Timothy Cooper v. The Commercial Savings Bank, et al

Filing

OPINION filed : The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Decision for publication. R. Guy Cole, Jr., Chief Judge; Damon J. Keith and Alice M. Batchelder (AUTHORING), Circuit Judges.

Case: 14-3031

Document: 53-2

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0092n.06
No. 14-3031

FILED

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Jan 30, 2015
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

TIMOTHY H. COOPER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE COMMERCIAL SAVINGS BANK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

BEFORE:

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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO

COLE, Chief Judge; KEITH and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Timothy Cooper challenged the
constitutional validity of a cognovit note that he signed, arguing in a lawsuit brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 that such a debt instrument violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the defendants were not state actors
and therefore not liable under § 1983. Cooper appealed. However, his brief on appeal is
completely devoid of any legal argument. Therefore we hold that he has waived any arguments
he might have offered and forfeited his appeal, and accordingly AFFIRM the district court.
A cognovit note is a debt instrument recognized by Ohio law, whereby the debtor agrees
to allow the creditor to obtain judgment without notice or a hearing in the event of nonpayment.
Cooper signed a cognovit note in the amount of $334,175, evidencing his indebtedness to
Defendant The Commercial Savings Bank. Cooper became delinquent on the payments and a

Case: 14-3031

Document: 53-2

Filed: 01/30/2015

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No. 14-3031
Cooper v. The Commercial Savings Bank, et al.

cognovit judgment was entered against him. After years of state litigation contesting aspects of
the debt instrument he had signed, Cooper filed this action against multiple defendants in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The amended complaint included
a due-process claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various state law claims; Cooper
also filed a motion for class certification. The defendants each filed separate motions for
summary judgment, which the district court granted as to all federal claims on the ground that
the defendants were not state actors and therefore are not liable under § 1983. The court
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, dismissing them without
prejudice, and denied the motion for class certification as moot. Cooper filed a timely notice of
appeal, assigning as error only the district court’s ruling that the defendants are not state actors
subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We review de novo a determination of whether a defendant is a state actor for purposes of
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1995). But this appeal
begins and ends with the issue of waiver. “An appellant waives an issue when he fails to present
it in his initial briefs before this court.” Marks v. Newcourt Credit Grp., Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 462
(6th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 607 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding
defendant waived objections to jury instructions by not raising those objections on appeal). An
appellant abandons any argument not raised in his opening brief. Sommer v. Davis, 317 F.3d
686, 691 (6th Cir. 2003). This lenient standard can be satisfied even by a short and undeveloped
argument. See, e.g., Robert N. Clemens Trust v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 852–
53 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a brief parroting the language of one section from an SEC rule
was sufficient to avoid waiver, but that arguments regarding two other sections were waived
because appellant’s brief was “devoid of any reference” to the two sections).
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Cooper’s brief on appeal fails to provide even a modicum of legal argument as to why the
district court erred in holding that the defendants are not state actors. He cites only to a single
case, D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 176–77 (1972), which holds that cognovit
notes are not per se unconstitutional, and does not address at all the question before us here,
namely whether persons or entities in the positions of these defendants have engaged in state
action.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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