Airline Service Providers Assn, et al v. Los Angeles World Airports, et al
Filing
FILED OPINION (RICHARD C. TALLMAN, MICHELLE T. FRIEDLAND and WILLIAM HORSLEY ORRICK) AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED. Judge: RCT concurring & dissenting, Judge: MTF Authoring, FILED AND ENTERED JUDGMENT. [10554492] [15-55571, 15-55572]
Intercity Buses: The Forgotten Mode | Cato Institute
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POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 680
Intercity Buses: The Forgotten Mode
By Randal O'Toole
June 29, 2011
T
he debate over President Obama’s fantastically expensive high-speed rail program
has obscured the resurgence of a directly competing mode of transportation:
intercity buses. Entrepreneurial immigrants from China and recently privatized
British transportation companies have developed a new model for intercity bus operations that
provides travelers with faster service at dramatically reduced fares. Airports
rld
s Wo
gele , 2017
An
Los
st 21
n v.
ss
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ed o
iders
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e
ervic
557
ine S o. 15-5
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movies.
twice as fast as Amtrak.
passenger mile than Amtrak.
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Randal O’Toole is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and author of
Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do about It.
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Preface and Acknowledgments
In the t went y-first century, as unions in the united states
find themselves increasingly overwhelmed by adversity—beleaguered by a relentlessly inhospitable political environment and representing an ever-shrinking share of
the workforce—the California labor movement appears surprisingly robust. Union
membership and density have inched upward in the state over recent years, even as
they continue to decline nationally. In addition to its successes in directly recruiting
new members, California labor has helped to promote a range of innovative legislative initiatives at both the state and the local level that indirectly facilitate organizs
r ot
ing. Changing state law to establish a public authority as the employerpofr record for
ld Ai
Wor
les tens
homecare workers, for example, paved the way to unionizing 2017 of thousands of
Ange 21
Los passed,the nation’s first effecv.
employees over the course of the 1990s. California alsogust
Assn
n Au
iders chived o
vwhich rprohibits employers from using state funds
tive state neutrality law in 2000,
Pro 1, a
ice
for anti-union—or e Serv . 15-5557
pro-union—activities. Labor’s efforts have also helped to secure
rilin
A
No
passage of local labor peace ordinances and “living wage” laws up and down the
state. Although, like their national counterparts, California unions continue to face
many daunting challenges, these recent achievements offer a basis for optimism and
perhaps even a model for others to emulate.
Enemies of organized labor often cast it as a “special interest” with political clout
disproportionate to its membership, but in many instances the California labor
movement exerts its considerable influence in Sacramento on behalf of not only its
own members but also the state’s vast non-union workforce, often with impressive
results. The most important recent example is the 2002 California paid family leave
law, the first of its kind in the United States, which will provide leave with pay for
new parents and workers caring for seriously ill family members starting in 2004.
More generally, as corporate restructuring and neoliberal government policies
steadily widen the gulf between rich and poor—a problem even more pronounced
in the state than in the nation—the California labor movement is the one voice consistently defending the economically disenfranchised. Such leadership on fundamental issues of economic and social justice is all too often lacking in other quarters.
After the long economic boom of the late 1990s gave way to deep recession and fiscal
crisis, effectively addressing such issues became far more difficult politically. Yet,
preface and acknowledgments
xi
Case: 15-55571, 08/23/2017, ID: 10554492, DktEntry: 30-2, Page 6 of 274
growing economic inequality and social justice issues are likely to remain at the forefront of public concern, and labor will continue to lead efforts to craft legislation
and public policy in this area.
This year’s State of California Labor is an effort to illuminate labor’s recent
achievements in California, as well as the broader political and economic context in
which they are situated. The volume opens with a chapter on union membership in
California, drawing on the California Union Census (CUC), a new source of data
from a project launched by the Institute for Labor and Employment (ILE) shortly
after its establishment in 2000. In partnership with the California Department of
Industrial Relations (DIR), and with cooperation from the California Labor Federation, the ILE conducted a survey of all local unions in the state in 2001–02. The
DIR once conducted similar surveys of union membership, publishing regular
reports on the subject from the late 1940s until 1987, when this data collection program was abruptly halted. In the first chapter of this volume, Daisy Rooks and I analyze the results of the 2001–02 CUC, along with other data on California union
membership, to explore why union density has increased recently in California even
as the nationwide decline continues. We provide a detailed portrait of the state’s
union members, by sector and industry as well as by demographics. The chapter also
includes a discussion of union staffing patterns and shows that organizing staff, in
s
rpo
particular, are concentrated in a relatively small number of unions. rt
ld Ai
Wor
Complementing this opening chapter is Kate ngeles 017 and Robert Hickey’s
Bronfenbrenner
A
,2
Los
s 2
v.
careful analysis of recent union organizing trends tin1the state, which tracks both
ssn on Augu
sA
National Labor Relationsovider rchived elections and less traditional organizing
r Board (NLRB)
ice P 5571, a
campaigns,line Seas those5using “card-check” neutrality agreements, over the 1997–
such rv 15o.
Ari
2002 period. NotN
only do California unions win NLRB elections at a slightly higher
rate than do unions nationally, but the proportion of workers organized as a result is
substantially greater in the state than in the nation (mainly because win rates in large
workplaces are higher in California). This chapter points out that the effectiveness of
union organizing campaigns varies with the type and combination of tactics used, as
Bronfenbrenner’s previous work on unions nationwide has shown, and reports that
in California, too, win rates are much higher for some unions than for others, especially in the face of determined employer opposition.
Part 2 of this volume turns from developments inside the labor movement to an
examination of the wider context of employment in the state. The chapter by Frank D.
Bean and B. Lindsay Lowell focuses on employment patterns among California’s
immigrants, a growing segment of the nation’s workforce and an even larger component of the state’s. Drawing on recently released 2000 U.S. census data, this chapter
offers an overview of immigrant employment statewide as well as in the Los Angeles
and San Francisco–San Jose metropolitan areas, comparing the 1990 and 2000
employment distribution of foreign-born workers across industries, by gender, as
well as by race and ethnicity. Bean and Lowell interrogate the relationship between
the growth of immigrant employment in California and the process of economic
xii
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
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polarization—robust growth in high- and low-paying jobs but relatively little growth
in the middle—that has increasingly characterized the state. Building on previous
work on polarized job growth in the 2002 State of California Labor, they offer an
analysis of 1994–2000 Current Population Survey data that suggests that immigration is not the driving force behind the polarization process. Moreover, they provide
some evidence that immigrants are moving up in the employment structure over
time despite the growing obstacles to such mobility.
Part 2 also includes an important study by Issac Martin, Jerome Karabel, and
Sean W. Jaquez that exposes the link between access to higher education and
employment outcomes in California. The recent trajectory of social and economic
inequality in the state, as well as nationwide, is in large part rooted in the widening
divide between college-educated and non-college-educated workers. Thus access—
or lack of it—to the prestigious University of California system is a critical factor
contributing to the shape of the new inequality. Martin, Karabel, and Jaquez draw
on UC admissions data to document the inequalities in access to UC among the
state’s high schools. Their analysis shows that students admitted to the university are
disproportionately drawn from a small subset of the state’s schools: those whose student bodies are largely affluent, Anglo, and Asian. Access is far more limited for
schools serving largely poor, Latino, and/or African American populations.
s
involving the
Part 3 of the volume shifts the focus back to developments directlyrport
ld Ai
Wor of AB 1889, the
an
California labor movement. John Logan’s chapter offers elesanalysis
Ang 21, 2017
Los
2000 “Cedillo Bill,” a pathbreaking effort nto . enforce ust neutrality in the labor
s v n Aug state
s As
arena by prohibiting employersrovider rchived ofunds from using them to promote
that receive state
ice P
1, a
or deter unionization. erv 15-5557the history of this legislation, exposing both the
e SLogan traces
.
rilin
A
No
political processes that led to its passage and describing the court challenges that it
currently faces. His essay also documents other recent examples of innovative state
and municipal labor law in California, including a detailed account of “labor peace
ordinances,” which the city of San Francisco pioneered. He situates all these developments in the broader context of ongoing conflict between employers and labor, a
conflict whose focal point has shifted from the national to the state and the local
level in recent years.
Michael Reich’s chapter on living wage laws in California complements Logan’s
analysis, for such legislation has been another major thrust of labor movement
efforts in the past decade. Reich’s chapter both chronicles the achievements of the
living wage movement in California to date, with detailed accounts of developments
in Los Angeles and San Francisco, and insightfully reviews the burgeoning research
literature on the economic effects of living wage legislation. Finally, our 2003 edition
closes with a review by Daniel J.B. Mitchell of recent labor relations developments
in the state. His survey, which covers all major sectors of the California economy,
highlights key trends in union-management relations, presenting them in the context of the state’s shifting economic conditions, and charts upcoming collective bargaining agreements.
preface and acknowledgments
xiii
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Any volume of this kind involves extensive collective effort. Special thanks are due
to Paul Attewell, Richard Flacks, Stephanie Luce, Roger Waldinger, as well as our
Associate Editors and Editorial Advisory Board, for assistance in critically reviewing
the articles included here. I am also grateful to ILE staff members Elizabeth del Rocio
Camacho and James Robbins for their contributions to the production process, as
well as to the exceptional staff at the University of California Press. My most heartfelt thanks go to our managing editor, Rebecca Frazier, for her exemplary work on
the volume. She was meticulous in her attention to every detail and tirelessly cheerful in the face of more than the usual delays and difficulties.
Ruth Milkman
For the Editors
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les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
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.
sn v
ugus
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e
ovid archi
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,
ervic 5-55571
S
riline No. 1
A
xiv
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
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California Union Membership
a turn-of-the-century portrait
RUTH MILKMAN
and D A I S Y R O O K S
The changing level and composition of union membership is
a long-standing focus of research on the organized labor movement. In the United
States union density began falling in the late 1950s; the decline accelerated in the
mid-1970s and has continued since.1 With the election of John Sweeney to the AFLCIO presidency in 1995, and the renewed commitment to organizing that he promoted, many hoped for a reversal of this trend. Initially, such optimism seemed
Thanks to Dorothy Sue Cobble, Richard Freeman, Peter Olney, Tom Rankin, Kim Voss, and Kent
s
Wong for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter, and to Christine Schwartz
rport
ld Ai
for extensive assistance with the data analysis. We are also indebted to David Aroner and his staff
Wor
les
at the Division of Labor Statistics and Research in the Californiae 1, 2017 of Industrial RelaAng Department
Los
t2
.
tions, as well as Tom Rankin and Angie Wei Assn vCalifornia us
of the
ug Labor Federation for helping us
on A
rs
e
ide
launch the California Union Censuso(CUC)aproject.dThanks also to Carol Bank, Mike Dugan,
Pr v , rchiv
vice Olney, Neal
erPeter 5-55571 Sacharow, and Kent Wong for helping to persuade
Dan Hall, June McMahon,
eS
.1
Arilin
N the
various unions to respond to o CUC, and to Joshua Page for assistance in locating data on the
prison guards’ union. Finally, we are grateful to James Robbins for logistical assistance, to Elizabeth
del Rocio Camacho for making the questionnaire available online, and to the many UCLA students who assisted with various aspects of the data collection effort: Rene Almeling, Limor BarCohen, Kathryn Cooney, Angela Jamison, Howard Padwa, Gabrielle Raley, and Darolyn Striley.
1. “Density” refers to the percentage of union members (or workers covered by union contracts)
among wage and salary employees in a given labor market or region. Density is a key index of
labor union strength. Its meaning is complex, however, given the winner-take-all industrial
relations system that exists in the United States, under which unions either represent all the
workers in a given workplace or none of them. One reason that density figures fail to fully capture the extent of union influence is that, in addition to representing their members directly in
collective bargaining, unions indirectly generate improvements in the pay, benefits, and working conditions of nonunion workers in a variety of ways. For example, many employers seek to
avoid unionization by preemptively offering wages and benefits similar to those of their unionized competitors. The workers they employ thus receive many of the same economic advantages as union members, despite their nonunion status. Similarly, and on a far larger scale, the
efforts of organized labor in the political and legislative arenas often result in improvements for
nonunion workers in the form of minimum wage laws, unemployment benefits, health and
safety legislation, workers’ compensation, and the like. Moreover, the standard convention of
calculating density using the number of wage and salary workers as the denominator can be
misleading, since managers, supervisors, “confidential” employees, and others are ineligible for
milkman & rooks / california union membership
3
Case: 15-55571, 08/23/2017, ID: 10554492, DktEntry: 30-2, Page 10 of 274
45%
California
U.S.
40
Percentage Unionized
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1954
1958
1962
1966
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1994
1998
Year
figure 1.1. Union Density, U.S. and California, 1951–2002
s ou rc e : Hirsch and MacPherson, various years.
warranted: several large unions poured resources into recruiting new members in the
s
late 1990s, and the downward trend was briefly arrested (although not reversed).
rport
ld Ai
Wor by 2002 the unionized
After the century’s end, however, the decline resumed, and 7
les 01
2
Ange
Los hadst 21, to 13.3%, lower than any
percentage of the wage and salary workforce ugu fallen
v.
ssn on A
A
(Figure 1).
time since the early 1930sroviders 1.chived
ice P 5571, ar
rv
California stands out5as an exception to the general pattern over the past few years.
e Se . 1 -5
Arilin
No
Against all odds, union density has inched upward in the nation’s most populous
state, from 16.1% of all wage and salary workers in 1998 to 17.8% in 2002. Although
several states have higher absolute levels of density, the recent upturn in California is
highly unusual.2 This chapter presents an analysis of union membership patterns in
the state and explores the reasons for its recent divergence from the nation as a
whole. Our analysis centers on a new source of data: the 2001–02 California Union
Census (CUC), a survey of all local unions in the state sponsored by the Institute for
Labor and Employment of the University of California.3 We also draw on national
union membership under U.S. labor law (see Cobble 1994). Still, union density is the most
widely used, and arguably the single best, measure of organized labor’s strength and influence
over time, across sectors of the economy, and geographically.
2. In 2002 seven states (New York, Alaska, Hawaii, Michigan, New Jersey, Illinois, and Washington) had higher levels of density than California; however, density increased in only three of
these states between 1998 and 2002. In New York, density rose marginally from 25.4% in 1998
to 25.6% in 2002; in Illinois, the gain was more substantial, from 18.9% to 19.7%. Only
Alaska, where density rose from 20.4% to 24.4% over the period, had a greater increase than
California (Hirsch and MacPherson, various years).
3. Most U.S. unions have “locals” representing workers in a particular sector or geographic
4
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
2002
Case: 15-55571, 08/23/2017, ID: 10554492, DktEntry: 30-2, Page 11 of 274
data from the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS). On this basis we present a
more detailed portrait of unionism in California than has been available for many
years.4
Actively recruiting new members into the ranks of the labor movement, as the
current leadership of the AFL-CIO has urged its affiliates to do, is the main way
in which unions themselves can help to increase density. But many other factors
influence the density level. If employment declines in a unionized industry or occupation, or if employment expands in a non-union (or weakly unionized) industry
or occupation, union density will fall. Conversely, if employment expands in a
unionized industry or occupation, or if it declines in a non-unionized one, density
will increase. As is often pointed out, given the impact of shifting employment
trends and normal labor market growth and turnover, simply to maintain U.S.
union density at current levels would require unions to organize about 500,000
new members annually. To increase density by one percentage point nationally
requires organizing nearly a million new members (Freeman 2003). This makes the
recent increase in density in California all the more impressive.
In 2001–02 the CUC found a total of 2,583,349 union members and a total of
2,980,360 workers who were covered by collective bargaining agreements (not all
of whom were dues-paying union members) in the state of California.5 The CPS
s
reports slightly lower figures for the state: 2,578,700 union members, ior ort.8% of all
A rp 17
orld
W1%, for 2002.6 These
e
wage and salary workers, and 2,760,389 covered workers, lors19. 017
Ange 21 2
Los nation ,as a whole, where only
t
.
density levels are substantially higher thansthose in thegus
sn v n Au
rs Aunion members in 2002, and 13.6% were
13.3% of wage and salary workersidwererchived o
v e
ro
ice P
1, a
7
covered by collective Serv 15-5557
e bargaining agreements. As Figure 1.1 shows, however, this is a
.
rilin
A
No
recent development: from the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s, California density levels
4.
5.
6.
7.
area. In most cases local unions are affiliated with national unions, often called “Internationals”
because they include (or formerly included) some locals in Canada. Following standard usage
inside the labor movement, in the text we refer to all national unions as Internationals.
For more details on our data and methodology, see the Appendix to this chapter.
Although unions are legally required to represent everyone in the bargaining unit for which
they negotiate a collective agreement, in some cases the workers in the unit are required neither
to become union members nor to pay union dues. This can be the case if the union is unable
to win a “union shop” agreement, which requires all workers hired by the employer to become
union members after a fixed period of time. The alternative to a union shop is typically an
“open shop,” where formal membership in the union is voluntary. In other cases, mostly in the
public sector, unions may have an “agency shop” agreement, which stipulates that all represented workers pay an agency fee whether or not they are union members.
It is not surprising that the CUC, which collected data directly from unions, found a higher
figure for covered workers than the CPS, which is based on a household survey, since nonmembers covered by union contracts are often unaware of their status.
The CPS figures in 2001 were 16.4% for union membership in California, with 18.0% covered by
agreements; nationally the figures were 13.5% and 14.8%, respectively. In later sections of this
chapter, we merge the 2001 and 2002 CPS data, since the CUC data overlap 2001 and 2002.
milkman & rooks / california union membership
5
Case: 15-55571, 08/23/2017, ID: 10554492, DktEntry: 30-2, Page 12 of 274
were closer to the U.S. average (although in the 1950s and 1960s California density
was consistently above the national average).
In many respects, trends in California closely resemble those in the United States
as a whole. In both cases union membership growth has been concentrated in the
public sector, while the private sector has presented far more difficult challenges to
the labor movement. The overall distribution of union membership by industry and
occupation is generally similar in the state and the nation as well. Union membership patterns are highly gender-differentiated, with women disproportionately concentrated in some unions (especially those based in the public sector) and men in
others (most notably in the building trades), both in California and nationwide.
The recent divergence between density levels in the state and the nation is linked
to several factors that distinguish California from the rest of the United States. Historically, the industrial unions (and the manufacturing sector in which they are based)
have been weaker in California than elsewhere in the nation, and in recent years membership losses in the state also have been smaller in this sector than in the nation as a
whole. At the same time, union growth in the public sector, as well as in health care,
has been much more rapid in California than in the nation over the past few decades.
Another factor distinguishing California from the United States as a whole is that
union organizing efforts have been more effective in the state than in the nation (see
s
Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, this volume). The leading force irport nation’s most
ld A is the
Wor Union (SEIU).8 The
les 017
rapidly growing union, the Service EmployeesnInternational
2
A ge
Los share 21,total union membership in
SEIU has historically accounted forsa v. August of
s n greater
rs A v d on
California than in the nation,eand cthisehas contributed greatly to the divergence in
hi
rovid
ice P 5571, ar
density trends. Serv . 15-5is also distinguished by the presence of a few large unions
e California
Arilin
No
whose membership is either limited to the state or overwhelmingly concentrated
there, and some of these unions are unusually active in the organizing arena as well.
California’s demographic composition is also unusual in that it includes a disproportionate share of the nation’s growing population of immigrant workers and has
(largely as a result of immigration) a workforce that is more racially and ethnically
diverse than that of the nation as a whole. Economic inequality is also more extreme in
California (especially Southern California) than in the nation (Milkman and Dwyer
2002). The state’s large low-wage workforce, many of whose members are foreign born,
has been a key target in recent organizing efforts. When those efforts have succeeded,
they have contributed to the growth in California’s union density; nevertheless, recent
immigrants remain underrepresented in union ranks, as we discuss below.
Finally, organized labor has more political influence in California than in most
other states. This has not only helped to maintain existing union membership but
also facilitated the recruitment of new, previously non-union workers into the labor
movement. For example, in 1999 the SEIU added 74,000 home health care workers
to its ranks after a lengthy labor-led campaign for a change in state law (Greenhouse
8. See the list of union abbreviations at the beginning of this volume.
6
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
Case: 15-55571, 08/23/2017, ID: 10554492, DktEntry: 30-2, Page 13 of 274
1999). At the local level the labor movement also has found ways to successfully parlay its political clout into legislative and other efforts that indirectly or directly support organizing (see Meyerson 2001; Logan, this volume).
THE DISTRIBUTION OF UNION MEMBERSHIP BY INDUSTRY,
SECTOR, AND AFFILIATION
The contemporary composition of union membership in California has several characteristics that distinguish it from that in the United States as a whole, reflecting the
state’s rather unusual labor history. The industrial unionism that emerged nationally
in the 1930s and 1940s never achieved the strength in California (nor in the West generally) that it enjoyed elsewhere in the nation. In the mid-1950s, employment in manufacturing comprised a smaller proportion of total employment in California than
was the case nationally, and union density in the state’s manufacturing sector lagged
behind the national level as well. Two-thirds of California’s union members were
employed outside the manufacturing sector, compared to about two-fifths in the
nation as a whole, so that what one careful mid-twentieth-century observer called
“nonfactory unionism” dominated the region (Kennedy 1955, 5–7).
In this early period, the unions affiliated with the American Federationsof Labor
rt
Airpo
(AFL), especially the Teamsters and the building trades unions,ldwere numerically
Wor
eles
7
dominant in the state. In 1955, on the eve of the os Ang st 21, 201 the Congress of
merger with
LAFL’s u
g
n v.
Industrial Organizations (CIO), the rs Ass ed on Au
e California Department of Industrial Relations
hiv
rovid
(1956, 9) reported thateonly 12% 571therc
ice P 5 of , a state’s union members were affiliated with
rv
eS
15-5
A lin
the CIO, whichriprimarily .organized within basic manufacturing, compared to 29%
No
of those in the United States. Fully 81% of the state’s union members were AFLaffiliated at this time (with another 7% in independent unions), compared to 61%
nationally. By 1987 (the most recent year for which such data are available, other
than the 2001–02 CUC data discussed below) only one of the twelve largest International unions in the state was a former CIO affiliate (California Department of
Industrial Relations, 1987).9
Although the distinction between AFL and CIO unions is far less meaningful
today, the weight of this history is still palpable: the unions formerly affiliated with
the CIO now account for a relatively small share of California’s union members,
compared to the nation as a whole. Moreover, in 2001–02, manufacturing was the
only major sector of the economy in which California’s union density (9.3%) was
lower than the nation’s (14.6%) (Figure 1.2).10
9. In 1987 the state’s top twelve unions, ranked by membership size, were IBT, SEIU, UFCW,
IAM, UBC, CWA, IBEW, Actors and Artistes, IUOE, LIUNA, HERE, and NALC (California Department of Industrial Relations 1989, 13). CWA is the only former CIO affiliate in this
group. See Figure 1.4a for the 2001–02 ranking.
10. Workers in aerospace, the state’s largest manufacturing industry from the 1950s until its dra-
milkman & rooks / california union membership
7
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60%
California
U.S.
53.8%
47.8%
40
34.7%
29.8%
30
20
37.6%
36.3%
22.4%
19.1%
17.0%
17.1%
14.6%
9.3%
10
13.4%
8.1%
4.6%
10.0%
10.0% 8.8%
2.5% 2.4%
rs
rke
Wo
All
vat
Pri
All
blic
Pu
All
eS
Se
ec
cto
tor
r
n
atio
uc
Ed
Ca
re
alth
He
ns
po
an rtati
d U on
tilit
ies
Wh
ole
s
Re ale a
tail nd
Tra
de
Fin
an
ce
an , Insu
d R ra
ea nce
lE
sta ,
te
Tra
tur
fac
nu
Ma
ns
tru
cti
on
ing
0
Co
Percentage Unionized
50
figure 1.2. Union Density, by Selected Industry Group and Sector, U.S. and California,
2001–2002
ts
s ou rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files, or
rp merged for 2001 and
ld Ai
2002 (see Appendix).
Wor
eles
7
n ot e : Results are calculated using the CPS unrevised s Ang weights. 1
sampling 1, 20
2
Lo
N ϭ 25,052 for California; N ϭ 355,670ssnthe United gust
for v.
States.
A
n Au
ed o
iders
Prov 1, archiv
ice
Serv 5-5557
riline No. 1unionization in California is illustrated in Figure 1.3, which
The unevenness of
A
compares the 2001–02 distribution across major industry groups of California’s
union members (Figure 1.3a) with the distribution of the state’s employed wage and
salary workers (Figure 1.3b).11 For example, over a fourth (26.2%) of all California
matic decline in the early 1990s, were largely represented by the International Association of
Machinists (IAM), an AFL affiliate. By the late 1960s the UAW also had a significant presence
in California, representing workers in aircraft and defense plants as well as in some half-dozen
auto assembly plants that were then operating in the state. At its peak in 1968 the UAW was
ranked sixth in membership among all International unions in California. Even then the
state’s nonmanufacturing union membership was more than double the level in manufacturing (California Department of Industrial Relations 1969, 8–9). In the 1970s and 1980s a wave
of plant closings decimated the state’s basic manufacturing sector, followed in the 1990s by the
collapse of the aerospace and defense industries. Union density in manufacturing in California has lagged behind the nationwide level for many years. In 1988, for example, the state’s
union density in manufacturing was 15.6%, compared to 22.1% in the United States; at that
time California ranked thirty-fourth among the fifty states in manufacturing density, but seventeenth in overall union density (Hirsch and MacPherson 1999, 108).
11. We collapsed some of the industry groups that the CPS presents separately. Our “transportation and utilities” group includes “transportation,” “communications,” and “utilities and san-
8
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Construction
5.9%
Other
14.6%
Manufacturing
13.9%
Education
9.4%
Transportation
and Utilities
7.1%
Health Care
7.9%
Wholesale and
Retail Trade
20.6%
Services
14.4%
Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate
6.3%
figure 1.3a. Employed Workers, by Selected Industry Group, California, 2001–2002
rts
s ou rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files,d Airpo for 2001
l merged
Wor
and 2002 (see Appendix).
s
gele 2017
n ot e : Results are calculated using the CPS unrevised sampling An
Los weights.21,
t
.
N ϭ 25,052 for California.
sn v n Augus
o
rs As
vide rchived
ro
ice P 5571, a
Construction
rv
e Se . 15-5
7.7%
Arilin
No
Other
18.7%
Manufacturing
7.6%
Transportation
and Utilities
15.0%
Education
26.2%
Health Care
7.9%
Wholesale and
Retail Trade
9.7%
Finance,
Services Insurance,
and Real Estate
6.4%
0.9%
fig u r e 1.3b . Union Members, by Selected Industry Group, California, 2001–2002
s ou rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files, merged for 2001
and 2002 (see Appendix).
m i CPS n & r o k s / c a weights.
n ot e : Results are calculated using the l k m aunrevisedosampling l i f o r n i a u n i o n m e m b e r s h i p
N ϭ 25,052 for California.
9
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union members, but under a tenth (9.4%) of the state’s wage and salary workers,
were in the education sector. Similarly, transportation and utilities accounted for
15.0% of unionized workers but only 7.1% of wage and salary workers. By contrast,
wholesale and retail trade, combined with finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE)
and other services, accounted for 41.3% of all wage and salary workers, but only
17.0% of union members in the state.12
Public-sector and health care unionism have been the main source of organized
labor’s growth throughout the nation in recent decades. In both these arenas, however, California has moved far ahead of the United States as a whole, with much
higher density rates in the state than in the nation (see Figure 1.2). Whereas union
density in 2001–02 was 37.6% for public-sector workers nationally, in California it
was a far higher 53.8%. (The gap in private-sector density rates between the nation
and the state was much smaller, with rates of 8.8% and 10.0%, respectively.) Similarly, union density in health care was 10.0% nationally, but 17.0% in California.13
Yet, because public-sector and health care industry workers comprised only about
16% and 8%, respectively, of all employed wage and salary workers (both statewide
and nationally), the relatively high density rates in these sectors have limited impact
on the overall picture.
The SEIU is the state’s powerhouse in both these sectors, whereas nationally it has
s
been less dominant, sharing the field more evenly with otherAplayers, most imporrport
ld i
Wor Municipal Employees
tantly the American Federation of State, County, and17
les
Ange 21, 20
Los thet SEIU represented 16.5% of all
.
(AFSCME). The CUC found thatsin 2001–02 gus
sn v n Au
sA
o
California union members and r rchivofdall workers covered by collective bargaining
vide 20.3% e
ro
ice P 5571, a
v
agreementsliin the rstate 5-5
e Se . 1 (Figure 1.4a). In the public sector the SEIU’s share was even
Ari n
No
greater, accounting for nearly one-fourth (24.2%) of all union members in the state
(Figure 1.5a). And in health care (which includes both public- and private-sector
employers), SEIU represented over half (53.5%) of all union members and nearly
two-thirds (64.3%) of all covered workers. Nationally, SEIU’s membership is larger
than that of any other union except for the National Education Association (NEA)
(Figure 1.4b). Nevertheless, it accounted for only 7.8% of all union members nationwide in 2001, less than half its share in California.
itary services:’ our “services” group includes “private household services,” “business and repair
services,” “personal services,” and “entertainment and recreation”; and our “health care” group
includes “hospitals” and “medical services, other than hospitals.” Occupational group breakdowns are also included in the CPS data; we analyzed these but do not report any results here.
12. Unionization is also uneven within many industries. Construction is a good example: although
precise data are not available on the state level, residential construction is virtually nonunion
today, whereas density remains substantial in commercial and highway construction.
13. The health care industry includes a substantial public-sector segment, in which density is
much higher than it is in private-sector health care. In California, 43.1% of public-sector
health care workers are unionized, compared to 13.4% of private-sector health care workers; in
the United States the figures are 27.5% and 8.1%, respectively.
10
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SEIU
16.5%
Other
24.1%
CTA/NEA
11.1%
AFTRA 1.5%
IATSE 1.5%
IAM 1.7%
HERE 2.2%
IBT
8.4%
CWA 2.3%
LIUNA 2.4%
AFT 2.4%
IBEW 2.5%
UBC 2.9%
AFSCME
IUOE
3.2%
3.4%
CSEA
7.0%
UFCW
6.9%
figure 1.4a. Distribution of Union Members, by International Union,
California, 2001–2002
s
rport
s ou rc e : California Union Census 2001–02.
ld Ai
Wor
n ot e : Results are weighted to correct for survey non-response (see Appendix).
les
Ange 21, 2017
N ϭ 1,352 local unions.
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
NEA
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
15.5%
e S Other 1
Arilin
19.7%
No.
SEIU
7.8%
HERE 1.5%
APWU 1.7%
PACE 1.7%
IUOE 1.7%
AFSCME
7.7%
LIUNA 1.9%
USWA 2.7%
IAM 2.8%
IBT
7.5%
UBC
3.2%
CWA
3.8%
IBEW
4.1%
UAW
4.5%
AFT
5.3%
UFCW
7.0%
figure 1.4b. Distribution of Union Members, by International Union,
U.S., 2001
s ou rc e s : Gifford 2002, 2, 238–239; http://www. carpenters.org.
milkman & rooks / california union membership
11
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Other
15.7%
SEIU
24.2%
IBEW 1.9%
IAFF 2.0%
IUPA 2.1%
IUOE 2.2%
CCPOA 2.2%
UFCW 2.7%
NALC 2.7%
AFT 4.5%
CTA/NEA
21.3%
AFSCME
5.1%
CSEA
13.4%
figure 1.5a. Distribution of Public-Sector Union Members, by International
s
Union, California, 2001–2002
rport
ld Ai
s ou rc e : California Union Census 2001–02.
Wor
les
7
n ot e : Results are weighted to correct for survey non-response (see201
Ange 21, Appendix).
Los
N ϭ 1,352 local unions.
gust
n v.
Ass d on Au
e
iders
Prov 1, archiv
e
ervic 5-5557
eS
IBT
1
Arilin
No.
Other
16.4%
20.9%
SMWIA 1.5%
UFCW
11.5%
UFW 2.1%
UA 2.2%
CNA 2.2%
AFTRA 3.0%
SEIU
8.1%
IBEW 3.1%
IATSE 3.2%
UBC
5.6%
IAM 3.4%
LIUNA
3.5%
CWA
4.1%
HERE
4.5%
IUOE
4.7%
figure 1.5b. Distribution of Private-Sector Union Members, by International
Union, California, 2001–2002
12
s ou rc e : California Union Census 2001–02.
n ot e : s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i correctofor /survey3non-response (see Appendix).
t h e Results are weighted to a l a b r 2 0 0
N ϭ 1,352 local unions.
Case: 15-55571, 08/23/2017, ID: 10554492, DktEntry: 30-2, Page 19 of 274
Another public-sector heavyweight, and the second largest union in the state, is
the California Teachers Association (CTA), which is affiliated with the NEA (but
not with the AFL-CIO). Together with the California School Employees Association, another large union that represents a variety of workers (other than teachers)
employed in public schools, the CTA dominates the heavily unionized education
sector. The two together represent almost three-quarters (71.6%) of all California
union members employed in education.
The SEIU’s overarching role is one unusual feature of the California labor movement. Another is the presence of a few large unions that are not directly affiliated
with any larger national or International union and in which membership is either
exclusive to the state or overwhelmingly concentrated there. Examples include the
California Nurses Association (CNA), the California Correctional Peace Officers
Association (CCPOA), and the United Farm Workers (UFW).14 Numerically, the
most important of these unaffiliated unions is the abovementioned California
School Employees Association (CSEA).15 The CSEA represents 7.0% of the state’s
union members (see Figure 1.4a), and its share of public-sector dues-payers is an
even greater 13.4%—a larger share than that of any organization other than the
SEIU and the CTA (Figure 1.5a).
Both CSEA and several of the largest SEIU locals represent many public-sector
workers who in other states are often represented by AFSCME. Indeed,oins2001–02
rp rt
ld Ai
Wor
AFSCME accounted for only 3.2% of California union s 017 compared to
le members,
Ange 21, 2
Los union members in California’s
.
7.7% nationally in 2001 (Figure 1.4b). Only 5.1% ofugust
sn v n A
s As
public sector were in AFSCMErovider rchived o 1.5a).
in 2001–02 (Figure
P
71, a
rvice
Thus, union membership 5-5California is highly concentrated in a small number
e Se . 1 in 55
rilin
A
No
of unions that represent the bulk of the organized workforce (Figure 1.4a). This is
the case nationally as well (Figure 1.4b). The general patterns are similar in California and the United States, with two notable exceptions: the SEIU’s and CSEA’s especially large share of the state’s union membership; and the relatively minor presence
in California of the United Auto Workers (UAW), once the nation’s largest union
and the flagship of the CIO, and the United Steel Workers of America (USWA),
another former CIO affiliate. In 2001–02 the UAW accounted for only 0.6% of the
state’s union members (many of whom are not industrial workers at all but recently
14. The UFW is a national union, but the vast bulk of its membership is in California. For purposes of our analysis here, we treat the other large statewide units as “Internationals” if they
have 15,000 members or more, even though their membership is limited to California.
15. There are two unions that use the acronym CSEA. The first and largest is the California
School Employees Association, which is the organization we refer to here (and throughout the
text when we use this abbreviation). The CSEA was an independent union until 2001, when it
affiliated with the AFL-CIO. This organization represents teachers’ aides and school bus drivers, as well as clerical workers, food service workers, custodians, groundskeepers, and maintenance workers (see http://www.scsea.com). The other union that uses this acronym is the
California State Employees Association, which became Local 1000 of the SEIU in 1988 (previously it was an independent employee association) (see http://www.calcsea.org).
milkman & rooks / california union membership
13
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organized teaching assistants in the University of California). Nationally, by contrast, the UAW is the seventh largest union, with 4.5% of all union members in the
United States in 2001. Similarly, the USWA accounted for only 0.6% of California
union members but 2.7% of those in the nation.
California public-sector union membership was especially highly concentrated in
2001–02, with only five unions accounting for more than two-thirds of the members
(Figure 1.5a).16 In the private sector the picture is rather different (Figure 1.5b). In
2001–02 the Teamsters had the largest share of members in the state, followed by the
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) and SEIU. Those top three Internationals accounted for over a third (36.0%) of all private-sector union members in
the state. Another 16.9% were in the four largest construction unions: the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters (UBC), the International Union of Operating Engineers
(IUOE), the Laborers’ International Union of North America (LIUNA), and the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). Other Internationals were
significant players in the private sector as well: the Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees (HERE), the Communication Workers of America (CWA), and two
entertainment industry unions, the American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists (AFTRA) and the International Alliance of Theatrical State Employees
(IATSE).17
p rts
The distribution of union membership across Internationalsirino2001–02 was not
ld A
Wor
es
dramatically different from that in previous years. lThe CUC found that the same
Ange 2 2017
Los union 1,
t membership in 2001–02 had
unions that had the largest share ofsthe .state’sugus
nv
nA
s As
the largest share in both o1991 rand h1996.o The most important change over this
vide rc ived 18
Pr
ice
1, a
period is the e Serv growth 57 the SEIU, whose share of California union membersteady 15-55 of
.
rilin
A
No
ship grew by nearly six percentage points between 1991 and 2001–02 (Figure 1.6).
