David Williams, Jr. v. Franciscan Missionaries

Filing

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [16-30728 Affirmed] Judge: PEH, Judge: ECP, Judge: CH. Mandate pull date is 06/08/2017 [16-30728]

Case: 16-30728

Document: 00513998424

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Date Filed: 05/18/2017

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-30728
Summary Calendar
DAVID L. WILLIAMS, JR.,

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
May 18, 2017
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:14-CV-640
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Williams, an African-American man, worked for Defendant Franciscan
Missionaries of Our Lady Health Systems, Inc. (“FMOLHS”) before he was
terminated on November 26, 2012. He then brought this action in the district
court, alleging discrimination under Title VII and retaliation for engaging in a
protected activity under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted summary

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
R. 47.5.4.
*

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judgment for FMOLHS, holding that Williams had failed to make out the
prima facie case for either claim. We affirm.
I.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the district court. 1 Summary judgment is appropriate where there
is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. 2 On summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences
in the non-movant’s favor. 3 To survive summary judgment, the non-movant
must supply evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” 4
II.
Williams alleges he was terminated based on his race in violation of Title
VII. On a motion for summary judgment, absent direct evidence of
discrimination, this Court applies the familiar burden shifting framework: 5
To survive summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas, the
plaintiff must first present evidence of a prima facie case of
discrimination. If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case,
discrimination is presumed, and the burden shifts to the employer
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
underlying employment action. If the employer is able to state a
legitimate rationale for its employment action, the inference of
discrimination disappears and the plaintiff must present evidence
that the employer’s proffered reason was mere pretext for racial
discrimination. 6
Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing U.S. v.
Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 2001)).
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
3 Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866, 1868 (2014).
4 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
5 Ratliff v. Advisors Asset Mgmt., Inc., 660 F. App’x 290, 291 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing
Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512-14 (5th Cir. 2001)).
6 Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transp., 383 F.3d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 2004).
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“Pursuant to this framework, the initial burden rests with the employee to
produce evidence that he: (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified
for the position that he held, (3) was subject to an adverse employment action,
and (4) was treated less favorably than others similarly situated outside of his
protected class.” 7
Williams argues on appeal that the district court erred in requiring him
to prove that other, similarly situated employees were not terminated. We find
no error here. Williams is correct that a similarly situated employee who was
not terminated is not the only way to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. He may also show that he was replaced by someone outside of
the protected class. 8 Neither his original complaint, his amended complaint,
nor his opposition to summary judgment mentions a non-African-American
replacement. Rather, his complaint alleged, and he reiterated by reference in
his amended complaint, that “the defendant treated Mr. Williams unfavorably
as compared to similarly situated Caucasian employees.”
The district court properly analyzed his proffered evidence for a similarly
situated employee who was “treated more favorably under nearly identical
circumstances.” 9 The record reveals no such person, and the district court did
not err in granting summary judgment for FMOLHS on his discrimination
claim.
III.
Williams also alleges that his termination was retaliatory. Absent direct
evidence, “[a] plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by showing:

Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Bryan v.
McKinsey & Co., 375 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2004).
8 McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Wheeler v. BL
Dev. Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2005)).
9 Morris v. Town of Independence, 827 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Willis v.
Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 2014)).
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(1) that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) that an adverse
employment action occurred; and (3) that there was a causal connection
between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse
employment decision.” 10 There is no dispute that Williams’ termination
constitutes an adverse employment action. For the purposes of summary
judgment, the district court assumed there were issues for trial on whether
Williams was engaged in a protected activity.
The district court determined that Williams had failed to meet his
burden of establishing a genuine dispute that the individuals involved in the
decision to terminate him were aware of his complaints of racial
discrimination. Our review of the record confirms this conclusion—Williams
has provided some evidence that the decision makers were aware that he
disputed the bases for his discipline, but Williams has not directed us to any
evidence that the decision makers were aware that Williams had complained
that he was disciplined on account of his race. The district court did not err in
granting summary judgment for FMOLHS on Williams’ retaliation claim.
AFFIRMED.

Shackelford v. Delotte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir. 1992)).
10