Jeffrey Hinneburg v. Nicole Miron, et al

Filing

OPINION filed : The district court's grant of summary judgment as to defendants Miron, Edringer, and DeLuca is AFFIRMED, decision not for publication. R. Guy Cole , Jr., Chief Circuit Judge (Authoring) ; Danny J. Boggs, Circuit Judge and Eugene E. Siler , Jr., Circuit Judge.

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 17a0044n.06
Case No. 16-1561

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JEFFREY HINNEBURG, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Ashlee P.
Hinneburg, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NICOLE MIRON; LUKAS EDRINGER; DAVID
EALY; JACOB THORNE; TIFFANY DELUCA,
R.N.; CINDY DEVIEW, R.N.,
Defendants-Appellees.

BEFORE:

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Jan 19, 2017
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

OPINION

COLE, Chief Judge; BOGGS and SILER, Circuit Judges.

COLE, Chief Judge. Ashlee Hinneburg died on April 14, 2014, while incarcerated at the
Macomb County Jail (“Macomb”) in Mt. Clemens, Michigan. Jeffrey Hinneburg, the personal
representative for her estate, filed suit alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent
to Hinneburg’s serious medical need. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to Officers Nicole Miron and Lukas Edringer, and Nurse Tiffany DeLuca, because there is no
genuine dispute of material fact that the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to
Hinneburg’s serious medical need.

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I. BACKGROUND
On April 14, 2014, Hinneburg filled a prescription at an urgent-care facility for pills that
contained hydrocodone. On that same day, she pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ninety days
in jail for a probation violation.
Following the sentencing, and while at the Roseville Police Department, Hinneburg
apparently removed something from her genital area that the parties believe was a pill and placed
it in her mouth. Around 1:30 p.m., Hinneburg was transported from the Roseville Police
Department to Macomb. Hinneburg was transported with Janelle Craft, another inmate, who
testified that Hinneburg appeared “extremely high” because she was nodding out and “falling all
over the place.”
At Macomb, Hinneburg was assigned to holding cell 10. She did not receive any medical
attention before being placed in the holding cell. While there, Janet Tate, another inmate,
observed that Hinneburg appeared “visibly high” because “she was nodding out and talking to
herself.”
At 3:36 p.m., a deputy escorted Hinneburg and Craft to a bench in front of the nurse’s
office to await their intake medical screenings. Video footage shows Hinneburg dropping her
head repeatedly and slumping forward while waiting for the screening. Dylan Corbett, an
inmate, observed Hinneburg while she was waiting to see the nurse and testified that she
appeared “very high” and was “nodding out.” (Corbett Dep. R. 77-4, PageID 848.) While
Hinneburg was waiting for her screening, Officer Jacob Thorne also saw her drop her head about
five times in five minutes. Thorne believed that Hinneburg’s behavior was abnormal but did not
check on her because she was with other officers and was about to see the nurse. Also, Thorne

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did not see Hinneburg stumble, trip, or struggle while walking into the nurse’s office or back to
her cell.
Hinneburg waited to see Tiffany DeLuca, the nurse, for about five minutes. DeLuca
completed Hinneburg’s medical questionnaire around 3:58 p.m., ending her medical screen.
DeLuca reported that Hinneburg did not show any signs of medical distress.

During the

screening, DeLuca asked Hinneburg a number of questions about her medical history, many of
which were contained in a five-page medical questionnaire. Hinneburg acknowledged that she
was currently taking two prescription medications, Effexor and Buspar, but denied taking any
other medications or drugs.

DeLuca did not observe any of the normal signs of opiate

intoxication when she interviewed Hinneburg. She says that Hinneburg was “alert[,] [s]he was
coherent[, and] answer[ed] the questions appropriately.” (DeLuca Dep., R. 67-4, PageID 624.)
After the screening, Hinneburg walked back to holding cell 10 unassisted. At some point while
Hinneburg was in holding cell 10, either before or after the medical screening, Craft saw her take
more pills.
Miron and Edringer worked in the booking room on the day Hinneburg died. Miron
heard commotion coming from cell 10 while she was in the booking room. Miron and Edringer
went to cell 10 at 4:29 p.m. and saw that inmates Binney and Tate “were upset because
Hinneburg was flooding the cell and spilling juice and putting apples into the toilet.” (Miron
Dep., R. 66-20, Page ID 522.) Tate testified that “[Hinneburg] needed some medical attention.”
(Tate Dep., R. 77-3, PageID 839.) Miron did not believe that these actions were odd for an
inmate and believed it was just an inmate misbehaving.
Miron and Edringer removed Hinneburg from the cell, had her change into a jail uniform,
and then placed her in a detoxification cell. They claim that this was to separate her from Binney

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and Tate, not because they perceived that she had used drugs or alcohol.

