Marie Weaver v. City Of Twinsburg, Ohio

Filing

OPINION filed : The disrict court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Twinsburg is AFFIRMED, decision not for publication. Eric L. Clay and Jane Branstetter Stranch, Circuit Judges; and Timothy S. Black, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0725n.06
No. 13-4011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MARIE WEAVER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF TWINSBURG, OHIO,
Defendant-Appellee.

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FILED
Sep 16, 2014
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO

BEFORE: CLAY and STRANCH, Circuit Judges; BLACK, District Judge.*

BLACK, District Judge. Marie Weaver (“Weaver”) appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Twinsburg. Weaver argues that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment on both her retaliatory suspension
claim and her retaliatory termination claim, where there was temporal proximity between
her protected activity and the adverse action. We find that the district court appropriately
granted summary judgment. As such, we AFFIRM.
I.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Weaver was hired by the City of Twinsburg as a Deputy Clerk of City Council on
November 13, 2006. In January 2008, Weaver was promoted to Acting Clerk of Council,
and on March 8, 2008, she was officially named Clerk of Council. (Id.) As Clerk of
*

The Honorable Timothy S. Black, United States District Judge for the Southern District of
Ohio, sitting by designation.

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Council, Weaver was responsible, in some part, for fulfilling public record requests, for
updating Council’s agendas, and for submitting some ordinances to the proper state
bodies. While Clerk of Council, Weaver was Council’s employee, reported directly to
Council, and was under Council’s exclusive control for purposes of hiring, discipline, and
firing. She held the Clerk’s position until March 11, 2009, the day the City terminated
her. Weaver was the only African American working at Twinsburg City Hall. (R. 36–3
at PageID 467).
Weaver had been the Clerk for roughly three months when Council passed an
ordinance that allowed for levying an annual fee related to motor vehicle licensing.
Weaver was charged with providing this ordinance to the Ohio Department of Public
Safety. On July 29, 2008, that Department informed Weaver that the ordinance had been
received after the July 1, 2008 deadline, and therefore Twinsburg could not begin
collection until 2010. This caused a loss of revenue of roughly $86,000. At the time the
error was discovered, there was some dispute over the allocation of blame with Mayor
Procop blaming Weaver, and several councilmen believing that the Finance Director had
voluntarily taken responsibility for ensuring the ordinance was timely submitted.
In addition to failing to timely submit the ordinance, Weaver was also accused of
insubordination during a meeting with Mayor Procop on October 16, 2008.

An

administrative assistant who overheard portions of the conversation indicated that she had
“never heard any employee ever talk to any Mayor or City Manager like that.” (R. 36–12
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at PageID 617).

Weaver contends that she remained professional throughout the

encounter and was unfairly attacked by Mayor Procop.
During the executive session of the next Council meeting, on October 28, 2008,
Council discussed the missed filing deadline and Weaver’s alleged insubordination.
Council agreed at that time to refrain from taking any action until Weaver’s six month
review was completed on October 31, 2008 and until they had the opportunity to speak to
legal counsel about options. The next Council meeting was set for November 18, 2008.
(Id.) Three days after the executive session, on October 31, 2008, the City gave Weaver
a performance evaluation. While Plaintiff received “Needs Improvement” in several
areas, her aggregate scores resulted in ratings of “Effective” and “Exceeds Expectations.”
(Id.)
On November 14, 2008, Twinsburg Law Director David Maistros instructed
Weaver to amend the Council meeting agenda to include an executive session for
discussing “personnel issues.” On November 18, 2008, the day of the scheduled Council
meeting, Weaver’s legal counsel emailed Mayor Procop to inform her that Weaver had
contacted the EEOC regarding a racial discrimination claim. The email indicates that
Council members would receive courtesy copies with information regarding Weaver’s
contact with the EEOC. (Id.) It is unclear if or when Council members received this
information.

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Council proceeded with the scheduled executive session, during which they
discussed the missed filing deadline and Weaver’s alleged insubordination. Ultimately,
Council determined that Weaver should receive a pre-disciplinary hearing before any
punishment was imposed. Council appointed Frank Beni, the Chair of Twinsburg’s Civil
Service Commission, to preside over the hearing. The hearing was held on November
25, 2008, and thereafter, Beni concluded that Weaver had been insubordinate and that
there was cause for corrective action. Council then offered Weaver the choice of a twoday suspension or enrollment in an Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”). Weaver
declined the EAP and on December 1, 2008, Twinsburg suspended her for two days.
Weaver served her suspension in December 2008 and returned to work without
incident. However, in early 2009, Maistros’ assistant relayed to him a portion of a phone
conversation in which she overheard Weaver tell someone that she would send them a
copy of one of Maistros’ legal opinions.