The only other unions that increased their share of the state’s union membership by
more than one percentage point over the period were the CTA, CSEA, and AFSCME.
As the SEIU and these three public-sector unions expanded their role in California’s
labor movement over this period, the share of union membership held by most
other large unions in the state declined somewhat.
Unionism in the United States has always been highly decentralized, especially at
the local level, where individual union organizations tend to be quite small. Although
16. CUC respondents were nearly equally divided between public- and private-sector locals, with
each category comprising 46% of the total. The remaining 8% of respondent locals include
both public- and private-sector members; we do not present data here on their composition
by International.
17. Another major entertainment industry union, the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), declined to
participate in the CUC, so is not included in Figure 1.5b.
18. The CUC data for these years are incomplete: 26.7% of respondents did not provide membership figures for 1991, and 18.8% did not provide figures for 1996. On average, however,
there was no significant difference between the size (in 2001–02) of the locals that did and
those that did not provide such figures (p ϭ 0.160 for 1991 and p ϭ 0.155 for 1996).
14
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5.9%
7.0%
6.0
0.4%
1.0
0.2%
2.0
0.6%
1.3%
2.2%
3.0
2.5%
4.0
SE
IAT
TR
A
– 0.9%
rts
AF
– 0.8%
RE
IAM
– 0.4%
HE
A
CW
NA
– 0.6%
– 0.3%
LIU
W
IBE
T
C
UB
ME
SC
E
AF
IUO
CW
UF
EA
CS
CT
A/N
IU
EA
–3.0
IBT
–2.0%
–2.0
AF
– 1.0
– 1.0%
– 0.7%
– 0.6%
0.0
SE
Percentage Point Change
5.0
rpo
ld Ai
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los International Unions,
figure 1.6. Change in Membership Sharessn v.
of Selected ugust
rs A ved on A
e
California, 1991 to 2001–2002
ovid archi
e Pr
sou rc e : California Unionervic 2001–02. ,
Census -55571
eS
5
n ot e : Results are weighted too. 1 for survey non-response (see Appendix).
Arilin
N correct
International Union
N ϭ 990 local unions.
comparable national data are not available, the CUC found that in 2001–02 the
majority of California’s local unions (52.1%) had 300 members or fewer. Only 5.5%
of the CUC respondent locals had more than 5,000 members, while nearly threefourths of them (74.6%) had 1,000 members or fewer.19
Average local union size varied widely among International unions in California
(Table 1.1).20 Small locals are especially characteristic of the International Association
of Fire Fighters (IAFF), with a median local size of 60 members among CUC
19. Local unions in the state were even smaller in 1987, the last year prior to the CUC for which
any such data are available. At that time only 2.9% of California local unions had 5,000 or
more members, and 63.2% had fewer than 300 members (California Department of Industrial Relations 1989, 11). In the years since 1987, many local unions have merged, which would
account for the increase in average size.
20. The table includes only those Internationals (as well as the category of independent unions)
for which the CUC had at least 25 local union respondents. The means were generally higher
than the medians because most Internationals had at least one very large local; hence medians
are the better measure here.
milkman & rooks / california union membership
15
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table 1 .1. Median and Mean Local Union Size
(Number of Dues-Paying Members) for Selected
International Unions, California, 2001–2002
Union
Median Size
of Locals
Mean Size
of Locals
SEIU
5,676
13,301
IBT
3,000
4,029
UBC
1,058
1,363
LIUNA
1,034
1,575
CCPOA
756
627
IBEW
696
1,762
CWA
609
1,248
IAM
427
757
PAT
424
656
AFSCME
274
1,165
CTA/NEA
234
234
IATSE
160
832
AFT
128
464
Independent Unions
94
604ts
rpor
ld Ai 149
UTU
84
Wor
es
NALC
69 l
Ange 21, 2017 437
Los
t
.
sn v n Augus
IAFF
60
180
o
rs As
vide rchived
Pro 1, a
ice 557
Serv : California Union Census.
-5
riline s o u rc e15
A
No.
n ot e : These results are unweighted.
N ϭ 1,352 local unions.
respondents, and the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC), with a
median local size of 69. Independent unions (those with no AFL-CIO affiliation)
also tend to be quite small; among CUC respondents the median size for this group
of unions was 94. In sharp contrast, some Internationals typically have very large
locals. The outstanding examples in the CUC are the SEIU, with a median local size
of 5,676 members, and the Teamsters, with a median size of 3,000.
UNION MEMBERSHIP BY GENDER, AGE, NATIVITY,
RACE AND ETHNICITY
California’s union members include a higher proportion of women and older
workers than does the nation as a whole. In addition, the fact that California is
home to such a disproportionate share of the nation’s immigrants means that they
16
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
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60%
55.8%
California
U.S.
52.2%
Percentage Unionized
50
39.1%
40
36.4%
30
20
17.4%
15.0%
16.8%
11.6% 11.5% 11.3%
8.1%
10
5.9%
0
All Employed
Men
All Employed
Women
Private-Sector Private-Sector
Men
Women
Public-Sector
Men
Public-Sector
Women
figure 1.7. Unionization Rates, by Gender and Sector, California and U.S., 2001–2002
s ou rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files, merged for 2001 and
2002 (see Appendix).
n ot e : Results are calculated using the CPS unrevised sampling weights.
N ϭ 25,052 for California; N ϭ 355,670 for the United States.
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
.
have a considerable presence among unionized workerssteven though their rate of
sn v
ugu
rs As ved on A
vide rnative-born counterparts. In regard to race
membership is lower than thatro their chi
P of 1, a
vice
and ethnicity, theine Serunion-5557
state’s . 15 membership is more diverse than that of the nation,
Aril
No
with an especially large representation of African Americans.
Gender
Historically, women have been less extensively unionized than men throughout
the United States, but in California the gender gap in union density is extremely
small: in 2001–02, according to the CPS, 16.8% of the state’s employed female wage
and salary workers were union members, compared to 17.4% of their male counterparts. In the United States as a whole, the gap is considerably wider: 11.6% of
employed women were unionized in 2001–02, compared to 15.0% of employed
men. The contrast is largely an artifact of the fact that the public sector, in which
female employment is relatively extensive, is more highly unionized in California
than nationwide (Figure 1.7). The extremely low level of unionization among women
employed in the private sector—only 5.9% nationally and 8.1% in California—
reflects the fact that the more highly unionized private-sector industries tend to
employ a disproportionate share of male workers. For example, in California in 2001–
02, 92.0% of all wage and salary workers employed in construction, and 68.7% of
those in transportation and utilities, were male. These are relatively highly unionized
milkman & rooks / california union membership
17
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industries (see Figure 1.2); in contrast, in the overwhelmingly nonunion finance,
insurance, and real estate industry, only 38.7% of the workers were male.
The CUC data, similarly, reveal a high degree of gender differentiation among
California union members.21 Whereas female union members are overwhelmingly
concentrated in the public and service sector unions, their male counterparts are disproportionately found in the building trades. (The same is most likely true of the
United States as a whole, although national data on gender by International union
are not available.) To a large extent this reflects gender segregation in the workforce,
which has historically been reproduced in the jurisdictional divisions internal to the
organized labor movement. In recent decades, however, traditional lines of union
jurisdiction have become increasingly blurred.
In 2001–02, women made up 46.4% of all union members in the state (compared
to 41.8% nationwide), but their distribution across unions contrasted sharply with
that of their male counterparts (Figure 1.8a). Although the CTA/NEA, SEIU, the
Teamsters, and UFCW accounted for large shares of both female and male union
members, there the similarities end. The other unions with large shares of California’s female union members were the CSEA, AFSCME, AFT, UFCW, and CNA,
with 19.8%, 4.8%, 4.7%, 4.6%, and 4.3%, respectively. None of these unions was
among the top five unions for men (Figure 1.8b). (CSEA was the seventh most
s
important union for men, but it accounted for only 3.6% ofdmale ort
rp union members.)
l Ai
Wor the largest share of the
Among the six labor organizations that accounted for 17
les
Ange 21, 20
Los
state’s male union members in the ssn v. CUC,stthree are building trades unions
2001–02 ugu
nA
sA
(the Operating Engineers, ovide8.0% ofed o
with r rchiv all male union members in the state, the CarPr
ice
1, a
penters, with e Serv and-5557
7.0%, 15 the Laborers, with 4.4%). A tiny proportion of the state’s
.
rilin
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female union members were found in these unions (1.1%, 0.6%, and 1.1%, respectively). Almost a third (30.1%) of all male union members in California were in the
building trades, compared to a very small percentage (2.9%) of female union members. If public-sector unions are excluded, the building trades’ share rises to a figure
approaching half (46.7%) of the state’s male union members.
Women are far more concentrated than men in the public-sector unions. The
CUC found that 61.9% of the state’s female union members were in public-sector
unions (and another 13.8% in “mixed” union locals that include both public- and
private-sector workers), compared to 36.5% of the state’s male union members (with
another 20.9% in mixed locals).
Age
The age distribution of union members is heavily weighted toward older workers
(Figure 1.9). Density rates for workers under twenty-five years of age were dramatically lower than for older workers, and workers over fifty-five had the highest density
21. Of local unions responding to the CUC, 79.2% supplied data on their gender composition.
18
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CSEA
19.8%
Other
22.1%
HERE 1.5%
CWA 1.8%
CNA 4.3%
CTA/NEA
19.7%
UFCW
4.6%
AFT
4.7%
AFSCME
4.8%
IBT
7.1%
SEIU
9.6%
figure 1.8a. Female Union Members, by International Union, California,
2001–2002
s
s ou rc e : California Union Census 2001–02.
rport
ld Ai
n ot e : Results are weighted to correct for survey non-responsees Wor
(see Appendix).
l
N ϭ 1,112 local unions.
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
CTA/NEA
S
.1
riline NoOther
14.4%
A
20.2%
IBT
10.7%
IATSE 1.5%
CWA 1.6%
SMWIA 1.7%
BSOIW 1.8%
AFT 1.8%
IUOE
8.0%
UFW 1.9%
IAM 2.2%
IBEW 2.2%
IUPA 2.3%
UA 2.3%
CCPOA 2.5%
IAFF 2.6%
UFCW CSEA
3.0% 3.6%
UBC
7.0%
SEIU
4.3%
LIUNA
4.4%
figure 1.8b. Male Union Members, by International Union, California,
2001–2002
s ou rc e : California Union Census 2001–02.
n ot e : Results are weightedm i lcorrect for r o o k snon-responsen(see u n i o n m e m b e r s h i p
to k m a n & survey / c a l i f o r i a Appendix).
N ϭ 1,112 local unions.
19
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25%
California
U.S.
Percentage Unionized
20
22.0%
18.5%
17.1%
14.9%
15
10
5
15.4%
13.4%
7.9%
5.2%
0
Age 16–24
Age 25–54
Age 55+
Total
figure 1.9. Unionization Rates, by Age, California and U.S., 2001–2002
s ou rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files,
merged for 2001 and 2002 (see Appendix).
n ot e : Results are calculated using the CPS unrevised sampling weights.
N ϭ 25,052 for California; N ϭ 355,670 for the United States.
rates. This is the case nationally, but to an even greater degree in California. The
skewed age pattern reflects the fact that young workers tend to be orts
irp clustered in occurld A
Woas the tendency of unionpations and industries with low unionization rates,eas s
e well 17
ng l
0
ized workplaces to reward seniority andLos A ustgreater job security than nonprovide 21, 2
v.
ssn on Aug
unionized ones.
ers A ived
ovid
rch
Pr
71, a
rvice
e Se . 15-555
Arilin
No
Nativity and Race and Ethnicity
California’s large immigrant population has been an important target of union
organizing in recent years, and there is some evidence that this population has an
unusually favorable attitude toward unionism (Weir 2002, 121). Yet, the overall
unionization rate for these workers remains well below that for the native born.
Only 11.7% of the state’s foreign-born workers were union members in 2001–02,
compared to 19.7% of their native-born counterparts. The differential between
immigrants and natives was smaller on the national level, with unionization rates of
11.0% and 13.8%, respectively.22 Despite this, immigrants comprised 22.1% of all
union members in California in 2001–02, compared to only 11.9% of union members nationwide. This reflects the fact that immigrants make up a far greater portion
of the state’s workforce (32.4%) than of the nation’s (22.1%), rendering the recent
increases in union density in California—and the contrast between that trend and
the national decline in density—all the more remarkable.
22. This is partly because the most recent immigrants, for whom unionization rates are especially
low, are disproportionately concentrated in California (for more details see the next paragraph
of the text).
20
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As other commentators have noted (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000, 69–
70), recent immigrants are less likely to be union members than those who have
been U.S. residents for many years. In California, 19.8% of immigrants who arrived
in the United States before 1980 were unionized in 2001–02, compared to 10.8% of
those who arrived between 1980 and 1989; only 6.0% of those who arrived in 1990
or later were unionized. The majority of immigrants, however, are among the more
recent arrivals (70.9% arrived in 1980 or later), and their low unionization rates
depress the overall immigrant unionization rate.
Figure 1.10 compares the composition of the state’s workforce with that of its
union membership, disaggregated by nativity as well as race and ethnicity. Here the
continuing underrepresentation of the state’s massive immigrant workforce in organized labor is apparent. The figure also shows that native-born African Americans
comprise a much larger proportion of union members than of employed workers.
The same is true (although with a much smaller differential) for native-born Anglos.
Unionization rates vary considerably by race and ethnicity among both foreignand native-born workers (Figure 1.11). Statewide, 28.7% of employed African American wage and salary workers were unionized in 2001–02, a higher unionization rate
than that for any other racial or ethnic group, or for African American workers
nationwide, which was considerably lower at 17.1%. This large differential between
s
state and nation reflects the fact that California’s union density isld Airport
much higher than
Wor
s
the nation’s in the public sector, a major employmentnniche for017
gele 2 African Americans.
sA
LoAmericans ,in California were in
t 21
v.
Nearly a third (30.1%) of all employed sAfrican Augus
A sn on
iders chiv any
vmore than ed other group.
public-sector jobs in 2001–02, far
ro
ice P
1, ar
There was a smallererv . 1still 557
e S but 5-5 substantial differential between state and national
Arilin
No
unionization rates for native-born Latinos: 20.3% in California, but only 13.2% in
the United States. Although the unionization rate for native-born Latinos was well
below the level for African Americans, it reflects a similar ethnically specific pattern
of extensive public-sector employment in a state with unusually strong public-sector
unionization. In 2001–02, 20.2% of California’s native-born Latinos were employed
in the public sector—more than native-born Anglos (18.2%) or native-born Asians
(17.9%).
The variation among racial and ethnic groups, when analyzed by nativity, is relatively small within the public and private sectors alike (Figure 1.12). Even foreignborn workers, whose overall unionization rates were far below those of their nativeborn counterparts, had very high unionization rates within the public sector. The
fact that relatively few of them are employed in that sector (only 6.4% of foreignborn Latinos and 13.2% of foreign-born Asians) means that this does little to boost
the overall unionization rate for these subgroups, however. Indeed, that so many
foreign-born Latinos are employed in industries and occupations that rely on casual
forms of employment—either marginal to or entirely outside of the formal economy—
helps explain their relatively low rates of unionization.
The CUC included questions about the composition of local union membership
milkman & rooks / california union membership
21
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Foreign-Born African Americans
0.5%
Native-Born African Americans
5.7%
Other 0.7%
Foreign-Born Asians
9.2%
Native-Born Asians
2.5%
Native-Born Anglos
46.9%
Foreign-Born
Latinos
17.9%
Native-Born Latinos
11.8%
Foreign-Born Anglos
4.8%
figure 1.10a. Employed Wage and Salary Workers, by Race and Ethnicity and
Nativity, California, 2001–2002
s
rp rt
s ou rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files,o
ld Ai merged for 2001 and
Wor
2002 (see Appendix).
s
gele , 2017
n ot e : Results are calculated using the CPS unrevised s An
21
Lo samplingt weights. N ϭ 25,052.
.
sn v n Augus
o
rs As
vide rchived
ro
ice P 5571, a
Foreign-Born African Americans
rv
e Se
5-5
Arilin 0.5%No. 1
Other 0.9%
Native-Born African Americans
10.0%
Foreign-Born Asians
7.0%
Native-Born Asians
2.3%
Native-Born Anglos
50.7%
Foreign-Born
Latinos
11.0%
Native-Born Latinos
14.0%
Foreign-Born Anglos
3.6%
figure 1.10b. Union Members, by Race and Ethnicity and Nativity, California, 2001–2002
22
s ou rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files, merged for 2001 and 2002
t h Appendix).
(see e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
n ot e : Results are calculated using the CPS unrevised sampling weights. N ϭ 25,052.
Case: 15-55571, 08/23/2017, ID: 10554492, DktEntry: 30-2, Page 29 of 274
30%
28.7%
California
U.S.
Percentage Unionized
25
20.3%
20
18.5%
17.1%
15.7% 15.6%
15
13.4%
13.2%
13.1%
10.6%
10
9.6%
10.6%
13.0%
11.4%
5
0
African
Americans
Native-Born
Anglos
Native-Born
Latinos
Native-Born
Asians
Foreign-Born Foreign-Born Foreign-Born
Latinos
Asians
Anglos
figure 1.11. Unionization Rates, by Race and Ethnicity and Nativity, California and
U.S., 2001–2002
s ou rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files, merged for 2001 and
2002 (see Appendix).
n ot e : Results are calculated using the CPS unrevised sampling weights.
N ϭ 25,052 for California; N ϭ 355,670 for the United States.
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor
les
Ange 2 , 2017
Losprovided1such data, however, so
.
by race and ethnicity. Only 59.6% of respondents August
sn v n
s As
the results must be interpreted rwither rchived o 23 What these data do suggest is a
vid great caution.
o
ice P
1, a
S racial and 57
considerable degreeeof erv 15-55ethnic concentration by local union. For example,
.
rilin
A
No
among the local unions that provided data on their racial and ethnic composition,
20.0% had no African American members, and 48.7% had a very low percentage of
African Americans—less than 5%. Similarly, 30.3% of the locals had no Asian members, and 68.0% had less than 5%. This pattern was much less common for Latinos
and Anglos, the two largest racial/ethnic groups in the state’s workforce. Only 4.8%
of the locals providing data on this topic had no Latino members, and only 12.2%
had less than 5%. Similarly, only 3.2% of locals reported no Anglo members, and in
only 4.8% did Anglos make up less than 5% of all members.
REGIONAL PATTERNS OF UNION MEMBERSHIP IN CALIFORNIA
For most of the twentieth century the San Francisco Bay Area had by far the highest
level of union density in the state of California. By contrast, the Los Angeles area
23. In most cases the CUC respondents indicated that they did not keep records on this subject,
and even those who did supply such data often did so on the basis of rough estimates. The
data on nativity were reported even less frequently by CUC respondents than that for race,
and thus none are reported here.
milkman & rooks / california union membership
23
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70%
Public Sector
Private Sector
62.5%
60
55.1%
49.8%
Percentage Unionized
50
47.9%
48.0%
49.7%
50.4%
40
30
20
14.1%
10.4%
10
12.8%
8.6%
8.0%
7.6%
7.0%
0
African
Americans
Native-Born
Anglos
Native-Born
Latinos
Native-Born
Asians
Foreign-Born Foreign-Born Foreign-Born
Latinos
Asians
Anglos
figure 1.12. Unionization Rates, by Sector, Race and Ethnicity, and Nativity, California,
2001–2002
s ou rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files, merged for 2001 and
ts
2002 (see Appendix).
irpor
n ot e : Results are calculated using the CPS unrevised sampling weights. ld A
Wor
es
N ϭ 25,052.
ngel
017
,2
sA
st 21
v. Lo
ssn on Augu
ers A ived
ovid
had a reputation ervac“company, town,” which dated from the open shop movement
as i e Pr 571 arch
5
eS
15-5
that dominated theocity in the early decades of the twentieth century. Although by
Arilin
N .
the early postwar period Los Angeles had achieved density approaching the statewide level, the Bay Area long remained the center of organized labor’s strength in the
state. In 1955, for example, the California Department of Industrial Relations (1956,
11) found that union density was 51% in the Bay Area, compared to only 37% in the
Los Angeles metropolitan area and 40% statewide. By 2001–02, however, the difference in density levels between the state’s two largest metropolitan areas had narrowed to only half a percentage point: 16.9% in the Bay Area and 16.5% in the Los
Angeles metropolitan area (Table 1.2). Los Angeles has also emerged as the most
important stronghold of labor’s political influence in recent years (Meyerson 2001).
Some of the state’s smaller metropolitan areas show considerably higher density
rates than either Los Angeles or the San Francisco Bay Area. The most important
example is Sacramento, with a density rate of 25.7%, reflecting the large concentration of public-sector employment in the state capital: 27.1% of all wage and salary
employees in the Sacramento area worked in the public sector, compared to 16.4%
statewide.24
24. The situation is similar in the Fresno area, which also has relatively high overall density
(19.9%) and where 23.8 % of wage and salary employment is in the public sector.
24
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table 1 .2. Employment, Union Membership, and Union Density in California’s
Major Metropolitan Areas and Regions, 2001–2002
Metropolitan Area/Region
San Francisco Bay Areaa
Los Angeles metro areab
Sacramento metro areac
San Diego metro aread
Fresno metro areae
Central Valleyf
Rest of state
California total
N
Employed Wage
and Salary
Workers,
Percentage
Distribution
22.5%
46.8
5.8
8.2
2.8
9.3
4.7
100.0
25,052
Union Members,
Percentage
Distribution
22.1%
45.0
8.7
7.2
3.2
9.8
4.0
100.0
4,284
Density (Union
Members as
Percentage of
Employed Wage
and Salary Workers)
16.9%
16.5
25.7
15.0
19.9
18.1
14.8
17.1
—
s o u rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files, merged for 2001 and
2002 (see Appendix).
ts
n ot e : Results are calculated using the CPS unrevised sampling weights.
irpor
a
Includes San Francisco, Alameda, Santa Clara, Marin, San Mateo, Sonoma, orld AContra Costa,
W Napa,
les 017
Solano and Santa Cruz Counties.
Ange
,2
b
Includes Los Angeles, Riverside, Orange, Ventura and v. Los gust Counties.
San Bernadino 21
sn
c
sCounties. Au
A
n
Includes Sacramento, El Dorado, Placer andrYolo
ide s chived o
d
Includes San Diego County only. Prov
ice 5571, ar
v
e
Includes Fresno andine SeCounties.
Maera r 15-5
.
f
Aril
N Monterey, Merced, Stanislaus, San Joaquin, San Benito and San Luis
Includes Kings, Tulare, Kern, o
Obispo Counties.
The CPS sample sizes are too small to permit detailed analysis of the composition
of union membership on a regional basis, even using the pooled 2001–02 data, with
the partial exception of the state’s two largest metropolitan areas, the Los Angeles
region and the San Francisco Bay Area (which includes San Jose and Oakland).25
These two regions account for over two-thirds of the state’s union members. Even
so, we can extract reliable results from the CPS for only a few variables.
In the San Francisco Bay Area union density was considerably higher in the construction, transportation/utilities, and health care industries than it was in the Los
Angeles metropolitan area or in the state as a whole in 2001–02 (Figure 1.13). In the
25. More specifically, the CPS data are for the Los Angeles–Anaheim–Riverside Consolidated
Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA), which includes Los Angeles, Riverside, Orange, Ventura, and San Bernardino Counties; and the San Francisco–Oakland–San Jose CMSA, which
includes San Francisco, Alameda, Santa Clara, Marin, San Mateo, Sonoma, Napa, Contra
Costa, Solano, and Santa Cruz counties.
milkman & rooks / california union membership
25
56.4%
53.9%
53.8%
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16.5%
16.9%
17.1%
9.4%
10.7%
10.0%
14.7%
rke
Wo
ec
All
All
Pri
vat
eS
Se
blic
Pu
All
rs
tor
r
cto
n
atio
uc
Ed
Ca
re
alth
He
Wh
ns
po
an rtati
d U on
tilit
ies
Tra
tur
fac
nu
Ma
ns
tru
cti
ing
on
0
1.8%
1.8%
2.5%
7.0%
9.5%
8.1%
10
ole
s
Re ale a
tail nd
Tra
de
Fin
an
ce
, In
an
d R sura
ea nce
lE
sta ,
te
9.0%
7.8%
9.3%
20
Los Angeles
Bay Area
California
24.9%
17.0%
35.5%
42.8%
36.3%
31.6%
22.4%
18.2%
30
Co
Percentage Unionized
50
40
48.8%
42.4%
47.8%
60%
figure 1.13. Union Density, by Selected Industry Group and Sector, California,
Los Angeles, and San Francisco Bay Area, 2001–2002
ts
irpor
s ou rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings A
ld Files, merged for 2001 and
Wor
les 017
2002 (see Appendix).
2
Ange
n ot e : Results are calculated using the CPS unreviseds
Lo sampling 21,
st weights.
v.
ssnSan on Augu N ϭ 25,052 for California.
N ϭ 13,819 for Los Angeles, N ϭers A for d Francisco,
4,760
rovid
chive
ice P 5571, ar
erv 5-5
eS
1
Arilin
No.
Los Angeles area, in contrast, union density was higher in the education sector and
the public sector generally.
The gender and age distribution of union membership in the state’s major regions
was not significantly different from the statewide pattern. Some notable contrasts
between the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas in regard to nativity and race and
ethnicity are evident, however (Figure 1.14). For example, in 2001–02 African Americans were more extensively unionized in the Los Angeles area than in the Bay Area
(reflecting the overrepresentation of African Americans in public-sector employment
in combination with Los Angeles’s relatively high public-sector union density).
More striking, however, is the fact that a lower proportion of Latino wage and salary workers, and especially foreign-born Latinos, were unionized in Los Angeles
than in the Bay Area. The widespread perception of Los Angeles as the main center
of Latino immigrant unionization notwithstanding, only 9.5% of immigrant Latino
workers in Los Angeles were union members in 2001–02, compared to 14.1% in the
Bay Area.26
26. This is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that a higher proportion of foreign-born
workers in 2001–02 was made up of recent arrivals in the San Francisco Bay Area (79.2%
26
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
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figure 1.14. Unionization Rates, by Race and Ethnicity and Nativity, for Selected
Groups, California, Los Angeles, and San Francisco Bay Area, 2001–2002
s ou rc e : Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files, merged for 2001 and
s
2002 (see Appendix).
rport
ld Ai
n ot e : Results are calculated using the CPS unrevised sampling weights.
Wor
es
N ϭ 13,819 for Los Angeles, N ϭ 4,760 for San Francisco, N ϭ 25,052 for California.
ngel
017
,2
sA
st 21
v. Lo
ssn on Augu
ers A ived
rovid
ch
ice P 5571, ar
Serv 15eperception5and reality is linked to the huge proportion—37.5%
The gap between
Arilin
No.
in 2001–02—of the Los Angeles metropolitan area workforce that is Latino (almost
two-thirds of whom were foreign-born in 2001–02). By contrast, only 17.8% of the
Bay Area workforce was Latino in 2001–02 (slightly less than two-thirds were foreignborn). Despite their relatively low unionization rates, then, immigrant Latinos
figure prominently among Los Angeles union members, thanks largely to their massive presence in the metropolitan area’s workforce. In 2001–02, 29.7% of all Los
Angeles union members were Latino (15.9% native- born and 13.8% foreign-born),
compared to only 18.4% of those in the Bay Area (9.1% native-born and 9.3%
foreign-born).
The CUC also collected geographical data on union membership in the state’s
major metropolitan areas and regions.27 As is the case statewide (see Figure 1.4a),
arrived in 1980 or later, and 46.8% in or after 1990) than in the Los Angeles area (68.9%
arrived in 1980 or later, and 31.6% in or after 1990), since, as noted above, recent immigrants
are generally less likely to be unionized than those who have been in the United States for a
longer period of time.
27. The CPS geographical data refer to the region in which workers reside, whereas the CUC data
refer to the region in which union members’ workplaces are located. The CUC asked each
milkman & rooks / california union membership
27
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union membership in the San Francisco and the Los Angeles regions alike is concentrated in a relatively small number of unions (Figure 1.15). Although the major players
in these two metropolitan areas are similar to those in the state, the SEIU’s 2001–02
share of union membership was particularly massive in the Bay Area, where it
accounted for more than a fifth (21.4%) of all union members. The SEIU was the
largest single union in the Los Angeles area too, but accounted for a considerably
smaller share of the 2001–02 total (15.4%). The major building trades unions (UBC,
IUOE, LIUNA, and IBEW) also accounted for a larger share of Bay Area union
membership (12.1%, compared to 10.6% for Los Angeles). The CNA is a significant
player in the Bay Area, with 2.7% of all union members in the region; in the L.A.
area it accounted only for 0.4%. In Los Angeles the two largest entertainment
unions, IATSE and AFTRA, jointly accounted for 5.4% of union members; their
share of Bay Area union membership was relatively small (1.1% jointly), and
UFCW’s share of union membership in Los Angeles was more than double that in
the Bay Area (8.5% versus 3.3%).
UNION STAFFING PATTERNS
s
rport
The CUC also collected data on union staffing patterns indCalifornia, including a
l Ai
Wor organizers and to what
detailed breakdown as to which unions in the stateles 017
employ
Ange 21, 2
28
Los organizing from the national AFLt
extent. In light of the recent pushsfor v. Augus
sn renewed
on
rs A
CIO, these data are particularly revealing. When John Sweeney became the labor
vide rchived
ro
ice P 5571, a
rv
federation’slipresident in -5 he called on all the affiliates to participate in a massive
e Se . 15 1995,
Ari n
No
“Change to Organize” program and urged them to help reverse the tide of declining
union density by devoting 30% of their budgets to organizing unorganized workers.
Many unions embraced Sweeney’s rhetoric, but relatively few actually dedicated the
extensive resources to organizing that his program called for, in part because they
were reluctant to shift staffing priorities away from servicing existing members (Voss
and Sherman 2000).
No national data are publicly available on the extent to which unions have redirected staff resources toward organizing, but the CUC found that California local
unions employ very few organizers and that those organizers who are on union staffs
local union to identify the location of each employer for which they represented members. In
cases of employers who operated on a statewide basis, we assumed that the distribution of the
members across regions was proportional to that of the union membership in the state for
which regional data were reported. Because of various problems involving the data for other
regions, here we discuss only the state’s two largest regions, the San Francisco Bay Area and
the Los Angeles metropolitan area. (The CUC definitions of each region are identical to those
of the two CMSAs described in note 25.)
28. The response rate for the CUC staffing questions was 96.5%.
28
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SEIU
21.4%
Other
26.8%
CTA/NEA
9.5%
CWA 2.1%
IBEW 2.1%
LIUNA 2.2%
HERE 2.1%
CSEA
8.6%
AFT 2.2%
AFSCME 2.3%
CNA 2.7%
UFCW
3.3%
IUOE
3.4%
UBC
4.4%
IBT
6.9%
figure 1.15a. Distribution of Union Members, by International Union,
San Francisco Bay Area, 2001–2002
s
s ou rc e : California Union Census 2001–02.
rport
ld Ai
n ot e : Results are weighted to correct for survey non-response (see Appendix).
Wor
les
N ϭ 521 local unions.
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
SEIU
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
15.4%
S
.
riline Other 1
A
No
25.4%
CTA/NEA
10.3%
CWA 2.2%
AFSCME 2.3%
CSEA
8.7%
UBC 2.4%
HERE 2.5%
AFTRA 2.5%
AFT 2.7%
UFCW
8.5%
IATSE 2.9%
LIUNA
3.1% IUOE
3.5%
IBT
7.6%
figure 1.15b. Distribution of Union Members, by International Union,
Los Angeles, 2001–2002
s ou rc e : California Union Census 2001–02.
n ot e : Results are weighted to correct for survey non-response (see Appendix).
N ϭ 661 local unions.
milkman & rooks / california union membership
29
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table 1.3 . Union Staffing Levels by Size of Local Union, California, 2001–2002
Number of Staff Employed
by Local Union (full-time equivalent)
0
More than 0 but less than or equal to 1
More than 1 but less than or equal to 3
More than 3 but less than or equal to 5
More than 5 but less than or equal to 10
More than 10 but less than or equal to 25
More than 25
Total
Percentage of All
Local Unions
in California
Average Number
of Dues-Paying
Members in
Local Union
50.9%
13.3
12.6
6.6
7.7
5.8
3.3
218
479
880
1,509
2,348
5,279
26,475
100.0
—
s ou r c e : California Union Census.
n o t e : N ϭ 1,306 local unions. Percentages are weighted to correct for survey non-response (see
Appendix); averages are unweighted.
rts
Airpo
ld
are concentrated in very few Internationals. Indeed,Wa rmere five Internationals
s o
gele , 2017
s n t 2 state.29 The extent to which
employ nearly half (48.9%) of all organizersAin the 1
v. Lo
us
ssn not n Augin relation to the AFL-CIO’s orgaunions employ organizers is iders A ved o only
important
v
ro
rchi
nizing programSbutice P 55571, ait is both a cause and a consequence of increased
rv also because
e e . 15Arilin
union density. No
About half (50.9%) of California’s local unions in 2001–02 had no paid staff at all,
64.2% had one full-time staff member or less, and fully 83.4% had five or less (Table
1.3). Not surprisingly, staffing levels were closely correlated with local union size, and
as we have already noted, most unions in the state are quite small.30 Larger unions
tend to employ more staff than smaller unions, both because they have more
resources and because they have a greater need for staff support.
29. The CUC defined “paid staff” as individuals employed by local unions for a minimum of 20
hours per week. All staffing data in this section are presented as FTEs (full-time equivalents,
where full-time is defined as 40 hours per week). Elected union leaders (such as president, vice
president, secretary-treasurer, etc.) were included only if they also were employed by the
union as clerical workers, business agents, organizers, or researchers—the four job titles on
which data are presented here. We asked each responding local for a full report on staff members serving their local union, including individuals whose salaries were paid by other union
entities (Internationals, or regional or district units of Internationals). We did not collect data
on staff employed by regional union organizations (such as the California Labor Federation or
the State Building and Construction Trades Council) or on the staff of Central Labor Councils and the like.
30. The correlation between local union size and staff FTE is r ϭ 0.932 (p Ͻ .01). N ϭ 1304.
30
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table 1.4. Number of Staff Employed by Local Unions, with Percentage
Distribution among all Local Unions, for Selected Staff Titles, California, 2001–2002
Number of Staff (full-time equilvalent)
0
More than 0 but less than or equal to 1
More than 1 but less than or equal to 3
More than 3 but less than or equal to 5
More than 5 but less than or equal to 10
More than 10 but less than or equal to 25
More than 25
Total
All Union
Staff
50.9%
13.2
12.6
6.6
7.7
5.8
3.3
100.0
Clerical
Workers
60.0%
16.8
13.6
4.0
3.0
1.8
0.8
100.0
Business
Agents Organizers Researchers
64.2%
14.4
9.1
5.1
4.3
2.0
0.9
100.0
84.8%
8.8
4.3
0.8
0.8
0.3
0.2
100.0
96.9%
0.8
1.8
0.5
0
0
0
100.0
s ou r c e : California Union Census.
note: N ϭ 1,306 local unions. Results are weighted to correct for survey non-response (see Appendix).
Unions that did have staff primarily employed clerical workers ports business
and
ir
rld A
agents (Table 1.4). Clerical workers were the largest single Wo
s group, with 40.0% of
gele
17
local unions employing at least some part-timeLclerical staff. ,Only 23.2% of locals,
s An t 21 20
o
gus
n v.
however, had more than one clericalestaff ss ed on Au
rs A member.
hiv
rovid
The next most common e P title 1, arc
ic job 557 was that of union business agent, whose duties
erv 5-5
eS
1
Ar in
primarily involveilthe enforcement of union contracts. The CUC found that 35.8% of
No.
locals had at least a part-time business agent in 2001–02, with 21.4% of locals employing one or more business agents. There is a strong correlation between the number of
business agents a local employed and the number of dues-paying members it had.31
Business agents in public-sector unions served more than twice as many members (1,950 members, on average) than their private-sector counterparts (856 members).32 This is probably because public-sector unions, given the greater prevalence
of agency and open shop contract provisions, often have fewer dues-payers than
private-sector unions do, so that their resources are more limited.33 Public-sector
unions are also more likely to have unpaid shop stewards who carry out some of the
tasks business agents perform elsewhere. Business agents in the building trades
served fewer members (471, on average) than did business agents employed by
unions in other sectors (1,396, on average). Building trades locals tend to employ
more staff because of their role in the labor-intensive work of maintaining hiring
31. The correlation between local union size and business agent FTE is r ϭ 0.891 (p Ͻ .01). N ϭ
1304.
