USA v. Anthony Shelton

Filing

OPINION filed : AFFIRMED, decision not for publication. Gilbert S. Merritt, Authoring Circuit Judge; Eric L. Clay, Circuit Judge and Bernice Bouie Donald, Circuit Judge.

Case: 16-5772

Document: 23-1

Filed: 01/20/2017

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 17a0050n.06
Case No. 16-5772
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED
Jan 20, 2017
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY SHELTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
TENNESSEE

Before: MERRITT, CLAY, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

The defendant-appellant, Anthony Shelton, received a

sentence of 151 months after pleading guilty to one count of possessing with intent to distribute
more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 280 grams of crack cocaine. Subsequently, the
Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 782 which had the effect of reducing the guideline
range upon which the sentence was originally calculated from 151–188 months to 121–151
months.

Shelton and the government entered into a plea agreement containing a waiver

provision, however, that stated that Shelton “knowingly waive[d] his right to challenge [his]
sentence . . . including, but not limited to, a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and/or
§ 2241, and/or 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).” The sentencing court accepted the plea agreement without
a presentence investigative report.

Case: 16-5772

Document: 23-1

Filed: 01/20/2017

Page: 2

Case No. 16-5772
United States v. Shelton
After Shelton filed this appeal, this court decided United States v. Bryant, No. 16-5176,
2016 WL 5899177 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016), a similar case containing the same waiver provision
as we have here in which the defendant “knowingly waive[d] the right to challenge the agreed
sentence in any collateral attack, including . . . a motion brought pursuant to . . . 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c).” Id. at *1. Thus, the Bryant case is directly on point. The court in Bryant said:
Waiver. The district court lacked authority to grant Bryant’s motion because he
waived the right to challenge his sentence under § 3582(c) in the plea agreement.
The agreement could not be clearer. It states that Bryant “knowingly waives the
right to challenge th[e] agreed sentence in any collateral attack, including . . . a
motion brought pursuant to . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).” This case begins, and
arguably should end, there.
Id.
Because Shelton’s plea agreement contained the exact same waiver language and because
Shelton seeks the exact same relief as was sought in Bryant, we affirm the judgment of the
district court’s dismissal of Shelton’s petition brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

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