Maistros then used software known as

Barracuda to search through old emails on Twinsburg’s server. Through this search,
Maistros learned that Weaver had supplied a substantial number of documents to
Marcella “Sally” Gaydosh. Gaydosh had frequently litigated against Twinsburg. (Id. at
458-60)
Maistros continued his investigation of Weaver’s emails and found that between
November 2008 and early March 2009, Weaver and Gaydosh had exchanged roughly 120
emails. Maistros concluded that although many of the emails were responses to public
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records requests, Weaver had also provided numerous documents that had not been
requested through formal channels.
The first Council meeting that occurred following Maistros’ discovery was held on
March 10, 2009. However, prior to that hearing, on February 24, 2009, Weaver filed a
retaliation charge and perfected her racial discrimination charge with the EEOC.
Maistros claims that he learned of the charges on March 6, 2009, while HR Director
Morris indicated that he may have learned of the charges a day earlier on March 5, 2009.
Also on March 6, 2009, Maistros requested that an executive session be added to the
March 10, 2009 Council meeting to discuss personnel issues.
During the executive session, Council reviewed a packet of emails between
Weaver and Gaydosh and spoke with Maistros about the content of those emails.
Council then unanimously determined that Weaver should be terminated. Defendant
contends that there was no discussion of Weaver’s EEOC charges during the executive
session.

Council was then provided with pre-prepared termination letters that were

signed and delivered to Weaver the following day.
Weaver contends that Twinsburg retaliated against her on two occasions for
contacting the EEOC. She contends that her November 2008 suspension was retaliation
for her first contact with the EEOC and that her March 2009 termination was retaliation
for her second contact with the EEOC. Twinsburg contends that no retaliation occurred
and that Weaver was properly disciplined and terminated. Weaver timely appeals the
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order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant City of
Twinsburg.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Summary judgment is
appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The evidence must be considered in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, but there must be more than “some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That is, there must be more than a “mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence” to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
III.

ANALYSIS

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Weaver must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity under Title
VII; (2) her protected activity was known to Twinsburg; (3) Twinsburg took adverse
employment actions against her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the
adverse employment action and the protected activity. Taylor v. Geithner, 703 F.3d 328,
336 (6th Cir. 2013). As to the fourth element, “[t]he burden of proof at the prima facie
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stage is minimal; all the plaintiff must do is put forth some credible evidence that enables
the court to deduce that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory action and the
protected activity.” Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007).
On appeal, Weaver argues that the evidence is sufficient to raise issues of fact as
to whether her suspension and ultimate termination were causally related to her protected
activity.

A. Suspension
First, Weaver alleges that her December 2008 suspension was in retaliation for
filing an EEOC complaint in November 2008. There is no dispute that Weaver engaged
in protected activity when she filed her November 2008 EEOC complaint.
An adverse employment action is a “materially adverse change in the terms and
conditions of . . . employment.” Hollins v. Atl. Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir.
1999). An adverse employment action involves changes in the terms of employment,
such as “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,” and usually
“inflicts direct economic harm.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761–62

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(1998). Such a change “must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities.” Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662.1
At the conclusion of Mr. Beni’s independent investigation, he found cause for
corrective action.

Weaver conceded that she should have been disciplined.

The

suggested corrective action included participation in an EAP or a two-day suspension.
Weaver argues that her suspension was an adverse employment action.
Plaintiff fails to cite any case where a court found that an EAP was an adverse
employment action. See, e.g., Novotny v. Reed Elsevier, 291 F. App’x 698, 703 (6th Cir.
2008) (the fact that plaintiff’s calendar was closely scrutinized, she was left off of out-ofoffice emails, she was referred to executive coaching, she was pushed for input on her
development plan, and she was placed on a corrective action plan, did not qualify as
adverse employment actions).2 Here, Weaver claims that she did not opt for the EAP
1

See also Crawford v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 12–3698, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16374, at
*6 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2013) (“In addition to terminations and pay reductions, demotions and
negative changes in job responsibilities generally are sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action.”).
2