32. The number of members per business agent was even lower in mixed locals (837 members).
33. See note 5 regarding agency and open shop provisions.
milkman & rooks / california union membership
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SEIU
21.9%
Other
22.3%
BSOIW
2.1%
LIUNA 2.4%
AFSCME
10.7%
IUOE 2.4%
SMWIA 2.7%
UBC 3.0%
CNA
6.4%
IBT
3.3%
UA
4.0%
HERE
4.2%
UFCW
4.3%
CWA
5.0%
IBEW
5.3%
figure 1.16. Distribution of Organizers, by International Union,
California, 2001–2002
s
s ou rc e : California Union Census 2001–02.
rport
ld Ai
n ot e : Results are weighted to correct for survey non-response (see Appendix).
Wor
les
N ϭ 1,306 local unions.
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
e r
,
halls and administeringPapprenticeship programs. Shop stewards are a rarity in the
ervic 5-55571
S
riline No. 1
trades asAwell.
Local unions were far less likely to employ organizers than clerical workers or
business agents. Only 15.0% of CUC respondents had even one part-time organizer
on staff in 2001–02, and only 6.2% of locals employed one or more organizers.34 A
mere 1.9% of locals employed three or more organizers.
Internationals varied greatly in the extent to which they employed organizers
(Figure 1.16 and Table 1.5). SEIU, which has the largest number of union members
in California, also employed the largest number of organizers: 136, or 21.9% of all
organizers in the state. Other unions that employed 15 or more organizers included
AFSCME, CNA, CWA, UFCW, HERE, the Teamsters, and several of the building
trades unions (IBEW, UA, UBC, SMWIA, LIUNA and IUOE).
One would expect the unions with the largest numbers of dues-paying members
to employ the largest number of organizers, but this was not always the case.35 The
34. Most of the part-time organizers in our data are business agents who are expected to spend
half of their time organizing nonunion workers.
35. There is a positive and statistically significant correlation between organizer FTE and local
union size, but it is much weaker than the correlations reported in notes 30 and 31: r ϭ 0.394
(p Ͻ .01). N ϭ 1304.
32
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table 1 .5 . Number of Organizers and Member-toOrganizer Ratio, by International Union, California,
2001–2002
International
Union
Number of
Organizers
(FTE)
Percentage
of
Total
Member-toOrganizer Ratio
SEIU
136.0
21.9%
4,452
AFSCME
66.6
10.7
1,707
CNA
40.0
6.4
950
IBEW
33.4
5.3
1,957
CWA
30.9
5.0
2,321
UFCW
26.4
4.3
6,819
HERE
26.2
4.2
2,218
UA
24.7
4.0
1,134
IBT
20.6
3.3
10,646
UBC
18.3
3.0
4,113
SMWIA
16.5
2.7
1,105
LIUNA
15.1
2.4
4,277
IUOE
15.0
2.4
6,056
rts
BSOIW
13.1
2.1
1,342 Airpo
ld
Wor
CSEA
12.0
1.9 ngeles 2017
17,917
A
1,
Los
NEA
11.5 ssn v. 1.9 ugust 226,358
A
A
d on
iders
PAT
2,051
rov10.2 chive 1.6
ice P 5571, ar
erv 5-5 8.5
AFTRA
1.4
4,427
eS
1
Arilin
No.
AFA
7.0
1.1
1,028
NALC
7.0
1.1
5,666
IUPA
6.0
1.0
5,122
IATSE
5.5
0.9
7,695
All Others
67.6
10.8
—
Total
620.1
100.0
—
s o u rc e : California Union Census.
n ot e : N ϭ 1,306 local unions. Results are weighted to correct for
survey non-response (see Appendix).
last column of Table 1.5 shows the ratio of union members to organizers for all Internationals with five or more organizers. A few unions stand out as having an exceptionally large number of organizers relative to their memberships: these include the
CNA, the UA, and AFA. Like the ratio of members to business agents, the memberto-organizer ratio was much higher in public-sector unions (7,493 members per
organizer, on average) than those in the private sector (4,234).36 The average ratio for
36. The ratio for mixed locals is an even lower 3,044 members per organizer.
milkman & rooks / california union membership
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building trades locals was 2,631 members per organizer, half the average ratio (5,028
workers per organizer) in non-trades locals.
Of all the staff titles reported here, unions were least likely to hire researchers:
96.9% had none, and only 2.3% employed one or more full-time staff members in
this capacity (see Table 1.4). Moreover, researchers were even more concentrated
than organizers were among very few unions: of the 40 locals that did employ
researchers, 11 were SEIU affiliates and 7 were HERE affiliates. Researchers on local
union staffs are primarily engaged in providing support for organizing campaigns,
so it is not surprising that their distribution among unions is similar to that for
organizers.
The CUC data also suggest a relationship between union growth and staffing
patterns, particularly in regard to organizers. One might expect unions that
employ sizable numbers of organizers to be the unions that grow most rapidly, all
else being equal (of course, a variety of other factors may also affect union growth
or stagnation), since organizers increase a union’s capacity to organize new workers.
The presence of organizers can also result from past growth, since an expanded
membership base increases union resources, making it possible to hire more organizers. There is indeed a correlation between the number of organizers employed
by California local unions in 2001–02 and the extent to which the membership of
rts
those locals grew over the preceding five years. No suchdcorrelation was found
Airpo
orl
Wand union growth.37 It is
between the employment of staff for other job etitles 017
les
Ang 21, 2
Los
t
likely that the unions with extensive n v.
s organizing us will be better able than their
ug staff
on A
rs As respond to the challenge of increasing union
counterparts who lack Providstaff rto ived
such e ch
,a
rvice
eyears. -55571
S
density in future
15
line
Ari
No.
CONCLUSION
Although union membership patterns in California are similar in many respects to
those in the nation, the state’s labor movement also has several distinctive features. It
is to these that we must turn to explain California’s recent divergence from the
United States as a whole in regard to union density.
California’s unusual labor history is critical in this regard. The relatively early
growth of public-sector and health care unionism in the state helped give it an edge
and fueled continued expansion of the unionization in the state. The SEIU’s unusually large presence in California had a major impact in the 1990s, when this union
became exceptionally active in organizing new members. The existence of several
other vibrant unions that operate entirely or largely in the state further contributed
37. The correlation between the number of organizer FTEs and the percentage change in the
number of dues-paying members in each union between 1996 and 2001–02 is r ϭ 0.280 (p Ͻ
.01). N ϭ 1051.
34
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
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to California’s divergence from the nation. Finally, because the industrial unions of
the CIO were always relatively weak in the state, the precipitous decline of these
unions over the past few decades, which has been devastating for the labor movement in the rustbelt, had only a limited impact on California.
Another crucial factor that sets California apart from the nation as a whole is
organized labor’s extensive political influence in the state, particularly in the past
decade. Through involvement in electoral politics and the legislative process, California unions increasingly have been able to use their political muscle to make organizing gains—a source of influence that is conspicuously absent on the national
level. The California Labor Federation (the statewide AFL-CIO body) and many of
the Central Labor Councils (local AFL-CIO bodies) are especially active and effective. On the local level, and especially in Southern California, labor has constructed
a virtuous circle, translating organizing successes into political power by mobilizing
at the grassroots, and then using the resulting political leverage as a resource to help
foster further organizing. Thanks to this dynamic, along with the strength of publicsector unionism in Los Angeles, the once substantial gap in union density between
the San Francisco Bay Area and Los Angeles has virtually disappeared.
Another gap that has all but closed in California is the longstanding gender disparity in union membership. Today union density among women is far higher in the
s
state than it is in the United States as a whole, although women and men ort
Airp remain conorld
Wmovement (as is also
les
centrated in very different parts of California’s organizedelabor 017
Ang 21, 2
Los extensively unionized in Calithe case nationally). African Americans aresn v. more gust
also
u
rs As ve on A
videworkers, d have a higher unionization rate in
fornia than in the nation. Immigrant archi too,
Pro 1,
ice
S United States,
California than innthe erv . 15-5557 although in this case the gap is minimal. That
rili e No
A
the state’s workforce includes a disproportionately large share of recent immigrants,
who comprise one of the least unionized population groups (both nationally and in
the state), makes California’s recent gains in union density all the more impressive.
Whether the state’s labor movement can maintain its recent momentum and continue to increase union density depends on a variety of complex factors, most of
which are difficult to predict. But, assuming that the SEIU continues to expand and
that labor remains politically influential in the state, we can conclude that the outlook for continued union growth is far more favorable in California than in the
United States as a whole, where prospects of reversing the long-term density decline
appear relatively bleak.
REFERENCES
California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Statistics and Research.
Various years. Union Labor in California.
Cobble, Dorothy Sue. 1994. “Making Postindustrial Unionism Possible.” In Restoring the
Promise of American Labor Law, edited by Sheldon Friedman, Richard W. Hurd, Rudolph A.
Oswald, and Ronald J. Seeber. Ithaca: ILR Press.
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Freeman, Richard. 2003. “Searching Outside the Box: The Road to Union Renascence and
Worker Well-Being in the U.S.” Unpublished paper, presented at the Ray Marshall Center
conference on “The Future of Organized Labor: Restoring the Balance in a Market Economy,” Washington, D.C.
Gifford, Court, ed. 2002. Directory of U.S. Labor Organizations: 2002 Edition. Washington,
D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs.
Greenhouse, Steven. 1999. “In Biggest Drive since 1937, Union Gains a Victory.” New York
Times [national edition], 26 February: A1.
Hirsch, Barry T., and David A. Macpherson. Various years. Union Membership and Earnings
Data Book: Compilations from the Current Population Survey. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of
National Affairs.
Kennedy, Van Dusen. 1955. Nonfactory Unionism and Labor Relations. Berkeley: Institute of
Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley.
Meyerson, Harold. 2001. “California’s Progressive Mosaic.” The American Prospect 12: 17–23.
Milkman, Ruth, and Rachel E. Dwyer. 2002. “Growing Apart: The ‘New Economy’ and Job
Polarization in California, 1992-2000.” The State of California Labor 2: 3–35.
Voss, Kim, and Rachel Sherman. 2000. “Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Tactical Innovation and the Revitalization of the American Labor Movement.” American Journal of Sociology 106: 303–349.
Waldinger, Roger, and Claudia Der-Martirosian. 2000. “Immigrant Workers and American
Labor: Challenge . . . or Disaster?” In Organizing Immigrants: The Challenge for Unions in
s
Contemporary California, edited by Ruth Milkman. Ithaca: Cornell iUniversity Press.
rport
ld A
Weir, Margaret. 2002. “Income Polarization and California’s Social Contract.” The State of
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les
Ange 21, 2017
California Labor 2: 97–131.
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t
.
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
e Pr
,
ervic and 571
A P P E N DilIine S Data 5-55Methods
r X . No. 1
A
Since 1987 the only regularly collected data on union density in California have been those
included once a year in the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS). For purposes of analyzing
broad national or state-level trends, these data are extremely valuable. Because they are based
on a relatively small household sample, however, they are of limited utility for analysis of
smaller geographic units or specific industries within the state.
In the past, the California Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) collected data on
union density in the state. For four decades, from 1947 to 1987, the DIR conducted a survey
of all union locals, which it published in the serial Union Labor in California, at first annually
and then, after 1971, biannually. After 1987 this practice was discontinued, and for the years
since the only publicly available data on union density in the state have been those in the
CPS, with the exception of the survey we report on here.
In early 2001 the University of California’s newly established Institute for Labor and Employment (ILE) approached the DIR to explore the possibility of reviving the practice of collecting union membership and union coverage data directly from union locals. The authors
of this chapter led this effort. With the assistance of the DIR and the California Labor Federation, we developed a survey instrument and sent it to all the local unions in the state.
We obtained a list of all AFL-CIO affiliated union locals from the California Labor Federation and developed our own list of independent (i.e., not AFL-CIO affiliated) unions from a
variety of public sources. Our approach was more inclusive than that used by DIR in the
36
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past: whereas they excluded all private-sector independent unions with less than two employers or less than 1,000 members, we included all independent unions that had written collective bargaining agreements, regardless of size. We did exclude independent unions that
lacked any such agreements.
The 2001–02 California Union Census (CUC) was modeled after the DIR’s 1947–1987
surveys in some respects, but we updated some of the old questions and added some new
ones. Using a mail questionnaire combined with extensive telephone follow-up, we were able
to obtain an 83% response rate (1,348 of 1,620 locals) in the 2001–02 survey (although for
some questions, the response rates were far lower). In some cases we obtained data from public sources to supplement and verify the data collected through the survey, and in a few
instances we used this method to obtain data for nonrespondents.
Because the response rate varied among the International unions we surveyed, and between independent unions and AFL-CIO affiliates, we used a data weighting technique in
the analysis reported in the text. We created a weight variable, defined as the total number of
locals in each International divided by the total number of locals from whom we received responses to the survey. Thus the weights are the inverse of the probability that a local is included in our sample (probability weights). In addition, we corrected for some inconsistencies in the data, using other information provided by respondents. This involved less than 5%
of the cases for the variables on which findings are reported here.
The CPS data cited in this report are from a dataset that we constructed by merging the
2001 and 2002 Outgoing Rotation Group data. Results are calculated using the CPS unres
vised sampling weights. The sample includes employed civilian wage and salaryoworkers, age
rp rt
ld Ai
sixteen and over. We followed the sample definition and weighting procedures described in
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Hirsch and Macpherson (2003, 1–8).
Los
v.
ust
Merging the 2001 and 2002 CPS data Assnincreases ug reliability of our analysis (by
rs files ved on A the
e
i
ovid
doubling the number of observations), 1, arithis the closest approximation to the timing of
e Pr 7 and c
5
ervic 5-which began in the fall of 2001 and continued through the
e S process, 55
the CUC data collection o. 1
Arilin
N
summer of 2002. (We requested that CUC respondents supply data for 2001, but in some
cases they gave us 2002 figures, and in other cases they provided the most recent data they
had access to, which sometimes predated 2001).
The CUC data differ from those collected by the CPS in several ways, but the single most
important is that the CUC’s source is data obtained from the population of union locals in
the state, whereas the CPS is a household sample that reaches about 1.5% of all employed
wage and salary workers (see Hirsch and MacPherson 2003, 11). In both cases there are significant limitations to the data, as well as distinct advantages. For example, many individuals
surveyed by the CPS may not be aware of their union or nonunion status. On the other
hand, the demographic information we collected from union locals on their members was
poor in quality; here the CPS data are far superior. In compiling the text, we compared the
data from both sources. Where one was definitively more reliable, we used it; in cases were
both are of comparable reliability, we report both.
Further details on the data and methods are available from the authors.
The State of California Labor, 2003, Vol. 2, pp. 3–37, ISSN 1531-9037, electronic ISSN 1541-9045. © 2003 by
the Institute for Labor and Employment. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to: Rights
and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center Street, Suite 303, Berkeley, CA
94704-1223.
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The State of Organizing
in California
challenges and possibilities
KATE BRONFENBRENNER
and R O B E R T H I C K E Y
Since the mid-1990s the U.S. labor movement has been involved
in an enormous effort to reverse the decades-long downward trend in union organizing activity and union density. This is especially true in California, which has more
union members than any other state and is one of a handful of states in which
unions have made major organizing gains in recent years.
Still, union density averages only 18% in California, and increases in union membership lag far behind those in non-union employment. Furthermore, the bar keeps
moving higher: job losses are increasing in industries that have traditionally been
ports
union strongholds, such as the airline transportation and motion lpicture and broadd Air
Wor
casting industries, at the same time that most of the ngelesemployment expansion
state’s 2017
sA
1,
has been concentrated in largely unorganized v. Lo August 2
n industries.
ss
ers A ived on
In this essay we assess thePstatus of rorganizing in California and examine the
rovid
ch
ice 5571, a
challenges that must Serv . 15-5 if unions are significantly to boost membership
e be overcome
Arilin
No
and realize the gains in political clout and bargaining power that those increases
would engender. The first section examines organizing gains in the context of
changes that have occurred in employment, union membership, density, and
workforce and union demographics over the past six years. The second section
provides an analysis of the nature, extent, and outcome of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certification election activity in the state since 1997. In the
third section we explore the nature and extent of non-NLRB election and card
check recognition campaigns in the state. Finally, we discuss the characteristics of
organizing campaigns in the United States and their implications for unions in
California.
UNIONS AND EMPLOYMENT IN CALIFORNIA, 1997–2002
On the surface, the California employment landscape appears to be remarkably similar to that of the nation. As in the United States as a whole, the overwhelming
majority of workers in California are employed in service industries (primarily in
professional and business services and in health care), the public sector, or in retail
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
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California
U.S.
3%
Agriculture
1%
5%
5%
Construction
12%
13%
Manufacturing
3%
3%
Transportation
21%
23%
Wholesale and
Retail Trade
Communications
and Utilities
2%
2%
6%
6%
Finance
31%
31%
All Services
16%
16%
Public Sector
ts
rpor30
25
ld Ai
Wor
les
Percentage nge
Aof Workforce017
,2
Los
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v.
ssn on Augu
figure 2.1. Employment,rs AIndustry, California and U.S., 2002
e by
d
rovid , a chive
ice PEDD 2003.r
s ou rc e s : BLS v
er 2003a;-55571
eS
15
Arilin
No.
0
5
10
15
20
35%
and wholesale trade (Figure 2.1).1 Not surprisingly, a slightly higher percentage of
workers in California is employed in agriculture compared to the nation as a whole,
while a slightly lower percentage is employed in manufacturing and wholesale and
retail trade. For other industries, however, the percentages are the same for California and the nation.
California also reflected national trends in job growth and decline between 1997
and 2002 (Table 2.1). Employment in most industries grew during this period:
the private sector sustained an increase of 8.8% in California and 6.2% nationwide,
the public sector an increase of 14.4% in California and 8.7% nationwide. Nationally, employment in professional and business services grew by nearly 2.3 million
jobs; 235,700 jobs were created in California alone. Gains also occurred in health
care and retail trade.
In general, California’s employment growth was stronger than the nation’s. While
the total civilian labor force increased by 9.7% in California, it grew by only 6.6%
1. Unless otherwise specified, throughout this chapter the term “health care” refers to both health
care and social services; “communications and utilities” includes the sanitation industry.
40
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
12,404,400
376,100
772,600
1,775,200
439,500
2,451,800
651,500
195,700
90,900
849,900
4,707,700
2,091,300
245,800
1,253,800
421,400
2002
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
2,448,100
14,852,500
1,309,700
9.7
14.4
122,690,000
19,557,000
Ϫ4.55
23.6
3.8
13.6
Ϫ9,100
47,000
6,900
60,500
307,400
550,000
1,642,000
1,746,000
5,006,000
8.8%
Ϫ8.9
39.3
Ϫ9.1
4.1
6.7
9.4
22.9
2.0
14.2
12.8
12.7
23.6
14.7
5.6
130,791,000
21,260,000
583,000
1,750,000
1,798,000
5,450,000
109,531,000
1,819,000
6,556,000
17,281,000
4,317,000
23,306,000
6,671,000
1,614,000
842,000
7,760,000
40,840,000
14,883,000
2,526,000
13,850,000
2,333,000
2002
8,101,000
1,703,000
33,000
108,000
52,000
444,000
6,398,000
138,000
865,000
Ϫ1,990,000
194,000
1,340,000
23,000
195,000
Ϫ24,000
651,000
4,973,000
2,285,000
422,000
1,629,000
141,000
6.6
8.7
6.0
6.6
3.0
8.9
6.2%
8.2
15.2
Ϫ10.3
4.7
6.1
0.3
13.7
Ϫ2.8
9.2
13.9
18.1
20.1
13.3
6.4
Percentage
Change
1997–2002
s o u rc e s : BLS 2003a; EDD 2003.
n ot e : Unless otherwise noted, “Manufacturing” includes mining, “Transportation” includes warehousing, “Retail” includes eating and drinking establishments, and “Health care”
includes social services. “Other services” includes repair and maintenance services, personal and laundry services, religious services, labor organizations, and other similar civic
organizations.
2,140,700
13,542,800
200,500
198,500
182,800
445,200
103,133,000
1,681,000
5,691,000
19,271,000
4,123,000
21,966,000
6,648,000
1,419,000
866,000
7,109,000
35,867,000
12,598,000
2,104,000
12,221,000
2,192,000
1997
Net Change
1997–2002
u n i t e d s tat e s
Number Employed
1,002,300
Ϫ36,900
218,100
Ϫ177,800
17,400
154,900
55,900
36,500
1,800
105,600
533,400
235,700
47,000
160,900
22,400
rts
All Industries
191,400
245,700
189,700
505,700
11,402,100
413,000
554,500
1,953,000
422,100
2,296,900
595,600
159,200
89,100
744,300
4,174,300
1,855,600
198,800
1,092,900
399,000
1997
Net Change
1997–2002
Percentage
Change
1997–2002
rpo
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Public Sector
Private Sector
Agriculture
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Retail trade
Wholesale trade
Communications
Utilities
Finance
Services
Professional and business services
Educational services
Health care
Entertainment
Motion picture and
broadcasting
Other entertainment
Hotels and motels
Other services
Industry
Number Employed
california
table 2.1. Employment, by Industry, California and U.S., 1997–2002
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nationally. The rate of growth of construction jobs in California between 1997 and
2002, 39.3%, was over twice the national rate of 15.2%. Wholesale trade was nearly
unchanged in the nation as a whole, but grew by 9.4% in California. Communications grew 22.9% in California, compared to 13.7% nationwide.
California employment trends diverged from the rest of the nation in agriculture
and communications and utilities (Figure 2.2). Nationwide, employment in agriculture increased by 8.1% between 1997 and 2002, while in California it fell by 8.9%.
Similarly, California employment in communications and utilities grew by 2.0%,
while national employment in those industries fell by 2.8% over the period. Although
overall employment growth in service industries was similar for California (12.8%) and
the United States (13.9%), the growth rate was lower in California in several service
industries, including entertainment and professional and business services. Employment in the motion picture, recording, and broadcasting portions of the entertainment industry in California fell by more than 9,000 jobs during this period, a drop of
4.5%, while nationally employment in motion picture, recording, and broadcasting
grew by 6.0%, reflecting a continuing shift of film and television jobs out of California. Employment in the rest of California’s entertainment industry, including arts and
recreation, grew by 31,500 jobs, or 15.9%, between 1997 and 2002, for a net increase in
employment in the entertainment industry of 5.6% (see Table 2.1).
Whereas most industries enjoyed employment growth duringportsperiod, manuthis
r
ld Ai
facturing experienced massive job losses both in California rand nationwide. All told,
Wo
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nearly two million jobs were lost in manufacturing2in, 201 United States between
Los
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1997 and 2002, reflecting a i10.3% ss einomanufacturing employment nationwide.
rs A loss d n A
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During this same rperiodrmanufacturing employment declined by 9.1% in Califore vic 5-55571
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riline loss of 177,800 manufacturing jobs.
nia, for a total No
A
Certain manufacturing industries in California were particularly hard hit by
employment losses (Figure 2.3). Together, the apparel, leather, and textile industries
lost nearly 25% of their employment base in California, falling from 178,800 jobs in
1997 to 134,800 jobs in 2002. Employment in the computer and electronic products
industry dropped by more than 64,000 jobs, a 15% decline. Even with this drop, it
employed more than 360,000 workers in California, or 20% of the total manufacturing workforce and 2% of the entire civilian workforce in the state.
Aerospace and fabricated metal products each lost around 20,000 workers in California between 1997 and 2002. The loss in aerospace followed a period in the mid1990s when employment in the industry appeared to have stabilized after dropping
by more than 50% between 1990 and 1995. By 2002 the total number of aerospace
workers was only 80,100, a dramatic decrease from the 214,000 employed at the
beginning of the 1990s.
The second largest manufacturing industry in California, food and tobacco products, remained relatively stable, going from 190,600 workers in 1997 to 190,500 in
2002. Three manufacturing industries—electrical equipment and appliances, furniture and related products, and metal production—all experienced slight increases in
employment during this period.
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–8.9%
Agriculture
8.2%
39.3%
Construction
Manufacturing
15.2%
– 9.1%
–10.3%
4.1%
Transportation
4.7%
6.7%
Retail Trade
6.1%
9.4%
Wholesale Trade
0.3%
22.9%
Communications
13.7%
2.0%
Utilities
–2.8%
14.2%
Finance
9.2%
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Ar
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13.3%
12.7%
Professional and
Business Services
18.1% o
es W
5.6%
Entertainment
6.4%
3.8%
Hotels and Motels
3.0%
13.6%
Other Services
8.9%
14.4%
Public Sector
8.7%
California
U.S.
9.7%
6.6%
All Industries
–15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40%
Percentage Change in Employment
figure 2.2. Change in Employment, by Industry, California and U.S.,
1997–2002
s ou rc e s : BLS 2003a; EDD 2003.
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
43
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134,800
Apparel, Leather,
and Textiles
– 44,000
80,100
Aerospace Production
and Parts
–20,500
15,100
Other Transportation
Equipment
–1,100
42,900
Auto and Auto Parts
–1,500
361,200
Computers and
Electronic Products
– 64,400
Electrical Equipment
and Appliances
40,000
400
Food, Beverages,
and Tobacco
190,500
–100
Furniture and
Related Products
68,300
1,500
93,000
Machinery
–11,800
rts
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–19,700
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Metal Production
rs As ved on A
–2,500 e
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MineralA
Products
146,800
Metal Fabrication
2,000
31,500
Paper Products
– 5,400
Petroleum and Coal
–2,900
Plastics Products
– 4,200
14,900
56,900
70,300
Printing
–11,500
7,000
Rubber Products
–1,500
2002 Employment
Employment Change
40,700
Wood Products
– 300
–100
–50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Employment (thousands)
figure 2.3. Manufacturing Employment, 2002, and Change
in Manufacturing Employment, 1997–2002, by Industry, California
s ou rc e : EDD 2003.
44
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
400
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80%
77%
California
U.S.
70
Percentage of Workforce
60
50
52% 53%
50%
40
34%
30%
30
20
12%
10
7%
11%
9%
9%
4%
1% 1%
0
Anglo
African
American
Native
American
Asian/Pacific
Islander
Latino
Women
Foreign-Born
figure 2.4. Selected Workforce Demographics, California and U.S., 2002
s
rport
s ou rc e : BLS 2003b.
ld Ai
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Ange 21, 2017
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Workforce Demographics
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Unlike the industrial . 15-5
which is quite similar for California and the
eS
Arilin
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nation as a whole, the demographic makeup of the California workforce differs
significantly from the nation’s. California workers are much more likely to be nonAnglo and/or foreign born than their counterparts are in the United States as a
whole (Figure 2.4). Overall, in 2002 77% of the U.S. workforce was Anglo, but in
California half was non-Anglo. Most of this group was Latino (30% of the California workforce, compared to 9% nationwide) and Asian or Pacific Islander (12% of
the California workforce, 4% nationwide). While the proportion of women in the
workforce was fairly similar in California (52%) relative to the United States as a
whole (53%), the percentage of foreign-born workers in California was more than
three times higher (34%) than the national average (11%). The proportion of African
American workers was, however, lower in California (7%) than nationwide (9%).
In California in 2002, workers who are Latino or Asian or Pacific Islander and/or
foreign born were particularly concentrated in industries such as agriculture, hotels
and motels, construction, and manufacturing (Table 2.2). The percentages for manufacturing workers were particularly striking, since nationwide a much lower proportion was identified as Latino, Asian or Pacific Islander, or foreign born. The
percentage of Latino and of foreign-born workers employed in construction was also
much higher in California than in the nation as a whole.
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
45
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table 2.2. Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Workforce, California and U.S., 2002
pe rc e n tag e pe r c e n tag e
african
al l
non-anglo american
CA US
CA
US
Private Sector
Agriculture
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Retail trade
Wholesale trade
Communications
Utilities and sanitation
Finance
Health care
Entertainment
Hotels and motels
Business and other
services
53%
71
53
59
57
52
49
47
35
38
53
31
63
24%
20
22
23
27
24
19
24
17
19
26
21
42
5%
1
3
3
9
5
4
12
9
6
10
6
6
9%
4
5
8
12
9
6
12
8
8
12
7
13
pe r c e n tag e
asian and
pac i f i c
islander
CA
US
12% 4%
3
3
4
2
16
4
12
4
11
4
11
3
13
5
11
2
14
5
14
4
9
4
15 10
percentage
latino
CA
US
34%
74
49
40
35
36
35
22
13
20
27
16
42
10%
26
17
11
9
11
10
7
5
7
7
9
19
s
rport
ld Ai 9
52
26
6
9
13
5 s Wor31
le
2017
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Public Sector
47
24
12
12 v. Los10 gust421, 23
6
n
s
u
rs As ved on A8
Public education
39
19 vide 8
9
4
22
6
hi
Pro
, arc 15
Other public sector
47 e
12
4
24
6
ervic 285557116
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5Arilin 50o. 124
N
All Industries
7
9
12
4
30
9
percentage
foreign
born
CA
US
37%
69
42
48
33
34
36
23
20
24
30
21
54
12%
25
16
14
11
12
11
7
4
9
10
11
27
37
13
19
18
20
6
6
6
34
11
so u rce : BLS 2003b.
note: “Business and other services” includes business services, professional and technical services, private sector
educational services, and other services. “Other public sector” includes all public sector other than public
education.
Just as they were nationwide, African American workers in California were most
concentrated in non-education public-sector positions, particularly public transportation, health care, and communications and utilities. Compared to the nation as a
whole, African American workers were particularly underrepresented in certain California industries: agriculture, construction, manufacturing, retail trade and wholesale trade, and hotels and motels.
Union Workers in California
Although employment patterns in California are largely representative of the
national employment picture, union membership and density patterns in California
contrast with the rest of the nation in several respects (see Milkman and Rooks, this
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Latino
Asian/Pacific Islander
Native American
African American
Anglo
100%
7%
90
22%
8%
27%
13%
80
Percentage of Union Membership
4%
1%
4%
1%
12%
9%
70
1%
10%
10%
1%
60
10%
50
40
30
75%
76%
58%
52%
20
10
rts
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California U.S.
Californias U.S. 7
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figure Pro 71, arch
e 2.5. Union Membership, by Racial and
ervic 5-555
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Background, California and U.S., 1997–2002
Arilin Ethnic 1
No.
0
s ou rc e : BLS 2003b.
volume). California was one of only seven states in the country where union density
increased in both the public and private sectors between 1997 and 2002, with an
overall percentage increase in union density of 13.2%. Yet, because recent employment growth in California has been concentrated in traditionally less-unionized
industries such as computers and electronics, union density in California, even at
18%, is lower than it is in New York, Hawaii, Alaska, Michigan, New Jersey, Illinois,
and Washington (all between 18% and 26%) (Hirsch and MacPherson 2003).
Given the state’s increasingly diverse workforce, it is no surprise that the labor
movement in California is also more diverse than it is nationwide, and that it is
growing more diverse each year. For the six years from 1999 to 2002 the non-Anglo
proportion of union members nationwide hovered around 25% (Figure 2.5). As early
as 1997, however, 42% of all union members in California were non-Anglo, including 22% Latino, 9% Asian or Pacific Islander, 1% Native American, and 10% African American. By 2002 the proportion of union members who are Latino had
increased to 27% and the overall proportion of non-Anglo workers had increased to
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
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table 2.3. Union Density, by Race and Ethnicity, Gender, and
National Origin, California and U.S., 1997 and 2002
percentage unionized
1997
California
2002
U.S.
California
U.S.
Race or Ethnicity
Anglo
African American
Native American
Asian and Pacific Islander
Latino
18%
26
17
12
12
14%
19
9
14
12
19%
30
21
15
15
13%
18
11
14
11
Gender
Men
Women
17
15
16
12
18
18
15
12
National Origin
U.S. born
Foreign born
19
10
14
12
21
12
14
11
s
rport
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Ange 21, 2017
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48%. The proportion Provide archi union members who are foreign born also
of California
71,
rvice
increased,rifromS20% 15-1997 to 22% in 2002. In contrast, in 2002 only 9% of all
e e . in 555
lin
A
No
s ou rc e : BLS 2003b.
union members nationwide were foreign born. The proportion of California union
members who are female was 47% in 2002, compared to 43% in the United States.
Since 1997 union density in California has increased a few percentage points
across every demographic group (Table 2.3). Most notably, union density in California increased from 12% to 15% for Asians and Pacific Islanders, 12% to 15 % for
Latinos, and from 26% to 30% for African Americans. In contrast, union density for
the United States as a whole declined by approximately a percentage point in almost
every demographic group, with the exception of density among Native Americans,
which increased from 9% to 11%, and women, which remained stable at 12%.
Women and non-Anglos continue to be underrepresented by unions in many key
industries in California (Figure 2.6). Union density is lowest in agriculture, finance,
retail and wholesale trade, and most service industries—precisely the industries in
which women and/or non-Anglos are most concentrated. In contrast, union density
in the private sector is highest in communications and utilities, where women and nonAnglos are in the minority. Union density for these two groups is highest in the public
sector, particularly in education, just as it is nationwide. This is a primarily a function of
the greater organizing success achieved among teachers and city employees, the majority
of whom are women and/or non-Anglos (see Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1998).
48
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
49
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
so urc e : BLS 2003b.
ltu
re
uc
tio
n
ctu
rin
g
ort
atio
n
Tra
de
ole
Tra
m
ica
tio
ns
Uti
litie
s
Fin
an
ce
B
us
Ot ines
he
r s
Se and
rvic
es
rts
figure 2.6. Women, Non-Anglos, and Union Density, by Industry, California, 2002
cu
90%
Percentage of Workforce
Ag
ri
Co
ns
tr
Ma
nu
fa
Tra
ns
p
R
eta
il
Wh
sal
e
de
Co
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a
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Ca
re
En
ter
ta
inm
en
Ho
tel
t
sa
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M
ote
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Pu
bli
cE
d
uc
atio
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Se
Union Density
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us
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s
Women
Non-Anglos
cto
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Although the prospects for the labor movement seem brighter in California than
in many other states, unions still face enormous challenges, particularly in the private sector. Unions in California still represent only 10% of the private workforce in
the state. Despite a 56% union density rate in the state’s public sector, public-sector
jobs represent just 16% of all civilian employment (see Figure 2.1). Even if California
unions were able to organize 100% of the public sector, 74% of the total workforce
in the state would still be non-union. The greatest job growth has been in industries
in which union density is relatively low, such as professional and business services,
retail trade, and health care, or, in the case of the finance industry, virtually nonexistent. California unions will have to organize hundreds of thousands of new members
a year just to keep pace with employment expansion, much less make significant
gains in union density.
NLRB ELECTION ACTIVITY
To gain a better understanding of the nature and extent of organizing in California
we must move beyond employment, membership, and union density data to the
organizing process itself. Unfortunately, it is not easy to compile a complete picture
orts
of organizing in California. NLRB regulates labor relations lin Airpprivate sector, and
d the
Wor in California, however,
the only reliable data come from NLRB elections. les 017
ge Unions
s An
1, 2
are increasingly attempting to organizev. Lo Augofst 2 NLRB process, both in the
n outside u the
ss
sA
d on
public sector and, through vider checkseand other voluntary recognition campaigns,
ro card chiv
ice P 5571, ar
Serv 15in the privateesector. .This5section summarizes all NLRB elections that took place in
Arilin
No
California from 1997 to 2002. In the section that follows we estimate organizing
gains made outside the NLRB process, which, when combined with the NLRB
data, provide a much clearer understanding of how successful California unions
have been in meeting the organizing challenge.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 compare NLRB election activity in California with that in the
nine other states that had the largest number of NLRB elections between 1997 and
2002. With an average of just under 300 NLRB elections each year, and a total of
1,762 elections for the six-year period, California unions averaged more elections per
year than unions in any other state and were responsible for approximately 10% of
all NLRB election activity that took place nationwide. Election win rates also consistently averaged higher in California than in most other states, starting at 55% in
1997, and, after dropping to 53% in 1998, remaining steady at 55% until 2002, when
the win rate increased to 58%.
The true measure of organizing success is not the election win rates, but rather
the number of workers who were organized. In terms of the number of workers
organized in NLRB elections during this period, California was second only to New
York, with between 8,516 (1997) and 12,210 (1998) newly organized workers each
year. For the six years combined, unions in California won elections involving 61,714
50
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
3,268
311
301
239
229
175
167
198
123
117
98
Number
51
55%
56
55
49
47
50
44
62
51
56
Win
Rate
s o u rc e : BNA PLUS 2002, 2003.
