

Signature:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2.OL the foregoing document was served on all parties or their
I certify that on f\)1l/4
counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

11 /i/(date)

(signature)
-2-

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS
Disclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus
case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent
party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are
required to file disclosure statements.
If counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
No.

17-2231 L

Caption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.

Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1.
Lambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund

(name of party/arnicus)

Amicus Curiae
who is
makes the following disclosure:
(appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/am icus/intervenor)

I.

Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity?

2.

YES NO
Does party/am icus have any parent corporations?
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:

3.

Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or
other publicly held entity?
DYESNO
If yes, identify all such owners:

09/29/2016 SCC

-

1

-

YES NO

___________________________________

__________

4.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(a)(2)(B))? DYESNO
If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:

5.

EYES
NO
Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)
If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

6.

Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?
If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:

D

-,

EYES

NO

-

—

Signature:

-U---—

Date: 11.14.17

Counsel for: Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fun

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
**************************

‘,

the foregoing document was served on all parties or their
I ceify that on
counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

“/i /i
(date)

(signature)
-2-

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TI-IL FOURTH CIRCUIT
DISCLOSt RE OF CORPORAIE AI:I:ILIATIONS AN!) Oll-IER INTERESTS
Disclosures must be Ii led on behalF of uil puties to a civil. agency, bankruptcy or mandamus
case. except that a disclosure statement is tint required l’roni the U nited States, From an indicent
party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising From a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate de lendanis in a criminal or post—conviction case and corporate amici curiae are
required to tile disclosure statements.

I F counsel is not a registered ECF Ii Icr and clues not intend to tile documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may tile the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic Form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
No.

17-2231 L

Caption:

nternational Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.

Pursuant to FRAP 2(. 1 and I .ocal Ru Ic 26. I
Mississippi Center for Justice
(name of party/an icus)

Arnicus Curiae
who is
makes the fo I lo\\ rig disc losure:
(appel lant/appel lee/petitioner/respondent/am elK! intervenor)

I.

Is partv/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity’?

2.

Does party/au icus have any parent corporations?
YES NO
I’ yes. identify all parent corporations. includinu all genel’at ions ol’ parent corporations:

3.

Is 10% or more ot the stock ol’ a parR/am ens owned by a publicly held corporation or
other publicly held entity’?
YES
NO
yes. identi ‘v all such owners:
If

YES NO

D

09/2W2Oh5sQd

-

I

-

________________

4.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.I(a)(2)(B))? YESNO
If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:

5.

Is party a trade association? (amid curiae do not complete this question)
NO
EYES
If yes, identify any publicLy held member whose stock or equity value could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

6.

Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?
If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:

Signature:’-7

,?2Q_Jf

IYESEINO

Date:

Counsel for: Mississippi Center for Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on ‘1/ 1I D)9 the foregoing document was served on all parties or their
counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

-2-

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS
Disclosures must be flied on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus
case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent
party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate defendants in a criminal or
required to file disclosure statements.

post-conviction

case

and corporate amid curiae are

If counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information,
No,

17-2231 L

Caption: International Refugee Assistance Project et aT. v. Trump et al.

Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,
National Center for Lesbian Rights

(name of party/am icus)

Amicus Curiae
makes the following disclosure:
who is
(appel lant/appel lee/petitioner/respondent/am icus/intervenor)
,

YESNO

I.

Is party/arnicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity?

2.

YES ENO
Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?
of parent corporations:
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations

3.

Is 10% 01’ more of the stock of a pai’ty/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or
DYESNO
other publicly held entity?
If yes, identify all such owners:

09129/2OI6SCC

-

I

-

_

4.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))? DYESNO
If yes, identify entity and natLire of interest:

5.

Is party a trade association? (amid curiae do not complete this question)
DYES D NO
If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

6.

Does this ease arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?
If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:

Signature:

—__________________

__________

Date:

DYES NO

November 15, 2017

Counsel for: National Center for Lesbian Rights

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A).

*** ****** * * ** * ****

1) the foregoing document was seied on all parties or their
I certify that on
counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

ii/,
(signature)

(date)
-2-

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTI-I CIRCUIT
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS
Disclosures must be filed on behalf of
parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus
case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent
party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are
required to file disclosure statements.
If counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
No.

17-223 1 L

Caption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.

Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,
National Urban League
(name of party/amicus)

Amicus Curiae
who is
makes the following disclosure:
(appel lant/appel lee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)
,

1.

Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? EYES 1NO

2.

Does party/arnicus have any parent corporations?
E YES 1NO
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:

3.

Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or
other publicly held entity?
EYESNO
If yes, identify all such owners:

O9/29J2O13SCC

-

1

-

________________________

4.

5.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publ clv held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litication (Local Rule 26,! (a)(2)(B))? DYES
NO
If yes, identify entity and nature of’ interest:

curiae do not complete this question)
DYES D
member whose stock or equity value could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity. or state that there is no such member:
Is party a trade association? (amici

yes. identify any publicly

If

6.

Does this
If

yes.

case arise

identify any

out of a bankruptcy proceeding?
trustee and the members of’ any creditors’ committee:

a /

)

Signature:

-

-

Counsel

DYES NO

/7

Date:

for: National Urban League

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
the for:g:ing document was served on all parties or their
I certify that on
counsel of record through the CM!ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not. by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

t7A,J2.
(signature)

NO

held

OJO

It /R /L
(date)

1Th4ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER TNTERESTS
parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy’ or mandamus
Disclosures must be filed on behalf of
case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent
party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are
required to file disclosure statements.
If counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
No.

17-2231L

Caption: lnLernationaRefugee Assistance Project et al.

V.

Trump etal.

Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,
People For the American Way Foundation
(name of party!arnicus)

Arnicus Cuhae
makes the following disclosure:
who is
(appel lantlappel lee/petitioner/respondent/amicus!intervenor)
.

I.

Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? DYESNO

2.

YES NO
Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:

3.

Is 10% or more of the stock of a pai’ty/arnicus owned by a publicly held corporation or
flYESNO
other publicly held entity’?
If yes, identify all such owners:

fl

09/29/2016 SCC

-

1

-

_

__

_

4.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))?YESNO
If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:

5.

NO
EYES
Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)
If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

6.

Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?
If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:

YESNO

//

.7
Signature:

....

Date:

/‘

//

/

Counsel for: P&ple For the American Way Fdn

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

N.

** * ** **** *** ** * * *** ** * ** *

i
foregoing document was seed on all parties or their
I certify that on
counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

.--t/
(signature)
-25

///
(date)

______________________________

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER iNTERESTS
Disclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus
case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent
party, or from a state or local govermnent in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are
required to file disclosure statements.
If counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
No.

17-2231L

Caption: International Refugee Asstance Projectetal. v. Trumpetal.

Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,
Southern Coalition for Social Justice
(name of party/amicus)

Amicus Curiae
who is
makes the following disclosure:
(appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)
,

1.

Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity?

2.

Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?
YES NO
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:

3.

Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or
other publicly held entity?
YES
NO
If yes, identify all such owners:

09129/2OI6SCC

-1

-

YES NO

4.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))? EYES NO
If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:

5.

Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)
ZYES
NO
If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

6.

Does this case arise out of a banlcruptcy proceeding?
If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:

E

Siamre:

jt1

Date:

YESI2]NO

/

H I/i

Counsel for: Southern Coalition for Social Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Mv1

**************************

I certify that on
aZi.-the foregoing document was served on all parties or their
counsel of record through the CM/BCF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

u /i /L

•

—

(signature)

(date)

-

-2-

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS
Disclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or mandamus
case, except that a disclosure statement is not required from the United States, from an indigent
party, or from a state or local government in a pro se case. In mandamus cases arising from a
civil or bankruptcy action, all parties to the action in the district court are considered parties to
the mandamus case.
Corporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici curiae are
required to file disclosure statements.
If counsel is not a registered ECF filer and does not intend to file documents other than the
required disclosure statement, counsel may file the disclosure statement in paper rather than
electronic form. Counsel has a continuing duty to update this information.
No.

17-2231 L

Caption: International Refugee Assistance Project et al. v. Trump et al.

Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1,
Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs
(name of party/amicus)
Washington Lawyers

Amicus Curiae
who is
makes the following disclosure:
(appellantlappellee/petitioner/respondentlamicus/intervenor)
,

fl YES NO

1.

Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity?

2.

Does party/amicus have any parent corporations?
YES NO
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations:

3.

Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or
other publicly held entity?
YES
NO
If yes, identify all such owners:

09/29/2016

SCC

-

1

-

4.

Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.l(a)(2)(B))? EYESNO
If yes, identify entity and nature of interest:

5.

Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)
EYES
NO
If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member:

6.

Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?
If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:

E

Signature:

Date:

EYEs1 NO

//

‘

/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A)g)/1

1)12).. the foregoing document was served on all parties or their
I
I certify that on
counsel of record through the CMIECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:

LI /i/

MlatQ t1o2
(signature)

(date)
-2-