See also Delia v. Donahoe, 862 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (EAP referral is not an
adverse action); Jenkins v. Med. Labs. of E. Iowa, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 946, 961 (N.D. Iowa
2012) (a requirement to attend EAP counseling does not constitute a “tangible change in working
conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage.”); Choulagh v. Holder, No. 1014279, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98271, at *21–22 (E.D. Mich. July 16, 2012) (recommending that
the plaintiff explore an EAP referral is not an adverse employment action); Waters v. Gen. Bd. of
Global Ministries, 769 F. Supp. 2d 545, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (recommendation that plaintiff
attend EAP counseling sessions does not constitute an adverse employment action); Logan v.
Henderson, No. C2-00-0978, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15679, at *18 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2002) (the
fact that plaintiff had to enroll in an EAP to deal with on-the-job stress is not an adverse
employment action).
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because she “didn’t need the EAP…[t]here was no reason or cause for [her] to need their
services.” (R. 36–3 at PageID 507). Accordingly, Weaver argues that this Hobson’s
choice3 constitutes an adverse employment action. See Blume v. Potter, 289 F. App’x 99,
106 (6th Cir. 2008) (an illusory choice of employment options resulted in an adverse
action).4 The fact that Weaver did not think she needed services from the EAP does not
render this an illusory choice. In fact, Weaver conceded that she should have been
disciplined.
While a suspension without pay is an adverse employment action, Weaver chose
the suspension in lieu of the EAP. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 71–72 (2006). We decline to find an adverse employment action where Weaver
chose the suspension. See Hill v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 67 F. App’x 277, 282 (6th
Cir. 2003). Weaver’s decision to take a suspension instead of participating in the EAP
does not create a materially adverse employment action.

A Hobson’s choice is “an apparently free choice that offers no actual alternative.” Stokes v.
Scott, 821 F. Supp. 2d 898, 911 n. 5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 527 F.
App’x 358 (6th Cir. 2013).
3

“Blume had the ability to choose between ending his employment immediately, without
reaching retirement eligibility, or working up to his first eligible retirement date, but this choice
was illusory. Neither option provided Blume with the opportunity to remain an employee of the
Postal Service indefinitely.” Id. at 106.
4

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Weaver failed to prove all four elements required to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation.

Accordingly, with respect to the 2008 suspension, Weaver’s claim for

retaliation fails as a matter of law.
B. Termination
Next, Weaver alleges that her March 2009 termination was retaliation for her
February 24, 2009 EEOC complaint. It is undisputed that Weaver engaged in protected
activity when she filed her EEOC complaint and that Twinsburg took adverse
employment action against her when it terminated her employment.
Evidence that an adverse action was taken shortly after the plaintiff’s exercise of
protected rights is relevant to causation. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563
(6th Cir. 2000). When an adverse employment action occurs close in time to when an
employer learns that an employee engaged in a protected activity, temporal proximity
alone is enough to constitute evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of
satisfying a prima facie case of retaliation. Williams v. Zurz, No. 10–4161, 2012 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22604, at *14–15 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co.,
516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding temporal proximity to be sufficient evidence
of causation where termination occurred on the same day the employer learned of the
protected conduct)).
Weaver was terminated on March 10, 2009, approximately four to five days after
her EEOC charge was received by the City of Twinsburg. The date on which the
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“investigation” that led to Weaver’s termination commenced is in dispute. Law Director
Maistros conducted the initial Barracuda search on March 3, 2009, but only used the
search term “Gaydosh.” Maistros claims that he learned about the February 24, 2009
EEOC complaint on March 6, 2009, while HR Director Morris indicated that he may
have learned about the charges a day earlier on March 5, 2009. It was only after learning
of Weaver’s EEOC charges that Maistros conducted a second Barracuda search on March
9, 2009 with the search terms “Weaver” and “Gaydosh.”
Within a day after learning of Weaver’s charges, Maistros asked to have an
executive session added to the March 10, 2009 City Council meeting to discuss “pending
or imminent litigation.”

