ILWU, et al v. ICTSI Oregon, Inc.
Filing
FILED OPINION (DIARMUID F. O'SCANNLAIN, RICHARD R. CLIFTON and JACQUELINE H. NGUYEN) ICTSI s motion for judicial notice is GRANTED. See Small v. Avanti Health Systems, LLC, 661 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2011).; AFFIRMED. Judge: DFO Authoring, Judge: RRC Concurring. FILED AND ENTERED JUDGMENT. [10518020]
Case: 14-35504, 07/24/2017, ID: 10518020, DktEntry: 55-2, Page 1 of 10
ALEX BRYSON
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, UK
Union wage effects
What are the economic implications of union wage bargaining for
workers, firms, and society?
Keywords: trade unions, wages, bargaining, labor market, firm performance, productivity
ELEVATOR PITCH
Union wage premium
Despite declining bargaining power, unions continue
to generate a wage premium. Some feel collective
bargaining has had its day. Politicians on both sides
of the Atlantic have recently called for the removal of
bargaining rights from workers in the name of wage and
employment flexibility, yet unions often work in tandem
with employers for mutual gain based on productivity
growth. If this is where the premium originates, then
firms and workers benefit. Without unions bargaining
successfully to raise worker wages, income inequality
would almost certainly be higher than it is.
KEY FINDINGS
Pros
Cited
i
U
n ILW
Trade unions maintain and improve workers’
terms and conditions through bargaining with
employers.
Workers organized in trade unions benefit
from higher wages—the so-called union wage
premium.
Union bargaining also results in a fringe benefits
premium for covered workers.
Trade unions reduce wage inequality.
The counter-cyclical wage premium helps to
maintain the real wages of covered workers.
All employees raw wage premium
All employees regression adjusted
30
Percent
25
20
15
10
5
12
20
10
20
08
20
06
20
04
20
02
20
00
20
98
19
96
19
19
94
0
7
, 201
ly 18
uBryson and J. Forth based on British Labour
Source: Calculations by A.
nJ
ed o
Force Surveyrchiv
data.
4a
0
-355
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., N
, Inc
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I Ore
TS
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35
Cons
Trade unions restrict employment flexibility.
Trade unions prevent markets from clearing.
By standardizing wages across regions, unions
distort labor supply.
Trade unions harm businesses if the return for
additional wages is low.
If the premium comes at the expense of normal
profits, this can damage firms and employment
growth.
AUTHOR’S MAIN MESSAGE
Unions continue to affect wage rises and reduce wage inequality despite reductions in their bargaining power. Society
and firms can benefit when the union wage premium is the result of productivity growth. However, if raised wages
come at the expense of normal profits, this can damage the prospects of firms and employment growth—to the longterm detriment of all. As union influence on wages has fallen, wage inequality has grown in many countries, perhaps
to the detriment of most workers and employers alike.
Union wage effects. IZA World of Labor 2014: 35
doi: 10.15185/izawol.35 | Alex Bryson © | July 2014 | wol.iza.org
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ALEX BRYSON
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Union wage effects
MOTIVATION
Union wage bargaining is perhaps the biggest departure from market wage-setting
in modern economies. Unions’ wage standardization policies that attach wages to
jobs, not individuals, have important implications for wage dispersion. Unions’ ability
to limit the labor supply to firms so as to extract above-market wages can benefit
workers but be detrimental to firms and employment. However, the implications of
union wage-setting are complex. Factors include: union bargaining power; institutional
arrangements for bargaining; unions’ ability to negotiate over employment as well as
wages; employer–union relations; and the profitability of the firms they organize. It is no
surprise, therefore, that the implications of union wage bargaining for workers, firms,
and society are heavily contested.
This article outlines the pros and cons of union wage bargaining, with empirical
evidence on the size of effects across countries and over time. It points to limitations
in our knowledge of the size of union wage effects and their origins. It concludes with
implications for public policy.
DISCUSSION OF PROS AND CONS
How do unions affect wages?