All states
California
New York
Illinois
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Michigan
Ohio
Washington
Missouri
Florida
State
1997
3,297
350
302
235
216
194
190
186
104
90
73
Number
1998
52
53%
62
57
50
45
47
45
55
56
47
Win
Rate
3,108
306
316
187
206
190
181
175
93
99
95
Number
52
55%
64
47
45
47
48
51
58
54
60
Win
Rate
2,868
310
272
207
209
137
149
144
79
80
79
Number
2000
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1999
230
227
191
184
140
110
95
67
72
95
2,361
53
Number
2001
55%
58
48
49
58
54
51
54
54
43
Win
Rate
54
55%
59
63
55
51
53
47
57
50
59
Win
Rate
2,540
255
243
200
182
148
158
151
73
73
74
Number
2002
56
58%
57
57
56
58
56
45
62
40
55
Win
Rate
ta ble 2 .4. Number of NLRB Elections and Win Rates in the Ten States with the Largest Number of Elections, 1997–2002
17,442
1,762
1,661
1,259
1,226
984
955
949
539
531
514
Number
53
55%
59
54
50
51
51
47
58
51
54
Win
Rate
1997–2002
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51
52
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
20,659
20,051
15,179
18,158
9,101
15,323
9,675
9,110
6,431
5,241
220,242
State
New York
California
Illinois
Pennsylvania
Michigan
Ohio
New Jersey
Florida
Washington
Massachusetts
All states
20,553
23,705
16,993
13,760
13,467
13,370
10,744
5,787
7,590
6,801
14,719
12,210
8,833
5,985
5,447
4,590
3,758
1,944
4,247
4,057
Voters in
Elections
Won
1998
Number
of
Voters
18,569
20,809
13,228
15,973
16,511
19,294
12,671
13,184
3,975
6,074
Number
of
Voters
11,608
8,825
5,665
7,010
6,114
8,625
5,728
5,011
2,286
2,560
Voters in
Elections
Won
1999
19,532
18,170
8,605
9,740
6,073
10,350
9,628
6,807
20,862
5,685
23,626 14,178
25,675 11,690
11,417 4,875
14,012 6,094
14,448 8,247
9,631 3,633
8,171 4,004
7,140 2,715
2,834 1,493
3,509 1,535
23,383 11,733
20,841 11,283
10,753 3,970
9,265 3,016
7,949 3,750
7,963 1,874
9,997 4,116
9,962 2,632
4,722 3,004
2,110
890
Voters in
Elections
Won
2002
Number
of
Voters
126,322
129,315
76,175
80,908
67,549
75,931
60,886
51,990
46,414
29,420
74,315
61,714
35,568
30,912
30,102
24,882
24,208
21,060
17,620
14,178
Voters in
Elections
Won
1997–2002
Number
of
Voters
68,728 180,820 72,908 1,284,441 534,367
11,495
9,190
5,044
3,444
2,571
1,946
3,376
4,676
2,690
3,260
Voters in
Elections
Won
2001
Number
of
Voters
Voters in
Elections
Won
Number
of
Voters
2000
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86,161 232,977 106,354 244,255 106,734 212,816 93,482 193,331
10,582
8,516
7,171
5,363
3,973
4,214
3,226
4,082
3,900
1,876
Voters in
Elections
Won
s o u rc e : BNA PLUS 2002, 2003.
Number
of
Voters
1997
ta ble 2.5 . Number of Voters in All NLRB Elections and in Elections Won for the Ten States with the Largest Number of Newly Organized
Workers, 1997–2002
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Union Win Rate, U.S.
Union Win Rate, California
Percentage of Voters Unionized, U.S.
Percentage of Voters Unionized, California
70%
60
55%
51%
50
52% 53%
52%
42%
46%
55%
52%
53%
54% 55%
56%
58%
54%
46%
44%
51%
44%
42%
40
55%
40%
39%
36%
30
20
10
0
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor
es
figure 2.7. Union Win Rates and PercentagegelVoters 017
An of 21, 2 Unionized
Los
t
in NLRB Elections, California andsn v. 1997–2002
U.S.,
gus
As
n Au
s ou rc e : BNA PLUS 2002,iders hived o
v 2003. rc
Pro 1, a
7
rvice
e Se . 15-555
Arilin
No
Year
of the 129,315 eligible voters who participated in NLRB elections. In contrast, unions
in New York won elections involving 74,315 of the 126,322 eligible voters. The number of workers organized then drops precipitously, to 35,558 in Illinois and 30,912 in
Pennsylvania. Of the nearly 1.3 million voters who participated in NLRB certification elections nationwide between 1997 and 2002, only 42% of these voters were in
units where the election was won. The figure was higher in California, with 48%.
Nationally, the gap has been widening between the number of NLRB elections
won and the percentage of voters who were organized through NLRB elections (Figure 2.7). While the election win rate for all NLRB elections in the United States
increased from 51% in 1997 to 56% in 2002, the percentage of voters won increased
only 1% over the six-year span, from 39% in 1997 to 40% in 2002. In California,
however, a very different pattern emerges. Although the percentage of eligible voters
in elections won was only 42% in 1997, by 2002 it had increased to 54%, only four
percentage points lower than the 2002 election win rate of 58%.
Election wins, both in California and the nation as a whole, were most frequent
in elections with a relatively small number of eligible voters (Figure 2.8). In California 64% of all NRLB elections from 1997 to 2002 occurred in units with fewer than
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
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Less Than 50 Workers
50–99 Workers
100–199 Workers
200–500 Workers
More Than 500 Workers
70%
65%
64%
60%
60
58%
45% 43%
49%
50
47%
46%
38%
40%
40
30
20
17%
16%
11%
10
10%
6%
2%
6%
2%
0
Percentage of
All Elections
Union Win Rate
Percentage of
All Elections
Union Win Rate
U.S.
ts
irpor
rld A
Wo by Unit Size,
figure 2.8. NLRB Elections and Unioneles Rates,
Win 017
Ang
,2
California and U.S., 1997–2002v. Los gust 21
ssn on Au
A
s ou rc e : BNA PLUS ers 2003. d
2002, ive
rovid
ch
ice P 5571, ar
rv
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Arilin
No
California
fifty eligible voters; only 6% were in units with between 200 and 500 eligible voters
and only 2% were in units with more than 500 voters. The national pattern is nearly
identical. For the United States as a whole, win rates steadily declined as the number
of eligible voters increased, from a high of 58% in units with fewer than 50 eligible
voters down to 38% in units with more than 500 voters. In California win rates were
60% in the smallest units, dropping down to 43% in units with 200 to 500 eligible
voters, and increasing slightly to 46% in units with more than 500 eligible voters.
This pattern reflects the tendency of unions to target small “hot shops” (where
workers have already expressed an active interest in organizing) and their failure to
take on and win the larger, more strategic, units in their industries. One win in a
unit of 5,000 workers is far more significant than one hundred wins in units with
fewer than 50 eligible voters, and it can take just as much time and just as many
resources to bargain a contract for 5,000 workers as for 5. With 5,000 workers the
union has the power and the dues to do what it takes to win a strong first contract,
something that is greatly lacking in bargaining for small units (Bronfenbrenner
1996). Thus, if unions participating in NLRB elections in the private sector are committed to organizing new members on the scale necessary to significantly increase
union density, they will have no choice but to target larger units.
54
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NLRB Election Activity by Industry
Figure 2.9 compares NLRB election activity and win rates for California and the
United States for 1997 through 2002. Unions in California concentrated their
NLRB election activity in different industries than their counterparts did nationwide, but there is little difference in industry win rates between California and the
nation as a whole. California unions ran a higher percentage of elections in transportation (17% in California versus 13% nationwide), retail and wholesale trade (15%
versus 12%), entertainment (5% versus 2%), hotels and motels (3% versus 2%), and
communications and utilities (8% versus 6%). California unions ran a smaller percentage of elections in construction, manufacturing, and health care. Both nationally and within California, NLRB win rates were highest—above 60%—in service
industries such as health care, entertainment, and business services. Win rates were
lower in manufacturing, construction, and communications and utilities.
This election activity looks much less substantial when the number of elections in
California is broken down by industry and year, as Table 2.6 reveals. Even in the
most active areas of the economy—manufacturing, transportation, health care, and
retail and wholesale trade—the average number of elections over the six-year span
ranged from only 34 to 63. In other industries the number of elections was much
lower, particularly in hotels and motels and communications, whichirportsaveraged
both
dA
under 8 elections a year, and in finance, with a total of onlyWorl
7 elections during the
les
Ange 21, 2017
entire six-year period.
Los
t
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The average number of eligibleide
voters involved in
rchi
Prov
vic 5 quite
for the six-year perioderwasealso5571, asmall (Figure 2.10). With the exception of
eS
o. 15
Arilin
health care, which hadNan average of 158 eligible voters per election, the average
number was fewer than 100. Averages were even lower for the number of workers
who participated in winning elections, with retail and wholesale trade having the
fewest, at 26. Once again, health care had not only the largest average number in
this regard (153) but also the smallest drop (2%) between the average number of eligible voters and the average number of voters involved in a win.
Manufacturing and health care had by far the highest yearly average number of
eligible voters (5,695 and 5,310, respectively) (Figure 2.11). In manufacturing, an
average of 63 elections took place each year; the average unit size was 90 workers. In
health care, an average of 34 elections took place each year; the average unit size was
158 (see Figure 2.10). However, because average NLRB win rates in California were
so much lower in manufacturing (44%) than in health care (69%) (see Table 2.6),
the average number of newly organized workers in manufacturing in California was
only 2,189, compared to 3,549 workers organized in health care. Transportation also
showed a significant drop: only 1,428 workers organized, although 2,953 participated
in NLRB elections. The most dramatic difference was in retail and wholesale trade,
where the majority of elections won were concentrated in small units. On average,
only 524 of the 2,545 workers who participated in NLRB elections in the retail and
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80%
Union Win Rate, U.S.
Union Win Rate, California
Percentage of All Elections, U.S.
70
69%
65% 64%
Percentage of All Elections, California
60
66%
63%
62%
61%
57%
54%
53%
51%
50%
49%
47%
50
53%
51% 50%
44%
41%
40
30
25%
17%
16%
15%
8%
s
s
nd
sa
tel
ice
Ho
En
ter
tain
Mo
me
tel
nt
re
Ca
alth
He
Wh Ret
ole ail a
sal nd
eT
rad
e
Co
mm
un
i
an catio
d U ns
tilit
ies
Bu
sin
es
sS
erv
ice
s
n
tio
rta
po
ns
tur
fac
nu
Ma
3%
2%
6%
erv
s
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A
ing
on
cti
tru
ns
12%
8%
6%
0
Co
12%
5%
6%
rS
13%
10%
Tra
10
he
22%
Ot
20
figure 2.9. NLRB Elections and Union Win Rates, by Industry, California and U.S.,
1997–2002
s ou rc e : BNA PLUS 2002, 2003.
n ot e : “Other services” includes professional, educational, and other services.
wholesale industries each year were in units where the election was won. Gains were
also small in construction and in communications and utilities.
Few differences were evident in win rates between NLRB elections in California
and the United States as a whole, as noted above, but there were significant differences in regard to the type of industry in which election activity was concentrated
and the average number of eligible voters participating in the elections (Figure 2.12).
For example, only 21% of newly organized workers in California were in manufacturing, compared to 26% nationwide. They were also less concentrated in retail and
wholesale trade, although only slightly: 5% in California versus 6% in the United
States as a whole. On the other hand, newly organized workers in California were
slightly more concentrated in health care, transportation, and communications and
utilities.
56
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
86
45
53
14
11
15
311
All private-sector industries
350
23
5
15
37
70
51
62
5
26
0
27
72
Number
of
Elections
1998
s o urc e : BNA PLUS 2002, 2003.
n ot e : Other services includes all services other than health care.
55
39%
41
63
48
86
62
—
55
71
19
74
57
42
7
13
0
31
68
Win
Rate
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Retail and wholesale trade
Communications
Utilities
Finance
Health care
Other services
Business and personal
services
Hotels and motels
Entertainment
Industry
Number
of
Elections
1997
53
61
40
33
306
16
4
19
10
66
54
62
6
14
0
29
65
Number
of
Elections
Win
Rate
Win
Rate
55
56
75
63
50%
44
63
50
83
43
—
76
55
43%
41
57
61
0
35
100
61
66
56
50
82
55
21
63
60
28
1
17
3
49
68
26
4
11
310
2000
Number
of
Elections
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62%
50
47
45
20
58
—
70
54
Win
Rate
1999
tab le 2.6 . Number of NLRB Elections and Win Rates, by Industry, California, 1997–2002
230
10
9
11
10
44
40
37
4
17
1
30
47
Number
of
Elections
2001
55
50
33
73
70%
41
50
41
0
76
0
73
66
Win
Rate
255
14
11
8
16
63
34
26
8
19
3
36
50
Number
of
Elections
2002
58
79
64
88
63%
49
62
42
38
42
67
81
68
Win
Rate
1762
103
44
79
113
380
296
257
31
106
7
202
370
Number
of
Elections
55
64
50
66
54%
44
57
47
48
53
71
69
63
Win
Rate
1997–2002
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All Elections
Elections Won
43
38
Construction
90
Manufacturing
78
60
51
Transportation
Retail and
WholesaleTrade
59
26
Communication
and Utilities
55
44
158
153
Health Care
48
43
Other Services
0
20
40
60
80
100 120 140 160 180
Average Number of Eligible Voters per Election
figure 2.10. Average Number of Voters per NLRB
Election, by Industry, California, 1997–2002
s
rport
ld Ai
s ou rc e: BNA PLUS 2002, 2003.
Wor
s
n ot e : “Other services” includes allgele other7
An services, 201 than health care.
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t 21
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384
Construction
Elections Won
All Elections
801
2189
Manufacturing
5695
1428
Transportation
2953
Retail and
WholesaleTrade
524
Communication
and Utilities
556
2545
1311
3549
Health Care
5310
1656
Other Services
2945
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Average Number of Eligible Voters per Year
figure 2.11. Average Number of Voters per Year in
NLRB Elections, by Industry, California, 1997–2002
58
t h e s tat e o f c a lsiou r n i a BNA PLUS 0 0 3 2003.
f o rc e: l a b o r / 2 2002,
n ot e : “Other services” includes all services other than health care.
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Construction
Communications and Utilities
Manufacturing
Health Care
Transportation
Other Services
Retail and Wholesale Trade
100%
6%
4%
4%
22%
26%
4%
21%
10%
4%
90
80
70
37%
14%
17%
11%
14%
60
50
26%
25%
5%
15%
12%
13%
10%
5%
4%
12%
6%
40
6%
8%
8%
5%
35%
33%
30
12%
25%
6%
16%
24%
20
10
0
s
rport
16%
ld Ai
Wor 13%
s
gele , 2017
An
. Los gu t 21
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage n v Percentage s Percentage
Percentage
ss
Au
A
on
of Elections
of Eligible
of Workers edof Elections
of Eligible
of Workers
iders ch
r
ProvOrganized iv
Voterse
Voters
Organized
,a
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riline California
U.S.
A
No
21%
14%
16%
18%
figure 2.12. NLRB Elections, Voters, and Newly Organized Workers,
by Industry, California and U.S., 1997–2002
s ou rc e : BNA PLUS 2002, 2003.
n ot e : “Other services” includes all services other than health care.
Unions and NLRB Activity in California
Table 2.7 provides summary data for the primary unions active in NLRB elections in California. As they are nationwide, the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (IBT) was involved in the greatest number of elections by far, participating in 693, or 39%, of the 1,762 NLRB elections that took place in California
between 1997 and 2002 (Figure 2.13). With an average win rate over the six-year
period of 50%, the Teamsters were able to gain representation for 14,062 workers
during this period, representing 35% of all eligible voters participating in Teamsters
elections and 23% of all workers organized under the NLRB in California for the
six-year period (Figure 2.14). These figures compare favorably with the national
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
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table 2.7. NLRB Election Activity, by Union, California, 1997–2002
Total
Number
of
Elections
Union
IBT
SEIU
CNA
IAM
LIUNA
GCIU
UFCW
ILWU
IUOE
CWA
AFSCME
IBEW
UTU
UBC
UE
PAT
HERE
OPEIU
UAW
ATU
USWA
BCTGM
PACE
IATSE
UFW
AFTRA
BSOIW
AFT
SMW
IFPTE
UNITE
SIUNA
UWUA
GMPPAW
PPF
All unions
Percentage
of all
Elections
Win
Rate
Average
Number
of Voters
per Year
Total
Number
of Voters
Won
Percentage
of Total
New
Percentage
of Voters Workers
Won Organized
693
39%
50%
6,725
2,344
14,062
35%
120
7
73
2,861
2,208
13,249
77
15
1
80
1,138
735
4,409
64
113
6
61
713
333
1,999
47
62
4
48
1,177
317
1,900
27
29
2
52
692
302
1,813
44
77
4
47
1,195
290
1,740
24
63
4
62
505
257
1,542
51
115
7
63
432
241
1,447
56
45
3
58
455
188
1,130
41
15
1
73
275
184
1,101
67
47
3
57
366
166
996
45
8
0
88
143
127
764
89
26
1
46
428
110
662 orts26
Airp
rl596
6
0
50
199
99
50
o d
les W 017
ge
31
2
65
134
69
s An92 t 21, 2 554
s
v. Lo
ssn on Augu
23
1
39
263
92
552
35
ers A ived
h
ro id
15
1 ice P73 v 1, arc199
81
486
41
rv
57
10 riline Se o. 15-55
1
50
188
75
447
40
A
N
13
1
69
111
71
428
64
14
1
29
383
63
377
16
14
1
43
192
57
339
29
11
1
64
104
53
315
51
26
1
50
190
47
279
24
2
0
100
41
41
243
100
9
1
78
33
32
191
96
14
1
29
71
32
191
45
5
0
80
38
30
177
77
30
2
17
185
20
118
11
2
0
50
35
17
100
48
2
0
50
16
10
59
62
10
1
20
131
7
42
5
2
0
50
11
6
33
49
7
0
14
122
4
25
3
5
0
20
30
2
10
6
1,762
100
55
21,558
so u rce : BNA PLUS 2002, 2003.
60
Average
Number
of Voters
Won
per Year
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
10,286
61,714
48
23%
22
7
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
Case: 15-55571, 08/23/2017, ID: 10554492, DktEntry: 30-2, Page 66 of 274
Others
17%
GCIU 2%
IBT
39%
SMWIA 2%
PAT 2%
CWA 3%
IBEW 3%
LIUNA
4%
ILWU
4%
UFCW
4%
IAM
6%
IUOE
7%
SEIU
7%
figure 2.13. NLRB Elections, by International Union,
California, 1997–2002
s
rport
ld Ai
s ou rc e : BNA PLUS 2002, 2003.
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A
ide
Prov , archi
IBT
vice
erOthers -55571
S 25%
23%
riline No. 15
A
IBEW 2%
AFSCME 2%
CWA 2%
IUOE 2%
SEIU
22%
ILWU 3%
UFCW 3%
GCIU 3%
LIUNA
3%
IAM
3%
CNA
7%
figure 2.14. Workers Newly Organized through NLRB
Elections, by International Union, California, 1997–2002
s ou rc e : BNA PLUS 2002, 2003.
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
61
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data for the Teamsters. With an average win rate of 44% and an average unit size in
elections won of only 36, the union was able to gain representation for only 30% of
the workers who voted in the Teamsters’s elections nationwide (Bronfenbrenner
and Hickey 2002).
Following the Teamsters is the Service Employees International Union (SEIU).
Despite participating in only 120 NLRB elections in the last six years, a combination
of an extremely high win rate of 73% and a high percentage of victories in larger
units enabled SEIU to gain representation for 13,249 workers, or 77% of all workers
participating in SEIU’s NLRB elections and 22% of all workers organized in California during this period. When these gains are combined with the even larger number
of workers SEIU organized outside the traditional NLRB process (see the discussion
below), SEIU moves far ahead of any other union in the state in terms of organizing
gains between 1997 and 2002.
The Teamsters and the SEIU are responsible for 46% of all NLRB elections and
45% of all workers organized under the NLRB in California since 1997. In terms of
the number of elections, they are followed by the International Union of Operating
Engineers (IUOE), the International Association of Machinists (IAM), the United
Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW), the International
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), and the Laborers’ International Union
s
rport
of North America (LIUNA). Together these unions were responsible for 24% of all
ld Ai
Wor and 2002, but only 15%
les
NLRB elections that took place in California between 199717
Ange 21, 20
Los
.
of all workers organized through these elections. ust
sn v n Aug LIUNA and the UFCW showed a
o
rs As
vide rchived the percentage of voters in all elections
significant difference between win rates and
ro
ice P 5571, a
v
won (48%iliversus r27%5for LIUNA, 47% versus 24% for UFCW), which suggests
e Se . 1 -5
Ar n
No
that these unions have been unable to make significant gains in larger units. In this
regard they contrast with the California Nurses Association (CNA) and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), which,
while they each only participated in 15 elections during this period, made more
significant membership gains because of high win rates (80% for CNA, 73% for
AFSCME) and a larger average unit size. CNA gained representation for 64% of its
workers who participated in NLRB elections; for AFSCME that figure was 67%.
Unions in the United States are increasingly organizing workers outside of their
traditional jurisdictions (see Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2002), and, as Figure 2.15
shows, California is no exception. Although some unions continue to concentrate
more than 75% of their organizing in one of their traditional jurisdictions, just as
many are organizing across a variety of industries. For some unions, such as UFCW
and CWA, this reflects the merger of unions from more than one area. Some
unions have targeted two divergent industries; for example, UAW has organized
workers in the auto and auto parts industry and in higher education. Other unions,
such as the Teamsters, LIUNA, and IAM, have increasingly acted more like general
unions, organizing across every industrial area. One trend, however, stands out:
nearly every union, including industrial unions and those representing the building
62
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
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Construction
All Services
Manufacturing
Other
Transportation
AFSCME
93%
BCTGM
7%
7%
79%
BSOIW
14%
79%
7%
CNA
14%
100%
2%
CWA
13%
4%
38%
42%
3%
GCIU
83%
HERE
14%
87%
13%
1%
IAM
32%
9%
17%
IATSE
41%
100%
IBEW
21%
11%
40%
27%
2%
IBT
21%
ILWU 3%
28%
21%
13%
27%
17%
54%
rts
Airpo
rld 34%
s Wo
gele , 2017
15%
26%
5%
s An 40% 21
st
v. Lo
ssn on Augu
rs A 100%
e
ovid archived
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
S
77%
10%
riline No. 1
A
IUOE
11%
LIUNA
OPEIU
PAT
SEIU
11%
5%
38%
11%
14%
6%
6%
89%
UAW
50%
UBC
12%
10%
23%
20%
20%
62%
4%
12%
3%
UFCW
32%
USWA
7%
All Unions
6%
9%
0
56%
71%
22%
10
20
7%
17%
30
40
32%
50
60
7%
7%
23%
70
80
90
100%
Percentage of Elections
figure 2.15. NLRB Election Activity, by International Union and
Industry, U.S., 1997–2002
s ou rc e : BNA PLUS 2002, 2003.
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
63
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trades, is engaged in some organizing in the service industries, particularly in health
care.
In Table 2.8 unions are distributed into six groups that indicate their primary
jurisdiction: industrial, building trades, transportation (primarily the Teamsters and
ILWU), service and public sector, independents (CNA, UE, and other unions not
affiliated with the AFL-CIO), and “other,” which includes unions with primary
jurisdiction in communications (CWA), utilities (UWUA), retail and wholesale
trade (UFCW), and agriculture (UFW).2 With the exception of transportation
unions, all had average win rates of more than 60% in NLRB elections in service
industries. Industrial unions had an average win rate only 40% in manufacturing
but 66% in services; building trades unions averaged 44% in construction but 63%
in services.
The attraction of service industries, particularly health care, is obvious. At a time
when almost every area of the economy has been touched by globalization, capital
mobility, and transnational ownership and investment structures that are large and
diffuse, the majority of health care industries continue to be non-profit and thus cannot move out of the country, or credibly threaten to move out of the country, in
response to unionization (Bronfenbrenner 2000). Still, if more and more industrial,
building trades, and transportation unions shift their organizing efforts to target the
s
service sector, who will organize in their traditional jurisdictions,port what will hapr and
ld Ai
Wor
pen to the union’s bargaining power in those industries? 017
les
Ange 21, 2
Los
t
.
Although unions organizing in manufacturing, construction, transportation, and
sn v n Augus
o
rs As employers that are more multinational, more
retail and wholesale tradeovide facehived
may rc
e Pr
,a
ervic 5-55571anti-union, these industries have the density that is
S
mobile, andnmore aggressively
rili e No. 1
A
needed to bargain successfully and to build public and government support. Rather
than using their power in traditional jurisdictions to run aggressive and comprehensive campaigns to gain more members, many unions have been seeking easier election wins in service-sector industries. It is in service industries in California that
unions have been most innovative in their use of bargaining and community leverage in organizing campaigns.
ORGANIZING OUTSIDE THE NLRB
NLRB elections do not offer the only path to organization in California and
nationwide. Unions are also gaining new members through public-sector elections,
card check and voluntary recognition campaigns in public and private sectors, and
2. Even though they are no longer affiliates of the AFL-CIO, we have not included either the
UBC or the UTU under independents because for most of the years on which this study is
focused they were still affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Thus the only major unions included in the
independent group are CNA and UE. Most of the others are small independents, including
many security guard unions, that have been organized in business services.
64
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
rpo
ld Ai
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
S
riline No. 1
A
17
73
18
0
3
2
41%
59
39
—
100
50
12
10
160
14
3
4
40%
44
46
—
78
45
63
68
199
5
2
64
75%
50
57
64
100
100
12
10
160
14
3
4
66%
63
55
68
83
61
Win
Rate
Number
of
Elections
Number
of
Elections
Win
Rate
all services
transportation
63
68
199
5
2
64
Number
of
Elections
56%
52
47
60
100
47
Win
Rate
ot her
indus t ries
s o u rc e : BNA PLUS 2002, 2003.
n ot e : “Other unions” includes CWA, UFCW, UWUA, and UFW. The independent unions include CNA, UE, and other unions not a ffiliated with the AFL-CIO. “Other
industries” includes retail and wholesale trade, utilities, and communications.
Industrial unions
Building trades unions
Transportation unions
Service and public-sector unions
Small independent unions
Other unions
Primary Jurisdiction
Win
Rate
Number
of
Elections
Number
of
Elections
Win
Rate
manufacturing
construction
table 2.8. NLRB Elections and Win Rates, by Primary Union Jurisdiction and Industry, U.S., 1997–2002
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rts
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
65
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organizing under the Railway Labor Act. According to one AFL-CIO estimate, five
times as many workers are being organized today outside the traditional NLRB process than through NLRB certification elections (AFL-CIO 2003).
It is extremely difficult to estimate the number of workers organized outside the
NLRB process. The only systematic analysis of organizing activity and outcomes in
the public sector was conducted in the early 1990s (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich
1995). The study examined all state and local certification election and voluntary recognition activity from the forty-three state agencies in thirty-four states and the District of Columbia that had collective bargaining legislation covering at least some
public-sector workers in the state. The authors of the study found that approximately 45,000 workers had been organized in the public sector nationwide each
year, including more than 6,000 workers in California alone. None of that data has
been updated in the last decade, so we have no reliable or comprehensive data source
on current public-sector organizing activity and outcomes.
Collecting accurate public-sector data is particularly difficult in California.
Although election data can be obtained for state government and public education
elections supervised by the State of California’s Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB), the majority of public-sector workers in the state, including all city and
county employees, organize under a much more informal system under the jurisdics
tion of the California Board of Mediation and Conciliation, Airport has no reliable
ld which
Wor
centralized data collection and reporting process. geles 017
s An
1, 2
v. Lo
Data on elections won under the Railway Labor ust 2
ssn on Aug Act (RLA) are available, but because
sA
d
most of these elections are vider archunits that include workers from more than one
ro in airline ive
ice P 5571,
erv of 5-5
state, thereilis no way . 1 knowing, for example, how many of the 10,000 USAIRWAYS
eS
Ar in
No
ticket agents organized by CWA, the 19,000 ticket agents organized by the IAM at
United Airlines, or 5,000 mechanics organized by the Teamsters at Continental Airlines
are based in California. California unions have also used other non-NLRB strategies in
the private sector, particularly in the hotel and motel, building services, construction,
and retail industries. Most such organizing involves a card check recognition procedure,
where employers agree to recognize the union if a majority of the workers in the unit
sign authorization cards. Some card check agreements further stipulate that the
employer will remain neutral during the union’s organizing campaign.
Data on the growing number of private-sector organizing gains from card check
and voluntary recognition campaigns are even more difficult to find than data on
public-sector campaigns, since no government body is responsible for collecting and
reporting data on non-NLRB private-sector campaigns. The only sources of information are reports generated by AFL-CIO affiliates and sent to the national AFLCIO; these reports are summarized each week in the AFL-CIO’s Work In Progress
reports (1997–2003). The data gleaned from these reports, supplemented with whatever organizing reports we were able to obtain from PERB, enable us to provide
some rough estimates of the nature and extent of non-NLRB organizing in California between 1997 and 2002.
66
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Organizing in California in the Public Sector, 1997–2002
The AFL-CIO’s Works in Progress (WIP) for 2003 reported that 188,737 publicsector workers organized in California between 1997 and 2002. PERB reported that
an additional 2,919 employees organized in 2001 and 2002 (PERB 2001, 2002).
Most of the workers participating in PERB elections were local school district
employees who were forming independent associations. In combination, the PERB
and WIP data suggest that more than 191,000 public-sector workers organized in
California from 1997 to 2002. Because these data only include PERB figures from
2001 and 2002 and do not include any data on county and municipal elections, we
estimate that the total number of public-sector workers organized in California during this period is closer to 200,000.
The vast majority of the newly organized public-sector workers, 148,600, were
home care workers, who provide in-home services to the elderly and disabled (Table
2.9). In 1999, 75,000 home care workers in Los Angeles County joined SEIU. This
was the largest successful organizing campaign in California since the recognition of
the UAW at Ford’s massive River Rouge automobile plant some sixty years earlier
(Greenhouse 1999). The victory followed a decade-long campaign by the union for
legislation that would create a public authority to serve as the employer of record
for the home care workers in the county (AFL-CIO 2003). Between 1997ts 2002
and
irpor
rld A
California unions organized nearly 150,000 home care workers through similar legiso
les W
lation passed by county and municipal supervisorysboards. 21, 2017
Ange
v. Lo
ust
Another significant achievement rin Assn d on Augorganizing took place when
s public-sector
vide
ive
the UAW won representationPro 571, arsome 10,000 graduate student employees at
e rights for ch
ervic 5-55
S
the eight campuses e theoUniversity of California system. These employees work as
Arilin in N . 1
readers, tutors, and teaching assistants (AFL-CIO 2003). This victory spurred UAW
organizing efforts among graduate student employees in other states. In 2000 the
UAW became the first union to successfully organize graduate student employees at
a private university, New York University. Graduate student employees in the private
sector had previously been barred from organizing under the National Labor Relations Act because they were classified as students, not employees.
Non-NLRB Organizing in the Private Sector
According to WIP reports for 1997 through 2002, 25,374 workers were organized
through card check procedures; 16,867 of these workers were in the private sector. In
the private sector, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Union
(HERE) was the union that used card check procedures most frequently, employing
it to organize over 5,500 workers, particularly in the hotel and motel industry. The
UFCW scored the single largest card check victory, organizing 4,600 retail employees at Thrifty Rite-Aid.
Despite the fact that the vast majority of organizing campaigns in the construcbronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
67
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table 2.9. Non-NLRB Organizing Reported in California, 1997–2002
c a rd c h e c k
elections
tota l
Number of
Bargaining
Units
Number of
Workers
in Unit
Number of
Bargaining
Units
Number of
Workers
in Unit
Number of
Bargaining
Units
Number of
Workers
in Unit
7
3
4
8,507
6,327
2,180
83
38
18
26
183,149
18,855
148,600
15,681
90
41
22
26
191,656
25,182
150,780
15,681
43
16,867
3
3
849
849
2
1
2
7
6
2
23
200
260
5,600
1,745
1,600
46
3
2
1
2
7
6
2
17,716
849
23
200
260
5,600
1,745
1,600
6
3
14
2,185
1,900
3,354
6
rts
Airpo 3
rld
s Wo
14
gele , 2017
An
21
Los
n v. 86August183,998
Total Non-NLRB
50
25,374ss
136
A
n
ed o
iders
Prov 1, archiv
ice 557
Serv
-5
so u rce s : AFL-CIO 2003;iPERB 2001, 2002.
r line No. 15
A
2,185
1,900
3,354
Public Sector
Education
Home care
Other public sector
Private Sector
Agriculture
Construction
Manufacturing
Communication
Retail and wholesale trade
Health care
Building services
Professional and business
services
Entertainment
Hotels and motels
209,372
note : The number of workers in unit reflects the reported number of newly organized workers. The AFL-CIO
reported 188,737 workers organized in California through non-NLRB procedures. PERB reported 2,919 workers
organized through public-sector certification election procedures.
tion industry occur outside the NLRB process, only two small non-NLRB campaigns, covering a combined total of twenty-three workers, were included in the
WIP data for 1997 through 2002. Absent these data there is no way to estimate reliably the number of construction workers who have been organized outside the
NLRB process, although it is obviously substantially more than what has been
reported. What we do know is that union membership in construction increased by
more than 48,000 between 1997 and 2002, and a good portion of that was from new
organizing (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003).
The California labor movement also pushed for political legislation to support
card check recognition procedures in the private sector. In 1998 San Francisco
Mayor Willie Brown signed legislation that requires restaurants and hotels on city
property or in which the city has a financial interest to grant card check recognition
to unions for which a majority of workers sign authorization cards (AFL-CIO 2003;
see also Logan, this volume). As part of that initiative, the San Francisco Airport Com68
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mission passed the “Labor Peace/Card Check Rule,” under which the airport agreed to
card check recognition procedures. The Machinists, the SEIU, and the Teamsters
organized over 2,000 workers at the San Francisco airport under those procedures.
Some of their organizing gains were eliminated by changes in airport security and
the removal of union representation rights for thousands of federal workers following passage of the Homeland Security Act.
In combination, the WIP and PERB data suggest that more than 209,000
workers organized in California outside the NLRB process between 1997 and 2002.
It is also apparent, however, that many newly organized California workers are missing from these data, particularly workers in city and county government and the
construction industry and those who organized under the RLA. If those workers are
added, even our most conservative estimates of the total number of workers organized outside of the NLRB in California between 1997 and 2002 would be 230,00
workers. That, with the 61,579 organized through NLRB elections, brings the total
number of newly organized workers statewide close to 300,000.
COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS AND UNION
ORGANIZING STRATEGIES
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor
les
The national data on NLRB elections and non-NLRBgcampaigns7provide an overAn e 21, 201
Los
t
.
ugus
view of the industries in which unionsssn vorganizing and the win rates across
rs A are d on A
e
ide
unions and industries. The e Prov 71,nature of the organizing environment and the
changing archiv
ervic 5-555
S
employer andAunion response to those changes are further illuminated by our
riline No. 1
microlevel survey research on NLRB certification election campaigns that took
place in 1998 and 1999 (Bronfenbrenner 2000; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2003a,
forthcoming).3
The survey data suggest that unions organizing today are operating in a much
more global, mobile, and rapidly changing corporate environment (Figure 2.16).4
Although most private-sector organizing campaigns continue to be concentrated in
3. Our study was based on a random sample of 600 elections in units with fifty or more eligible
voters that took place in 1998 and 1999. For each case in the sample we conducted in-depth surveys of the lead organizer for the campaign by mail and phone. We were able to complete
surveys for 412 of the 600 cases in our sample for a response rate of 68%. We also conducted
computerized corporate, media, legal, and union database searches, reviewed Securities and
Exchange Commission filings, IRS 9909s forms, and NLRB documents to collect data on company ownership, structure and operations, employment, financial condition, and unionization,
and data on employer characteristics and practices.
4. Although our sample was representative across industry, union, region, and bargaining unit, the
total number of cases for California, 34, is too small for us to provide any detailed analysis of the
California data. Thus, in this section we primarily use national-level data to gain a better understanding of the current nature of organizing campaigns.
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
69
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90%
84%
Union Win Rate with Company Characteristic
Union Win Rate without Company Characteristic
80
Percentage of All Elections
70
63%
60
58%
54%
52%
48%
50
47%
45% 44%
41%
40%
40
34%
47%
46%
39%
33%
43%
33%
30
31%
29%
23%
20
12%
10
U.S
Mu .-Bas
ltin ed
atio
na
l
Fo
rei
gn
Mu -Bas
ltin ed
atio
na
l
U.S
All .-Bas
Sit ed
es
,
U.S
.
ely
Fo Held
rP
rof
it
vat
blic
Pu
Pri
it
No
n-P
rof
ry
idia
bs
Su
us
Ind
bile
Mo
ly
Fo Held
rP
rof
it
s
rport
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Ange 21, 2017
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figure 2.16. NLRB Elections, Union Win Rates, and Corporate Structure,
National Sample, 1998–1999
try
0
s ou rc e : Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, forthcoming.
relatively small units in U.S.-owned for-profit companies, these companies are
increasingly subsidiaries of larger parent companies, including many multinationals.
