USA v. San Davila

Filing

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [16-41386 Vacated and Remanded] Judge: EGJ, Judge: JES, Judge: JEG. Mandate pull date is 05/24/2017 for Appellant San Juanita Davila [16-41386]

Case: 16-41386

Document: 00513977572

Page: 1

Date Filed: 05/03/2017

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-41386
Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
May 3, 2017
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
SAN JUANITA DAVILA,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:16-CR-525-2
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *

San Juanita Davila pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to transport
an illegal alien and received a guidelines sentence of 15 months in prison, to
be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The district court
imposed a special condition of release requiring Davila to participate in a
substance abuse treatment program “as deemed necessary and approved by
the Probation Office.” Davila now contends that the language of this condition

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
*

Case: 16-41386

Document: 00513977572

Page: 2

Date Filed: 05/03/2017

No. 16-41386
impermissibly delegated to the probation officer the court’s responsibility to
determine whether she must participate in treatment. Because Davila did not
raise this argument in the district court, we review for plain error. See Puckett
v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); United States v. Scott, 821 F.3d 562,
570 (5th Cir. 2016).
The imposition of supervised release conditions and terms “is a core
judicial function that may not be delegated.” United States v. Franklin, 838
F.3d 564, 568 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Davila has shown a clear or obvious error affecting her substantial rights
because the language of the challenged special condition “creates an ambiguity
regarding whether the district court intended to delegate authority [to the
probation officer] not only to implement treatment but to decide whether
treatment was needed.” Id.; see Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. Additionally, we
conclude that this error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings” because it involves core judicial functions.
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135; see Franklin, 838 F.3d at 568. Consequently, we will
exercise our discretion to correct the error by vacating the challenged special
condition and remanding for resentencing.

Accordingly, we VACATE the

substance abuse treatment special condition and REMAND to the district
court for resentencing, with the following clarifying instruction:
If the district court intends that the therapy be mandatory but
leaves a variety of details, including the selection of a therapy
provider and schedule to the probation officer, such a condition of
probation may be imposed. If, on the other hand, the court intends
to leave the issue of the defendant’s participation in therapy to the
discretion of the probation officer, such a condition would
constitute an impermissible delegation of judicial authority and
should not be included.

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