Unions affect wage levels and dispersion in five ways—two direct and three indirect (see
7
, 201
Mechanisms by which unions can affect wages). By threatening ly 18limit the supply of
u to
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labor, unions generate bargaining power, which they archivto negotiate improved terms
4 use
3550
. 14and conditions for covered employees, including wages. This power can also be used
., No
Inc
to resist downward pressure onOregon, such as employer efforts to cut or freeze wages
wages,
SI
T
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in an economic downturn. IThis makes union wages more rigid than non-union wages.
LWU
Cited
in I
Mechanisms by which unions can affect wages
Direct
•• Bargaining on behalf of covered employees for increased wages.
••
Bargaining on behalf of covered employees to maintain wages.
Indirect
•• Influence on other outcomes for covered employees, for example “voice” →
higher tenure → firm-specific human capital investments (Freeman and Medoff,
1984).
••
Threat of unionization raises wages in the non-union sector (Rosen, 1969).
••
Job losses in union sector, resulting in excess labor supply to non-union sector.
Freeman, R. B., and J. L. Medoff. What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books, 1984.
Rosen, S. “Trade union power, threat effects and the extent of organization.” Review of
Economic Studies 36 (1969): 185–196.
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Union wage effects
Unions can also affect covered employees’ wages through processes other than
wage bargaining. For example, in providing a “voice” for covered workers that allows
employers to resolve problems and disputes, unions reduce quit rates, raise tenure,
and thus provide employers and workers with an additional incentive to invest in firmspecific human capital, resulting in higher wages [1].
Union bargaining can affect wage-setting in the non-union sector in two ways that run
in opposite directions:
••
The first is the threat of unionization. This may lead non-union employers to raise
wages in the hope that doing so will limit opportunities for unions to organize
workers [2]. The threat effect therefore has the potential to close the gap between
wages in the covered and uncovered sectors.
••
On the other hand, if union-bargained wages result in job losses among unionized
employees, this may result in an excess supply of labor to the non-union sector,
which may depress wages there.
Evidence for union wage effects
Is the union wage effect real?
There is a long-standing debate as to whether unions have any effect2at7all on wages.
1
8, 0
ul 1
Adam Smith in 1776 and Fleeming Jenkin in 1868 believed unionsy did raise wages, but
on J
ived
Milton Friedman in 1950 thought they had little 5504 archbecause they could not affect
effect,
-3
the supply of labor. Instead, he said, they No. 14 took the credit for what would have
simply
Inc.,
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happened anyway. However, toward nthe end of the 20th century a consensus emerged
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that unions did affectWU v. [1], [3].
IL wages
Cited
in
So how big is the effect, and where does it come from? Answers to the questions “How
big?” and “Where from?” help determine whether union effects are welfare-enhancing
or deleterious to firms and the economy. Getting clear answers to these questions is
made difficult by tricky data and econometric problems in identifying a union causal
effect on wages. It is hard to exclude unions from an economy and then experimentally
insert them, or to separate direct bargaining effects on covered workers from the effects
of unions on wage-setting in the economy at large. Nevertheless, some strides have been
taken.
Empirical evidence on the size of the union wage premium
It is difficult to generalize about the size of union wage effects across countries because
the nature of unions and the institutional settings in which they operate are vastly
different. Until recently the literature was dominated by studies for English-speaking
countries characterized by workplace or firm-level bargaining where unions organize
workers with little or no statutory assistance from the state. Efforts to make crosscountry comparisons have relied on differentials between union members and nonmembers based on analyses of household surveys. In the empirical literature for the
Anglo-American world what is usually estimated is the difference between the ceteris
paribus earnings of union members and those of non-members. These estimates
identify the wage gap between union members and non-members holding constant their
individual and workplace characteristics. To illustrate, Figure 1 uses the International
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ALEX BRYSON
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Union wage effects
Figure 1. Union membership wage premium from around the world
Country
Years