Miron, while

accompanying Hinneburg to change her clothing, asked Hinneburg about her strange behavior.
Miron testified that Hinneburg blamed her actions on not having slept in a few days and being
upset about her jail sentence. Miron also stated that Hinneburg changed on her own and put all
of her belongings in the property bag by herself. Miron did not believe that Hinneburg had a
medical problem.
Edringer stated that he photographed Hinneburg and created her wristband before she
was moved to the detox cell. Edringer stated that she “was responsive to my instructions” and
“was not dropping her head or body.” (Edringer Aff., R. 66-21, PageID 537.) He stated that “he
did not see her stumble or stagger, or walk with spaghetti legs.” (Id. at 538.)
Officer David Ealy was assigned to “booking detex,” which meant that he conducted
hourly rounds throughout the jail, beginning around 3:00 p.m. Ealy observed Hinneburg about
once every hour and checked for “chest rise,” while she was in the detoxification cell. (Ealy
Dep., R. 66-22, PageID 542.) He further testified that seeing Hinneburg lying down with her
chest rising would indicate that she was sleeping. Around 6:08 p.m., Cynthia Deview, another
nurse, made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a urine sample from Hinneburg.
At 8:19 p.m., Ealy was unable to verify that Hinneburg had chest rise. “[U]pon noticing
that . . . she was unresponsive, [Ealy] contacted the medical staff immediately.

Upon the

medical staff coming into the cell, the medical staff . . . began administering smelling salts.
When the smelling salts were unsuccessful, I rolled Hinneburg from her stomach to her back and
began chest compressions.” (Ealy Dep., R. 77-11, PageID 1001.)
Paramedics transported Hinneburg to McClaren Macomb Hospital in Mt. Clemens at
about 8:42 p.m., where she was pronounced dead at 9:08 p.m. The Macomb County Chief

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Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy and concluded that hydrocodone intoxication caused
Hinneburg’s death.
The plaintiff filed the instant complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the six
defendants violated Hinneburg’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. The four correctional
officers, Miron, Thorne, Edringer, and Ealy, moved for summary judgment. The nurses, DeLuca
and Deview, also moved for summary judgment. The defendants argued that there was no
genuine dispute of material fact and that they were not deliberately indifferent to Hinneburg’s
serious medical need. They argued, in the alternative, that they were entitled to qualified
immunity.
The district court granted summary judgment to all of the defendants. The district court
assumed that Hinneburg had an objectively serious medical need and focused on whether the
defendants knew she was seriously ill and failed to provide her the appropriate medical care.
The court held that no reasonable jury could find that any of the defendants knew or should have
known that Hinneburg had a serious medical need and failed to provide her with the necessary
medical care, and that, in the alternative, all of the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity.
The plaintiff appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment, but no longer
pursues any claims against Officer Thorne, Officer Ealy, or Nurse Deview.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews a summary judgment determination de novo. Carl v. Muskegon Cty.,
763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 56(a). Courts consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986). But “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of plaintiff’s
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the plaintiff.” Id. at 252.
B. Deliberate Indifference
The Supreme Court has long held that the government is obligated to “provide medical
care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
(1976). “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” constitutes an Eighth
Amendment violation, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 104–05.
Deliberate indifference claims have two components—one objective and one subjective.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective component requires evidence
of a “sufficiently serious” medical need. Id.; Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 550
(6th Cir. 2009).

The subjective component requires proof “that the official being sued

subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact
draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693,
703 (6th Cir. 2001).
As a result, the subjective prong of Farmer has three parts. First, “the official must . . .
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Second, the official must draw the inference. Id. Third, the
official must consciously choose to ignore that risk. Id.
At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must “make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence” of deliberate indifference, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

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322 (1986), because the plaintiff bears “the onerous burden of proving the official’s subjective
knowledge” at trial. See Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703.
i. Objective Prong
The district court assumed that the plaintiff had met the objective prong in this case. In
general, the principal fact the plaintiff must prove under the objective prong is that the medical
need was sufficiently serious. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
Hinneburg has met the objective prong. Several of the inmates, through sworn affidavits and
depositions, testified as to the extreme nature of Hinneburg’s intoxication, and Tate specifically
testified that she believed Hinneburg needed medical attention. In cases like this one, where
death results from a failure to provide medical services, and there is evidence that lay persons,
Tate in this case, recognized the necessity for a doctor’s attention, the objective prong is usually
met. See Phillips v. Roane Cty., Tenn., 534 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 2008).
ii. Subjective Prong
The court must analyze the subjective prong for each defendant. Id. at 542. In cases of
drug-overdose deaths while in custody, this court has found that the fact that officers know or
should have known that a detainee ingested drugs is not enough to establish deliberate
indifference. See Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398, 411 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding officers acted
constitutionally where they did not provide treatment to a detainee who they had not seen ingest
drugs, who was not incapacitated, and who did not ask for help). On the other hand, correctional
officers should be held liable where they refused to “verify underlying facts that [they] strongly
suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that [they] strongly suspected to
exist.” Border v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 414 F. App’x 831, 838 (6th Cir. 2011)
(alterations in original) (citation omitted).