On the afternoon of March 10, 2009, before Weaver’s

termination was even discussed with Council, Morris pre-drafted termination letters for
the Council President and Vice President to sign.
Weaver need not prove that Council knew about her protected activity to prevail.
If a supervisory employee acts with retaliatory animus, and the act is intended to cause
and is the proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, the employer is liable
under the “cat’s paw” theory. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344,
355 (6th Cir. 1998).5 Morris and Maistros, who had knowledge of Weaver’s EEOC

Cobbins v. Tenn. Dep’t of Transp., 566 F.3d 582, 586 n.5 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The ‘cat’s paw’
theory refers to a situation in which a biased subordinate, who lacks decisionmaking power,
influences the unbiased decisionmaker to make an adverse…decision, thereby hiding the
subordinate’s discriminatory intent.”).
5

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filings, “recommended a termination.” 6 (R. 32–1 at PageID 401–2). Because Morris and
Maistros knew about Weaver’s EEOC charges, their recommendation of termination to
City Council is sufficient to establish a prima facie causal connection.
Accordingly, the district court erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation as to the March 2009 suspension.
C. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reasons and Pretext
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the
employer to identify a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
decision. Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008). The City of
Twinsburg easily meets this burden. If the employer meets this burden of production,
then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given is a pretext for discrimination. Id.
A plaintiff may establish that an employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual by
showing those reasons have no basis in fact, did not actually motivate the employer’s
action, or were insufficient to warrant the action. Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co.,
681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit has adopted the “honest belief” rule
with regard to an employer’s proffered reason for discharging an employee. Under the
honest belief rule, “so long as the employer honestly believed in the proffered
Councilman Scaffide claims that he learned of Weaver’s EEOC Charge during an executive
session. While there is no evidence that Scaffide learned about the EEOC charge on or before
March 10, 2009, it is unclear when he learned about the charge.
6

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[nondiscriminatory] reason given for its employment action, the employee cannot
establish pretext even if the employer’s reason is ultimately found to be mistaken” or
incorrect. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998). The employer’s
decision-making process need not be optimal, nor leave no stone unturned; “[r]ather, the
key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision
before taking an adverse employment action.” Id. at 807. To determine whether the
employer had an honest belief in the proffered basis for the adverse employment action, a
court should ask whether the employer reasonably relied “on the particularized facts that
were before it at the time the decision was made.” Id.
1. 2008 Suspension
Although Weaver established a prima facie case of retaliation for the 2008
suspension, she cannot demonstrate that the City Council’s legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons for suspension were pretext for a discriminatory motive.
Plaintiff was suspended in 2008 for insubordination to the Mayor and a $86,000
mistake. Instead of simply disciplining Weaver, the Council appointed a neutral party to
preside over a predisciplinary hearing, and not until it received the neutral party’s
recommendation did Council act. Weaver argues that the conclusion reached by Mr.
Beni “gives rise to doubt about the objectivity of Beni’s ‘investigation[.]’” (Appellant

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Br. at 28).7

However, Weaver offers nothing more than conjecture to support her

suggestion that Mr. Beni’s investigation was impartial. There is no evidence that the
actions taken by Council were in retaliation for Weaver’s EEOC complaint and not for
her mistake and insubordination.

Accordingly, Weaver fails to evidence that City

Council’s articulated reason for suspension was pretextual.
2. 2009 Termination
Weaver was terminated for providing Gaydosh with information that was not
specifically requested, not appropriate, and that caused harm to the City—all of which
resulted in Weaver breaching City Council’s and the City of Twinsburg’s trust.
Accordingly, Twinsburg has satisfied its burden of providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Weaver’s termination.
Weaver argues that: (1) the City articulated inconsistent reasons for her
termination; (2) a satisfactory performance review six months prior to her termination
demonstrates that the City’s actions were pretextual; (3) the City was to blame for her
actions because it did not provide her with adequate training for responding to public
records requests; and (4) she did not improperly provide documents to Gaydosh. The
crux of the question is whether Weaver was terminated by City Council based upon a
good faith belief that she violated their trust.
Weaver also argues that there was a “four month delay” between her conduct and the
discipline, however Council was in a three month recess following the missed deadline.
7

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a.

Inconsistent Explanations

First, Weaver argues that the City articulated inconsistent reasons for her
termination. The letter Weaver received regarding her termination stated that she “ha[d]
not fulfilled the expectations of [her] position.” A few days later, Morris told the local
media that Weaver was terminated because of “a poor yearly performance review.” In
June 2009, the City indicated that Weaver was terminated for disseminating information
to Gaydosh. While these reasons may be interpreted as inconsistent, it is clear that
Weaver did not fulfill the expectation of her position because she acted in a manner that
was contrary to City policy, put the City at risk of further litigation, violated her fiduciary
duties, and compromised City Council’s trust. There is insufficient evidence to establish
a genuine issue of disputed fact regarding whether the City’s proffered reasons for the
termination were not based in fact, did not actually motivate the employer’s action, or
were insufficient to warrant the action.
b.