Union % increase
Australia
Austria
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Cyprus
Denmark
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
UK
US
1994, 1998, and 1999
1994, 1995, 1998, and 1999
1999
1997−1999
1998, 1999
1996 −1998
1997−1998
1996−1998
1994 −1999
1994 and 1998
1994 −1996, 1998, 1999
1994 and 1995
1994 −1999
1994 −1999
1998 −1999
1995, 1997−1999
1994 −1999
1993 −2002
1973 −2002
12
15
34
8
16
14
16
3 (ns)
4 (ns)
0
26
0
10
7
18
7
0
10
17
Notes: Dependent variable log of earnings variously defined. Controls are age, age squared, years2017
of schooling, private
,
sector, hours, and union status. Sample restricted to employees. Germany includes EastJand 18
uly West. Dependent variable
n
ed o
defined as follows: Australia—Yearly income in Australian $; Austria—Personalvnet income per month in shilling;
rchi
4 a$; Chile—R’s monthly net income in CLP;
Canada—In what range would your own personal income fall in Canadian
3550
.1 Cyprus—Monthly gross earnings before taxes in Cyprus pounds;4Denmark—R’s earnings per year before taxes in Dkr;
., No
c
France—R’s monthly earnings in francs; Germany—R’s net earnings per month after taxes and social insurance in DM;
n, In
rego
Italy—R’s net income per month in CTSI O of lire; Japan—How much did you earn yourself last year before taxes
thousands
v. I
in thousands yen; Netherlands—R’s income after taxes in Gld; New Zealand—Yearly income from all sources before
WU
in IL
tax in NZ$; Norway—Personal gross income before taxes and allowances in 1997 include retirement benefits, etc.;
Cited
Portugal—R’s monthly average net income in escudos; Southern Ireland—Weekly gross income before taxes and
social insurance; Spain—R’s monthly earnings in pts; Sweden—Approximate income per month before taxes in SEK;
UK—Log hourly earnings; US--Log hourly earnings.
Source: ISSP, 1994 −1999, apart from UK (British Social Attitudes Survey) and US (Current Population Survey).
Based on Blanchflower, D., and A. Bryson. “Changes over time in union relative wage effects in the UK and the US
revisited.” In: Addison, J. T., and C. Schnabel (eds). International Handbook of Trade Unions. Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar, 2003; pp. 197 −245 [4].
Social Survey Program (ISSP) data for 1994–1999 to estimate the union membership
wage gap in 17 countries; additionally, data for the UK and US are provided for 1993–
2002 (British Social Attitudes Survey) and 1973–2002 (Current Population Survey),
respectively. There are five countries—France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Sweden—where the union wage premium is zero or not significantly different from
zero (ns). This is “primarily due to the fact that unions are also able to control wage
outcomes in the non-union sector” by extension of collectively bargained rates [4], p.
211. Although this points to diverse results across countries, it is problematic, because
union bargaining coverage is not always strongly correlated with union membership. In
that respect the US is unusual.
Evidence for the US and for the UK often points to a union membership wage premium
of between 10% and 15%, but effects vary across different parts of the wage distribution
(see “Union affects on the wage distribution”). Union bargaining also results in a nonwage premium in the form of fringe benefits such as pensions and holiday pay.
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ALEX BRYSON
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Union wage effects
Where unions organize at workplace level it is possible to see the direct effect of unions
on wages subsequent to a new organizing drive, especially when this results in a new
employment contract with renegotiated wages, as is often the case in the US. In these
settings, the size of union effects (on wages and other outcomes like share prices) reflects
union bargaining strength, as indicated by the proportion of employees supporting the
union. Not surprisingly, then, comparing wage changes where unions have only just won
the support of employees in a workplace election with those where they have just lost
reveals insignificant effects [5].
In most continental European countries, union bargaining can occur at various levels:
workplace, firm, sector, region, or nationally. In some of these countries (such as France,
Spain, Italy, and Denmark), it occurs at more than one level, such that the wage received
by a worker will reflect bargaining at different levels and the degree to which this is
coordinated. Where sectoral or national bargaining predominates, the outcomes from
union wage bargaining are often extended to uncovered employees—such that the wage
differential between union-covered and uncovered workers is reduced. Where there is
a differential, it is due to local negotiated rates exceeding the “base” rate agreed more
centrally (as has happened recently, for example, in Denmark). These union differentials
can be sizable, but in the main they are not [6].
