Rodney Williams v. Carolyn Colvin

Filing

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [13-31111 Affirmed ] Judge: PEH , Judge: EHJ , Judge: ECP. Mandate pull date is 09/05/2014 [13-31111]

Case: 13-31111

Document: 00512698904

Page: 1

Date Filed: 07/15/2014

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

No. 13-31111

FILED
July 15, 2014
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

RODNEY WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:12-CV-1259
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Petitioner-Appellant Rodney Williams appeals the Social Security
Administration’s denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income
benefits and disability insurance benefits. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation granting the Commissioner’s
motion for summary judgment and thereby affirming the denial of disability
benefits. Williams timely appealed. We AFFIRM.

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
*

Case: 13-31111

Document: 00512698904

Page: 2

Date Filed: 07/15/2014

No. 13-31111
I
A
In early March 2010, Rodney Williams suffered a heart attack. Soon
thereafter, on March 11, 2010, he filed his third application 1 for Supplemental
Security Income and disability insurance benefits, alleging three “severe
impairments”: (i) status post cardiac stent placement, (ii) status post right
popliteal artery percutaneous arthrectomy, and (iii) depression. 2 In support of
his application, Williams offered medical records from his cardiologist, as well
as recent psychiatric evaluations. Record evidence of Williams’ psychiatric
history included: a 2008 report from Sandra Durdin, a psychologist, a 2010
report from Richard Burns, Williams’ treating psychiatrist, and two
subsequent progress notes from Burns.
In her 2008 report, Durdin’s examination findings included: that
Williams had a normal mood and was alert; that he was oriented in all spheres;
and, that he had adequate memory, cognitive skills, logical thought content,
and good concentration. 3 Durdin also noted that Williams was capable of
understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple and detailed
instructions; he could maintain focus on simple, repetitive tasks for two hours
at a time. 4 But, Durdin opined that it would be impossible to diagnose a mood
disorder until his substance abuse was addressed.
Several months after his heart attack, Burns performed a psychiatric
evaluation of Williams. Using a check-box form, Burns opined that Williams

His second application—alleging disability due to bipolar disorder, paranoid
schizophrenia, and depression since January 7, 2005—was denied two weeks prior to his
alleged disability onset date of March 6, 2010.
2 Williams does not appeal the ALJ’s determinations regarding disability related to
the cardiac stent placement or the popliteal artery percutaneous athrectomy.
3 R. 399–400.
4 R. 400.
1

2

Case: 13-31111

Document: 00512698904

Page: 3

Date Filed: 07/15/2014

No. 13-31111
suffered from multiple symptoms including: a major, recurrent depressive
disorder that was severe, and accompanied by psychotic features rendering
Williams with a substantial loss of ability to perform functions commensurate
with the functions of unskilled work. 5 But in subsequent progress reports,
Burns stated that Williams was “doing much better” and that he was in a “good
mood” with only “mild” depressive symptoms and no psychosis. 6
B
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) ALJ denied Williams
application for benefits.

The SSA has established a five-step sequential

evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is eligible for benefits: 7
i.

The claimant must not be engaged in substantial gainful work
activity (“SGA”), which is activity that involves physical or
mental activities and typically is performed for pay or profit; 8

ii.

The impairment must be “severe,” meaning that it significantly
limits an individual’s ability to perform basic work activities. 9

iii.

The claimant’s impairment or impairments must meet or equal
a medically equivalent impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appx. 1; 10

iv.

The claimant must not have the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform the requirements of past relevant work; 11

v.

Once the claimant carries his burden in steps (i)-(iv), the SSA
must establish that other SGA exists in the national economy
that the claimant would be able to perform. If the defendant
satisfies this requirement, then the burden returns to the

R. 643–44.
R. 793.
7 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a).
8 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b); 20 C.F.R. §
416.972(a).
9 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
10 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
11 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f).
5
6

3

Case: 13-31111

Document: 00512698904

Page: 4

Date Filed: 07/15/2014

No. 13-31111
claimant to prove that he does not have the requisite RFC to
perform other work in the national economy. 12
As we have explained, “[a]t steps one through four, the burden of proof rests
upon the claimant to show he is disabled.” 13 If the claimant carries his burden,
“at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is other
gainful employment the claimant is capable of performing in spite of his
existing impairments.” 14 Proceeding through this five-step analysis, the ALJ
first found that Williams was not engaged in SGA. Second, the ALJ found that
Williams was severely impaired under the Act because his impairments
significantly limited his ability to perform basic work activities. Third, the
ALJ found that Williams did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments medically equivalent to one of the listed impairments in the
relevant regulations. Finally, the ALJ found that Williams was unable to
perform requirements of past relevant work, but held that the SSA had
established that Williams was capable of performing other SGA in the national
economy. Accordingly, the ALJ held that Williams was not disabled for the
purpose of obtaining Social Security benefits. 15
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Williams timely sought
review in district court. The magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation, recommending that the district court grant the SSA’s motion
for summary judgment. Williams filed objections to the report and
recommendation, arguing that in denying him benefits, the SSA relied too
heavily on Durdin’s opinions, at the expense of the Burns’ opinion, and that
the ALJ substituted her own opinion for that of the treating physician. The