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In Smith v. Erie County Sheriff’s Department, this court found that officers who merely
believed that a woman was intoxicated, but not in need of medical attention, did not act with
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 603 F. App’x 414 (6th Cir. 2015). The
decedent in that matter was arrested for disorderly conduct after an officer observed that she was
not wearing shoes and smelled alcohol on her breath. Id. at 416. A corrections officer found two
bottles of pills prescribed to her in her purse and did not notify anyone else of the prescription
medication until after her death. Id. at 416–17. The decedent was found dead shortly after her
initial arrest. Id. The decedent’s daughter filed a § 1983 suit against the officers, claiming that
they were deliberately indifferent to her mother’s serious medical need. The court found that
“[n]o reasonable juror could conclude that [the decedent] appeared to be so intoxicated that she
needed immediate medical attention.” Id. at 421.
The case at hand has even less evidence of deliberate indifference than Smith because the
defendants did not know that Hinneburg had obtained pills earlier that day or ingested one or
more over the course of the afternoon. The district court found that Hinneburg’s behavior,
combined with the fact that the defendants were unaware she had taken hydrocodone, showed
only that she appeared intoxicated. The evidence does not demonstrate that the defendants knew
about Hinneburg’s serious medical need and failed to provide her with the medical attention she
required.
a. Officers Miron and Edringer
Miron and Edringer responded to the commotion in cell 10, and Miron interacted with
Hinneburg as she changed her clothing prior to Hinneburg’s reassignment to detox cell 2. Miron
described Hinneburg as agitated while she changed, but otherwise normal and responsive.
Edringer observed Hinneburg while he photographed her and created her wristband. He found

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her responsive to his directions and stated that she did not have difficulty walking or controlling
her body.
Plaintiff argues that he meets the subjective prong because Miron and Edringer should
have known from Hinneburg’s strange and volatile behavior in the holding cell and while she
was changing that she was intoxicated at a life-threatening level. The plaintiff claims that Tate’s
statements about Hinneburg’s actions in the holding cell create a genuine dispute of material fact
and contradict Miron and Edringer’s observations. Miron and Edringer, however, were not
present for the whole time that Tate observed Hinneburg in cell 10. They were only present for
the time that it took them to remove her from the cell. Because this inquiry is necessarily
individualized, the court cannot attribute observations to the defendants that they did not in fact
observe.
Miron’s and Edringer’s observations and interactions with Hinneburg did not indicate
that Hinneburg had a serious medical need, so there is no genuine dispute of material fact that
Miron and Edringer were not deliberately indifferent. As in Smith, the most Miron and Edringer
knew was that Hinneburg was intoxicated, but no evidence suggested that they knew or could
infer that Hinneburg had a serious medical need. Therefore, the plaintiff has not met the
subjective prong of the deliberate-indifference analysis as to Miron or Edringer.
b. Nurse DeLuca
DeLuca conducted the medical screening of Hinneburg and, with Hinneburg’s
participation, completed her medical questionnaire. The record establishes that Hinneburg left
cell 10 at 3:36 p.m., waited for DeLuca for about five minutes, and completed the screening
when DeLuca e-signed Hinneburg’s questionnaire around 3:58 p.m. Accordingly, DeLuca spent
no more than seventeen minutes with Hinneburg. DeLuca did not observe Hinneburg nodding

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her head repeatedly outside her office nor was she aware of Hinneburg’s behavior in the holding
cell. Hinneburg was alert and coherent, and able to complete the medical screening form, which
included five pages of questions about her medical history. DeLuca stated that Hinneburg did
not appear intoxicated and displayed no signs of opiate use. Again, at most, DeLuca was aware
that Hinneburg was intoxicated, but the evidence does not show that she was aware of facts from
which she could draw the inference that Hinneburg had a substantial risk of serious harm. Thus,
the subjective prong of the deliberate-indifference analysis is not met as to DeLuca.
Consequently, the plaintiff has failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact that
Miron, Edringer, or DeLuca were deliberately indifferent to Hinneburg’s serious medical need.
Because we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the merits, we need not address the
issue of qualified immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to
defendants Miron, Edringer, and DeLuca.

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