Nevertheless, as in the Anglo-American setting, the wage premium achieved through local
bargaining is a function of union bargaining power (often indicated by the proportion
7
, 201
of employees belonging to the union) and the financial gains that are8available from the
uly 1
J
d on
employer, as in the case of France.
chive
r
04 a
-355
o. 14 non-union employers are threatened
Difficulties measuring the degree toncwhich
., N
,I
reg to
by union organizing makes itShard on estimate the size of any union threat effect on
O
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v. IC
wages in the non-union sector. A study using three methods (changes in right-to-work
WU
in IL
Cited
legislation, industry deregulation, and predicted likelihoods of unionization) in the US
gives mixed results [7]. Similarly, although there do appear to be some disemployment
effects associated with union bargaining (see “Consequences of union wage effects for
employers”), it has proved difficult for analysts to establish the effects of any labor
spillover on wage-setting in the non-union sector.
Has the size of the union wage premium changed over time?
There are at least three reasons why we might expect to see a decline in the union wage
premium over time.
••
First, rising market competition may have increased the price sensitivity of demand
for goods and services, thus limiting unions’ ability to demand wage hikes without
contemplating potential job losses.
••
Second, if increased market competition has reduced the number of employers
with scope to pay higher wages, this increases the likelihood that unions will face
greater employer resistance to their wage demands, since any premium is likely to
cut into normal profits.
IZA World of Labor | July 2014 | wol.iza.org
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ALEX BRYSON
••
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Union wage effects
Third, unions face increased difficulties in monopolizing the supply of labor to
firms. This is due to declining union density within unionized firms and the
increased availability of non-union labor due to de-unionization in the home
country. Globalization makes it easier for employers to import non-union labor
directly (witness the recent disputes relating to posted workers in Europe) or to
contract out to non-union labor in developing economies.
In fact, although the wage premium in the US and the UK has declined in recent years
[8], [9], it remains sizable and statistically significant for most groups of employees.
There are perhaps four reasons for this:
••
While the unionized sector has shrunk, unions continue to have a foothold in
settings where their bargaining power has been particularly strong. For instance,
in the UK the rate of union decline is slowest in industries where it is possible to
extract higher pay. This is because unions work hard to retain a foothold in those
sectors, and perhaps because employers in industries where higher pay can be
extracted are less resistant to unionization than other employers.
••
Union strongholds persist in occupations where unions have high bargaining power,
such as health professionals.
••
The weakening of unions’ organizational capacity may have reduced the number
of instances in which unionization is a credible threat to non-union7employers—a
, 201
ly 18
n Ju
ohave been the case in the
factor that may keep non-union wages lower than might
ived
arch
504
past.
4-35
••
1
No.
Inc.,
on, has squeezed out union opportunities to extract
The degree to which competition
Oreg
TSI
higher wages from v. IC
employers has, perhaps, been exaggerated. There remain a
WU
in IL
number ofted
Ci sectors where employers occupy monopoly or oligopolistic positions in
markets for products or services, where the state dominates, or where regulation
limits the amount of competition in the marketplace. These are all settings that
unions can exploit to benefit their members.
The union wage premium is also counter-cyclical (i.e. out of phase with the underlying
business cycle) [9], reflecting the time it takes to renegotiate long-term contracts with
unions following unanticipated demand shocks, and, perhaps, unions’ ability to block
managerial attempts to downwardly adjust wages unilaterally, as can occur in the nonunion sector.
Union effects on the wage distribution
Union wage policies are often guided by the principle of “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s
work,” such that wages are attached to jobs rather than individuals’ attributes. This
wage standardization policy, coupled with union concerns to tackle wage discrimination
on grounds of race, gender, and disability, can compress wage differentials. It is difficult
to disentangle these causal effects from effects arising from worker sorting across the
union and non-union sectors.
Whether unions actually compress wage differentials depends on the position of unionized
workers in the pay distribution, the union wage premium attached to different types
of worker, and the degree of centralization and coordination in collective bargaining.
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Union wage effects
Unions continue to compress wages in the US, Canada, and the UK, although there is
some disagreement as to whether the effect is apparent for women [10].
Unions compress wages because the union wage premium is much larger for low-waged
workers, and is modest or even negative further up the wage distribution. The decline
in unionization has contributed substantially to the growth in wage dispersion. In the
US it accounts for about one-quarter of the increase between 1979 and 2009, and in
Germany de-unionization accounts for about one-third of the rise in wage inequality in
the lower tail of the earnings distribution in the 1990s [11].
