USA v. Jason Arnold
Filing
OPINION filed: We uphold the district court s denial of Arnold s motion to discharge counsel and represent himself, AFFIRM Arnold s conviction, VACATE Arnold s sentence, and REMAND this case for resentencing, decision not for publication. Gilbert S. Merritt, Circuit Judge; Martha Craig Daughtrey (authoring), Circuit Judge and Richard Allen Griffin, Circuit Judge.
Case: 14-1956
Document: 44-2
Filed: 11/03/2015
Page: 1
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0732n.06
No. 14-1956
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JASON PAUL ARNOLD,
Defendant-Appellant.
BEFORE:
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
FILED
Nov 03, 2015
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
MERRITT, DAUGHTREY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Jason Arnold was charged
with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Prior to trial, Arnold moved to discharge his
counsel and represent himself. During a hearing on the motion, the district judge attempted a
Faretta colloquy, first asking Arnold whether he understood the charges against him; Arnold was
unable or unwilling to answer this question. As a result, the court denied his motion without
further conversation, and the case proceeded to trial. Following the jury’s verdict finding Arnold
guilty, the district court advised Arnold that it intended to depart upwardly in sentencing him
because he suffered from “a serious mental health issue” that might require mental health
treatment “of some length” to restore him to release status and protect the public. On appeal,
Arnold contends (1) that the district judge’s failure to conduct a proper colloquy before denying
his motion to represent himself violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, and
Case: 14-1956
Document: 44-2
Filed: 11/03/2015
Page: 2
No. 14-1956
United States v. Arnold
(2) that his sentence is invalid because it was based on the impermissible ground of his need for
mental health treatment. For the reasons set out below, we find no abuse of discretion in the
district court's denial of Arnold’s request to discharge counsel and represent himself, given his
unfocused and unresponsive statements during the hearing on the motion, and affirm the
defendant’s conviction. However, we conclude that the district court did abuse its discretion in
its decision to depart upwardly in calculating Arnold’s sentence. Although that decision was
influenced at least in part by the district judge’s concern that Arnold’s anger problems posed a
threat to public safety, it was also driven by the court’s belief that Arnold was in need of mental
health treatment and that a shorter sentence would diminish the efficacy of that treatment, an
improper consideration when imposing a sentence. We therefore vacate the sentencing portion
of the district court's judgment and remand for resentencing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2013, Arnold was arrested and indicted for being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Arnold pleaded not guilty to the charge. In the
course of the pretrial proceedings, Arnold underwent two competency evaluations; he was found
competent for trial on both occasions. Arnold then filed a “motion for impartial dismissal,”
asserting that he was firing his attorney and intended to represent himself in his upcoming trial.
The district court construed the motion as a motion to disqualify counsel and scheduled a hearing
on the matter.
At the beginning of the hearing, the district court asked Arnold whether he understood
the charge against him, a question to which Arnold never gave a direct reply. Instead, he
repeatedly insisted upon relating his reasons for possessing the gun at issue. In response, the
-2-
Case: 14-1956
Document: 44-2
Filed: 11/03/2015
Page: 3
No. 14-1956
United States v. Arnold
court repeatedly instructed Arnold that his explanation of his reasons for possessing the gun was
not relevant to the hearing. At one point as Arnold began to explain his motive for purchasing
the firearm, his counsel reminded the district judge that the purpose of the hearing was to
consider Arnold’s motion to disqualify counsel and represent himself. The judge replied by
denying the motion “for the obvious . . . record here that’s being made.”
Following Arnold’s trial and conviction, the probation office prepared a presentence
investigation report that calculated his Guidelines imprisonment range as 41 to 51 months, based
on a total offense level of 20 and a criminal history category of III.
In its sentencing
memorandum, the government moved for an upward variance in Arnold’s sentence, under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), “to protect the public from Mr. Arnold.” The government based its
request for a variance on its claim that Arnold had acquired the firearm to “do harm to the people
who removed Arnold’s children from his custody” two months before Arnold purchased the gun.
After receiving the government’s sentencing memorandum, the district court issued a
notice of intent to depart upward, stating as the basis that:
It appears from a review of the Presentence Report that Mr. Arnold
suffers from a serious mental health issue which may necessitate
mental health treatment of some length not only to restore Mr.
Arnold to release status but protect the public.
Arnold filed a written objection to the notice, on the grounds that his mental health issues were
“an impermissible sentencing factor” under Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011), and
that his need for treatment could not provide a basis for determining or lengthening his sentence.
At the sentencing hearing, the government reiterated its position that an upward variance
was appropriate because Arnold had intended to harm others when he purchased the firearm.
Arnold countered that his intention in acquiring the gun was to commit suicide, not to harm
others, and requested that the court deny the government’s motion for an upward variance. The
-3-
Case: 14-1956
Document: 44-2
Filed: 11/03/2015
Page: 4
No. 14-1956
United States v. Arnold
court rejected Arnold’s claim that he intended to commit suicide with the rifle, noting that “the
commission of suicide with a rifle and a scope makes not a whole lot of sense.”