This is not because unions are targeting large multinational companies, but because
the U.S. private sector is increasingly dominated by multinational firms. Nationwide, only one-third of all campaigns occur in for-profit companies with all sites and
operations based in the United States, while 23% take place in non-profit companies
such as hospitals, social service agencies, or educational institutions (Bronfenbrenner
and Hickey, forthcoming).
Fifty-four percent of all NLRB elections are concentrated in mobile industries—
those for which production can easily be shifted out of state or out of the country.
Not surprisingly, win rates average just 34% in campaigns conducted in mobile
industries compared to 54% in immobile industries. Organizing win rates average as
high as 58% in non-profit companies, compared to 40% in for-profit companies.
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Among for-profit companies, win rates are highest for U.S.-based companies with all
sites in the U.S. (45%) and lower for foreign-based multinationals (29%) and U.S.based multinationals (39%). Win rates are also much higher (63%) in the 16% of the
companies that are not subsidiaries of larger parent companies; the win rate for companies that are subsidiaries is 41%.
An analysis of the national data on NLRB elections and non-NLRB campaigns
reveals that unions in California are conducting a higher percentage of their organizing
activity in service industries and the public sector than are unions in most other states.
Thirty-seven states (74%) have a higher percentage of NLRB elections in manufacturing industries than California does (21%), whereas California’s percentage of elections
in service industries (33%) is greater than the percentage of service industry elections in
thirty other states. This suggests that unions organizing in California are less likely to
confront large multinationals with sites and operations around the globe, and more
likely to organize among non-profits and other less mobile service industries.
Bargaining Unit Demographics
Our earlier discussion of demographic data reveals that California unions are
organizing a more diverse workforce and are much more diverse than their counters
rport
parts are across the nation. According to our survey data, win rates increase substanld Ai
Wor
tially as the proportion of women and non-Anglo Angeles increase (Figure 2.17).
workers 2017
1,
os
Although win rates average only 35% in ssn v. with ugmajority of Anglo men, they
units L A a ust 2
ers A
d on
average 53% in units with a majority arcnon-Anglo workers, 56% in units with at
rovid of hive
ice P 5571,
v
least 75% non-AngloSer . 15-58% in units with a majority of women, and 62% in
e workers, 5
Arilin
No
units with at least 75% women. The highest win rate, 82%, is in units with 75% or
more non-Anglo women. The higher win rates in these units indicate that, first,
women and non-Anglos—particularly non-Anglo women—are participating in
union elections in ever increasing numbers, and, second, the vast majority of new
workers coming into the labor movement today are women and non-Anglos. This is
particularly true in California, especially in the areas of the economy where California unions have been concentrating their organizing efforts.
Figure 2.17 also provides data on organizing activity among recent immigrants
and undocumented workers. Nationwide, immigrants have played a major role in
many of the largest organizing victories in the last six years, which have occurred in
industries such as home care, hotel, laundry, building services, drywall, and asbestos removal. Most of those campaigns were not conducted within the NLRB process (AFL-CIO 2003). Only 8% of all of the elections in our survey were in units
with 25% or more recent immigrants, and only 7% of the campaigns had undocumented workers in the unit. Win rates are 58% in units with at least 25% recent
immigrants. In units with undocumented workers the win rate drops to 36%,
which reflects the ability and willingness of employers to use the threat of deportation to thwart organizing efforts among these workers. The limited success of
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
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90%
Union Win Rate
Percentage of All Elections
82%
80
70
62%
60
58%
58%
56%
53%
50
44%
40
36%
36%
35%
30
30%
25%
20
10
8%
7%
7%
rts
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a
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Bargaining Unit Demographic
figure 2.17. NLRB Elections and Union Win Rates, by Selected
Demographics, National Sample, 1998–1999
s ou rc e : Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, forthcoming.
NLRB elections in these units suggests that card check neutrality campaigns have
become important in California because, in part, of the large numbers of undocumented workers in the state.
Employer Behavior
Not only are unions organizing in a corporate environment that has become much
more complex and diverse in recent years, they are also facing extremely sophisticated
and aggressive employer opposition. According to our survey, the overwhelming
majority of employers aggressively oppose union organizing efforts through a combination of threats, discharges, promises of improvements, unscheduled unilateral changes
72
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bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80%
73
s o urc e : Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, forthcoming.
rts
figure 2.18. NLRB Elections and Union Win Rates, by Employer Tactic, National Sample, 1998–1999
Hi
red
M
an
ag
Su
Co em
pe
rv
ns ent
ult
On isor
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riline No. 1
A
Percentage of Elections Where Tactic Used
Union Win Rate When Tactic Used
Union Win Rate When Tactic Not Used
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100%
93%
Percentage of All Elections
Union Win Rate
90
80
70
60
55%
50
48%
40
34%
30
23%
39%
26%
20
10
3%
0
Employer Used
No Tactics
Employer Used
1–4 Tactics
Employer Used
5–9 Tactics
Employer Used
10 or More Tactics
figure 2.19. NLRB Elections and Union Win Rates, by Intensity
of Employer Campaign, National Sample, 1998–1999
s ou rc e : Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, forthcoming.
s
rport
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Ange 21, 2017
Los
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.
in wages and benefits, bribes, and surveillance (Bronfenbrenner 2000). Figure 2.18 presn v
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sents the employer anti-unionetacticsi that are most commonly used in NLRB elecovid arch
e Pr
1,
ervic 5-5557use. As the survey data show, the use of many such
tions, listedine S . 1 of
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A
No
tactics has become pervasive. Moreover, these tactics, whether used individually or
in combination, are extremely effective in reducing union election win rates.
Fifty-two percent of all employers and 68% of those in mobile industries make
threats of full or partial plant closure during the organizing drive. Approximately one
in every four (26%) discharge workers for union activity, 48% make promises of
improvement, 20% give unscheduled wage increases, and 17% make unilateral
changes in benefits and working conditions. Sixty-seven percent of the employers hold
one-on-one meetings between supervisors and employees at least weekly, 34% give
bribes or special favors to those who oppose the union, 31% assist the anti-union
committee, and 10% use electronic surveillance of union activists during the organizing campaign. Employers threaten to refer undocumented workers to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 7% of all campaigns and in 52% of cases
where undocumented workers are present. For the most aggressive employer tactics,
win rates average ten to twenty percentage points lower when an anti-union tactic is
used than when it is not.
Most employers use a combination of tactics (Figure 2.19). Forty-eight percent of
the employers ran moderately aggressive anti-union campaigns, using five to nine
tactics, and 26% of the employers ran extremely aggressive campaigns, using more
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than ten tactics. Twenty-three percent ran weak campaigns, using one to five antiunion tactics. Employers ran no campaign whatsoever against the union in only 3% of
the cases in our survey—and unions won each of these elections. Overall, the win rate
drops to 55% for units where employers use one to five tactics, 39% where they use five
to nine tactics, and 34% where they use ten or more. The fact that only a slight drop
occurs between moderately aggressive and extremely aggressive employer campaigns
suggests that aggressive anti-union behavior by employers may reach a point of diminishing returns, particularly at a time when unions are running more aggressive and
sophisticated campaigns and workers’ trust in corporations is declining.
COMPREHENSIVE UNION ORGANIZING STRATEGIES
Increasing organizing activity and success is extremely difficult in the face of
employers’ increasingly sophisticated opposition and the dramatic growth of corporate restructuring and capital mobility. Still, it is too easy to blame employer
opposition alone for the labor movement’s failure to organize. As we have seen,
some unions are making significant organizing gains even in extremely hostile climates. The difficulty lies in the fact that the majority of unions continue to run rels
r ort
atively weak, non-strategic campaigns (Bronfenbrenner and Hickeyp2003). They
ld Ai
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have invested some money in organizing, recruitednmore organizers, and added
A ge 21, 2017
Los havet not made the wholesale
v
one or two new tactics to their arsenal, sbut. they ugus
As n
nA
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vichanges irequired to take on the diffuse, globally
strategic, structural, and cultural
Pro 1, arc
ice 557
Serv
connected, and ilextremely 1mobile corporate structures that dominate America
-5
r ine No. 5
A
today.
To make significant gains in the private sector, unions have to mount organizing
campaigns that are more aggressive, creative, and strategic, and they need to recruit
and train enough organizers to effectively mount them. Our analysis suggests that a
comprehensive union-building strategy incorporates the following ten elements,
each of which is a cluster of key union tactics critical to union organizing success:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Adequate and appropriate staff and financial resources.
Strategic targeting and research.
Active and representative rank-and-file organizing committees.
Active participation of member volunteer organizers.
Person-to-person contact inside and outside the workplace.
Benchmarks and assessments to monitor union support and set thresholds for
moving ahead with the campaign.
Issues that resonate in the workplace and in the community.
Creative, escalating internal pressure tactics involving members in the workplace.
Creative, escalating external pressure tactics involving members outside the
workplace at local, national, and/or international levels.
Building for the first contract during the organizing campaign.
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
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table 2.10. Union Use of Comprehensive Organizing Strategies, National
Sample, 1998–1999
Percentage
of NLRB
Elections
Percentage
of NLRB
Elections
Won
Percentage
of NLRB
Elections
Lost
Adequate and appropriate staff and
financial resources
14%
21%
9%
Strategic targeting
39
45
34
Active representative rank-and-file
committee
26
33
21
Effectively utilized member
volunteer organizers
27
31
23
Person-to-person contact inside
and outside the workplace
19
23
16
Benchmarks and assessments
24
35
14
Issues that resonate in the
workplace and community
23
25
21
Escalating pressure tactics in the
workplace
37
42
33
rts
Escalating pressure tactics outside
Airpo
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Wor
the workplace
17
16
les 18
Ange 21, 2017
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Building for the first contract
sn v n Augus
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before the election
39
31
vide rchived 35
ro
ice P 5571, a
Serv
line No. 15-5
s ou rc e : Ari
Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, forthcoming.
Win
Rate
64%
51
56
52
53
66
49
50
48
50
Table 2.10 presents summary statistics for these comprehensive organizing tactics,
showing how extensively unions use them in NLRB elections. Overall, only 14% of
all the union campaigns devote adequate and appropriate resources to the campaign,
only 19% engage in person-to-person contact inside and outside the workplace, and
only 17% engage in escalating pressure tactics outside the workplace such as rallies,
community forums, stockholder actions, and pressure on customers, suppliers, and
investors. Fewer than 30% have active representative committees or effectively utilize
member volunteer organizers, while fewer than 25% use benchmarks and assessments or focus on issues that resonate in the workplace and broader community.
The highest percentages are found for strategic targeting (39%), escalating pressure
tactics inside the workplace (37%), and building for the first contract before the election is held (35%).
All the organizing tactics are more likely to be used in winning campaigns than in
losing ones. The results are particularly striking for adequate and appropriate
resources (used in 21% of winning campaigns but 9% of losing campaigns), active
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100%
100%
Union Win Rate
Percentage of All Elections
90
80
70
67%
63%
62%
6%
6%
60
53%
50
47%
43%
40
32%
28%
30
20
19%
10
15%
21%
16%
14%
2%
1%
7
8
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Number of Tactics Used
fig u r e : 2.20. NLRB Elections and Union Win Rates, by Number of
Comprehensive Organizing Tactics Used, National Sample, 1998–1999
s
rport
ld Ai
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Ange 21, 2017
Los
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.
sn v
ugus
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representative committees (33%oofdwinning campaigns compared to 21% of losing
e Pr
1, a
ervic 5-5557assessments (35% of winning campaigns comS
campaigns), andilibenchmarks and
r ne No. 1
A
s ou rc e : Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, forthcoming.
pared to 14% of losing campaigns). Each of the individual elements are associated
with win rates that average between 4 to 28 percentage points higher when unions
use the tactic than when they do not. Once again, the most dramatic differences in
win rates are associated with adequate and appropriate resources (64% when present,
41% when not present), active representative committee (56% when present, 41%
when not present), and benchmarks and assessments (66% when present, 38% when
not present).
It is in combination that these tactics are most effective. As Figure 2.20 shows, the
win rate increases dramatically for each additional tactic used. Win rates start at 32%
for no organizing tactics, and then increase to 63% when five tactics are used, and
100% for the 1% of the campaigns in which unions use eight tactics. These data also
suggest that only a very small number of unions are using more than a few of these
tactics. Fourteen percent of all campaigns use no organizing tactics and 56% use
between one and three, but only 15% of all campaigns use five or more tactics. None
use more than eight.
Across all industrial sectors, win rates are much higher in elections where unions
use a comprehensive organizing strategy incorporating more than five comprehensive tactics, compared to campaigns in which they use five or fewer tactics (Figure
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
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Union Used No Comprehensive Tactics
Union Used 1–5 Comprehensive Tactics
Union Used More Than 5 Comprehensive Tactics
80%
75%
68%
70
68%
63%
Union Win Rate
60
57%
50
44%
45%
44%
40
30
20
29%
29%
32%
20%
10
0
Manufacturing
Service Sector
Other Sectors
All Sectors
figure 2.21. Union Win Rates, by Sector and Number of
Comprehensive Organizing Tactics Used, National Sample, 1998–1999
s ou rc e : Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, forthcoming.
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor in campaigns in which
le
2.21). In manufacturing, the win rate averagesnonlys20% 17
A ge 21, 20
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.
unions use no comprehensive organizing tactics, sincreasing only slightly to 29%
sn v
ugu
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e five
when they use betweenPoneidand rchi tactics, but then jumps to 63% in the camov
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,a
ervicuse-55571than five tactics. In the service sector the unions win
S
paigns in which they. 15 more
riline No
A
44% of campaigns when no tactics are used, 57% when one to five tactics are used,
and 68% when more than five comprehensive tactics are used. In all other sectors
combined (communications, construction, transportation, retail and wholesale trade,
and utilities) the win rate associated with campaigns in which unions use no comprehensive tactics is 29%, increasing to 45% when one to five tactics are used, and
75% when more than five comprehensive tactics are used. Thus, we find that a comprehensive organizing strategy improves election outcomes substantially, across all
sectors of the economy, even in the most mobile and global industries.
The importance of comprehensive organizing campaigns is most evident in the
context of employer behavior (Figure 2.22). Win rates average 93% when the union
runs a comprehensive campaign while the employer mounts a moderately aggressive
campaign against it, but drop to 35% when the union’s campaign is not comprehensive. Even in campaigns with aggressive employer opposition, win rates average 52%
overall with a comprehensive campaign, compared to only 29% without. Our
research finds that these trends hold true not only across all sectors but also across
company characteristics and bargaining unit demographics. Even first contract rates
are higher when unions use five or more tactics during the organizing phase of the
campaign (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, forthcoming). Although the majority of
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Union Win Rate without Comprehensive Campaign
Union Win Rate with Comprehensive Campaign
Percentage of Elections with Comprehensive Campaign
100%
93%
90
80
70
60
64%
60%
52%
50
40
35%
29%
30
20
10
20%
5%
7%
0
Weak Employer
Campaign
Moderately Aggressive
Employer Campaign
Aggressive Employer
Campaign
figure 2.22. Comprehensive Campaigns and Union Win Rates, ports
ir
rld A
by Intensity of Employer Opposition, National Sample,s Wo 7
le 1998–1999
nge
01
s ou rc e : Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, forthcoming. A st 21, 2
. Los gu
n vall campaigns in which the union
n ot e : “Comprehensive campaigns” includes on Au
Ass d
e
iders
used five or more comprehensive organizing tactics.
Prov 1, archiv
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ervic 5-5557
eS
1
Arilin
No.
employers run aggressive campaigns, taking full strategic advantage of a broad range
of anti-union tactics, the majority of unions continue to run fairly weak campaigns,
even when faced with aggressive employer opposition. Indeed, in only two campaigns in our sample did unions use more than six comprehensive organizing tactics
when they faced aggressive employer opposition—both elections were won. Thus,
although employer anti-union campaigns can and often do have a devastating
impact on union attempts to organize workers, unions can increase their win rates,
even in the face of the most aggressive employer opposition, if they run comprehensive campaigns.
CALIFORNIA UNIONS AND COMPREHENSIVE CAMPAIGNS
Our survey findings suggest that California unions are no exception to the national
pattern: they use only a limited number of organizing tactics during NLRB campaigns (Figure 2.23). Use of these tactics by most unions in California is similar to
that of unions nationwide, which explains why NLRB win rates continue to average
bronfenbrenner & hickey / state of organizing in california
79
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12%
Resources
California
U.S.
14%
35%
Target
39%
27%
Representative
Committee
26%
15%
Member Volunteers
27%
24%
One-on-One
19%
21%
Benchmarks
24%
9%
Issues
23%
18%
Workplace Pressure
External Pressure
37%
3%
17%
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor
35%
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
v.
gust 60
0
10
20 rs Assn 40n Au50
30
70
80
90
o
ed
ide
Prov 1, archiv
Percentage of Elections Sampled
ice 557
Serv
-5
riline No. 15
A
figure 2.23. Use of Selected Organizing Tactics in California
and U.S, National Sample, 1998–1999
Build for First
Contract
50%
100%
s ou rc e : Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, forthcoming.
between 55% to 58% a year and why the number of workers gained through NLRB
elections in California has had a limited impact on union density in the state.
Unions have seen more dramatic gains in non-NLRB campaigns in California,
especially in card check neutrality agreements, where we have found the most comprehensive use of organizing strategies. Although our survey data are limited to
NLRB campaigns, interviews with organizers and union leaders who have successfully employed card check neutrality agreements suggest that organizing strategies are
critical to the success of non-NLRB strategies. The unions that have brought in the
most new members through organizing outside the traditional NLRB process (SEIU
in building services and homecare, CWA in wireless technologies, HERE in hotels,
and UNITE in laundries) have succeeded in these endeavors because they have been
following a more comprehensive organizing strategy. Those that have been least successful in winning non-NLRB campaigns have focused on external leverage and have
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neglected to develop an active representative committee, person-to-person contact in
the workplace and community, and escalating internal pressure tactics. Often they
have also failed to do strategic research or to commit sufficient resources to mount the
kind of campaign necessary to make the cost of fighting the union greater than the
cost of voluntarily recognizing the union and bargaining for a first agreement.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis of union organizing activity shows that unions in California have been
more successful than the U.S. labor movement as a whole in reversing the decline of
union density: the California labor movement has increased union density in both
the private and the public sectors. In contrast to losses in union membership nationwide between 1997 and 2002, California unions gained more than 500,000 members
during that period (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003). The size and diversity of the California labor movement further suggests that unions could substantially increase union
membership and density and build the bargaining power and political influence that
results from a large and expanding labor movement.
Despite these encouraging trends, the record of organizing success in California
orts
remains modest, particularly within the NLRB framework. Unionrpwin rates in
ld Ai
Wor
NLRB certification elections are only slightly higher in geles 2017 in the nation
California than
s An
1,
as a whole. California unions added just sn v. Lo August 2 members from 1997 to
over 61,500 new
s
on
rs A
2002 through NLRB elections.rThise archivcomparison to California’s employment
ovid pales in ed
ice P 5571,
growth during the e Serv . 15-5 over one million people began working in privatesame period:
Arilin
No
sector industries. Organizing activity outside the NLRB process has shown much
greater promise, adding more than three times the number of new union members
gained under the NLRB. This non-NLRB organizing activity, however, has been concentrated in a limited number of unions and industries. California unions have
scored their greatest organizing successes when they have wielded their political influence and bargaining power in combination, as they have in the home care industry. The historic victories among home care workers in the last six years have transformed organizing activity in the state. Private-sector organizing outside the NLRB
has been far more modest.
The labor movement has tremendous potential in California, for unions could organize at a scale much larger than is possible in most other states. To tap that potential,
California unions, like the U.S. labor movement in general, will have to run more
comprehensive organizing campaigns both within and outside the NLRB process. But
unlike the labor movement in other states, unions in California have a solid foundation upon which to build and a diverse workforce that is ripe for organizing.
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REFERENCES
AFL-CIO. 2003. Work in Progress. Newsletters dated 6 January 1997–6 January 2003. Paged
electronic document. Retrieved 10 June 2003 from http://aflcio.org/aboutaflcio/wip/.
BLS (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). 2003a. Current Population Survey: Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups with Earnings Data. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Available
online from http://www.ciser.cornell.edu.
———. 2003b. Online database for the current employment statistics from the monthly establishment survey. Unpaged electronic document. Retrieved 10 June 2003 from http://
data.bls.gov/labjava/outside.jsp?surveyϭce.
BNA PLUS. 2002. Database of NLRB certification elections 1997–2001. Prepared specifically
for the Cornell Office of Labor Education Research by BNA PLUS, the research division
of The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D.C.
———. 2003. Database of NLRB elections 2002. Prepared specifically for the Cornell Office
of Labor Education Research by BNA PLUS, the research division of The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, DC.
Bronfenbrenner, Kate. 1996. “Lasting Victories: Successful Union Strategies for Winning First
Contracts.” In Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting. Madison, Wisconsin: Industrial Relations Research Association.
———. 2000. Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union
Organizing. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission. Available online
from http://www.ustdrc.gov/research/bronfenbrenner.pdf.
s
Bronfenbrenner, Kate, and Robert Hickey. 2002. “Overcoming the Challenges to Organizing
rport
l Ai
in the Manufacturing Sector.” Unpublished report submitted todthe AFL-CIO.
Wor
les
———. 2003a. Blueprint for Change: A National Ange 1, of0Winning Union Organizing
Assessment 2 17
Los
t2
Strategies. Ithaca, N.Y.: Office of Laborn v. n Augus
s Education Research, Cornell University.
rs As ved o
e
i
———. Forthcoming. “Changing to rOrganize: A National Assessment of Union Organizing
ovid
e Pr 71, a ch
5
ervic 5-5Labor: Organizing and Organizers in the New Union Movement,
Strategies.”nInS
e Rebuilding 5
1
rili
No.
edited A Ruth Milkman and Kim Voss. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
by
Bronfenbrenner, Kate, and Tom Juravich. 1995. Union Organizing in the Public Sector: An
Analysis of State and Local Elections. Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press.
EDD (State of California, Employment Development Department). 2003. “California Industry Employment and Labor Force, by Annual Averages. March 2002 Benchmark.”
Spreadsheet. (Updated on 7 May 2003.) Paged electronic document. Retrieved 10 June
2003 from http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/indhist/cal$haw.xls.
Greenhouse, Steven. 1999. “In Biggest Drive since 1937, Union Gains a Victory.” The New
York Times 1(3) February 25.
Hirsch, Barry T., and David A. Macpherson. 2003. “Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population Survey: Note.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review
56(2): 349–354.
Juravich, Tom, and Kate Bronfenbrenner. 1998. “Preparing for the Worst: Organizing and
Saying Organized in the Public Sector.” In Organizing to Win: New Research on Union
Strategies, edited by Kate Bronfenbrenner, Sheldon Friedman, Richard W. Hurd, Rudolph A.
Oswald, and Ronald L. Seeber. Ithaca: N.Y.: ILR Press.
PERB (State of California, Public Employment Relations Board). 2001. 2000–2001 Annual Report. Paged electronic document. Retrieved 10 June 2003 from http://www.perb.ca.gov/pdfs/
annual_report_2001.pdf.
———. 2002. 2001–2002 Annual Report. Paged electronic document. Retrieved 10 June 2003
from http://www.perb.ca.gov/pdfs/annual_report_2002.pdf.
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APPENDIX.
Method and Sources
We used a combination of data sources for this study. Our primary source for national employment data was the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) online data from the monthly establishment survey (BLS 2003a). Our primary source for California employment data was the
State of California Employment Development Department (2003) website. We created aggregate industry totals from these two data sources. Union density and demographic information for California and the United States were derived from Current Population Survey
(CPS) data compiled from the BLS “Current Population Survey: Merged Outgoing Rotation
Groups with Earnings Data” (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2003b).
The CPS data files for 1997 and 2002 are from the Cornell Institute for Social and Economic Research. We created new aggregate industry variables based on the existing industry
classification to ensure adequate response levels for California industry data, but no other manipulations or weighting schemes were used to alter the existing data. Union density and demographic estimates include all respondents employed in the industry, including those not
currently working, but exclude those not in the labor force or self-employed. CPS uses an industrial classification system equivalent to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). We
again derived broader industrial categories from the detailed industrial classifications.
The NLRB statistics were compiled from specialized databases, prepared by BNA Plus,
that cover all NLRB certification elections from 1 January 1997 through 31 December 2002.
These databases include election information on company name, petitioning union, number
of eligible voters, election type, vote count, outcome, and certification dateAirports 2002,
(BNA Plus
ld
Wor
2003). For the elections in which the bargaining unit’s industrial classification was not reles
1
Ange 21, such7
corded in the BNA database, the authors used onlineodata sources, 20 as LexisNexis and
L s
gust
n v.
Ass d on Au
Hoovers Online, to identify the proper industrial classification for the company and bargaine
iders
Prov 1, archivby information on non-NLRB campaigns
ing unit listed. These dataviwere supplemented
e
er c 5-5557
compiled through iaine S No. 1
Ar l search for California cases in the AFL-CIO Work in Progress reports from
1997–2002 (AFL-CIO 2003). Informal interviews with union organizing directors and staff
provided additional information on non-NLRB organizing activity.
Annual reports compiled by the State of California’s Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB) for the state legislature provided additional information on public-sector organizing
activity PERB 2002). PERB supervises certification elections only for state employees and
school district employees, including community colleges. Organizing among county and city
government employees occurs under the jurisdiction of the California Mediation and Conciliation Service; however, the elections themselves are supervised by a diversity of officials and
agencies such as the American Arbitration Association. Thus there is no centralized data collection authority for union organizing among county and municipal employees in California.
Additional data on NLRB campaign characteristics were based on findings from a survey
commissioned in May 2000 by the United States Trade Deficit Review Commission to update previous research on the impact of capital mobility on union organizing and first contract campaigns in the U.S. private sector (Bronfenbrenner 2002; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey
2002, 2003a, 2003b).
The State of California Labor, 2003, Vol. 3, pp. 39–83, ISSN 1531-9037, electronic ISSN 1541-9045. © 2003 by
the Institute for Labor and Employment. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to: Rights
and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center Street, Suite 303, Berkeley, CA
94704-1223.
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rts
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Immigrant Employment
and Mobility Opportunities
in California
F R A N K D . B E A N and
B. LINDSAY LOWELL
More immigrants come to the United States than to any other
country in the world. In 2000 an estimated 1.20 million foreign-born persons were
added to the U.S. population—850,000 who entered legally plus some 350,000
unauthorized entrants (United Nations Population Division 2003).1 California,
which in 2000 had the fifth or sixth largest economy in the world, received the largest share. More than 329,000 (about 217,000 legal and 112,000 unauthorized) immigrants, or 28%, settled in the state. In contrast, about 129,000 arrived in New York,
the state with the second largest immigration (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
s
rport
Service 2002, 2003).
ld Ai
Wor
es
Americans in general, and Californians in particular,eloften2display ambivalence
ng
017
os A st 1,
Llabor that2immigrants provide, for
about immigration, welcoming the inexpensive Augu
n v.
s
on
rs As
example, but worrying (probably ide archived that immigration may erode culProv unnecessarily)
ice 5571,
Serv 1 identity and cohesion (Bean and Stevens 2003; Clark
tural solidarity andenational 5-5
Arilin
No.
2003). Anxieties about immigration notwithstanding, the latter half of the 1990s
witnessed growing recognition that immigrants were playing an important and
increasingly prominent role in the U.S. economy (Mexico-U.S. Migration Panel
2001). Eleven percent of the country’s total population was foreign born in 2000,
but 14% was between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four—the prime employment
years (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000). Among the population in that age group
actually working, the percentage of foreign born was equally high, at 14%. The percentage of children in the population who were either immigrants or the children of
immigrants was even higher, nearly 20%, indicating that the nation’s future workforce will be even more dependent on immigration (Hernandez 1999). And in California, where these percentages are larger still, the immigrant share of the workforce
is even more striking.
Many immigrants come to the United States expressly for the purpose of working, including those who come as unauthorized labor migrants from Mexico and
those who enter under various kinds of employment-based visas. Most of those who
1. On a net basis. This was over 900,000 more than the number added to the Russian Federation, the world’s second leading immigration country.
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
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ostensibly come for non-work–related reasons, including those who enter under the
various preference categories for family reunification visas, end up holding jobs that
are similar in kind and pay to those who enter the country with work-related visas
(Sorensen et al. 1992). Indeed, for legal immigrants, neither placement within the
workforce nor economic status is appreciably determined by what type of visa they
use to enter the country.
The nature and magnitude of newcomer arrivals must be understood in the context of economic restructuring in the United States and California. The role of
immigrants in state and national workforces has grown while employment structures have changed. Both California and the nation are experiencing a relative
decline in manufacturing employment (especially high-wage, unionized jobs), a relative increase in service-industry employment, declining or stagnant real earnings at
the middle and the bottom of the income distribution, a growing number of workingage males (especially young African Americans) who are dropping out of the labor
force, decreasing wage gaps between men and women at equivalent levels of education, and declining levels of childbearing among native-born women (Bean and
Bell-Rose 1999; Bean and Stevens 2003).
The bimodal educational distribution of immigrants entering the United States
in recent years is another important phenomenon. Immigrants coming to the couns
rp or
try have had either a high level of education (i.e., a college degree) ort a low level (i.e.,
ld Ai
Wor % of adult immigrants
example, 01
without a high school diploma). In 2000, for ngeles 26 7
A
1, 2
Losfigure tslightly larger than that for the
had completed a college degree or ssn v. a Augus 2
higher,
ers A iv d on
native population (25%). ovidtheasameetime, 33% of all adult immigrants had not
r At
ch
ice P 5571, r
rv
completedilhighSschool,5compared to only 13% of adult natives. Among those with a
e e . 1 -5
Ar in
No
high school diploma or some college (but not a college degree), immigrants were relatively less numerous than natives (41% compared to 61%) (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000). This “hollowed out” educational distribution mirrors the pattern of
change in the labor market in recent years, namely substantial growth in the numbers of high- and low-end jobs, with much lower increases in the middle range
(Milkman and Dwyer 2002).
The growth in numbers of less-skilled immigrants presents a puzzle for social scientists. The migration has continued even as earnings at the bottom of the income
distribution have stagnated and the employment opportunities of disadvantaged
native racial/ethnic minorities, especially African Americans, have stalled (Bean and
Bell-Rose 1999; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Given the relative disappearance of
manufacturing jobs in cities, where many African Americans live, and the movement of middle-class African American role models to the suburbs, which has further disadvantaged African Americans (Wilson 1987, 1996), how does one explain
the growth in less-skilled immigration? Why should more and more less-skilled
Mexican migrants come to the United States when the demand for less-skilled labor
appears to be declining? The answer has partly to do with imbalances in demography and economy in Mexico, which continue to generate more labor supply than
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demand (Mexico-United States Binational Study 1997). Although this disequilibrium is less extreme today than in the past, the lack of job opportunities in Mexico
still makes even the worst jobs and limited employment prospects in the United
States attractive to many (Porter 2003). Moreover, social networks among less-skilled
immigrant groups foster migration and confer recruitment and hiring advantages
relative to African American workers at the low end of the wage scale (Massey et al.
1987; Waldinger 2001; Waldinger and Lichter 2003).
Two decades of empirical research on the labor market consequences of immigration have found few adverse short-run effects for native workers, although this research
has shown that increased immigration of less-skilled workers does limit employment
opportunities for less-skilled immigrants who had arrived earlier (Bean, Van Hook,
and Fossett 1999; Friedberg and Hunt 1999). Does this mean that the prospects for
moving up the job ladder into the economic mainstream are diminishing for today’s
immigrants, relative to earlier generations? Are opportunities for immigrants lessening in part because economic restructuring is hollowing out the middle of the job
structure, leaving fewer pathways to upward mobility? To what degree is this worrisome possibility exacerbated by the fact that so many of the new immigrants are
non-Anglo and thus are presumably subject to racial/ethnic discrimination?2
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor
eles
7
I M M I G R A T I O N A N D T H E S T R U C T U R E os Ang 21, 201
L
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O F E M P L O Y M E N T O P P O R T Urs IAss
N TIE
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Prov 1, archiv
ice 557
Serv
-5
ril the No. 15
In recent decadesine structure of job opportunities in the United States in general
A
and California in particular has increasingly taken an “hourglass” or “U-shaped”
form (Bell 1973; Milkman and Dwyer 2002; Piore and Sabel 1984; Wright and
Dwyer 2002). The relative decline in the manufacturing sector (which shifted from
employing 33% of private-sector workers in 1970 to 17% in 2000) has resulted in
fewer jobs that provide a middle-class lifestyle, especially for persons without college
educations. Although many factors affect the structure of the labor market, these
trends suggest diminishing opportunities for upward mobility, particularly for
workers without college degrees.
Discrimination in hiring, pay, and promotion on the basis of ascriptive characteristics such as race/ethnicity, nativity, and gender is harder to overcome under conditions of declining opportunities, especially for persons at the bottom of the social
hierarchy, whose chances for betterment depend on the number and kind of midrange opportunities for employment as well as the nature and strength of barriers
that stand in the way of achievement. Research indicating that racial/ethnic groups,
2. Throughout this chapter, “Anglo” refers to non-Latinos, or what the U.S. Census Bureau calls
“non-Hispanic whites”; “African American,” similarly, refers to non-Latino African Americans,
or “non-Hispanic Blacks.”
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
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especially female workers, are concentrated at the bottom of the job distribution
heightens concerns about emergent hourglass structures of employment and job
mobility. This is the context in which we must evaluate the prospects for new immigrants. They are not only newcomers to America’s workforce but also new members
of ethnic groups whose prospects for mobility are impeded to the extent that they
are treated as racialized minorities. Evidence of upward mobility among low-end
immigrants would suggest that immigrant status might not constrain opportunity
to the degree that perspectives focusing on the effects of race/ethnicity alone (without taking nativity into account) would imply. It is thus crucial to disaggregate outcomes by nativity. Moreover, it is also important to ascertain the extent of gender
variation, given that immigrant women may start out in very low-level jobs. In what
follows we disaggregate employment and mobility outcomes by race/ethnicity,
nativity, and gender, something all too often neglected in labor market studies.
IMMIGRATION AND RACE AND ETHNICITY
Ascertaining whether and to what degree racial/ethnic discrimination might worsen
opportunities for upward mobility for today’s less-skilled immigrants requires conts
sidering the extent to which predictions about their economicAirpor
ld incorporation involve
Wor
s
assumptions about their status as members of racialized groups. Competing theories
gele
17
s An t 21 20
Lo(in thescase,of assimilation perspectives)
of immigrant incorporation offer optimistic Augu
n v.
ss
ers A ed on
or pessimistic (in the caseovidethnichdisadvantage perspectives) pictures of the proPr of 1, arc iv
ice 5 7
S rv
cess, or a mixtureeof the two5(in the case of segmented assimilation views) (Bean and
-5
riline No. 15
A
Stevens 2003). The predominance of any one of these views has depended substantially, if not always explicitly, on whether a given immigrant group is treated as a
racialized, disadvantaged minority group. Ethnic disadvantage perspectives tend to
perceive immigrant groups as non-Anglo minorities subject to discrimination,
whereas assimilation perspectives tend to deemphasize racial/ethnic status and focus
on nativity. Thus, the issue of immigrant economic incorporation in the United
States is inextricably confounded with the issue of race/ethnicity (Bean and BellRose 1999). To be sure, the difference between the two perspectives is relative rather
than absolute. Nonetheless, the question of the pace of assimilation cannot be separated from the question of the extent to which new immigrants tend to be regarded
(and to regard themselves) as members of disadvantaged and racialized minority
groups.
The case of the Mexican-origin population exemplifies the difficulty of strictly
applying either perspective to new immigrants. Each view finds some evidence in
support of its claims. On the one hand, research suggests that persons of Mexican
origin often face job discrimination, although less frequently than African Americans do (Bean and Tienda 1987; Perlmann and Waldinger 1999). It is also evident
that data not disaggregated by nativity present an incomplete picture. The large gap
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in education and earnings between immigrant and native-born persons of Mexican
origin may have more to do with the different levels of economic development in
Mexico and the United States than with discrimination (see, e.g., Bean, Berg, and
Van Hook 1996; Bean, Gonzalez-Baker, and Capps 2001; Trejo 1996, 1997). Research
that lumps all Mexican-origin persons together thus tends to yield a negatively
biased view of the economic position of Mexican natives.