In those continental European countries where collective bargaining occurs locally and
nationally or sectorally, local bargaining usually sets rates above the national level, but
the effects of company-level agreements on pay dispersion differ across studies and
countries [6].
Consequences of union wage effects for employers
Whether union wage effects have consequences for firm performance depends on a
number of factors. Union wage effects can have positive benefits for employers where
they induce increased worker productivity through worker sorting (if better workers are
attracted by above-market wages), or increased worker effort due to efficiency wages,
do
ive
arch
504
5
17
8, 20
ly 1
n Ju
-3
1
Factors affecting the impact of union.,wage4effects on firm performance
No.
Inc
gon,
I Ore
TS
v. IC
••
Positive
WU
in IL
Cited
–– wages lead to increased labor productivity
–– worker sorting
–– worker effort (efficiency wages, fairer wages)
–– increase capital intensity
••
Neutral
–– taken from surplus rents (no closure)
–– high unionization among competitors, or extension of union pay rates
–– wages are simply labor’s share of bigger pie created by union
••
Negative
–– taken from normal rents
–– shareholder response (Lee and Mas, 2012)
–– wage compression reduces work incentives
–– limit managerial discretion to pay for performance
–– wage compression less attractive to high-ability workers
–– reduce capital investment (insufficient funds; anticipate lower returns)
Lee, D. S., and A. Mas. “Long-run impacts of unions on firms: New evidence from financial
markets, 1961–1999.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (2012): 333–378.
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Union wage effects
or reciprocation in return for fairer pay (if that is how workers perceive it). Firms may
also benefit by becoming more capital-intensive in response to increases in the relative
price of labor.
Alternatively, union wage effects may have little bearing on firm performance (neutral)
where the premium arises because unions have successfully organized firms that can
afford to pay more; where competitors also face union rates; or where the premium
simply reflects the additional value created by the productivity-enhancing effects of a
unionized labor force.
But the effects will have a negative impact on firms where the premium is extracted from
firms that have no “excess” profits; where wage compression reduces work incentives or
reduces the firm’s ability to attract high-ability labor; where union seniority rules and the
desire for wage standardization limit managerial discretion to pay for performance; and
where capital investment falls owing to insufficient funds or where investors perceive
that returns will be lower in the presence of a union.
Scholars in the 18th and 19th centuries came to the conclusion that unions were, in the
main, a good thing, in that they raised wages without creating unemployment. More
recently, there is no strong evidence that union wage bargaining results in workplace
closure, a finding that lends credence to the idea that workers are aware of the potentially
adverse consequences of making excessive wage claims. Unions respond to the median
7
union member accordingly by moderating their wage claims. However, unionized
, 201
y 18
ulgrow at a slower rate
J
workplaces in the UK, the US, Canada, and Australia appear nto
do
hive
4 arc who receive the largest wage
than their non-union counterparts. It is the low-skilled
550
14-3
No.
premium and who experience the largest., disemployment effects. It is unclear whether
c
n, In
this translates into a sizable TSI Orego
employment spillover to the non-union sector.
v. IC
WU
in IL some
have dbeen
Cite
There may
improvement in the financial performance of unionized
workplaces in recent years compared with non-unionized workplaces [8]. Although
this has been linked to unions seeking mutual gains with firms, the evidence of a
substantial productivity differential between union and non-union plants is not strong.
Furthermore, there is evidence that shareholders respond negatively to union organizing
in the US, such that the share price of publicly traded firms falls by roughly 10% in the
15–18 months following a successful union election campaign. The effects are larger in
firms where the majority voting union is substantial; that is, where employees reveal a
strong preference for union-bargained wage gains.
LIMITATIONS AND GAPS
Despite a spate of studies focusing on continental Europe, studies from the Englishspeaking world still dominate what we know about union wage effects. Yet unions are
an important part of developing economies. These studies grapple with very different
economic and political settings, and portray unions as very different institutions from
those we know through the existing literature. Differences in the nature of unionization,
even in the developed world, mean that we need to take full account of differences
in institutional settings. This means moving beyond simple estimates of differences
between union members and non-members using household data, although this is
often a good place to begin.
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Union wage effects
Technical (estimation and data) questions continue to make it difficult to tease out
causal effects of unions on wages and wage dispersion in union and non-union sectors.