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g).
Shave v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d
194 (5th Cir. 1999)).
14 Id.
15 R. 56, 60.
12
13

4

Case: 13-31111

Document: 00512698904

Page: 5

Date Filed: 07/15/2014

No. 13-31111
district

court

overruled

these

objections,

adopted

the

report

and

recommendation, and granted summary judgment in favor of the SSA.
Williams timely appeals.
II
“Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to two inquiries:
(1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as
a whole, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal
standard.” 16 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 17 Accordingly, we
must uphold the decision if the evidence is “more than a mere scintilla and less
than a preponderance.” 18 “[W]e may not reweigh the evidence, try the issues
de novo, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” 19
In evaluating whether there is substantial evidence, four elements of
proof are weighed, including: (i) objective material facts; (ii) diagnoses and
opinions of treating and examining physicians; (iii) claimant’s subjective
evidence of pain and disability; and (iv) claimant’s age, education, and work
history. 20

Importantly, the “Commissioner, rather than the courts, must

resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 21 And the “ALJ has the sole responsibility
for determining the claimant’s disability status.” 22
On appeal, Williams contends that the record lacks substantial evidence
to support the ALJ’s decision to deny disability benefits. Williams argues (i)

Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Greenspan v. Shalala,
38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994)); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
17 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
18 Perez, 415 F.3d at 461.
19 Haywood v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1463, 1466 (5th Cir. 1989).
20 Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995).
21 Id. at 174.
22 Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1984) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
16

5

Case: 13-31111

Document: 00512698904

Page: 6

Date Filed: 07/15/2014

No. 13-31111
that the ALJ improperly relied on Durdin’s 2008 psychological evaluation
because this evaluation predates his alleged disability onset date; (ii) that the
ALJ impermissibly substituted her own opinion for that of the treating
psychiatrist, Burns; and, (iii) that the ALJ should have contacted Burns for
clarification of the basis for his opinion.
These arguments fail to persuade.

To begin with, Durdin’s 2008

examination is relevant because “[e]ven if a doctor’s medical observations
regarding a claimant’s allegations of disability date from earlier, previously
adjudicated periods, the doctor’s observations are nevertheless relevant to the
claimant’s medical history and should be considered by the ALJ.” 23 Here,
Durdin’s 2008 opinion remains particularly relevant because it pertains to the
same claimed disability—depression—albeit with a different date of onset, for
which Williams now seeks disability benefits.
Second, there is substantial evidence in the record to justify the ALJ’s
decision to give less weight to Burns’ 2010 examination. Although a treating
physician’s opinions and diagnoses are to be accorded considerable weight,
“when good cause is shown, less weight, little weight, or even no weight may
be given to the physician’s testimony.” 24 Good cause may include “statements
that are brief and conclusory, not supported by medically acceptable clinical
laboratory diagnostic techniques, or [are] otherwise unsupported by the
evidence.” 25 And the ALJ is “entitled to determine the credibility of medical
experts as well as lay witnesses and weigh their opinions accordingly.” 26 Here,
the ALJ gave “little weight” to Burns’ 2010 examination wherein he opined—
using a check-box form—that Williams was suffering from severe depression

Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237.
25 Id.
26 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
23
24

6

Case: 13-31111

Document: 00512698904

Page: 7

Date Filed: 07/15/2014

No. 13-31111
and disabled. This decision is supported by substantial evidence, including
Burns’ own notes that are inconsistent with his 2010 opinion. In subsequent
progress notes, Burns explains that Williams had a “good initial response” to
prescribed medications, and that Williams was “doing much better,” was in a
“good mood,” and only had “minor depression.” And the ALJ noted that much
of Burns’ 2010 opinion “appear[ed] to unduly rely upon [Williams’] subjective
history . . . , rather than actual testing.”
Moreover, Burns’ findings were inconsistent with Durdin’s earlier
findings. In 2008, Durdin made detailed observations, including that Williams’
“attention and concentration were good[;]” that Williams had normal affect and
mood; that Williams had adequate memory, cognitive skills, and average
intellectual functioning; and, that Williams is not psychotic and he had the
“ability to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions and
detailed instructions . . . assuming sobriety and compliance.” Importantly,
Durdin’s 2008 opinion recognized and accounted for Williams’ history of
substantial substance abuse, whereas Burns’ 2010 opinion noted that there
was no history of substance abuse. Put simply, the ALJ found Durdin’s 2008
opinion to be more credible than Burns’ 2010 opinion, a determination that was
the ALJ’s to make and well-supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, although the ALJ noted that she had some difficulty deciphering
Burns’ notes, it is clear that she was able to decipher them; indeed, the ALJ
repeatedly quotes and cites from them. And it is undisputed that the full
records from Burns were obtained. Moreover, the records that the ALJ had
difficulty interpreting do not help Williams; instead, those records—Burns’
subsequent examination notes—serve to discredit the 2010 examination on
which Williams relies. Accordingly, we find no merit in Williams’ argument
that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record.
7

Case: 13-31111

Document: 00512698904

Page: 8

Date Filed: 07/15/2014

No. 13-31111
In sum, there is “more than a mere scintilla” of record evidence to
support the ALJ’s determinations. 27

Because “the Commissioner’s fact

findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive.” 28 We
AFFIRM.

27
28

Perez, 415 F.3d at 461.
Id.

8