United States v. Christopher Long

Filing

PER CURIAM OPINION FILED - THE COURT: Diana E. Murphy, Pasco M. Bowman and Duane Benton (UNPUBLISHED); Granting [4364576-2] motion to withdraw as counsel filed by Ms. Ann M. Koszuth.; Denying appellant's pending motions, [4371760-2] [4371760-3] [4374019-4] [4374019-3] [4408426] [16-1005]

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 16-1005
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Christopher S. Long
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin
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Submitted: June 2, 2016
Filed: June 7, 2016
[Unpublished]
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Before MURPHY, BOWMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Christopher Long appeals after he pleaded guilty to a felon-in-possession
charge and the District Court1 imposed a sentence of ninety-six months in prison and
1

The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

Appellate Case: 16-1005

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Date Filed: 06/07/2016 Entry ID: 4408426

three years of supervised release, varying downward from the advisory U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines range. Long’s counsel has moved to withdraw, and in a brief
filed under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), counsel raises two issues:
whether Long’s prior conviction under Missouri Revised Statutes section
571.030.1(4) was a “crime of violence” for purposes of calculating his offense level
under Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(2) and whether the sentence is substantively
unreasonable. In a pro se supplemental brief, Long joins counsel in challenging the
designation of his prior conviction as a crime of violence and also requests priorcustody credit.
We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that the court did not err in
determining that the section 571.030.1(4) offense was a “crime of violence” under the
Guidelines. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(1) (defining “crime
of violence”); United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir.) (holding that
§ 571.030.1(4) “meets the statutory definition of violent felony in [18 U.S.C.]
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i), because it involves the ‘use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another’”), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1035 (2009);
United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 826 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The statutory definition
of ‘violent felony’ is viewed as interchangeable with the guidelines definition of
‘crime of violence.’” (citations to quoted cases omitted)), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 927
(2010). We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
vary downward any more than it did. See United States v. Lazarski, 560 F.3d 731,
733–34 (8th Cir. 2009). Finally, Long must raise any issue of prior-custody credit
with the Bureau of Prisons. See United States v. Iversen, 90 F.3d 1340, 1344 (8th
Cir.1996).
We have reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), and
we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we deny Long’s pending motions.
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Date Filed: 06/07/2016 Entry ID: 4408426