In sentencing Arnold, the district court first observed that, based on the conclusions in
Arnold’s psychological evaluations, on his frequent outbursts during court proceedings
evidencing “a personality deficit that’s potentially very dangerous,” and on the loss of his
children, home, and job, Arnold “was and remains very angry.” This anger, the court remarked,
warranted an upward departure for public safety. The court then noted that Arnold “desperately
needs psychiatric intervention” and that, “in order to get that, the Court has to grant the
government’s motion to go outside and above the sentence guidelines.” The court also stated
that Arnold’s sentence required a balancing of his mental condition and public safety, and that
“the balance for both issues . . . is that we provide a means and a period of time when . . . the
Bureau of Prisons can work with him.”
The government, apparently concerned that the court’s articulation of its basis for
departure ran afoul of Tapia, attempted to clarify that the departure should be based on a finding
that Arnold was “an individual who’s dangerous, whose criminal history is extensive, and
[whose] risk of recidivating is . . . heightened.” The district judge responded to this statement by
asking, “Didn’t I say all that? Did I not say that?” Afterwards, however, while addressing the
relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court identified “protection to the
public,” in addition to Arnold’s “need for medical and correctional treatment in this matter,” as
“adequate 3553(a) criteria” for imposing a sentence of 60 months incarceration, followed by a
three-year period of supervised release. This appeal followed.
-4-
Case: 14-1956
Document: 44-2
Filed: 11/03/2015
Page: 5
No. 14-1956
United States v. Arnold
DISCUSSION
Arnold’s Motion for Self-Representation
For reasons that are not completely obvious, in this circuit we do not have a clearly
established standard of review for claims asserting the unconstitutional denial of the right to selfrepresentation. Cf. United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 866-68 (6th Cir. 2012) (“This Court has
not clearly identified the appropriate standard of review for a trial court’s decision to allow
waiver of counsel.”). Of particular pertinence in this case, however, we recently noted:
When determining whether a mentally ill defendant “falls in a gray area between
Dusky's minimal constitutional requirement that measures a defendant's ability to
stand trial and a somewhat higher standard that measures mental fitness for” selfrepresentation, the district court's decision merits deference. District courts “will
often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored
to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.
United States v. Stafford, 782 F.3d 786, 791 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Indiana v. Edwards,
554 U.S. 164, 172, 177 (2008)) (internal citation omitted).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to representation by
counsel as well as the right to waive the assistance of counsel and represent themselves. Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). The right to self-representation is not without limit,
however. “[T]he government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at
times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer.” Martinez v. Court of
Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000). In this circuit, “[w]hen an
accused wishes to represent himself, the district court must ask the defendant a series of
questions drawn from, or substantially similar to, the model inquiry set forth in the Bench Book
for United States District Judges.” Ross, 703 F.3d at 867 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The inquiry concerns the defendant’s familiarity with the law, legal system, and the charges
against him.
-5-
Case: 14-1956
Document: 44-2
Filed: 11/03/2015
Page: 6
No. 14-1956
United States v. Arnold
Arnold contends that the district court failed to conduct the proper inquiry before denying
his motion to represent himself and that this failure violated his Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation. In this case, however, the district court was faced with a defendant who would
not, or could not, respond adequately to even the most basic question required by the model
inquiry. Given this fact, coupled with initial concerns about Arnold’s fitness to stand trial, the
district court's reluctance to question him further is not only understandable but undeniably
appropriate.
Moreover, Arnold incorrectly characterizes the district court's decision to abandon the
inquiry as constitutional error. However, a court’s obligation to conduct a colloquy substantially
compliant with the model inquiry extends from our supervisory powers, not the Constitution.
See United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 249-50 (6th Cir. 1987). Arnold’s insistence that
this error is structural, requiring automatic reversal, is similarly incorrect. Denials of the right to
self-representation are structural errors, see United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2149
(2013), but Arnold does not challenge the denial of his motion to represent himself; rather, he
challenges the court’s failure to conduct a full colloquy before denying that motion.1
But, even if we were to find that the district court’s failure to complete the model inquiry
before denying the defendant’s motion was error, we would also find that the error was harmless.
Given Arnold’s insistence on responding to the court’s questioning with tangential explanations
of his reason for possessing the firearm, the court would not have granted Arnold’s motion to
represent himself in any event. Nor did denying Arnold the ability to represent himself at trial
have any effect on the outcome of that trial. During the hearing on his motion to discharge
1
In this regard, Arnold’s reliance on Moore v. Haviland, 531 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2008), is misplaced. In Moore, we
found structural error because the trial court not only failed to follow the model inquiry upon receiving the
defendant’s motion to proceed pro se but also failed to rule on the motion at all. 531 F.3d at 402-03, 404. Unlike in
Moore, the district court here did rule on Arnold’s motion.