Furthermore, few attempts have been made to distinguish between types of union,
despite their potential importance in understanding the wide range of union wage effects.
In the future, analysts should focus not simply on whether a union is present and how
many workers it has, but also on the type of union it is, and the relations between it and
management, which are, perhaps, the core of employment relations.
SUMMARY AND POLICY ADVICE
If unions do not cause the wage gap between union and non-union workers, no policy
implications follow. Where unions challenge employers who pay below employees’
true value, they may in fact perform a good by tackling discrimination or low pay and
increasing workers’ purchasing power. Although, in theory, it may be unsustainable
to pay above-market wages, unions can benefit workers and firms alike if the wage
premium reflects union-induced increases in productivity (see Factors affecting the
impact of union wage effects on firm performance).
But is the propensity of unions to compress pay harmful? National public sector pay
bargaining has received attention in the UK because it affects the quality of labor supplied
to the whole public sector, depending on how nationally bargained2017 rates there
pay
8,
uly 1
compare with the private (largely non-unionized) sector. These labor-supply distortions
on J
d
hive
have been linked to adverse welfare outcomes—for 504 arc
example, poor hospital care. A more
4-35
No. work incentives, although incentives may
dispersed wage structure might create Istrong 1
nc.,
n,
decline above a certain levelTSI Orego
of inequality. Also, perceptions of fairer pay can lead to
IC
greater worker effort WU v.
if workers reciprocate for the “gift” of greater fairness.
in IL
Cited
Governments’ perceptions of unions’ effects on wages depend on whether they view
current inequality levels as exacerbating or improving unemployment and poverty.
Those keen to tackle perceived discrimination and wages below workers’ worth may
support union bargaining; those concerned about wage inflation and unemployment
will prefer to let the market set wages. These political preferences have shifted, at least
in countries like the UK, where public policy became less tolerant of union bargaining
in the 1980s. In continental Europe, however, union bargaining remains key between
social partners.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks an anonymous referee and the IZA World of Labor editors for many
helpful suggestions on earlier drafts. Financial support from the Nuffield Foundation is
gratefully acknowledged.
Competing interests
The IZA World of Labor project is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research
Integrity. The author declares to have observed these principles.
©©Alex Bryson
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Union wage effects
REFERENCES
Further reading
Bryson, A., and J. Forth. Trade Union Membership and Influence, 1999–2009. Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP) Discussion Paper No. 1003, September 2010. Online at: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/dp1003.pdf
Frandsen, B. R. Why Unions Still Matter: The Effects of Unionization on the Distribution of Employee Earnings.
MIT Mimeo, 2012. Online at: http://www.ewi-ssl.pitt.edu/econ/files/seminars/120224_sem_
Brigham%20Frandsen.pdf
Lewis, H. G. Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States: An Empirical Inquiry. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1963.
Key references
[1] Freeman, R. B., and J. L. Medoff. What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books, 1984.
[2] Rosen, S. “Trade union power, threat effects and the extent of organization.” Review of Economic
Studies 36 (1969): 185–196.
[3] Lewis, H. G. Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
[4] Blanchflower, D., and A. Bryson. “Changes over time in union relative wage effects in the UK
and the US revisited.” In: Addison, J. T., and C. Schnabel (eds). International Handbook of Trade
Unions. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003; pp. 197–245.
[5] DiNardo, J., and D. S. Lee. “Economic impacts of new unionization on private sector
017
employers: 1984–2001.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119:4 (2004): 1383–1442.
18, 2
July
[6] Bryson, A. “Union effects on wages.” In: Marsden D., and F.hived on
Rycx (eds). Wage Structures,
arc
Employment Adjustments and Globalization: Evidence from Linked and Firm-Level Panel Data. Basingstoke:
504
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Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; pp. 174–184.Inc., No.
gon,
Ore
[7] Farber, H. S. “Non-union wage rates and the threat of unionization.” Industrial and Labor Relations
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v. IC
Review 58:3 (2005): WU
335–358.
n IL
ited
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The full reference list for this article is available from the IZA World of Labor website
(http://wol.iza.org/articles/union-wage-effects).
IZA World of Labor | July 2014 | wol.iza.org
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