To address the question of the role and position of immigrants in the California
workforce, we provide a profile of the California labor force as well as an analysis of
job quality and mobility in the late 1990s. We begin by examining employment patterns in California, disaggregated by race/ethnicity, nativity, and gender, in 1990 and
2000. We then go on to look at job quality and mobility, with job quality defined by
occupation, industry, and relative earnings, using the 1994 and 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS).
IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT IN CALIFORNIA: A PROFILE
Our profile focuses on immigrant employment in California as a whole and on the
state’s two largest metropolitan areas—Los Angeles and San Francisco—using the
po ts
decennial census data for 1990 and 2000.3 These data not only allowiran rassessment
ld A
Wor observations also
of patterns of aggregate change since 1990; the large ngeles 017
numbers of
A
,2
Los
v.
permit us to gauge variations by nativity, race/ethnicity, ust 21 industry, and metrossn on Aug gender,
sA
politan area simultaneously. IfProvider rin employment opportunities and outcomes
inequities chived
ice 5571, a
facing certain groupsServ 15-5
e of Californians are to be improved by public policies, insight
Arilin
No.
into the factors causing the inequities is crucial. This knowledge can be obtained
only if we know which groups are most severely affected.4
3. We use the 1-percent PUMS (Public Use Microdata Series) for 1990 and 2000, for all California civilian workers between the ages of 18 and 64. Differences exist between the 1990 and 2000
PUMS in geographic, race, and industry/occupational codes. We address these primarily by
using the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series version of these data compiled for comparability at the University of Minnesota (IPUMS 2003).
The data for Los Angeles and San Francisco are for two Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs): the Los Angeles–Anaheim–Riverside CMSA, and the San Francisco–
Oakland–San Jose CMSA. In the text all references to “Los Angeles” refer to the former
CMSA, and all references to “the San Francisco Bay Area,” “the Bay Area,” or “San Francisco–
San Jose” refer to the latter CMSA.
4. We classified race using the 1990 census codes and assigned “Spanish write-in” to the “other”
race category (hence, our figures correspond to published figures). In 2000 we assigned “primary” race and placed those persons identifying themselves in more than one race category
(4.4% of adult respondents in California) into “other” race. Arguments can be advanced to
categorize differently, but the alternatives have both advantages and disadvantages, as does the
approach we use here. In 2000 it is necessary to combine metropolitan aggregates (PMSAs)
with sub-metropolitan aggregates containing at least 400,000 population (“Super PUMAs”)
to construct comparable 1990 consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs), which
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
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table 3.1. Labor Force Participation Rate, by Race/Ethnicity, Nativity, and Gender,
Los Angeles, San Francisco, and California, 2000
pe rc e n tage m a l e
Racial/Ethnic and
Nativity Group
percen tage f em a l e
Los Angeles San Francisco
CMSA
CMSA
California
Latino foreign-born
Asian foreign-born
Latino native-born
Asian native-born
Anglo
African American
Other race/ethnicity
73.6%
75.4
76.2
74.5
88.1
68.4
73.7
76.3%
79.4
77.5
79.2
84.8
67.6
81.9
74.5%
76.5
74.0
76.8
86.9
65.4
76.0
Los Angeles
CMSA
49.1%
61.1
67.4
71.2
70.7
68.7
65.3
San Francisco
CMSA
California
55.8%
64.9
74.6
77.2
75.2
71.0
69.9
50.4%
61.8
68.2
73.3
71.3
68.9
64.7
so u rce : IPUMS 2003 (census microdata for civilian workers ages 18 to 64).
table 3 .2. Labor Force Participation Rate, by Race/Ethnicity, Nativity, and Gender,
Los Angeles, San Francisco, and California, 1990
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor
pe r c en t a ge m a l e
les percen tage f em a l e
Ange 2 , 2017
t Angeles San Francisco
Racial/Ethnic and
Los Angeles San Francisco n v. Los gusLos1
s
u
Nativity Group
CMSA
CMSA As California
CMSA
CMSA
California
on A
rs
e
d
rovid
chive
ice P 5571, ar
Serv 1 -5
Latino foreign-born Ariline 90.4% 5
89.9%
89.3%
59.8%
64.2%
59.8%
No.
Asian foreign-born
81.3
84.9
80.6
64.0
67.6
63.3
Latino native-born
82.6
84.1
82.3
66.6
70.6
66.5
Asian native-born
85.1
83.3
84.5
78.7
76.3
77.1
Anglo
88.1
88.8
87.3
71.0
74.9
70.9
African American
74.9
75.7
73.6
67.7
71.1
68.5
Other race/ethnicity
78.6
80.6
79.2
70.0
75.9
67.2
s o u rc e : IPUMS 2003 (census microdata for civilian workers ages 18 to 64).
results in some size discrepancies (with 1990 and with the actual 2000 CMSA size). More difficult is the wholesale change in the nature and codes for industry (and occupation) used in the
2000 census. We use the University of Minnesota IPUMS (2003) that generates a comparable
industry coding from the 1950 census to the present. We further aggregate these latter codes
into the familiar 13-category classification (further collapsed to 12) often used in the pre-2000
census era.
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Table 3.1 shows labor force participation rates (the number of persons employed
or looking for work divided by the total adult population) in 2000 for California,
Los Angeles, and the San Francisco Bay Area, for each gender, by major racial/ethnic
category and by nativity for Latinos and Asians. As would be expected, males of all
groups show higher rates of labor force participation than females. Anglo males
exhibit notably higher rates than any of the other groups, a pattern that holds
nationally and across all parts of the state. Among California’s major metropolitan
areas, overall participation rates were highest in San Francisco, reflecting the hightech boom there during the 1990s. Participation rates for male Latino immigrants
were lower than those of Latino natives in 2000, in contrast to 1990, when the
reverse was true (Table 3.2). Exactly what accounts for this relative drop is not clear,
although it may be related to the rapid increase in Latino immigration during the
late 1990s (perhaps causing a crowding effect). On the other hand, Asian immigrants’ participation rates were generally lower than those of their native counterparts in both 1990 and 2000, especially for women, perhaps reflecting the high
proportion of refugees in this population and more traditional gender relations
among immigrants.
By 2000 more than one in four of California’s workers were foreign born, up from
slightly less than one in five in 1990. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that the proportion of
s
male and female immigrant workers exceeded that of natives in lprimaryrtindustries
irpo
rdA
Woalso held the larger
les
(agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining). Immigrantgwomen 017
An e 21, 2
Los
t
.
share in nondurable manufacturing.
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A
The already significant roleProimmigrants in the state’s labor force increased appreof vide archi
e
,
ervic 5-55571 that changes in the immigrant share varied by
S
ciably over the decade. Figure 3.3 shows
riline No. 1
A
industry, as one might anticipate. For example, immigrant women’s share of the personal services industry jumped over 8 percentage points, and immigrant men’s share
of the manufacturing workforce outstripped gains by immigrant women.
In no other state do immigrants play such an important role in the labor force,
although their specific contribution varies by gender, metropolitan area, and industry. Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 show the distribution of immigrant and native-born
workers across major industries in California and in its two leading metropolitan
areas—Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area. While California’s labor force
experienced net growth for most industries during the 1990s, marked differences
were apparent between immigrants and natives. The state’s immigrant labor force
grew much faster than its native-born counterpart and was the main source of net
growth in the state overall. California’s economic recession during the early 1990s
also generated a net out-migration of natives, especially among Anglos, even as the
immigrant influx continued. Native out-migration slowed somewhat during the
boom years of the 1990s (Frey 2002, 2003), but resumed during the post-2001 recession, especially from Los Angeles (Martin 2003).
Table 3.3 shows that the net losses of native workers in California were concentrated in construction and manufacturing; the drop in manufacturing reflected the
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
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Foreign-Born
Native-Born
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining
Construction
Durable Goods Manufacturing
Nondurable Goods Manufacturing
Transportation and Communications
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Business and Repair Services
rts
rpo
ld Ai
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
v.
ugus
Entertainment and Recreation Assn
on A
rs
e
ovid archived
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
S
.1
riline and Related Services
Professional No
A
Personal Services
Public Administration
All Male Workers
0
25
50
75
100%
Percentage of Workforce
figure 3.1. Male Workforce, by Nativity and Industry, California, 2000
s ou rc e : IPUMS 2003.
collapse of the aerospace and defense industries after the demise of the Soviet Union.
Restructuring of the civilian aerospace industry played a role as well. The impact on
manufacturing was especially severe in the Los Angeles metro area. On the other
hand, the already large share of native workers in professional and related industries
grew markedly, as did the native share of the entertainment industry, particularly in
Los Angeles. More surprising, immigrants as well as natives increasingly found
94
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Foreign-Born
Native-Born
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining
Construction
Durable Goods Manufacturing
Nondurable Goods Manufacturing
Transportation and Communications
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Business and Repair Services
rts
rpo
ld Ai
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
Entertainment and Recreation
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
eS
rilinRelatedo. 1
Professional and
A
N Services
Personal Services
Public Administration
All Female Workers
0
25
50
75
100%
Percentage of Workforce
figure 3.2. Female Workforce, by Nativity and Industry, California, 2000
s ou rc e : IPUMS 2003.
employment in professional and related industries. For both groups, employment in
manufacturing jobs fell, reflecting the broader shift toward service sector and information jobs in the 1990s.
Employers in California are increasingly likely to employ immigrants (of either
gender). Male immigrants now make up over 40% of the state’s workforce in four of
the twelve industry categories examined here, and female immigrants are a majority
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
95
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Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining
Construction
Durable Goods Manufacturing
Nondurable Goods Manufacturing
Transportation and Communications
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Business and Repair Services
rts
rpo
ld Ai
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
n v.
ugus
Entertainment and Recreation Ass
on A
rs
e
ovid archived
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
S
.1
riline and Related Services
Professional No
A
Personal Services
Public Administration
Male
Female
All Workers
0
2
4
6
8
10
12%
Percentage Point Difference
figure 3.3. Net Change in Foreign-Born Workforce, by Industry,
California, 1990 to 2000
s ou rce: IPUMS 2003.
of workers in three of the twelve. Immigrants comprise an even larger share of the
workers in Los Angeles.
Immigrants’ share of employment increased more slowly (or not at all) in whitecollar industries where natives were most concentrated (entertainment and recreation, professional and related, and public administration), as Figures 3.3, 3.4, and
96
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Male
Female
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining
Construction
Durable Goods Manufacturing
Nondurable Goods Manufacturing
Transportation and Communications
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Business and Repair Services
rts
rpo
ld Ai
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
Entertainment and Recreation
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
eS
rilinRelated o. 1
Professional and
A
N Services
Personal Services
Public Administration
All Workers
0
2
4
6
8
10
12%
Percentage Point Difference
figure 3.4. Net Change in Foreign-Born Workforce, by Industry,
Los Angeles, 1990 to 2000
s ou rc e : IPUMS 2003.
3.5 show. Overall, immigrant employment in the 1990s was concentrated in the
lower reaches of the American job structure. This raises the question of the degree to
which immigrants may have contributed to the increasingly bifurcated pattern of
job growth, with more jobs being added at the high and low ends of the employment distribution and fewer being added in the middle.
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
97
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Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining
Construction
Durable Goods Manufacturing
Nondurable Goods Manufacturing
Transportation and Communications
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Business and Repair Services
rts
rpo
ld Ai
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
v.
ugus
Entertainment and Recreation Assn
on A
rs
e
ovid archived
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
S
.1
riline and Related Services
Professional No
A
Personal Services
Public Administration
Male
Female
All Workers
0
5
10
15
20
25%
Percentage Point Difference
figure 3.5. Net Change in Foreign-Born Workforce, by Industry,
San Francisco, 1990 to 2000
s ou rce: IPUMS 2003.
98
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table 3 .3 . Workers Employed in Major Industry Category, by Nativity and Gender,
California, 1990 and 2000
19 9 0
Percentage Percentage
Foreign
Native
Born
Born
Industry
Male
Agriculture, forestry, fishing,
and mining
Construction
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Transportation, communications
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Business and repair services
Personal services
Entertainment and recreation
Professional and related
Public administration
2000
Total
Number
Percentage Percentage
Native
Foreign
Total
Born
Born
Number
9.4%
383,071
2.5%
9.5%
11.0
933,777
10.7
10.7
16.0
1,102,673
9.3
13.0
9.1
500,201
4.6
7.7
4.7
534,066
6.6
4.7
4.5
387,881
4.4
5.1
18.4
1,247,051
15.0
16.9
3.6
425,451
5.2
3.3
7.4
615,446
9.5
9.6
3.0
160,082
1.7
2.7
1.7
207,753
4.5
2.3
7.9
950,261 Airports
17.3
11.5
rld
3.0
657,202
8.6
2.9
s Wo
gele , 2017
An
Los
t 21
Total
100.0 sn v.
100.0 ugus
8,104,915 100.0
100.0
on A
rs As
vide rchived
Pro 1, a
Female
7
rvice
e Se . 15-555
Agriculture, forestry, fishing,
Arilin
No
and mining
1.3
3.7
117,676
1.0
3.0
Construction
1.9
1.0
102,076
1.6
0.9
Durable goods
6.7
10.4
466,128
4.4
8.4
Nondurable goods
4.1
12.2
373,347
3.3
9.5
Transportation, communications
4.4
2.6
249,808
3.3
2.4
Wholesale trade
2.9
3.6
191,009
2.3
3.7
Retail trade
16.8
16.8
1,053,689
16.7
17.3
Finance, insurance, and real estate
10.6
7.7
620,347
8.6
6.2
Business and repair services
6.7
5.9
413,673
6.6
6.2
Personal services
3.9
9.3
324,974
3.5
8.9
Entertainment and recreation
2.4
1.1
131,534
3.4
1.7
Professional and related
32.4
22.7
1,875,783
39.0
28.7
Public administration
6.0
2.9
328,120
6.1
3.0
Total
2.6%
11.6
13.0
5.1
7.3
4.9
13.9
5.7
7.5
1.6
2.8
12.9
10.3
100.0
100.0
6,248,164
100.0
100.0
380,243
883,535
873,982
465,297
496,443
384,919
1,315,545
390,604
803,319
172,225
314,968
1,285,887
542,527
8,309,494
100,909
97,336
373,872
340,329
206,623
182,410
1,154,069
543,975
447,186
340,568
197,432
2,459,438
347,242
6,791,389
s o u rc e : IPUMS 2003 (census microdata for civilian workers ages 18 to 64).
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
99
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table 3 .4. Workers Employed in Major Industry Category, by Nativity and Gender,
Los Angeles, 1990 and 2000
19 9 0
Percentage Percentage
Native
Foreign
Born
Born
Industry
Male
Agriculture, forestry, fishing,
and mining
Construction
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Transportation, communications
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Business and repair services
Personal services
Entertainment and recreation
Professional and related
Public administration
2000
Total
Number
Percentage Percentage
Native
Foreign
Total
Born
Born
Number
5.5% 118,469
1.4%
4.4%
96,785
12.1
467,051
9.4
11.0
380,935
17.4
625,040
9.9
13.7
426,005
10.8
290,394
5.0
10.0
260,700
4.4
256,737
6.8
4.8
227,301
5.0
205,686
4.8
5.9
195,973
19.0
621,725
14.7
18.2
611,530
3.8
220,519
5.8
3.6
187,749
8.0
321,997
9.7
9.6
369,237
3.1
82,290
1.5
3.0
81,424
1.9
132,418
6.6
2.5
191,986
ts
7.1
439,959
17.8Airpor11.3
579,151
ld
Wor
1.8
216,398 s
6.6
2.2
179,568
le
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
Total
100.0
100.0 . 3,998,683
100.0
100.0 3,788,344
sn v n Augus
o
rs As
vide rchived
Pro 1, a
Female
7
rvice
e Se . 15-555
Agriculture, forestry, rilin
A fishing, No
and mining
0.8
1.5
29,198
0.5
0.7
18,285
Construction
1.8
0.8
43,693
1.4
0.8
37,766
Durable goods
8.0
11.0
261,079
4.9
7.7
177,451
Nondurable goods
4.3
14.7
220,285
3.4
12.2
193,794
Transportation, communications
4.7
2.6
121,745
3.5
2.5
97,660
Wholesale trade
3.2
3.9
101,829
2.6
3.7
92,549
Retail trade
16.1
16.7
494,403
16.3
17.7
512,107
Finance, insurance, and real estate 11.3
7.8
309,946
9.1
6.2
246,797
Business and repair services
6.7
6.2
200,200
6.7
5.7
195,155
Personal services
3.5
9.8
163,449
3.1
9.3
160,023
Entertainment and recreation
3.0
1.2
75,504
4.5
1.8
110,547
Professional and related
32.0
21.7
872,235
38.9
29.2 1,092,233
Public administration
4.5
2.1
115,466
5.0
2.5
125,880
Total
1.7%
11.2
15.2
5.5
7.5
5.3
13.5
6.3
8.0
1.6
4.0
13.0
7.4
100.0
100.0
3,009,032
s o u rc e : IPUMS 2003 (census microdata for civilian workers ages 18 to 64).
100
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
100.0
100.0
3,060,247
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table 3 .5. Workers Employed in Major Industry Category, by Nativity and Gender,
San Francisco, 1990 and 2000
19 9 0
Percentage Percentage
Native
Foreign
Born
Born
Industry
Male
Agriculture, forestry, fishing,
and mining
Construction
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Transportation, communications
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Business and repair services
Personal services
Entertainment and recreation
Professional and related
Public administration
2000
Total
Number
Percentage Percentage
Native
Foreign
Total
Born
Born
Number
4.9%
47,632
1.4%
4.6%
46,797
9.1
188,370
10.4
10.3
189,202
18.2
266,162
11.2
17.7
242,344
6.6
105,261
4.7
5.1
88,751
6.8
133,341
6.5
4.9
109,657
3.7
82,316
3.9
3.8
73,378
19.2
275,418
14.3
16.4
277,854
4.6
103,623
6.6
4.0
106,722
7.6
149,968
11.3
13.7
220,789
3.1
32,526
1.6
2.3
35,005
1.4
34,320
3.3
1.8
50,142
10.8
245,180 Airports
19.0
12.7
305,255
rld
4.1
130,260
5.8
2.7
88,013
s Wo
gele , 2017
An
Los
t 21
Total
100.0 sn v.100.0 ugus
1,794,377 100.0
100.0 1,833,909
on A
rs As
vide rchived
Pro 1, a
Female
7
rvice
e Se . 15-555
Agriculture, forestry, fishing,
Arilin
No
and mining
0.9
1.3
16,250
0.7
0.7
10,972
Construction
1.8
1.2
24,180
1.7
1.1
23,617
Durable goods
8.2
12.5
134,108
5.8
12.8
120,071
Nondurable goods
4.2
7.2
71,240
3.8
5.7
67,638
Transportation, communications
5.0
3.6
70,304
3.7
3.0
51,545
Wholesale trade
3.3
3.0
48,113
2.2
2.5
34,933
Retail trade
15.6
16.5
235,768
14.9
16.7
239,663
Finance, insurance, and real estate
10.9
10.3
157,235
9.1
7.4
133,745
Business and repair services
7.8
6.3
111,488
8.9
9.3
138,091
Personal services
3.0
8.4
63,999
2.9
7.9
68,182
Entertainment and recreation
1.9
1.0
25,298
2.5
1.2
31,626
Professional and related
32.0
24.8
445,601
38.8
28.5
546,370
Public administration
5.1
3.9
71,890
5.0
3.3
68,272
Total
1.6%
10.9
14.2
5.4
7.8
4.9
13.8
6.2
8.4
1.4
2.0
14.6
8.5
100.0
100.0
1,475,474
100.0
100.0
1,534,725
s o u rc e : Census microdata for civilian workers ages 18 to 64.
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
101
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JOB QUALITY AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
We now turn to the shifting patterns of employment in the United States and California in the late 1990s, disaggregating our data by nativity, race/ethnicity, and gender. Here we define “jobs” as positions occurring at the intersection of industry and
occupation, arrayed by their relative earnings into quintiles of the labor force, using
the CPS data for the boom years of 1994 to 2000.5
Wages are only one measure of job quality, but they are the only consistently
available indicator available in most sources of data on the labor force. Moreover, the
distribution of jobs by relative earnings is fundamental for tracking the forces driving changes in income inequality. We follow the example of research in this vein by
Milkman and Dwyer (2002) who, in turn, elaborated the methods of Wright and
Dwyer (2000–01, 2002).6 We share their interest in the changing distribution of jobs
during the 1990s expansion. Where their unit of analysis is job-quality deciles, however, we use job-quality quintiles. Further, our starting date is 1994, not 1992 (when
the national economic recovery officially began), because CPS data on nativity were
not available before that date. Arguably, 1994 is an appropriate start point because
the expansion began later in California than in the country as a whole. In addition,
labor market conditions for immigrants and other disadvantaged groups did not
begin to improve until well after 1992 (Suro and Lowell 2002). irports
A
orld
We examine a matrix of 1,035 possible jobs created W crossing 45 occupational
les by017
Ange 1, 2
Lo
and 23 industrial categories.7 Medianshourly s ugust 2were calculated for each job in
n v. earnings
As
nA
ed o
iders
Prov 1, archiv
ice 5 7
Se v
5. Stiglitz originallyr developed5 idea of using industry and occupation matrices to identify
-5 the
riline No. 15
A
“good” jobs—those with earnings greater than the national median wage—and applied the
schema to jobs created between 1994 and 1996. He concluded that during the two-year
period, 68% of net job creation involved good quality jobs (see U.S. Council of Economic
Advisors 1996).
6. The Current Population Survey is a national population survey collected by the Census Bureau
for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We used the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group data
(MORG) provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research. These data include just the
portion of the CPS sample that is dropped each month and combine all twelve months of
CPSs for each year. The resulting MORG data files are roughly three times as large as any single
CPS and provide a better sample size.
7. Like Milkman and Dwyer (2002) our sample includes only full-time workers ages eighteen to
sixty-four who are not self employed. We rely on the self-reporting of full time status in the
CPS to exclude part-time workers. Like Milkman and Dwyer we also disaggregate one of the
typical 22 industry groups into its two components of “business services” and “automotive and
repair services” (for 23 industry groups). We also follow them, as well as Wright and Dwyer
(2001), in including all jobs with any sample size in the analysis. In a nontrivial number of jobs
this means that the sample size is rather small. But because these jobs are further collapsed
within the quintiles that are analyzed, the effect of keeping them in the analysis does not substantially affect the results while it retains information. The variation in median earnings for
the small jobs-cells would generally not put the job into a different quintile (even if a larger
sample were available to generate a different estimate of the job’s median wage).
102
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table 3 .6 . Selected Characteristics of the Three Largest Jobs in Each Job-Quality
Quintile, U.S., 1994
Quintile
Industry/Occupation
1st
Retail trade/Sales workers, retail and personal services
Retail trade/Food services
Medical care not in hospitals/Health services
2nd
Manufacturing (nondurable)/Machine operators and
tenders, except precision workers
Retail trade/Supervisors and proprietors, sales occupations
Manufacturing (durable)/Machine operators and tenders,
except precision workers
3rd
4th
5th
Construction/Construction trades
Manufacturing (durable)/Other precision production,
craft, and repair
Transportation/Motor vehicle operators
Median
Wage
National
Workforce
$6.90
$6.23
$6.75
2,408,524
1,887,953
940,472
$8.10
$9.78
2,198,567
1,811,759
$9.40
1,629,491
$11.50
2,265,207
$12.00
$10.67
1,659,730
1,126,299
Education/Teachers, except college and university
$15.00 2,875,860
Public administration/Protective services
$14.29 1,276,603
s
Finance, insurance, and real estate/Sales, finance, and
rport
ld Ai
business services
868,424
Wor$14.40
s
gele
17
s An t 21, 20$17.50 1,140,075
Hospital/Health assessment and treatment. Lo gus
v
ssn
Au
Finance, insurance, and realviders A iveexecutives,
estate/Other d on
Pro 1, arch
administrators, randemanagers
$15.38
930,876
ic
Se v 15-5557
.
riline (durable)/Other executives,
Manufacturing No
A
administrators, and managers
$19.80
922,451
s o u rc e : U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1994.
the matrix. We then rank-ordered the jobs from lowest to highest median hourly
earnings and divided them into five groups, each containing roughly 20% of all fulltime workers. The exact share in each quintile, so defined, is not exactly 20%
because the wage cutoffs arrayed across jobs do not neatly divide up the wage array.
What results is a fivefold classification of jobs that range from the “lower,” or first,
quintile (the lowest 20% of median wage earners) to the “upper,” or fifth, quintile
(the highest 20%). Table 3.6 shows the jobs that had the three largest workforces in
each quintile in 1994. The lowest wage jobs were in retail trades such as food service.
At the upper end were professionals in the health industry, along with executives,
administrators, and managers.
Figure 3.6 shows that in 2000 about 20.8 million full-time workers were employed
nationally in the top job-quality quintile. In California, as shown in Figure 3.7, over
2.6 million full-time workers had high-quality jobs, a share that was slightly higher
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
103
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3.0
21
2.5
Number of Workers (millions)
Number of Workers (millions)
22
20
19
18
17
16
15
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
2.5
2.0
s o u rce: CPS (see footnote 6).
rts
rpo
ld Ai
Wor
les
500
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A 400
e
ovid archi
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
S
riline No. 1
300
A
Net Change in Number of Jobs (thousands)
3.0
figure 3.7. Distribution of
Full-Time Workers, by Job Quality,
California, 2000
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
3.5
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.6. Distribution of
Full-Time Workers, by Job Quality,
U.S., 2000
Net Change in Number of Jobs (millions)
Job-Quality Quintile
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
600
200
100
0
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.8. Job Growth for
Full-Time Workers, by Job-Quality
Quintile, U.S., 1994 to 2000
figure 3.9. Job Growth for
Full-Time Workers, by Job-Quality
Quintile, California, 1994 to 2000
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
104
Job-Quality Quintile
s o u rce: CPS (see footnote 6).
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
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than might be expected given California’s population. The number of persons
employed in the lowest quintile, almost 2.4 million, was even more disproportionate
relative to the nationwide pattern.
Our analysis next focuses on the net change in the number of full-time employees
from 1994 to 2000 in the United States and California. The measure captures job
destruction as well as creation, and in some cases employment declined over the
period. This U-shaped pattern implies that the economic boom of the 1990s did not
eliminate (and possibly reinforced) an hourglass pattern of job distribution (see
Milkman and Dwyer 2002). Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the net change in the number
of persons employed in each job-quality quintile over the 1994–2000 period. In the
United States, and in California especially, growth was disproportionate at each end:
both low-quality and high-quality jobs grew to a much greater degree than did those
of middle quality. The boom of the 1990s contributed to the state’s advantageous
position as an economic leader, with substantial gains in the number of high-quality
jobs. But this good news for the state’s residents and politicians was balanced by
apparent bad news: an even greater number of low-quality full-time jobs was created
in California, accounting for just over one-fifth of the net growth of these jobs in the
United States.
To interpret these data for immigrants, we first disaggregate the findings by gender.
po ts
Immigrant women start at disproportionately lower points in the lUnited rStates’s job
d Air
Wor
structure than do immigrant men (reflecting women’s ngeles 017 roles in many
more traditional
A
21, 2
Los
countries of origin and their lower levels sn v. August and professional achieves of educational
sA
on
ment), but greater numbers Proimmigrantivwomen work outside the home in the
of vider ch ed
ice 5571, ar
United States comparedrv . 15-5
e Se to women in their countries of origin. Immigrant women
Arilin
No
also improve their economic status faster in this country than their male counterparts do (Bean, Gonzalez-Baker, and Capps 2001), at least across successive generations, because of the United States’s relatively egalitarian opportunity structure.
As Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show, males and females contributed differentially to
employment growth between 1994 and 2000. Women contributed more to the
polarized pattern of job growth than men did in both the United States and in California. Nonetheless, in California the gender-specific contributions to the U-shaped
pattern were smaller than in the country as a whole. Nationwide, women contributed to growth at both the high and low ends, while growth among men was concentrated at the high end.
The disproportionate presence of immigrants in California’s labor force—33% as
opposed to 13% nationwide—is a crucial factor in the contrast between California
and U.S. growth patterns (see Figures 3.8 and 3.9). Immigrants are likely to start out
at low points in the job distribution, as Figures 3.12 and 3.13 illustrate. In the United
States as a whole, immigrants were relatively evenly distributed over the quintiles. In
California, however, where the job growth pattern was more polarized, and where
immigrants were a much larger proportion of the workforce, they accounted for
more than half of the growth in both the lowest and highest quintiles, substantially
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
105
3.5
3.0
Net Change in Number of Jobs (thousands)
Net Change in Number of Jobs (millions)
Case: 15-55571, 08/23/2017, ID: 10554492, DktEntry: 30-2, Page 109 of 274
Males
Females
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
600
Males
Females
500
400
300
200
100
0
5th
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Job-Quality Quintile
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.10. Job Growth for
Full-Time Workers, by Job-Quality
Quintile, Stacked by Gender, U.S.,
1994 to 2000
figure 3.11. Job Growth for
Full-Time Workers, by Job-Quality
Quintile, Stacked by Gender,
California, 1994 to 2000
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
s o u rce: CPS (see footnote 6).
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor
les Foreign-Born
Ange 21, 2017
Native-Born
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A 500
Foreign-Born ovide
rchi
Pr
Native-Born
71, a
rvice
e Se . 15-555
400
Arilin
No
3.5
3.0
2.5
Net Change in Number of Jobs (thousands)
Net Change in Number of Jobs (millions)
600
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
300
200
100
0
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.12. Job Growth for
Full-Time Workers, by Job-Quality
Quintile, Stacked by Nativity, U.S.,
1994 to 2000
figure 3.13. Job Growth for
Full-Time Workers, by Job-Quality
Quintile, Stacked by Nativity,
California, 1994 to 2000
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
106
Job-Quality Quintile
s o u rce: CPS (see footnote 6).
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
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250
Foreign-Born
Native-Born
Net Change in Number of Jobs (thousands)
Net Change in Number of Jobs (thousands)
300
200
150
100
50
0
–50
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
300
Foreign-Born
Native-Born
250
200
150
100
50
0
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Job-Quality Quintile
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.14. Job Growth for
Full-Time Male Workers, by
Job-Quality Quintile, Stacked by
Nativity, California, 1994 to 2000
figure 3.15. Job Growth for
Full-Time Female Workers, by
Job-Quality Quintile, Stacked by
Nativity, California, 1994 to 2000
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
s o u rce: CPS (see footnote 6).
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
v.
contributing to the more polarized structure of growth. st
ssn
AuguImmigrants also made up a
ers A ived on
vidpart rchCalifornia’s job distribution during 1994–
large share of growth in the middle a of
Pro 1,
vice
2000, accountingine Ser .three-fourths of that increase.
for over 15-5557
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No
As Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show, there were strikingly different gender dynamics at
work. Foreign-born males accounted for appreciable portions of employment
growth in the high and middle parts of the distribution (about two-thirds and threefifths, respectively), whereas foreign-born females accounted for a large portion
(about two-thirds) of the growth in the lower part of the distribution. The U-shaped
pattern that characterizes the distribution of job quality growth in California during
this period thus has distinctive gender and nativity origins, with immigrant women
accounting for the largest single component of low-end growth and immigrant men
the largest single component of middle- as well as high-end growth.
Disaggregating these results by race/ethnicity as well as gender and nativity further illuminates the dynamics underlying the job growth pattern in California. As
Figure 3.16 shows, Asian male immigrants contributed just under half of the growth
of California’s upper quality jobs, while Latino male immigrants and natives made
up just over one-third of the growth of the lowest quality jobs. More surprising,
however, Latino immigrants contributed almost half of California’s rather strong
growth in middle-range jobs among males. This Asian-Latino pattern is not as clearcut for women. As Figure 3.17 shows, Asian immigrant women made significant contributions to the growth of upper end jobs, but Asian females also made substantial
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
107
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Native-Born Asian
Foreign-Born Asian
Native-Born Latino
Foreign-Born Latino
African American
Anglo
Native-Born Asian
Foreign-Born Asian
Native-Born Latino
275
Net Change in Number of Jobs (thousands)
Net Change in Number of Jobs (thousands)
300
Foreign-Born Latino
African American
Anglo
250
200
150
100
50
0
–50
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
–25
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
1st
Job-Quality Quintile
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.16. Job Growth for Full-Time Male
figure 3.17. Job Growth for Full-Time
Workers, by Job-Quality Quintile, Stacked by
Female Workers, by Job-Quality Quintile,
rts
Race/Ethnicity and Nativity, California, 1994
Stackedrby Airpo
ld Race/Ethnicity and Nativity,
Wo 1994 to 2000
to 2000
California,
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
s o u rce: CPS (see footnote 6).
.
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
S
1
riline No.Foreign-Born Latino
Native-BornA
Asian
Native-Born Asian
Foreign-Born Latino
Foreign-Born Asian
Native-Born Latino
African American
Anglo
Foreign-Born Asian
Native-Born Latino
200
Net Change in Number of Jobs (thousands)
Net Change in Number of Jobs (thousands)
225
African American
Anglo
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.18. Job Growth for Full-Time
Male Workers, by Job-Quality Quintile,
Stacked by Race/Ethnicity and Nativity,
108Los Angeles,s1994 to f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
t h e tat e o 2000
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.19. Job Growth for Full-Time
Female Workers, by Job-Quality Quintile,
Stacked by Race/Ethnicity and Nativity,
Los Angeles, 1994 to 2000
s o u rce: CPS (see footnote 6).
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Native-Born Asian
Foreign-Born Asian
Native-Born Latino
Foreign-Born Latino
African American
Anglo
150
140
130
Foreign-Born Latino
African American
Anglo
Net Change in Number of Jobs (thousands)
175
150
125
100
75
50
Net Change in Number of Jobs (thousands)
120
Native-Born Asian
Foreign-Born Asian
Native-Born Latino
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
25
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor
0
les 017
2
Ange
Los10 ust 21,
v.
ssn on –Aug
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th s A
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
er
d
rovid
chive
ice P 5571, ar
Job-Quality Quintile
rv
Job-Quality Quintile
e Se . 15-5
Arilin
No
figure 3.20. Job Growth for Full-Time
figure 3.21. Job Growth for Full-Time
Male Workers, by Job-Quality Quintile,
Female Workers, by Job-Quality Quintile,
Stacked by Race/Ethnicity and Nativity,
Stacked by Race/Ethnicity and Nativity,
San Francisco, 1994 to 2000
San Francisco, 1994 to 2000
10
0
–25
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
s o u rce: CPS (see footnote 6).
contributions to lower end job growth. Native Latino women made stronger contributions to high-end job growth than did immigrant Latino women, who were the
single largest contributors to the growth of low-quality jobs in the state, surpassing
their male counterparts. The bimodal pattern of job quality growth, in short, was
especially stark for women, regardless of race/ethnic group. For male full-time
workers the bimodality loosely mirrored whether workers were Asian or Latino
immigrants.
Figures 3.18 through 3.21 provide a similar disaggregation for the Los Angeles and
the San Francisco metropolitan areas. The U-shaped pattern of net employment
change is again partly driven by upper end growth for males and lower end growth
for females. In Los Angeles, as in California, Asian immigrant males tended to dominate jobs in the top quintile, while Latino males, especially immigrants, predomibean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
109
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nated in the lower and middle quintiles. Asian female immigrants were distributed
across the quintiles relatively evenly, as were Latino native-born women. Latino
immigrant women in Los Angeles, however, disproportionately contributed to the
growth of lower quality jobs.
The San Francisco Bay Area had a very different pattern of job growth during the
1990s boom, as Milkman and Dwyer (2002) note. Some of the same gender, nativity, and race/ethnicity dynamics seen in the state and in Los Angeles were evident
nonetheless, as Figures 3.20 and 3.21 illustrate. For example, Asian male immigrants
were the strongest contributors to upper end job growth, and immigrant Latino
women played this role at the low end.
JOB QUALITY MOBILITY AMONG IMMIGRANTS
These results illustrate the significance of immigration in employment patterns in
California, and they indicate why it is important to consider the possibility that
newcomer dynamics, in addition to racialized group dynamics, may play an important role (Bean and Stevens 2003). Although most recent immigrants are members
of racial/ethnic groups, this fact may not fully explain why they are more likely to
s
rport
start out at low points in the job distribution. Another possibility is, simply, that
ld Ai
Wor
les
they are inexperienced societal newcomers. If thisgwere the0case, however, one would
An e 21, 2 17
Los
expect their labor market outcomes n v. improveust they gain job experience and
ss to
Aug as
ers A ived on
vidopportunities in the destination country.
familiarity with employment arch
Pro 1,
rvice
The public policies 5-5557 to provide avenues for upward mobility for lesse Se . 1 intended
Arilin
No
skilled members of racial/ethnic groups have generally focused on generating more
work opportunities in the middle part of the job distribution by solving demandside difficulties. Insofar as workers experience prejudice based on their race and ethnicity, the development of successful policies may require further efforts to overcome
the effects of discrimination. But if today’s Latino and Asian immigrants are more
like earlier waves of newcomers (mostly of European origin): they will be able move
up once they gain experience in the labor market. The effects of newcomer status
and those of discrimination are not, of course, mutually exclusive, but an attempt to
disentangle their effects is nonetheless useful.