Performance Review

Next, Weaver argues that she was given a favorable performance review six
months before her termination despite missing a filing deadline and the alleged
insubordination. While the performance review was generally favorable, it does note
several areas that “need improvement,” including Weaver’s ability to work and cooperate
with coworkers. (R. 41–11 at PageID 954). Specifically, the performance evaluation
indicates that “[t]ime taken for training and the lack of cooperation between Marie
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[Weaver] and the Deputy Clerk had a negative effect on quantity of work[,]” “[t]his is
one area Marie [Weaver] must improve [working with co-workers]. Marie must fine [sic]
ways to interface with co-workers[,]” and Weaver “did not deliver an Ordinance to the
proper agency in a timely manor [sic] that resulted in a loss of $82,000.00 of revenue.”
(Id. at PageID 953). The performance review also indicated that one of the major goals
for Weaver to work toward for the next evaluation period was that she “needs to attend
class (s) [sic] for conflict resolution.” (Id. at PageID 955).
Therefore, although Weaver claims that she received a favorable performance
review, the review reflects her inability to interact with co-workers.
c.

Training

Next, Weaver argues that she “did not know” or was not aware that she should not
have provided certain information to Gaydosh, because she was never properly trained
with respect to City policy regarding public record disclosures. The record evidence fails
to support Weaver’s contention.
Prior to becoming the Clerk of Council, Weaver served as Deputy Clerk of
Council and was employed for nearly two and a half years at the time of her termination.
Weaver admits that she received outside training for responding to public records
requests and that she “mimicked what was done by the prior Clerk of Council.” (Id. at
PageID 478–79). Moreover, Weaver testified that she never had any concerns about

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whether she was appropriately responding to records requests and never sought advice
from anyone about her communications with Gaydosh.
d.

Ms. Gaydosh

Finally, Weaver claims that she did not improperly provide documents to
Gaydosh.
Weaver testified that she provided Gaydosh with the City’s legal invoices.
However, Weaver never informed anyone at the City that such bills were being provided
to Gaydosh, nor did she notify Mr. Maistros or the finance department of any such
requests or the particulars of those requests. Weaver also admitted that Gaydosh was the
only person to whom she provided information that was not in response to a public
records request. Weaver took no steps before production to ensure that her responses
were legal and proper.
Additionally, Weaver and Gaydosh sent each other emails about Twinsburg’s
business, including information regarding Weaver’s own plans for claims against
Twinsburg,

Weaver’s

attorney’s

communications

regarding

her

claims,

and

communications from Twinsburg’s legal counsel regarding Weaver’s claims. Weaver
and Gaydosh discussed the various councilmen, the Mayor, and “taking down” Mr.
Maistros. (Id.) These communications all undermine Weaver’s claim that she was
terminated for “innocently” providing documents to Gaydosh. (Id.) In fact, Weaver sent
Gaydosh emails about a “spat” between the finance director and City Council members
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without being specifically requested to do so. Weaver could not explain why she sent
these documents to Gaydosh.

Additionally, an e-mail from Councilman Murphy

containing a request that the Mayor provide justification for a recent expenditure was
forwarded to Gaydosh within minutes of Weaver’s receipt of the email. Given the timing
of the email, it is impossible for this communication to have been in response to a public
records request. (Id.)
Accordingly, the record establishes that the Council reasonably relied “on the
particularized facts that were before it” when it unanimously decided that Weaver should
be terminated. Smith, 155 F.3d at 807. 8 The record evidence indicates that Weaver was
engaging in improper communications with Gaydosh. Weaver fails to evidence that
Twinsburg’s articulated reasons for her suspension and ultimate termination were pretext
to mask discrimination. Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 315 (6th
Cir. 2001). Therefore, Weaver’s retaliation claims fail as a matter of law.

8

Although the evidence indicates that at least some of the City Council members were not
entirely aware of the scope of Weaver’s conduct and that Morris and Maistros were guiding the
termination process, it is clear that an investigation was conducted, City Council was apprised of
the results of the investigation, and some City Council members asked questions about Weaver’s
conduct. For example, council member Scaffide indicated that he did not read any of the emails,
but after he learned about the emails, he “felt violated by that. [He] felt a mistrust had
happened.” (R. 39–2 at PageID 920). Weaver clearly used her email in an intentional manner to
send information—often without a public records request—to a woman who frequently litigates
against the City. Even if Council members were unaware of the exact content of the emails, they
clearly believed that Weaver’s conduct was improper.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Twinsburg
is AFFIRMED.

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