Emma Hill v. Commissioner of Social Securi

Filing

Per Curiam OPINION filed : AFFIRMED, decision not for publication. Alice M. Batchelder, Chief Circuit Judge; David W. McKeague, Circuit Judge and Solomon Oliver , Jr., Chief District Judge., NDO

Case: 13-5808

Document: 006111982323

Filed: 03/05/2014

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0177n.06
No. 13-5808
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

EMMA HILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE:
District Judge.*

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FILED
Mar 05, 2014
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
KENTUCKY

BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge; OLIVER,

PER CURIAM. Emma Hill appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of
her application for supplemental security income benefits.
In 2009, Hill filed an application for supplemental security income benefits, alleging that
she became disabled on March 3, 1996. After the Social Security Administration denied the
application, Hill requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ denied
Hill relief, and the Appeals Council declined to review the case. The district court affirmed the
denial of Hill’s application.
On appeal, Hill argues that, in determining her residual functional capacity (RFC), the
ALJ erred by failing to incorporate more restrictive limitations on her ability to sit, stand, and
walk on the basis of her disabling back pain. Hill also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to
include the additional limitations in his hypothetical questions to the vocational expert and that,
*

The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., Chief United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

Case: 13-5808

Document: 006111982323

Filed: 03/05/2014

Page: 2

No. 13-5808
Hill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
as a result, the ALJ could not properly rely on the expert’s opinion that Hill could perform light
work as a maid.
“Our review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009). “The substantial-evidence standard is
met if a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We give de novo review to the
district court’s conclusions on each issue.” Id.
When evaluating subjective complaints of disabling pain, we first determine “whether
there is objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition.” Buxton v. Halter,
246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001). If there is, we then determine whether objective medical
evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain or whether the medical condition is of such
severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain. Id.
The ALJ’s RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence. Although Hill’s
treatment records demonstrated that she had degenerative changes to her spine, the records did
not reflect that her spinal problems had a significant impact on her strength or range of motion,
and there was no objective medical evidence that corroborated Hill’s claims of disabling pain.
Further, none of Hill’s treating physicians concluded that her condition would cause disabling
pain or otherwise result in significant functional limitations, and Dr. Alex Guerrero, a consulting
physician, concluded that Hill was not significantly limited in her ability to sit, stand, and walk.
Because the ALJ’s RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence, Hill has
not demonstrated that the ALJ failed to ask proper hypothetical questions to the vocational expert

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Case: 13-5808

Document: 006111982323

Filed: 03/05/2014

Page: 3

No. 13-5808
Hill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
or that the ALJ erred by relying on the expert’s opinion that Hill could perform light work as a
maid.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

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