-6-
Case: 14-1956
Document: 44-2
Filed: 11/03/2015
Page: 7
No. 14-1956
United States v. Arnold
counsel, Arnold repeatedly admitted to possessing the firearm at issue and was obsessed with
disputing the government’s theory for why he had obtained the rifle. Nothing in the record
suggests that he would have defended himself any differently at trial.
Under any standard of review, Arnold’s self-representation claim fails. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Arnold’s motion. Similarly, de novo review of the record
reveals that Arnold’s motion to waive counsel should not have been granted.
Arnold’s
unfocused responses to the court’s questioning, as well as his evident confusion about what
information was and was not relevant to defending the charges against him, gave the court ample
reason to conclude that Arnold would be “unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present
his own defense without the help of counsel.” Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175-76.
Arnold’s Sentence
As a threshold matter, we note the government’s contention that Arnold’s challenges to
his sentence must be reviewed under the plain-error standard because he did not raise them in the
district court. Our review of the record, however, plainly refutes this claim.
To preserve a claim of error, a party must “object with that reasonable degree of
specificity which would have adequately apprised the trial court of the true basis for his
objection.” United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Arnold did preserve his claim, initially by filing a written objection to the district
court’s notice of intent to depart upward, arguing that departing upward for the reasons the court
stated in its notice would run afoul of Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011). During the
sentencing hearing, Arnold’s defense counsel reiterated his opposition to an upward variance or
departure.
-7-
Case: 14-1956
Document: 44-2
Filed: 11/03/2015
Page: 8
No. 14-1956
United States v. Arnold
The basis for the government’s contention that Arnold failed to preserve his claims is
unclear. It could be based on his failure to restate his objections after sentence was imposed, or
his failure to cite United States v. Moses, 106 F.3d 1273, 1277 (6th Cir. 1997)—on which he now
relies—during the sentencing hearing, or mere unfamiliarity with the record. Bostic, however,
makes clear that only “objections not previously raised” are forfeited if not stated after the
court’s final request for objections. 371 F.3d at 872-73 (emphasis added). The district court was
aware of the substance of Arnold’s objection to its decision to depart, even if certain arguments
in support of that objection now raised here were not articulated then.
Decisions to depart from the sentencing guidelines are reviewed for their reasonableness
under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); United
States v. Moses, 106 F.3d 1273, 1277 (6th Cir. 1997). “[T]he abuse of discretion standard
includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.”
Id.
Under Tapia, “a court may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an
offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” 131 S. Ct. at
2393. Eighteen U.S.C. § 3582(a) excludes a defendant’s need for correction and rehabilitation
from the factors considered in imposing a term of imprisonment. A defendant’s mental illness
cannot justify an upward departure under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and a
sentence extended on the basis of a defendant’s need for psychiatric treatment is substantively
unreasonable. Moses, 106 F.3d at 1280, 1281.
Arnold also contends that the district court’s upward departure in sentencing him was an
abuse of discretion because the court erroneously based this departure on the “future
dangerousness” reflected in his extreme anger at the time of his arrest. This argument, however,
-8-
Case: 14-1956
Document: 44-2
Filed: 11/03/2015
Page: 9
No. 14-1956
United States v. Arnold
does little to advance Arnold’s challenge to his sentence. He insists that the court departed under
United States Sentencing Guideline § 5K2.14, which permits a court to depart upward if
“national security, public health, or safety was significantly endangered.” But we held in Moses
that § 5K2.14 does not permit an upward departure based on the defendant’s future
dangerousness, because the provision concerns the defendant’s dangerousness at the time of the
crime. See Moses, 106 F.3d at 1277-79. However, the district court did not reference § 5K2.14
during Arnold’s sentencing hearing. Although the district court spoke in terms of departure, it
seems clear from the record that the court intended to impose a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553,
which permits a sentencing court to consider the need “to protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant” in imposing its sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). The court, then, did not
err in extending Arnold’s sentence on the grounds that his anger at the time of his arrest posed a
potential future threat to public safety.
In sum, the record makes clear that the district court’s sentence, although influenced in
part by concern that Arnold posed a threat to public safety, was also driven by Arnold’s need for
mental health treatment while incarcerated, and the court’s belief that this treatment would not be
completely effective if Arnold’s sentence was limited to the Guidelines range. But our decision
in Moses prohibits the extension of a defendant’s sentence based on the need for treatment for
mental illness, even if that mental illness creates a potential danger of violent behavior. 106 F.3d
at 1280. Instead, the appropriate mechanism for protecting the public from danger stemming
from a convicted person’s mental illness is commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246, “rather than an
extended criminal sentence.”
Moses, 106 F.3d at 1281.
Even a variance that lengthened
Arnold’s sentence, if it did so in order to accommodate treatment for mental illness, violates
Tapia and § 3582(a).
-9-
Case: 14-1956
Document: 44-2
Filed: 11/03/2015
Page: 10
No. 14-1956
United States v. Arnold
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, we uphold the district court’s denial of Arnold’s motion to
discharge counsel and represent himself, AFFIRM Arnold’s conviction, VACATE Arnold’s
sentence, and REMAND this case for resentencing.
-10-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?