Richard Thomason, et al v. Amalgamated Local No. 863, et al

Filing

OPINION filed: AFFIRMED; decision not for publication. Alan E. Norris, Circuit Judge (AUTHORING); Jeffrey S. Sutton, Circuit Judge and Bernice Bouie Donald, Circuit Judge.

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0665n.06
No. 14-3371
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD THOMASON,
Plaintiff,
and
TIMOTHY EVANS; MICHAEL
LEWIS; MICHAEL OGLE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
AMALGAMATED LOCAL NO. 863;
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE
AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA,
Defendants-Appellees.

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FILED
Sep 30, 2015
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO
OPINION

BEFORE: NORRIS, SUTTON, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to Title I of
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1),
alleging that defendants—the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (“UAW”), and UAW Local Union 863—deprived
them of their equal right to vote in a union matter that materially affected them. Earlier in this
litigation, the district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that plaintiffs were
not members of Local 863 at the time of the disputed vote. This court reversed and remanded the

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Thomason v. Amalgamated Local No. 863
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matter to permit further discovery. Thomason v. Amalgamated Local No. 863, 438 F. App’x
358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 2011). After remand, the district court granted summary judgment to
defendants, again holding that plaintiffs were not members of Local 863 at the time of the vote at
issue. We now affirm that decision.
I.
Plaintiffs were originally hired by Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) to work at a facility
located in Sharonville, Ohio.

Labor relations at that plant were governed by a collective

bargaining agreement between Ford and Local 863. The local union also had jurisdiction over a
transmission plant in Batavia, Ohio, which was owned by a German company,
ZF Friedrichshafen AG (“ZF”), and operated as a joint venture with Ford. ZF employed two sets
of workers at the Batavia plant: those borrowed from Ford and ZF’s own hires. Both groups
shared membership in Local 863. However, they worked under separate collective bargaining
agreements with each company.
In 2001, plaintiffs were laid off by Ford. The national agreement between Ford and the
UAW provided that laid off union members could transfer to other Ford facilities so that they
could protect their seniority and recall rights. The plaintiffs elected to transfer: Timothy Evans
and Michael Lewis accepted preferential placements at the Michigan truck facility, which was
under the jurisdiction of UAW Local 900; Michael Ogle transferred to the Kentucky truck
facility, which was under the jurisdiction of UAW Local 862.
In late 2004, Ford repurchased the Batavia plant from ZF and thereby ended their joint
venture. Pursuant to a transition agreement between the UAW and Ford, former ZF employees
would retain their accumulated seniority when they became Ford employees. The effect of this
provision, which lies at the heart of this appeal, is that a former ZF employee could have greater
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seniority than an employee who had worked for Ford all along. Plaintiffs were among the Ford
employees adversely affected.
In meetings held on September 20, 2004, by Local 863, ZF employees voted to approve
the transition agreement. Ford employees who were Local 863 members were not permitted to
vote. Plaintiffs contend that the LMRDA was violated because they were not permitted to
participate.
At the time of the vote, plaintiffs were still working at the Michigan and Kentucky Truck
facilities respectively. The following month, however, they exercised an option afforded by the
national agreement between Ford and the UAW and returned to the Sharonville plant. They
were later transferred to the Batavia plant. In 2006 they were laid off despite the fact that they
had more seniority with Ford than certain former ZF employees who had benefited from the
“retroactive seniority” provision of the transition agreement.
II.
The sole count of the amended complaint alleges a violation of the following section of
the LMRDA:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges
within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or
referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to
participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings,
subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and
bylaws.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1).1 The statute defines “member” as follows:
“Member” or “member in good standing”, when used in reference to a labor
organization, includes any person who has fulfilled the requirements for
membership in such organization, and who neither has voluntarily withdrawn
1

Section 411 of the LMDRA “has been labeled the union bill of rights.” Hooks v. Truck
Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local 100, 39 F. App’x 309, 312 (6th Cir. 2002).
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from membership nor has been expelled or suspended from membership after
appropriate proceedings consistent with lawful provisions of the constitution and
bylaws of such organization.
29 U.S.C. § 402(o). Members may seek relief for a violation of § 411. 29 U.S.C. § 412; see
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Dresden Local No. 267 v. Ohio Carpenters Health
& Welfare Fund, 926 F.2d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 1991).
As the definition of “member” quoted above makes clear, unions themselves may
establish the requirements for membership. In turn, we owe “substantial deference” to the
union’s interpretation of its own governing documents unless that interpretation is not “fair or
reasonable.” United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union Local 911 v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 301 F.3d 468, 478 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Dresden Local No. 267 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of
Am., S. Cent. Ohio Dist. Council, 992 F.2d 1418, 1423 (6th Cir. 1993)). Defendants contend that
plaintiffs were not members of Local 863 at the time of the contested vote based upon the
union’s consistent interpretation of its governing documents. We agree.
Article 16, § 19 of the International UAW Constitution provides that unless a laid off
worker certifies within six months that “s/he continues to be eligible for good standing
membership[,] . . . the member shall automatically be noted on the Local Union’s records as
having been issued an honorable withdrawal transfer card.” R. 95-2 at 51; Page ID 3906.
According to Gregory Drudi, who has, as explained further below, authority to interpret the
Constitution on behalf of the UAW president, Section 19 “automatically” strips workers of local
membership six months after a layoff, absent the required certification.

R. 81 at 118

(deposition); Page ID 2393. Plaintiffs do not contend that they sought the required certification;
thus, they ceased to be members of Local 863 long before the 2004 vote. Functionally speaking,
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when the union automatically noted that it had issued the plaintiffs honorable withdrawal transfer
cards it was “the equivalent of expulsion from the union.” Thompson v. Office & Prof’l Emps.
Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 74 F.3d 1492, 1508 (6th Cir. 1996). As this court has made clear, a
worker placed on “honorable withdrawal status” is “no longer a member able to assert claims
under § 411.” See Hooks, 39 F. App’x at 310-12.
In addition, Article IV, § 1 of Local 863’s bylaws provides that its membership “shall be
composed of workers . . . over whom the Local has jurisdiction.” R. 69-19 at 30; Page ID 972.
Local 863’s jurisdiction did not extend to workers in Michigan or Kentucky where the plaintiffs
worked at the time of the 2004 vote. As already noted, those areas were under the jurisdiction of
other local unions.
In short, the district court properly concluded that plaintiffs were not members of Local
863 on September 20, 2004, when the contested vote occurred. Hence, they are precluded from
bringing an action under Section 411 of the LMRDA.
Finally, we turn to plaintiffs’ contention that the district court erred when it refused to
strike the affidavit submitted by Gregory Drudi. Plaintiffs argued below that he had no personal
knowledge of the contested vote, and his affidavit was therefore inadmissible. As the district
court observed, however, Mr. Drudi assumed certain facts for the purpose of providing his
interpretation of the UAW Constitution regarding voting procedures. R. 131 at 6; Page ID 6682.
Since the disputed portions of the affidavit pertain only to voting, striking them would leave
undisturbed his observations about the critical element of this appeal: membership in a local
union. We agree with the district court that there is nothing in Mr. Drudi’s affidavit that requires
it to be stricken.

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III.
The judgment is affirmed.

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