All workers, native and immigrant, tend to earn more as they age and as they gain
job experience. For many immigrants, however, years of work experience can be separated into experience in the home country and experience gained after entering the
U.S. labor market. Upon arrival, immigrants often lack language and U.S.-specific
job skills; as skills and language improve, they are rewarded with better jobs and
earnings. Research on earnings that compares natives’ work experience in the United
States and immigrants’ experience outside the country generally supports the claim
that recent immigrants earn less than natives who have an equal number of years of
work experience. Yet, even after two decades of U.S.-specific experience, immigrants
110
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generally fail to catch up to the earnings levels of otherwise similar native workers
(controlling for such factors as education) (Smith and Edmonston 1997).8
Lacking longitudinal data, a fully adequate analysis of the earnings growth process
is not possible, but we can get a good approximation of immigrant mobility by tracking year-of-arrival cohorts over time. To do this, we grouped immigrants into three
cohorts according to the years that they reported arriving in the United States:9 those
who arrived between 1980 and 1983, between 1984 and 1989, and between 1990 and
1994–95 (the 2000 CPS data do not differentiate 1994 and 1995). To the degree that
job quality mobility occurs, one would expect that immigrants in these arrival cohorts
shifted into higher quality jobs during the economic boom years, from 1994 to 2000.
Figures 3.22, 3.23, 3.24, and 3.25 show the percentage point change for each cohort
across job-quality quintiles for the United States, California, San Francisco, and Los
Angeles.10 For example, Figure 3.22 shows that the percentage of the 1990–1994-95
cohort in the top quintile increased by about half a percentage point in the United
States as a whole. In contrast, the share of the 1980–1983 arrival cohort in the same
quintile increased by four percentage points. More to the point, the entire pattern
for the 1980–1983 cohort is one of upward mobility, with substantial losses in lower
quality jobs and strong gains in upper quality jobs. But even the most recent arrivals
experienced some upward mobility between 1994 and 2000. This was also the case
s
in California, as Figure 3.23 shows, although the large presence of Airport recent
the most
ld
Wor pattern).
arrivals in the top quintile is striking here (and differs ngeles U.S.
from the 017
A
,2
Los Francisco Bay Area, where the
As Figure 3.24 shows, this is driven bysn v. San ugust 21
the
s
A
sA
d on
cohort that arrived most recentlyider an hespecially strong presence in the highest
rov has c ive
ice P 5571, ar
quality jobs, gainingServ 15-5
e nearly fifteen percentage points over the 1994–2000 period.
Arilin
No.
Asian immigrants, most likely the wave of highly skilled immigrant professionals
recruited in the San Francisco–San Jose area during the high-tech boom, were
undoubtedly responsible for this leap. Figure 3.25 shows evidence of job mobility
during the economic expansion in Los Angeles as well. Indeed, the pattern for Los
Angeles looks much like that for the state of California (Figure 3.22), and it mirrors
the national pattern of stronger shifts into better quality jobs by the cohorts that had
been in the country for longer periods of time. The 1990–1994–95 cohort, for example, moved from the lowest quality jobs into those of middle quality.
8. Some research finds very fast wage assimilation, especially among Europeans and high-skilled
Asian immigrants. Otherwise, there is substantial agreement that Latino immigrants, Mexicans in particular, may experience slower assimilation patterns.
9. The results described in the text, for example, one of improving job mobility for the earlier
arrival cohorts, also hold for those who came to the United States in the 1970s and the 1960s.
10. The percentage distribution in 1994 is subtracted from the percentage distribution in 2000 to
get the percentage-point change across the time period. In 1994 there are five years’ worth of
immigrants (1990–1994), while in the 2000 data there are six years’ worth of immigrants
(1990–1996). A numerical change, as shown elsewhere in this study, would be biased because
the span of years is uneven. Also, the sample design of the CPS makes a comparison of counts
for immigrants in small year-of-arrival cohorts less reliable than a comparison of percentages.
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
111
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5%
4
Percentage Point Change
3
2
1
0
–1
–2
–3
Arrived Between 1980 and 1983
Arrived Between 1984 and 1989
Arrived Between 1990 and 1994–95
–4
–5
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.22. Job Mobility for Foreign-Born Workers,
by Date of Arrival, U.S., 1994 to 2000
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
rts
rpo
ld Ai
Wor
les
7
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
6
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
e Pr
,
5
ervic 5-55571
S
riline No. 1
A
4
Percentage Point Change
8%
3
2
1
0
–1
–2
–3
–4
–5
Arrived Between 1980 and 1983
Arrived Between 1984 and 1989
Arrived Between 1990 and 1994–95
–6
–7
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.23. Job Mobility for Foreign-Born Workers,
by Date of Arrival, California, 1994 to 2000
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
112
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
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15%
Percentage Point Change
10
Arrived Between 1980 and 1983
Arrived Between 1984 and 1989
Arrived Between 1990 and 1994–95
5
0
–5
– 10
– 15
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.24. Job Mobility for Foreign-Born Workers,
by Date of Arrival, San Francisco, 1994 to 2000
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
rts
rpo
ld Ai
Wor
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
7%
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
e Pr
,
6
ervic 5-55571
S
riline No. 1
A
5
Percentage Point Change
4
3
2
1
0
–1
–2
–3
–4
Arrived Between 1980 and 1983
Arrived Between 1984 and 1989
Arrived Between 1990 and 1994–95
–5
–6
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Job-Quality Quintile
figure 3.25. Job Mobility for Foreign-Born Workers,
by Date of Arrival, Los Angeles, 1994 to 2000
s ou rc e : CPS (see footnote 6).
bean & lowell / immigrant employment and mobility opportunities
113
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These findings suggest that many immigrants do move into better quality jobs
over time. These findings also suggest the importance of disaggregating immigrant
labor market experiences. Failing to do so yields a more pessimistic portrait of the
constraints facing recent immigrants than may be warranted.
CONCLUSION
The 1990s were a period of record immigration to California and the United States,
with both legal and unauthorized immigrants arriving in the country and state, a trend
that will likely continue in the twenty-first century. Immigrants make up a proportionately larger share of the workforce than of the population—and this is nowhere
more true than in California. Although many highly skilled as well as less-skilled
immigrants have been coming to the United States, most are among the less well
educated, a fact that is consistent with the employment patterns described above.
Many observers have been concerned that a bimodal pattern of immigrant education, with many immigrants either being poorly or very well educated, overlaps too
closely with the increasingly polarized distribution of job growth in the country.
Our analysis of changing employment patterns and the shifting distribution of bad
ts
and good jobs in the 1994–2000 economic boom suggests,ld Airpor that immigrahowever,
Wor
tion is not fundamentally driving the emergence les a 2polarized job structure in
nge of1, 017
os A
either the United States or California. v. L August 2 derives largely from changes
n That structure
ss
on
ers A
among the native born,Psuggestingcthat d
rovid , ar hive shifts in labor demand explain the pattern,
ice 5571
rv
rather thaninincreases 1in 5the supply of less-skilled and highly skilled immigrant
e Se . 5Aril
No
workers. Immigrants in California, however, do contribute to the polarization, to
varying degrees depending on race/ethnicity, gender, and location.
Disaggregating results by race/ethnicity, nativity, gender, and metropolitan area
reveals the importance of newcomer dynamics to labor market outcomes. In both
Los Angeles and the Bay Area, immigrants do not in general appear to be stuck in
low-end jobs. Our analyses of arrival cohort data suggest substantial immigrant
upward mobility, mainly from lower to middle-range jobs in Los Angeles and from
middle to higher range jobs in the Bay Area. This does not mean that predictions
based on racial/ethnic stratification theories are wrong, but it does suggest that such
perspectives should be modified by taking into account the effects of newcomer status and the likelihood that immigrants may experience more upward mobility than
many commentators presume.
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Unequal Opportunity
stu den t acce ss to
th e u ni ver si t y of ca lifo rn ia
ISAAC MARTIN,
JEROME KARABEL,
and S E A N W. J A Q U E Z
The Universit y of California (UC) has long been among the
most important avenues of upward economic mobility for Californians. UC is arguably one of the most prestigious public universities in the United States, and it is a
pathway to many of the most coveted jobs in the nation’s largest state. The promise
that all Californians have an equal opportunity to acquire a UC education is a core
part of California’s social contract as set forth in the state’s Master Plan for Higher
Education in California (California State Department of Education 1960). In this
essay we explore the current status of this promise and document the extent of ints
equality among California high schools in the access they provide ltoAirpor
d UC. The reality
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to UC 01 to
we find is cause for concern. The students admitted ngeles tend 7 come from an
sA
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exclusive subset of the state’s high schools.sIn v. Lo August 2 are disproportionately
n particular, they
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from schools whose student bodies e archived
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fessionals and disproportionately Anglo or Asian.
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Arilin
No
Why should we be concerned with these inequalities? Since the 1970s California
has developed an increasingly bifurcated economy, with a top tier of highly paid,
secure jobs and a growing bottom tier of poorly paid, insecure jobs (Greenwich and
Niedt 2001; Milkman and Dwyer 2002; Ong and Zonta 2001). In the same period,
wage inequality has grown more rapidly in California than in all but four other states
(Bernstein et al. 2000). Possession of a university degree becomes more and more essential as workers compete for the jobs at the top of this employment structure.
Researchers have established that there is a large and widening wage gap between
college-educated and non-college-educated workers across the United States
(McCall 2000; Morris and Western 1999; Paulsen 1998), and this trend appears to be
magnified in California (Carroll and Ross 2003; Ong and Zonta 2001; Reed 1999;
Reed et al. 1997). In fact, the growing wage gap between workers who have a college
degree and those who do not is the largest single factor contributing to the increase
in wage inequality in California—and to the growing gap between levels of wage
inequality in California and levels of wage inequality in the rest of the United States
(Reed 1999; Reed et al. 1997).
UC is only one segment of the state’s tripartite system of public higher education,
which also includes the California State University and the California Community
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Colleges, but it is the elite tier. As such, it is a particularly important gatekeeper. The
opportunity to make the transition directly from high school to an elite university
has important consequences for an individual’s career, as measured, for example, by
educational attainment or earnings. Although most students who currently attend
college in the United States did not enroll directly in a four-year university immediately after secondary school (Baker and Velez 1996), studies show that the students
who make this transition promptly are those students who are most likely to attend
or to graduate from a relatively prestigious four-year college (Kempner and Kinnick
1990; see also Dougherty 1987; Hilmer 2000; Velez 1985). Moreover, the labor market advantage conferred on students who graduate from the most prestigious and
selective four-year institutions is quite well documented.1
Inequalities in access to UC are also troubling because of their implications for
racial and ethnic equality. California is by any plausible measure one of the most
diverse states in the union, and it is only becoming more so.2 At the same time, ine1. It is difficult to get an exact dollar estimate for the financial benefit of attending a prestigious
undergraduate institution. Many of the personal characteristics that allow students to gain admission to elite colleges are the same characteristics that would enable them to succeed in the labor
market even if they had attended a less elite institution. Researchers have employed increasingly
sophisticated statistical methods to discover what part of the earnings difference between graduates of highly selective and less selective colleges is due to the actual effectiof orts
attending the college,
A rp
and what part is due to differences of personal characteristics. Mostrld
Wo research suggests that there is
eles
7
a substantial career return to attending the most s Ang 21, 201
Lo prestigious institutions, including institutions
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like UC Berkeley and UCLA (Behrman s
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2000; Ishida et al. 1997;eJamesvet al., 1989; Karabel and McClelland 1987; Monks 2000). An excepPro 1 archiv
c
57
erviby Stacey Berg Dale and Alan Krueger (2002), who find that expensive coltion is a recent study 15-55
eS
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No.
leges confer an earnings advantage but selective colleges do not, all else being equal.
Whatever the magnitude of the benefit, it rarely accrues to students who begin their postsecondary education at a community college. Transfer from a community college to an elite fouryear college is a rarity; for example, fewer than 1% of students who attended a California Community College in 2000–01 transferred to UC the following year (California Postsecondary
Education Commission 2003a, 2003b). Researchers have found that enrolling in a two-year or
community college actually diminishes the likelihood that a student will graduate from a fouryear institution (Brint 2003, 19; Brint and Karabel 1989, 129–130; Dougherty 1987, 88).
2. The census indicates that California has become one of the first “majority-minority” states, along
with Hawaii and New Mexico (see U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001). By comparison, Anglos are
projected to become a minority in the United States as a whole only in the second half of the
twenty-first century (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999). The use of administrative data from multiple sources complicates any discussion of racial and ethnic groups, since the definitions of
groups are not entirely consistent across sources. Here and throughout this paper we use the category “Anglo” to refer to persons classified by the census as “white non-hispanic,” and by UC
and the California Department of Education as “White.” We use “African Americans” to refer
to the individuals the census calls “black,” and the UC and the California Department of
Education call “African American.” We use the category “Asian” to include persons classified
by the census, the UC, and the California Department of Education variously as “Asian,”
“Asian American,” East Indian-Pakistani,” “Filipino American,” and “Pacific Islander.” We
construe the category “Latino” to include persons classified by the census as “white Hispanic,”
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quality in earnings among racial and ethnic groups is substantial and increasing in
the state (Carroll and Ross 2003; Milkman and Dwyer 2002; Ong and Zonta 2001).
Inequality in academic achievement among these groups has also been increasing. In
2002 the gap in scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) between African American and Anglo students in California was well above the national average (cf. College Board 2002a, 2002b), and a study from the mid-1990s found that this gap was
growing faster in California than in the nation as a whole (Slater 1995–96; cf. Jencks
and Phillips 1998).
The research we present here focuses on inequality among high schools, particularly
in regard to race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (SES). We focus on inequality
among schools—for instance, comparing Oakland Technical High School, which is
primarily African American and low SES, with Piedmont High, which is primarily
Anglo and affluent—rather than among groups of students within any particular
school—for instance, comparing the poorest students with middle-income students at
Oakland Technical High School. We also describe inequalities between public and private schools and among types of private schools, as defined by religious affiliation.
The structure of this essay is as follows: First we outline the context of California’s
higher education policy and UC admissions policy in particular. Next we briefly discuss some issues related to the geography of access to higher education. We then
s
rp rt
describe our data and methods and present findings from our statisticaloexploration
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of California secondary schools, both public and private. Finally we discuss the
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AN OVERVIEW OF ADMISSIONS POLICY
There is no single document that defines UC’s current admissions policy. The policy
consists of an accretion of multiple criteria and procedures that have been established over several decades. The state laid the foundation for this structure in 1960,
when the legislature endorsed the Master Plan for Higher Education. The impetus for
the Master Plan was the rapid growth of the state’s population, which was increasing
by 500,000 people a year. With more people came a greater demand for higher education. The state already operated several distinct institutions of higher education
that dated from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including UC, a
handful of state colleges, and a vast network of “junior,” or community, colleges.
Administrators anticipated expansion in all three of these branches. In 1959 UC
President Clark Kerr convened a committee to draft a comprehensive plan for
by the UC as “Chicano” or “Latino,” and by the California Department of Education as “Hispanic or Latino.” We use “Native American” to refer to persons classified as “Native American”
or “American Indian.”
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growth that would protect the interests of UC and prevent conflicts among the three
branches as they expanded by codifying the mission and functions appropriate to
each (Brint and Karabel 1989, 86–89; Lemann 1999, 129–134; Schrag 1999, 37–38).
The resulting Master Plan embodied a tension between the principle of democratic inclusion and the principle of meritocracy. On the one hand, the state was to
serve all its people; on the other hand, UC was to operate as an exclusive institution
that served the “best” students (Master Plan Survey Team 1960, 77). The plan reconciled these principles by establishing a three-tiered system of college admissions.
Admission to the community colleges would be open to all high school graduates;
admission to the state colleges would be open to the top one-third of high school
graduates statewide; and admission to UC would be open to the top one-eighth.
This division promised to control the costs of expansion by channeling most students into the less expensive community college system. It also protected the prestige of UC by ensuring that it would remain more selective than the state and
community colleges were. Perhaps its most important result, however, was to institutionalize an unprecedented guarantee: every Californian would henceforth be
entitled to a higher education, free of tuition, commensurate with his or her ability
(Brint and Karabel 1989, 86–89; Douglass 2001, 122; Schrag 1999, 38).3
To admit the top one-eighth of the state’s high school graduates, however, UC
s
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needed a set of criteria to identify them. The Master Plan established only loose
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guidelines for determining which graduates were geles eligible.” For example, it rec“UC 017
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requirements: theN
Subject, Scholarship, and Examination Requirements. The Subject Requirement is a sequence of coursework that includes courses in history,
English, math, science, and a language other than English. The Scholarship Requirement refers to a minimum grade point average (GPA) in these courses, with extra
points awarded for honors courses. The Examination Requirement refers to a minimum score on a battery of standardized tests, which during the period we analyze
included the SAT I “Reasoning Test” (or, alternatively, the ACT) and any three SAT
II subject tests.4 Meeting these minimum requirements was enough to make a
student eligible for consideration, but it was not sufficient to guarantee that he or
she would be admitted to the campus of his or her choice. All but two campuses
3. Nominally, UC still does not charge tuition, but increases in student fees since the 1970s have
rendered this guarantee less meaningful (Schrag 1999, 88).
4. Individual campuses have discretionary power to waive these eligibility requirements in individual cases, but they may exercise this power only within guidelines established by the university
and only for a small proportion of the entering class. The process of waiving the eligibility criteria is called “admission by exception.” According to the master plan, no more than 2 percent of
the entering freshman class at any campus may be admitted by exception; since then, university
policy has revised this figure upwards to 6 percent (Laird 1997).
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(UC Riverside and UC Santa Cruz) chose among eligible applicants based on their
grades, test scores, and a variety of nonacademic criteria. Under a policy first proposed in 1971 by the University of California Council of Chancellors, these selective
campuses combined academic and nonacademic criteria by dividing the freshman
class roughly in half: the first half of the class was to be admitted based on its academic performance alone, and the second was to be admitted on the basis of nonacademic characteristics as well as academic records.
The next watershed in the development of UC’s admissions policy was the adoption of affirmative action. In the mid-1960s several campuses began “soft” affirmative action programs that were designed to identify promising high school students
from underrepresented racial and ethnic minorities and to encourage them to apply
to UC. In 1968 selective UC campuses began to consider race and ethnicity explicitly in their admissions decisions, a practice that has come to be known as “hard”
affirmative action. These campuses gave extra consideration to African American,
Latino, and Native American applicants in particular. Students from these groups
tended on average to have lower grades and standardized test scores than their Anglo
and Asian peers did. If UC had relied only on grades and test scores to select its students, it would have excluded most African American and Latino applicants from its
top campuses, and such exclusion would have conflicted visibly with the university’s
s
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aspiration to serve all the state’s people. In 1968 UC also began to require that stuld Ai
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dents take the SAT ( Joint Committee on Higher Education 1969, 7
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109–110; Lemann 1999, 173).
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With this combination of rstandardized tests and affirmative action, the UC
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Regents struck ailicompromise between
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A
meritocracy that remained more or less stable for three decades. In July 1995, however, the UC Regents voted to eliminate all consideration of race and ethnicity from
UC admissions. The resulting policy, SP-1, stated that “the University of California
shall not use race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin as criteria for
admission to the University or to any program of study.” California’s voters subsequently wrote the ban on affirmative action into the state constitution when they
approved the ballot initiative called Proposition 209 in November 1996. SP-1 took
effect for graduate programs in 1997 and for undergraduate campuses in the fall of
1998 (Chávez 1998, 56–67; Lemann 1999, 307–336).
The ban on affirmative action ushered in a period of rapid change in UC’s admissions policies that is still underway. Immediately after the new policy took effect, UC
began revising its nonacademic admissions criteria. Some campuses replaced criteria
that had explicitly favored African American, Latino, and Native American students
with policies that explicitly favored students from low-SES backgrounds. Other
campuses began offering explicit advantages to individuals who had participated in
UC-sponsored high school outreach programs. UC also began to revise its eligibility
guidelines. In 2001, under a new program called “Eligibility in the Local Context”
(ELC), high school students could become UC-eligible without completing the
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Scholarship Requirement, provided that they were in the top 4 percent of their school’s
graduating class.5 In 2002 UC began a new admissions program called “comprehensive
review,” under which all applicants would be evaluated based on both academic and
nonacademic criteria, with a particular emphasis on the context of the educational
opportunities available to them. In practice, the emphasis on context means that students are compared to others within their high school. If two students from different
schools have equal SAT scores, for example, the one whose score stands out more from
those of his or her classmates will have an edge in the competition for UC admission.6
UC administrators also began negotiating with the College Board to revise the standardized tests used in UC admissions so that they would more accurately reflect the
curriculum to which students had been exposed. As a result of these negotiations, the
content and design of the SAT I test was revised substantially (Atkinson 2001, 2002).
At the time of this writing, UC’s undergraduate admissions policies include elements from each of these eras. From the Master Plan era comes the concept of “UC
eligibility,” which is still meant to distinguish the top one-eighth of California high
school graduates who are deemed at least minimally qualified to receive a UC education. From the era of affirmative action comes the emphasis on targeted high school
outreach programs that identify disadvantaged students and encourage them to
apply. From the post-affirmative action era comes the ELC program and the policy
s
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of comprehensive review.
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5. UC announced the ELC program after the University of 21 2
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for its “10% Plan,” which guaranteesAssn on Augu who graduate in the top 10 percent
admission to students
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of their high school classes. The , arc program
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plans shareine Ser than5a 5
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Aril
No.
ambitious than its Texas counterpart. Unlike the latter, it does not exempt students from meeting the Subject Requirement, nor does it guarantee students admission to the campus of their
choice. The difference between 4 percent and 10 percent is also quite substantial, particularly
given that most of the students in the top 4 percent of their high school class were UC eligible
anyway (see Geiser 1998).
Although policy makers discussed a “12.5% Plan” for California, no such plan was implemented.
In 2001 the UC Regents approved a “Dual Admissions Program,” under which UC campuses
would provide provisional acceptance notices to all students between the top 4 percent and 12.5
percent of the graduating class in particular California high schools, conditional on their completion of the ordinary UC eligibility requirements and a supplemental course of study at a California
community college. This program goes beyond UC eligibility as traditionally defined, mainly by
providing these high school students with the name of a particular campus that they would be
admitted to in the event that they completed the requirements. It would not make it any easier to
get into UC or guarantee admission to one’s campus of choice. It has not yet been implemented
because of a funding shortage (see University of California, Office of the President 2002a).
6. This policy brings UC’s admissions procedures more in line with the admissions algorithms
used by Ivy League institutions. As Paul Attewell points out, the emphasis on class rank within
the applicant’s high school will tend to disadvantage students who test well if they attend “star
high schools,” in which other students also test well (Attewell 2001, 273). By the same token, of
course, it will tend to advantage students who attend high schools where test scores are, on average, low.
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450
400
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250
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150
100
50
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Graduates
Public
All UC
All California
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fig u r e 4.1. California High School Students and UC Admissions, 1995
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Arilin
No.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITY
UC’s eligibility guidelines and admissions criteria generally establish a sequential
process of selection. For most California high school students, the pathway to UC
requires them to do all of the following: take specific UC-required courses; obtain
certain minimum grades in those courses; take standardized tests; obtain test scores
above a set minimum; graduate; apply to one or more UC campuses; and be selected
for admission in competition with the many other applicants who also meet the
minimum eligibility requirements. Each stage of this process weeds out tens of thousands of young people. As Figure 4.1 shows, in 1995 the process gradually whittled
down a population of over 400,000 California eighteen-year-olds until there were
fewer than 40,000 admitted students.
This selection process does not sort students at random. Instead, it tends to favor
particular groups of students, especially those who are affluent and those who are
Anglo or Asian. Researchers who study secondary education in the United States
have documented the inequalities related to race, ethnicity, and SES at every stage in
this process. These inequalities manifest themselves in patterns of course taking, in high
school grades, in standardized test scores, in rates of high school graduation, in the
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propensity to apply to college, and in rates of admission (see, e.g., Baker and Velez
1996; Bowen and Bok 1998; Cabrera and La Nasa 2001; Conley 1999; Davies and
Guppy 1997; Hearn 1991; Hurtado et al. 1997; Kane 1998; Karen 1991, 2002; Lillard
and Gerner 1999; Lucas 2001; Miller 1995; Perna 2000).
Such inequalities manifest themselves, in part, as inequalities of place (Jones and
Kaffuman 1994). Housing, and by extension schools, tend to be segregated by race,
ethnicity, and SES (Arum 2000, 403–406). Some counties, cities, school districts,
and neighborhoods in the United States are rich, while some are poor. Some are
primarily African American, while some are primarily Anglo.7 Unsurprisingly, then,
the practice of educating people in local high schools results in a geography of
unequal opportunity. Many researchers have found inequalities in college access
among high school students that are related to the socioeconomic composition of
the high school student body (see, e.g., Alexander and Eckland 1977; Persell et al.
1992a, 1992b). Others have found inequalities related to the racial and ethnic composition of schools (see, e.g., Perna 2000).
It is difficult to determine how much of this inequality among schools has to
do with processes internal to the schools themselves, and how much results from
the fact that students are not distributed randomly among schools. Two high
schools may send different proportions of their graduates to college simply
s
because their students came into school with vastly differentrport of academic
i levels
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15-5
Arilin
No.
would otherwise, since their parents often attempt to preserve their children’s
advantage in elite college admissions by pressuring schools to ration advanced
placement (AP) classes and similar college-relevant credentials (Attewell 2001, 288–
289). The existence, direction, and magnitude of so-called school effects on the academic success of individual students is a contentious question in social science;
since publication of the “Coleman Report” in 1966, researchers have debated
whether the resources and the sociodemographic characteristics of schools have any
independent effect on learning or chances for success (Coleman et al. 1966).8
7. Levels of racial segregation in California metropolitan areas vary by racial and ethnic group. In
general, they are comparable to levels for U.S. metropolitan areas as a whole, although African
Americans are somewhat less segregated from Anglos in California than in large metropolitan
areas in other states (see Iceland et al. 2002).
8. The most recent rounds of the debate over “school effects” have been reviewed by Richard Arum
(2000), Aage Sørensen and David Morgan (2000), and Thomas DiPrete and Jerry Forristal
(1994). Most education researchers at this point would probably agree that such effects exist,
although their measurement still poses a knotty technical problem because of selection bias: students are selected into particular high schools in part based on the same personal characteristics,
such as parental education, that help determine their academic performance and chances for
success later in life.
126
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In the following sections we describe the inequalities among California high
schools, both public and private, in the access that they provide to UC. The magnitude of the inequalities that we find is surprising, even in light of prior research. Our
data will not permit us to join the debate over whether these inequalities result from
school effects proper, and that is not our goal. We intend merely to raise the question
of how students from different schools fare in the competition for admission to UC.
The answer, we will show, is that they fare differently, and that these differences are
closely associated with the racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic characteristics of the
schools’ student bodies. Regardless of why these inequalities arise, they are relevant for
evaluating the state’s success at serving all of its residents and for assessing the continued viability of the promise embodied in the State of California’s Master Plan.
DATA AND METHODS
We explore high-school-level inequalities in access to UC using institutional data
on California public and private high schools from the 1998–99 school year. These
data come from the California Department of Education, and they describe high
school populations rather than individual students. We also obtained data from the
rts
UC Office of the President (UCOP) on all students from Californiaphigh schools
Air o
orld
Wsemester of 1999. We
who applied and were admitted to any UC campus for gelefall 017
the s
An
,2
Los in sorder to merge them with
aggregated these data at the level of the ssn v.school gu t 21
high
Au
n
sA
the data from the Department rovEducation.ed o
of ider chiv Because the Department of Education
ice P 5571, ar
r
collects only limited datavon 5-5 particularly for private schools, we supplemented
e Se . 1 SES,
Arilin
No
this information with 1990 census data that had been aggregated at the school district level by the National Center for Education Statistics (see Betts and Morell
1998).9
For the purposes of this paper we included data only for high schools reported by
the California Department of Education that were successfully merged with UCOP
data, meaning that they had at least one graduate who applied to UC for the fall of
1999. We excluded high schools that had fewer than ten students in grades 9
through 12. The final sample comprises 796 public schools and 273 private schools.
Together, these schools represent 79.8% of all UC applicants and 86.4% of all students admitted as freshmen for the fall of 1999.
Our analyses rely mostly on simple descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation
coefficients. Our main dependent variable is per capita admissions, or the percentage
of graduates who were admitted to UC. We refer to this variable as the size of the
“UC pipeline” from any given school. We also examine per capita applications to UC.
Because our data refer to the student bodies of entire high schools, rather than
individual high school students, two methodological caveats are in order. First, the
9. For a detailed description of the data set, see the appendix to this essay.
martin, karabel, & jaquez / unequal opportunity
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data do not permit inferences about individual behavior. The fact that comparatively
affluent high schools send a large percentage of their students to UC, for example,
does not mean that it is the most affluent students within these schools who are
likely to be admitted. Second, the data do not permit us to distinguish between the
effect of attending a particular school on the one hand, and the effects of individual
social background on the other. It may be that attending high school with affluent
students increases one’s probability of getting into UC, for example, by increasing
one’s access to educational resources such as AP classes and UC-required courses in
high school. Nonetheless, it is surely true that schools that do well at placing students in elite colleges tend to attract students who would do well anyway. Thus, it
might be that the association between affluence of the school population and per capita admissions arises only because affluent students are likely to win admission to UC,
regardless of whether they attend high school with other affluent students. Our data
are consistent with either hypothesis, and they will not allow us to determine which
is true. This fact does not make our findings less important, but it does mean that
readers should exercise caution in interpreting them.
PATTERNS OF INEQUALITY IN ACCESS TO UC
s
rport
ld Ai
Wor
e
We begin by presenting simple descriptive statistics.s As2we7noted above, we have
ngel
01
os A s 21,
Lgraduate tapply to UC for the fall of 1999.
v.
included only schools that had at leastnone Augu
Ass d on
e
iders
Prov 1, archiv
e
ervic 5-5557
eS
1
A ilin
Public rand Private High Schools
No.
The overall level of per capita admissions appears to be higher in private schools,
as may be seen in the summary statistics presented in Table 4.1. For the average public school, close to 13% of its graduates were admitted to UC; for the average private
school, the figure was nearly 28%, or more than double. This finding echoes the
research of other scholars, who have found that private school students possess a
substantial advantage in university admissions (Falsey and Heyns 1984; Persell et al.
1992a, 1992b). Per capita applications are also more than double at private high
schools than public high schools, suggesting that part of the inequality in per capita
admissions arises because public school students are less likely to apply to UC.10
10. Data on per capita applications from UC-eligible graduates should be read with particular caution. These were derived by dividing all applications from a school by the total number of
graduates who had met the Subject Requirement for eligibility. The numerator of this fraction
includes some applicants who were not actually UC eligible. As a result, the raw figure of
applications per capita can in principle exceed 100%, and it did so at eleven public schools
where more graduates applied to UC than had actually satisfied the Subject Requirement.
These may be schools where ineligible students were encouraged to apply on the theory that
some would be granted admission by exception. For all of these schools we recoded the per
128
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Some private schools have a larger admissions advantage over both public schools
and other private schools. Table 4.2 sorts private schools by their religious affiliation.
Catholic schools resemble all private schools in the mean percentage of their graduates that are admitted to UC (28%). Other Christian schools are much less effective
channels to UC, although they are still slightly better than the public schools; on
average, 16% of their graduates were admitted. A third group, nonsectarian college
preparatory schools, sends a far greater percentage of their graduates to UC: an average of nearly 38%.
Although the nonsectarian schools are a minority (just over 30%) of the private
schools in our database whose religious affiliation we could identify, they constitute
a majority of the schools at the top end of the distribution. The top 50 private feeder
schools to UC make up a small elite that outstrips the top public schools in the percentage of their graduates that are admitted to UC. A majority of them—30 of 50,
or 60%—are nonsectarian. We present summary statistics for this top tier of schools
in Table 4.3.
The first column of Table 4.3 presents summary statistics for the 50 private
schools with the highest rate of per capita admissions, and the second column presents statistics for their 50 public school counterparts. Note that the average percentage of graduates admitted is nearly 63% for the top private schools and over 42% for
ts
the top public schools. This table may even underestimate the university access of
irpor
rld A
Womay be so oriented
students at the very top private schools, where somengeles 017
students
2
sA
Loeven ust 21, applying to UC (see
toward elite private universities that theyssn v. Aug bother
do not
sA
on
Cookson and Persell 1985). Provider rchived
Note, however, that the students at the top private
ice 5571, a
schools do applyilto e Serv a 15-5 of 73%—almost five times the percentage of publicUC at rate
Ar in
No.
school graduates who apply.
The difference between sectors in per capita applications and admissions cannot
be explained by average differences in SES—the district median housing value and
capita applications to equal 100%, on the assumption that all eligible graduates applied. We
also experimented with omitting these schools from the analysis. Neither procedure changed
the substantive findings.
For six private schools, the per capita applications figure—applications as a percentage of all
graduates—also exceeded 100%. The fact that this figure exceeded 100% may indicate error in
the reported number of graduates; the data on private schools available from the California
Department of Education appear to be generally of poorer quality than are the data on public
schools. It is also possible that some of these applicants were not graduates: they were either
students who applied before they completed their senior year, or students who applied a year
or more after graduation. For all six of these schools, we recoded per capita applications to
equal 100%. This recoding did not alter any of our substantive conclusions. We also experimented with excluding these schools from the analysis. This procedure very slightly strengthened the correlations between application rates and SES reported in Table 4.6, but it too did
not alter the substantive conclusions.
martin, karabel, & jaquez / unequal opportunity
129
130
Mean (S.D.)
15.75
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
7.50
0.00%
0.00
0.00
37
140
19.37% (7.34)
114.92
65.00%
54.00%
61.00%
475.99
100.00%
91.21%
99.22%
75.55%
1.00
1.00
5,149
695,890
64.00%
19.41
37.17
0.00%
0.77%
Minimum
0.52 (0.50)
0.44 (0.50)
381 (350)
143,340 (256,330)
18.93% (4.79)
0.00
0.00
10
600
6.70%
30.40% (13.23) 6.50%
30.26% (5.10) 16.10%
44.17 (16.22)
220.75 (91.89)
27.51% (20.87)
36.98% (31.94)
82.46%
87.00%
100.00%
100.00%
rts
0.60 (0.49)
0.28 (0.45)
1,777 (900)
65,630 (170,260)
0.00%
42.16 (13.39)
11.81% (10.59)
26.86% (10.42)
23.24% (7.42)
181.99 (90.78)
30.92% (22.21)
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
1.15%
Mean (S.D.)
34.40%
72.60%
43.10%
105.56
475.99
100.00%
100.00%
Maximum
1.00
1.00
2,101
695,890
p r i vat e hi gh s chool s b
Maximum
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School Factors
Suburban school district
Urban school district
Students enrolled in grades 9–12
Students enrolled in district
Percentage of parentse with graduate education
Percentage of parents with four-year degreef
Percentage of parents with some college, no degree
Percentage of parents with high school
diploma only
Median income for families with children
in district (thousands of dollars)
Socioeconomic Status
Percentage of students receiving subsidized meals
Median housing value in district (thousands
of dollars)
7.17% (10.93)
32.53% (24.65)
12.60% (14.04)
Race and Ethnicity of Students
Percentage of students African American
Percentage of students Latino
Percentage of students Asian
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
Application and Admission to UC, Fall 1999
Percentage of graduates admitted
Percentage of graduates applying
Percentage of graduates UC-eligibled
Percentage of UC-eligible graduates applying
Minimum
p u b l i c hi gh s cho o l s
12.72% (10.30)
15.50% (11.85)
38.54% (18.26)
39.98% (19.92)
Selected Characteristics
c
table 4. 1. Selected Characteristics of California High Schoolsa
0.58 (0.49)
0.33 (0.47)
1,419 (1,002)
85,530 (198,720)
20.74% (5.31)
26.15% (12.94)
31.29% (5.71)
42.69 (14.21)
191.72 (92.55)
16.51% (15.23)
20.99% (14.43)
Mean (S.D.)
al l s chool s
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Percentage of teachers with full credential
Average years of teaching experience
Students per teacher
Percentage of students with limited English
proficiency
Percentage of AP courses (of all courses offered)
Percentage of UC-required courses (of all
courses offered)
Score on Academic Performance Indexg
Percentage National Merit finalists
UC outreach schoolh
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796
263,546
35,643
71.62%
90.02%
966.00
18.71%
1
51.85% (11.95)
0.62%
623.61 (106.76) 378.00
0.44% (1.32)
0.00%
.33 (0.47)
0
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23,470
7,350
14.77%
1.58% (3.96)
0.00% 29.33%
1,070
287,016
42,993
86.39%
0.74% (2.35)
s o u rc e s : California State Department of Education; National Merit Scholarship Corporation; University of California, Office of the President; University of California Outreach Advisory
Board; U.S. Bureau of the Census (see the Appendix for details).
n ot e :
ϭ district level variable.
a
Public high schools include four-year public high schools and K–12 schools, except for alternative and opportunity schools. Private high schools include all private schools with graded secondary students. Public and private schools with fewer than ten graded secondary students are excluded from the analysis, as are schools from which no graduates applied to UC for the fall
of 1999.
b
Some data were not available for private schools.
c
Percentages for students are proportions of all students.
d
“UC-eligible graduates” for the purposes of this table refers to all graduates who fulfilled the Subject Requirement for eligibility.
e
Figures reported for public schools refer to parents of children enrolled in the school; figures reported for private schools and all schools combined refer to 1990 census data on the percentage
of householders twenty-five years of age or older in the school district.
f
Figures for public schools are for a four-year degree only; figures for private schools and all schools combined are for a four-year degree or higher.
g
The Academic Performance Index (API) is computed annually by the state for all public schools. API scores for 1999 were based on student scores on the Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT).
h
1 ϭ school participates in Early Academic Outreach Program; 0 ϭ school does not participate.
i
The total number of students admitted to UC as freshmen for the fall 1999 semester was 49,764. Table 1 accounts for 42,993, or 86.39%. Of the balance, 5,621 (about 11.3%) were from outof-state schools; 164 (about 0.3%) were from California schools excluded from our database because of their size or institutional type; and 986 (about 2%) were from schools that are apparently in California but that we were unable to match to institutional data from the California Department of Education.
N
Total number of graduates
Total number of graduates admitted to UC
Percentage of all UC admissionsi
100.00%
15.00%
0.07%
0.18%
14.38% (12.59)
2.81% (1.98)
100.00%
23.90
51.55
34.38%
3.62
5.75
89.99% (8.32)
14.67 (2.86)
22.91 (3.64)
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37.26
2.38%
Minimum
6.50%
16.60%
7.50%
29.92% (4.89)
19.00% (3.91)
42.03 (14.19)
28.95% (11.81)
19.41
219.23 (85.75)
28.33% (14.34)
Application and Admission
to UC, Fall 1999
Percentage of graduates
admitted
Socioeconomic Status
Median housing value
in district
(thousands of dollars)
Median income for families
with children in district
(thousands of dollars)
Percentage of householders
with four-year degree
Percentage of householders
with some college,
no degree
Percentage of householders
with high school
diploma
Mean (S.D.)
Selected Characteristics
catholic high schools
28.40%
24.61% (9.72)
41.78 (10.67)
196.17 (86.87)
16.16% (15.65)
21.72% (4.90)
32.18% (4.22)
473.19
60.47%
Maximum
12.50%
24.00%
34.40%
40.00%
50.30%
22.38
7.20%
64.09
37.17
0.00%
Minimum
other christian high schools
Mean (S.D.)
rts
43.10%
65.40%
102.23
473.19
68.60%
Maximum
ta ble 4 .2. Selected Characteristics of California Private High Schools, a by Religious Affiliation
0.00%
16.64% (5.04)
28.91% (5.22)
37.34% (15.52)
49.73 (21.49)
6.70%
16.10%
9.90%
29.60
240.81 (101.03) 39.61
37.69% (25.87)
Minimum
nonsectarian high schools
Mean (S.D.)
28.30%
39.20%
72.60%
105.56
475.99
100.00%
Maximum
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Percentage National
Merit finalists
School Factors
Suburban school district
Urban school district
Students enrolled in
grades 9–12
Students enrolled in
district
martin, karabel, & jaquez / unequal opportunity
0.59% (2.15)
101,210 (218,880)
233 (176)
0.63 (0.49)
0.30 (0.46)
60
3,022
8.18%
695,890
2,101
1.00
1.00
577
105
15,167
0.00%
2,050
72
0.00
0.00
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13.95%
695,890
1,240
0.00%
705
1.00
1.00
25
0.00
0.00
1,882
80
4,071
3.42% (6.36)
149,100 (265,560)
215 (161)
0.59 (0.50)
0.41 (0.50)
0.00%
600
17
0.00
0.00
29.33%
695,890
802
1.00
1.00
s o u rc e s : California State Department of Education; National Merit Scholarship Corporation; University of California, Office of the President; U.S. Bureau of the Census
(see the Appendix for details).
n ot e :
ϭ district level variable.
a
Includes private high schools with ten or more graded secondary students and from which at least one graduate applied to UC for fall 1999. Thirteen of the private schools were Jewish, Muslim,
or belonged to another religious denomination, and 15 private schools had no religious affiliation data available from the California Department of Education. These schools were not included
in this table.
N
Total number of graduates
Total number of graduates
admitted to UC
0.84% (1.38)
150,220 (259,000)
648 (402)
0.45 (0.50)
0.52 (0.50)
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School Factors
Suburban school district
Urban school district
Students enrolled in grades 9–12
Students enrolled in district
Percentage of teachers with full credential
Socioeconomic Status
Percentage of students receiving subsidized meals
Median housing value in district (thousands of dollars)
Median family income for families with children in district (thousands of dollars)
Percentage of parentse with graduate education
Percentage of parents with four-year degreef
Percentage of parents with some college, no degree
Percentage of parents with high school diploma only
Race and Ethnicity of Students
Percentage of students African American
Percentage of students Latino
Percentage of students Asian
Application and Admission to UC, Fall 1999
Percentage of graduates admitted
Percentage of graduates applying
Percentage of graduates UC-eligibled
Percentage of UC-eligible graduates applying
Selected Characteristicsa
table 4.3 . Selected Characteristics of UC Feeder Schools
0.45
0.55
364
2,210
35.22%
27.69%
16.85%
256.39
46.03
62.60%
73.20%
Top 50
Private Schoolsb
11.39%
13.92%
37.29%
39.21%
Midrange
Public Schoolsc
7.94%
312.65
62.81
37.84%
36.80%
12.88%
7.38%
1,641
45,050
91.72%
0.58
0.30
1,834
69,780
90.03%
31.51%
179.23%
41.17
10.38%
26.62%
23.92%
19.85%
6.50%
9.96%
29.48%
0.82
7.06%
33.93%
11.83%
42.12%
49.80%
70.34%
71.57%
Top 50
Public Schools
0.56
0.24
1,117
28,490
87.71%
45.74%
107.11%
32.26
4.96%
20.14%
24.45%
25.02%
9.26%
35.69%
6.42%
1.79%
3.28%
24.04%
19.02%
Bottom 50
Public Schools
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15.39
22.21
7.31%
5.73%
65.87%
806.56
3.13%
50
18,096
7,510
15.09%
6.19%
50
4,284
2,658
5.34%
696
235,863
27,942
56.15%
14.72
23.02
14.72%
2.62%
51.52%
613.03
0.28%
50
9,587
191
0.38%
13.34
22.02
16.14%
2.14%
42.11%
551.90
0.04%
s o u rc e s : California State Department of Education; National Merit Scholarship Corporation; University of California, Office of the President; U.S. Bureau of the Census
(see the Appendix for details).
n ot e :
ϭ district level variable.
a
Percentages for students are proportions of all students.
b
Some data were not available for private schools.
c
Mid-range schools include all public schools that were not in the top 50 or the bottom 50. This category therefore includes the vast majority of public schools.
d
“UC-eligible graduates” for the purposes of this table refers to all graduates who fulfilled the Subject Requirement for eligibility.
e
Figures reported for public schools refer to parents of children enrolled in the school; figures reported for private schools refer to 1990 census data on the percentage of
householders twenty-five years of age or older in the school district.
f
Figures for public schools are for a four-year degree only; figures for private schools are for a four-year degree or higher.
g
The Academic Performance Index (API) is computed annually by the state for all public schools. API scores for 1999 were based on student scores on the Stanford Achievement
Test, Ninth Edition (SAT9).
N
Total number of graduates
Total number graduates admitted to UC
Percentage of all UC admissions
Average years of teaching experience
Students per teacher
Percentage of students with limited English proficiency
Percentage AP courses (of all courses offered)
Percentage of UC-required courses (of all courses offered)
Score on Academic Performance Indexg
Percentage National Merit finalists
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district median income are both higher on average for the top public schools. Since
we only have district-level averages for these variables, of course, we cannot exclude
the possibility that individual private school graduates who are admitted to UC have
more parental wealth and income than do private school graduates as a group or
their public school counterparts.
Race, Ethnicity, and SES
What about inequalities among schools within the public sector? The last three
columns of Table 4.3 show evidence of inequalities related to social background,
including race, ethnicity, and SES, among public schools. Regardless of the measure,
the SES of the school population varies with per capita admissions as we read across
the table. The most striking association is between per capita admissions and the
percentage of parents who have some graduate education. The latter variable is more
than seven times greater for the top fifty feeder schools than for the fifty at the bottom. The percentage of Asians also correlates with per capita admissions, whereas
the percentages of African Americans and Latinos vary inversely with per capita
admissions.
The data in Table 4.3 also suggest that educational opportunities vary across
s
rpo t
schools. The availability of a college preparatory curriculumdvaries rdirectly with per
l Ai
Wor
capita admissions. AP classes, for example, are ngelesthan 17 as available in the
more 20 twice
os A
21,
top fifty public feeder schools, wheresthey L Augustalmost 6% of all classes, than in
n v. comprise
s
on
rs A
the bottom fifty, whereProvide arcupved over 2% of all classes. AP classes are not
they make hi just
ice 5571,
Se v 15-5
necessary rfor eUCr eligibility, of course, but they do help in the competition for
A ilin
No.
admission. The availability of UC-required classes also varies somewhat across schools.
In the top public feeder schools, roughly two-thirds of all classes count toward UC’s
Subject Requirement for eligibility. In the schools at the bottom of the range, less
than half of all classes count toward UC requirements. Such curricular inequalities
may have serious consequences for students’ educational advancement. In contrast,
the mean levels of other school resources—such as the number of students per teacher,
or the percentage of teachers with full credentials—do not differ substantially across
groups of schools.
The relationship between the socioeconomic characteristics of schools and the
schools’ per capita admissions rates is not linear. Instead, the top feeder schools have
a distinctively privileged profile, while those at the bottom are relatively similar to
the majority of schools that are in the middle of the pack. Figures 4.2 through 4.4
show per capita admissions for selected independent variables, illustrating the degree
to which access is concentrated in a few privileged schools.
Figure 4.2 shows the inequality in per capita admissions associated with the racial
and ethnic composition of the high school student body for public schools. As the
percentage of African American and Latino students increases, the percentage of
graduates admitted to UC tends to decrease. The relationship appears more or less
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Percentage of Graduates Admitted
25%
20
15
10
5
0
5.3
10.8
16.1
22.6
31.1
39.6
48.5
58.4
73.6
90.2%
Median Percentage of African American and Latino Students, by School Decile
fig u r e 4.2. UC Admissions, by Racial or Ethnic Composition of School, 1999
s ou r c e s : California State Department of Education; University of California, Office of the
President; U.S. Bureau of the Census (see the Appendix for details).
n ot e : For the purposes of this figure, schools are grouped into deciles by their racialrts
composition,
o
from the lowest percentage of underrepresented minority students to thed Airp Each decile is
rl highest.
o
represented by the value for the median school within that decile. W
eles
7
Ang 21, 201
Los
t
n v.
s
ugus
rs As ved on A
e
ovid archi
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571
S
riline No. 1
A
30%
Percentage of Graduates Admitted
25
20
15
10
5
0
$52K
$78K
$113K
$142K
$169K
$188K
$219K
$227K
$273K
$358K
Median Housing Value (thousands of dollars), by School Decile
fig u r e 4.3 . UC Admissions, by School District Housing Values, 1999
s ou r c e s : California State Department of Education; University of California, Office of the
President; U.S. Bureau of the Census (see the Appendix for details).
n ot e : For the purposes of this figure, schools are grouped into deciles by the median 1990 housing
value of the school district,m a r t the, lowest b e l , & j a q u eEach u n e q u arepresented u n the median 137
from i n k a r a to the highest. z / decile is l o p p o r t by i t y
housing value for the district of the median school within that decile.
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60%
Percentage of Graduates Admitted
50
40
30
20
10
0
0–5
6–10
11–15
16–25
26–50
51–100%
Percentage of Parents in Each School with
at Least Some Postgraduate Education
ts
irpor
fig u r e 4.4. UC Admissions, by Parental Education, rld A
Wo 1999
s
g le
s ou rc e s : California State Department of Education;e 1, 2017California, Office of the
s An University of
Lothe Appendix for details).
t2
President; U.S. Bureau of the Census .
sn v (see Augus
on
rs As
vide rchived
ro
ice P 5571, a
rv
e Se . 15-5
Arilin
No
linear, except for the schools in the middle of the distribution. The overall pattern of
inequality reflects UC’s ban on affirmative action, which decreased the admissions
chances of African American and Latino students. Our data come from 1999, the
second year after implementation of the ban in undergraduate admissions.
Although some readers may suppose that eliminating consideration of race and
ethnicity from the admissions process would increase opportunities for low-SES students to attend UC, our data show the continued existence of dramatic socioeconomic inequalities in access. When schools are arranged by SES decile, the top 10%
have a much higher per capita admissions rate than do the rest, regardless of the SES
measure employed. Figure 4.3, which shows the relationship between admission
rates and the median housing value of the district in which a school is located, illustrates the common pattern. The jump in per capita admissions for the schools at the
top is quite dramatic, but, even so, the figure probably understates the true association between wealth and per capita admissions for two reasons. First, our measure of
housing value captures affluence at the level of school districts; it therefore provides
no information about inequalities among schools within any given district, and such
inequalities may also be associated with different rates of admission to UC. Second,
the figure is based on 1990 housing values, which do not reflect California’s housing
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table 4.4. Parental Education of Students Admitted to UC, Fall 1999
All 45- to
64-Year-Olds
in California,
March 1999
Percentage with
High-School Diploma
Percentage with Four-Year
College Degree
Parents of Students
Admitted to UC
as Freshmen
Degree of
Overrepresentation
Among UC Parents
82.9%
89.4%
107.8%
31.4
52.0
165.6
s ou rc e s : University of California, Office of the President (1999); U.S. Bureau of the Census
(2000a).
market in 1999, the year our per capita admissions data were collected. Since 1990
housing prices have risen meteorically in California, especially in urban areas (see
Greenwich and Niedt 2001, 37–39). Although housing prices rose across the board,
the increase was especially dramatic in areas that were already expensive. For this reason our use of 1990 data probably provides a conservative estimate of the true level
of socioeconomic inequality in 1999.
ports
d Air
Socioeconomic inequalities appear most extreme in thescaserlof parental educaWo
e
ngel
2017
tion, as Figure 4.4 shows.11 Indeed, for the few os A ustthat, reported that at least
L schools 21
g
n v.
s
u
50% of their students’ parents hadiders As ivdegrees, the per capita admissions were
graduate ed on A
Prov 1, arch
ice 557
close to 50%. Studentsefrom schools where the parents are well educated tend to do
S rv
-5
riline No. 15university admissions. This association suggests that
A
well in the competition for
individual students whose parents are highly educated are strongly advantaged,
independent of the school context. Table 4.4 illustrates this point by comparing
the parental education levels of all students admitted to UC for the fall of 1999 to
the educational attainment of all Californians aged forty-five to sixty-four in March
1999. The freshman class admitted to UC appears more unrepresentative of the state
at the higher level of educational attainment.
Which of these inequalities in access are greatest? One way to compare these
different dimensions of unequal access is to summarize them with standardized correlation coefficients. We have done this separately for public and private schools.
The results for public schools are presented in the first column of Table 4.5.
These bivariate correlations for public high schools show that the percentage of
graduates admitted to UC is substantially negatively correlated with the percentage of African Americans (Ϫ.06) and Latinos (Ϫ.40) in the student body, and
positively correlated with the percentage of Asians (.44) and Anglos (.16). This
11. The pattern is similar for other SES variables in our database, including the median income of
families with children in the school district and the percentage of students receiving free or
reduced-price lunches.
martin, karabel, & jaquez / unequal opportunity
139
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table 4.5 . Bivariate Correlations between Selected Characteristics of Public High Schools
and Admissions to UC in Fall 1999a
a p p l i ca t i o n a n d a d m i s s i o n s
Selected Characteristics
Race and Ethnicity of Students
African American students (as percentage
of all students)
Latino students (as percentage of all students)
Asian students (as percentage of all students)
Anglo students (as percentage of all students)
Graduates
Admitted b
UC-Eligible
Graduatesc
Graduates
Applying
Applicants
Admitted
Ϫ0.06
Ϫ0.40
0.44
0.16
Ϫ0.05
Ϫ0.36
0.26
0.22
Ϫ0.02
Ϫ0.39
0.45
0.14
Ϫ0.21
Ϫ0.15
0.04
0.20
Socioeconomic Status
Students receiving subsidized meals (as percentage
of all students)
Ϫ0.42
Ϫ0.37
Ϫ0.41
District median housing value
0.55
0.40
0.57
Median income for families with children in district
0.59
0.43
0.58
Parents with graduate education (as percentage of
all parents)
0.82
0.58
0.82
Parents with four-year degree only (as percentage
rts
of all parents)
0.50
0.45
rpo0.49
ld Ai
Parents with some college, no degree (as percentage
Wor
les
A e Ϫ0.18 7 Ϫ0.39
of all parents)
Ϫ0.38ng 21, 201
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
Parents with high school diploma only
rs As ved on A
e
(as percentage of all parents) e Provid archi
Ϫ0.65
Ϫ0.51
Ϫ0.65
,
ervic 5-55571
eS
1
School Factor
Arilin
No.
Suburban school district
0.14
0.06
0.13
Urban school district
Ϫ0.05
Ϫ0.04
Ϫ0.03
Students enrolled in grades 9–12
0.02
Ϫ0.07
0.03
Students enrolled in district
0.00
0.05
0.03
Teachers with full credential (as percentage of
all teachers)
0.17
0.09
0.14
Ϫ0.19
0.02
0.11
0.16
0.18
0.06
Ϫ0.19
0.05
Ϫ0.05
Ϫ0.04
Ϫ0.12
0.14
pattern is broadly characteristic of average differences across groups in academic
performance, although we were surprised to find that the negative correlation for
African Americans is closer to zero than is the correlation for Latinos. As we discuss below, this finding probably reflects at least in part the countervailing influence of UC outreach programs. Many of these programs, which encourage students to take UC-required courses and apply for admission, target low-performing
schools, in which African Americans happen to be concentrated (Le-Nguyen 1999).
The correlation coefficients of per capita admissions with various measures of SES
for public schools are generally larger than are the correlations with race and ethnicity. They range from Ϫ.42 for the percentage of students receiving reduced-price
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table 4.5. (Continued )
a p p l i ca t i o n a n d a d m i s s i o n s
Graduates
Admitted b
School Factor (continued )
Average years of teaching experience
Students per teacher
Students with limited English proficiency
(as percentage of all students)
AP courses (as percentage of all courses offered)
UC-required courses (as percentage of all courses
offered)
Score on Academic Performance Indexd
National Merit finalists
UC outreach school
Application and Admissions
Applicants admitted
Graduates applying
UC-Eligible
Graduatesc
Graduates
Applying
0.16
0.00
0.05
Ϫ0.11
0.15
Ϫ0.01
0.07
0.03
Ϫ0.22
0.51
Ϫ0.27
0.34
Ϫ0.21
0.51
Ϫ0.10
0.05
0.43
0.68
0.63
Ϫ0.14
0.36
0.56
0.35
Ϫ0.16
0.43
0.67
0.60
Ϫ0.13
0.12
0.24
0.12
Ϫ0.08
0.20
0.99
Selected Characteristics
Applicants
Admitted
0.04
0.64
0.10
rts
Airpo
rld
s ou rc e s : California State Department of Education; National Merit Scholarship Corporation; University of
s Wo
gele , 2017
California, Office of the President; University of California Outreach Advisory Board; U.S. Bureau of the Census
An
21
Los
(see the Appendix for details).
gust
n v.
ssschoolsn AuK–12 schools in our database, except for alternative
a
Correlations calculated for all four-year public high ed o and
rs A v
vide rchi
and opportunity schools, with e Pro ten graded secondary students (N ϭ 796).
at least
,a
b
ervicto5-55571
The figures in this iline S refer 1 the correlations between selected characteristics of public high schools and their
rcolumn No.
A
percentage of all graduates admitted to UC. Not all graduates apply to UC. The proportion of graduates admitted
equals the proportion of graduates who apply times the proportion of those applicants who are admitted: thus,
these correlations are affected by inequalities in rates of application, as well as by inequalities in the rates at which
applications are admitted. Columns three and four of this table correlate school characteristics with, respectively,
the rates at which graduates apply and the rates at which applicants are admitted.
c
For the purposes of this table, “UC-eligible graduates” refers to the percentage of all graduates who fulfilled the
Subject Requirement for eligibility.
d
The Academic Performance Index (API) is computed annually by the state for all public schools. API scores for 1999
were based on student scores on the Stanford Achievement Test, Ninth Edition (SAT9).
meals, to .55 for the school district’s median housing value, to .59 for the median
income of families with children in the district, and finally to .82 for the percentage
of students in the school whose parents have some graduate education. The last of
these coefficients is even greater than the correlation of per capita admissions with
average academic performance (as measured by the state’s Academic Performance
Index or the number of National Merit finalists).12 Indeed, a correlation of .82 implies
that we can predict almost 70% of the variance in the percentage of graduates from
12. The Academic Index is computed annually by the state for all public schools based on student
scores on a standardized test.
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California public high schools who are admitted to UC using only the distribution
of parents’ educational attainment.
The correlation of per capita admissions with curricular variables is also relatively
strong. The availability of AP courses correlates at .51 with per capita admissions.
The availability of UC-required courses correlates at .43 with per capita admissions. Unsurprisingly, schools where the curriculum is tailored to college preparation tend to
be among the best pathways to UC.
Finally, the correlations of per capita admissions with administrative variables—
such as the percentage of teachers who are fully credentialed or the average number of
students per teacher—are generally lower than the correlations with race, ethnicity,
and SES characteristics of the school population. These low correlations are consistent
with the findings of the Coleman Report—and a great deal of subsequent educational
research—that students’ family background is more important to their future success
than are the resources provided by the schools they attend (Sørensen and Morgan
2000). This does not imply, of course, that school resources are unimportant.13
How do these inequalities arise? The data shown in the second, third, and fourth
columns of Table 4.5 allow us to draw some conclusions about the processes that produce these correlations. These columns break the college selection process into stages:
first, graduates must take the classes required for UC eligibility; then, they must
s
apply; and finally, applicants must be selected by the universityrport
admissions officers.
ld Ai
Wor
les 017
Thus, by examining the association between sociodemographic characteristics of the
2
Ange
Los course 21,
student body on the one hand, andsn v. ofAugust taking and application on the
s rateson
s A ed
other, we can discover whichiderthese istages give rise to the greatest inequalities.
rov of
ch v
ice P 5571, ar
erv 5-5
The correlation coefficients reported in these columns suggest important conclueS
1
Arilin
No.
sions about the impact of race and ethnicity. For Latinos, Asians, and Anglos, this
impact is greatest in the earlier stages of the admissions process. That is, the racial
and ethnic composition of the student body is associated with the percentage of
graduates who are eligible for UC and with the percentage of graduates who apply
to UC, but once students have taken the required classes and have applied, the racial
and ethnic composition of the school has relatively little impact on admissions.
Thus, the crucial process producing the association between race and ethnicity and
per capita admissions is not the decision of admissions officers. The processes
involved are, at the institutional level, the articulation of UC’s eligibility guidelines
with the courses offered by particular schools and, at the individual level, decisions
about patterns of course taking and application to UC.
Schools that are predominantly African American are the exception to this pattern.
These schools tend to have rates of course taking and UC application that are similar
to the average, but rates of admission that are substantially lower. A likely interpreta13. As Richard Arum notes, the general consensus among educational researchers has recently
shifted to the view that school resources do matter for individual academic outcomes (2000,
404). A recent study of California’s schools by Julian Betts and co-authors concludes that the
unequal resources of schools affect individual academic achievement (Betts et al. 2000).
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tion of this finding is that UC’s public high school outreach programs are successfully
changing the course taking and application behavior of students in these schools.
Although UC’s outreach programs are not explicitly designed for specific racial and
ethnic groups, they do target underperforming schools in areas of concentrated socioeconomic disadvantage (Le-Nguyen 1999). These are precisely the schools in which
African American students tend to be most concentrated (Betts et al. 2000, 86–87).
The association between SES and the size of the UC pipeline is also driven by patterns of course taking and application. Relatively little SES inequality is added by the
selection of applicants. Nevertheless, it appears that SES inequalities are cumulative.
Students from low SES schools are on average less likely to take required classes, less
likely to apply, and less likely to be admitted once they apply. Our data do not show
whether this is actually true of the low-SES students within these schools, but other
research has demonstrated that it is true of low-SES students in general (see, e.g.,
Cabrera and La Nasa 2001).
We find a similar pattern of correlations for private schools, as may be seen in
Table 4.6. Here the correlations are considerably weaker, probably because the data,
taken from the 1990 census and aggregated to the district level, are of poorer quality.
We still find that parental education is the measure of SES that has the strongest correlation with per capita admissions. These “parental education” data do not actually
s
rport
refer to parents, but to all adult householders in the district over twenty-five years of
ld Ai
Wor
le
age, and they lump together adults who have some graduateseducation with all other
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
college graduates. Still, the percentage of graduates admitted to UC has a correlation
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A
e
i
of .30 with the percentage of householders in the top education category. The correovid
e Pr 71, arch
5
ervic SES5measures: .25 for the median housing value in the
lations are weakernfor other15-5
eS
Arili
No.
district and .17 for the median income of families with children.
In summary, we find that high schools with high SES rankings have higher rates of
admission to UC. Our findings also show that schools with heavily African American
and Latino student populations channel fewer students into UC. Moreover, these inequalities are cumulative: with a multiple regression analysis of the 674 public high
schools that have no missing data, we can predict 80% of the variance in per capita
admissions by including only variables that describe the racial and ethnic composition
of the student body, dummy variables for urban and suburban location, total enrollment in the school and the district, and the SES measures we have described.14
What this means is that UC is disproportionately accessible to students from
affluent schools in highly educated communities with largely Anglo and Asian student bodies. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate this point more intuitively for readers who
have some familiarity with the social geography of Los Angeles or the San Francisco
Bay Area. These tables list the top twenty-five public and private feeder schools in
14. We do not report the detailed results of this regression analysis here. Because the SES variables
are so highly intercorrelated with one another and with race and ethnicity, and because the
data are so highly aggregated, individual regression coefficients are uninformative about the
relative magnitudes and causal dynamics of these inequalities.
martin, karabel, & jaquez / unequal opportunity
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table 4.6 . Bivariate Correlations between Selected Characteristics of Private
High Schools and Admissions to UC in Fall 1999a
a p p l i cat i o n a n d a d m i s s i o n s
Selected Characteristicsb
Graduates
Admitted c
Graduates
Applying
Applicants
Admitted
Socioeconomic Status
Median housing value in district
Median income of families with children
Householders with 4-year college degree or higher
Householders with some college, no degree
Householders with high school diploma only
0.25
0.17
0.30
Ϫ0.23
Ϫ0.30
0.11
0.00
0.10
Ϫ0.08
Ϫ0.10
Ϫ0.02
0.11
0.13
0.03
Ϫ0.10
School Factors
Suburban school district
Urban school district
Students enrolled in grades 9–12
Students enrolled in district
National Merit finalists
Ϫ0.06
0.09
0.15
0.07
0.54
Ϫ0.08
0.10
Ϫ0.05
0.03
0.11
0.04
Ϫ0.04
0.13
Ϫ0.09
0.15
Application and Admissions
Applicants admitted
Graduates applying
orts
0.33
rp0.05
ld Ai
Wor
0.15
les
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
sn v
ugus
s As
o A
sources: California State Departmentrof Education; n
vide rchived National Merit Scholarship Corporation;
Pro
University of California, Office of1, aPresident; U.S. Bureau of the Census (see the Appendix for
7 the
rvice
e Se . 15-555
details). rilin
A
No
a
Correlations calculated for all private schools in our database with at least ten graded secondary
students (N ϭ 273).
All school characteristics in this table except “Students enrolled in grades 9–12,” “National Merit
finalists,” “Applicants admitted,” and “Graduates applying,” refer to district-level measures.
c
The figures in this column represent the correlations of the selected school characteristics with the
percentage of graduates admitted to UC. Not all graduates apply to UC. A negative correlation
coefficient may therefore mean that the school characteristic in question is negatively associated
with the percentage of graduates who apply, or with the percentage of such applicants who are
admitted, or with both. Columns two and three correlate school characteristics with, respectively,
the percentage of graduates applying and the percentage of applicants admitted.
b
California, as measured by the percentage of their graduates who were admitted to
UC as undergraduates for the fall of 1999. We have excluded schools with fewer than
thirty applicants. From Piedmont, to Palo Alto, to Palos Verdes Estates, the list reads
like a roster of affluent and relatively Anglo communities.
Table 4.9 presents the other end of the distribution: the twenty-five lowest feeder
schools among California’s biggest public high schools. We have excluded schools with
fewer than 100 seniors from this table in order to draw attention to the large schools that
had no or almost no graduates admitted to UC for 1999. Washington High in Fresno
and Centennial High in Compton top the list, with zero and one admission, respectively.
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table 4.7. Top Twenty-five Public UC Feeder Schools, Fall 1999a
Number Percentage
Graduates Graduates
Admitted Admitted
All
to UC
Graduates to UC
171
118
141
81
198
295
451
391
627
199
303
460
230
126
171
252
202
322
101
152
222
110
504
386
799
341
280
290
524
478
513
684
180
306
181
166
School
82.5% Whitney (Gretchen) High
68.6
California Academy of
Math & Science
63.6
Piedmont High
58.0
San Marino High
55.9
Davis Senior High
51.7
Lynbrook High
51.4
Lowell High
50.8
Campolindo High
50.2
Palo Alto High
48.3
Monta Vista High
47.8
Saratoga High
District
ABC Unified
Long Beach Unified
Piedmont City Unified
San Marino Unified
Davis Joint Unified
Fremont Union High
San Francisco Unified
Acalanes Union High
Palo Alto Unified
Fremont Union High
Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint
Union High
240
47.6
University High
Irvine Unified
181
46.9
La Jolla Senior High
San Diego Cityrports
Unified
Ai
370
46.3
Arcadia High
Arcadia orld
W Unified
eles
17
157
46.0
Gunn (Henry M.) High AngPalo 1, 20Unified
2 Alto
Los
gust
n v.
127
45.4
Miramonte High d on Au Acalanes Union High
Ass
iders ch e
Prov 1, Highiv
129
44.5 ice Acalanes ar
Acalanes Union High
7
rv
e Se . 15-555 San Jose High
233 rilin 44.5o Mission
Fremont Unified
A
N
210
43.9
Sunny Hills High
Fullerton Joint Union High
225
43.9
Torrey Pines High
San Dieguito Union High
292
42.7
Palos Verdes Peninsula
Palos Verdes Peninsula
High
Unified
73
40.6
Albany High
Albany City Unified
123
40.2
La Canada High
La Canada Unified
71
39.2
Tamalpais High
Tamalpais Union High
65
39.2
Los Angeles Ctr. for
Los Angeles Unified
Enriched Studies
City
Cerritos
Carson
Piedmont
San Marino
Davis
San Jose
San Francisco
Moraga
Palo Alto
Cupertino
Saratoga
Irvine
La Jolla
Arcadia
Palo Alto
Orinda
Lafayette
Fremont
Fullerton
San Diego
Rolling Hills
Estates
Albany
La Canada
Mill Valley
Los Angeles
s ou rc e s : University of California, Office of the President (1995, 1999).
a
Table excludes schools with fewer than thirty applicants to UC for the fall 1999 semester.
A FUTURE OF UNEQUAL ACCESS?
We have documented that there are substantial inequalities among high schools in
the access they provide to UC, and that these inequalities are related to race, ethnicity,
and SES. The existence of such inequalities is not surprising, but their magnitude—
martin, karabel, & jaquez / unequal opportunity
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table 4. 8. Top Twenty-five Private UC Feeder Schools, Fall 1999a
Number Percentage
Graduates Graduates
Admitted Admitted
All
to UC
Graduates to UC
92
75
80
96
57
262
50
82
54
86
76
91
34
58
79
63
67
78
42
190
36
59
38
59
52
62
23
39
78
52
369
127
271
64
240
82
174
41
89
73
77
56
45
47
60
53
255
34
30
144
85.9%
84.0
83.8
81.3
73.7
72.5
72.0
72.0
70.4
68.6
68.4
68.1
67.6
67.2
School
District
Lick-Wilmerding High
College Preparatory
Head-Royce
San Francisco University High
Urban School Of San Francisco
Harvard-Westlake
Windward
Marin Academy
Westridge
Marymount Highb
Marlborough
Flintridge Preparatory
Viewpoint
Chadwick
San Francisco Unified
Oakland Unified
Oakland Unified
San Francisco Unified
San Francisco Unified
Los Angeles Unified
Los Angeles Unified
San Rafael City High
Pasadena Unified
Los Angeles Unified
Los Angeles Unified
La Canada Unified
Las Virgenes Unified
Palos Verdes Peninsula
Unified irports
A
orld
66.7
The Branson School
Tamalpais Union
les W 017
Ange 2High
,2
Los
st 1
n v.
b
ss
Augu San Francisco Unified
65.0
St. Ignatius College Preparatory
rs A ved on
vide
i
64.6
Menlo ro 71, arch
Sequoia Union High
ice P 55
rv
5
e Se Loyola-High School of L.A.b
64.2
Los Angeles Unified
. 15
rilin
A
No
64.1
Crystal Springs Uplands
San Mateo Union
High
62.9
Polytechnic
Pasadena Unified
61.6
Oakwood Secondary
Los Angeles Unified
61.0
La Jolla Country Day
San Diego City
Unified
56.7
Cate
Carpinteria Unified
56.6
Castilleja
Palo Alto Unified
56.5
Bishop O’Dowd Highb
Oakland Unified
so u rce s : University of California, Office of the President (1995, 1999).
a
Table excludes schools with fewer than 30 applicants to UC for the fall 1999 semester.
b
Catholic school.
146
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
City
San Francisco
Oakland
Oakland
San Francisco
San Francisco
North Hollywood
Los Angeles
San Rafael
Pasadena
Los Angeles
Los Angeles
La Canada
Calabasas
Palos Verdes
Estates
Ross
San Francisco
Atherton
Los Angeles
Hillsborough
Pasadena
North Hollywood
La Jolla
Carpinteria
Palo Alto
Oakland
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table 4.9. Bottom Twenty-five Public UC Feeder Schools, Fall 1999a
Number Percentage
Graduates Graduates
Admitted Admitted
All
to UC
Graduates to UC
255
227
196
186
140
209
201
311
296
388
249
184
235
397
111
109
327
103
100
250
139
366
133
388
215
0
1
1
1
1
2
2
4
4
6
4
3
School
District
0.0%
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.7
1.0
1.0
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.6
Washington High
Washington Union High
Centennial High
Compton Unified
Mesa Verde High
San Juan Unified
Escondido Charter High
Escondido Union High
Rosamond High
Southern Kern Unified
West Valley High
Anderson Union High
Lindhurst High
Marysville Joint Unified
Silverado High
Victor Valley Union High
Alisal High
Salinas Union High
Arvin High
Kern Union High
Sierra High
Manteca Unified
Duncan (Erma)
Fresno Unified
Polytechnical High
4
1.7
Compton High
Compton Unified
7
1.8
Ridgeview High
Kern Union High orts
rp
ld Ai
2
1.8
School of the Arts (High) Sanles Wor Unified
Francisco
Ange 21, 2017
2
1.8
Willows High
Los Willows Unified
t
n v.
s
ugus
6
1.8
Dominguez High ed on A Compton Unified
rs As v
e
hi
rovid
2
1.9 rvice P 571, arcHigh
Mojave Senior
Mojave Unified
e
S
e2.0 . 15-55 Lake High
2 Arilin
Lower
Konocti Unified
No
5
2.0
Anderson High
Anderson Union High
3
2.2
Kern Valley High
Kern Union High
8
2.2
North High
Kern Union High
3
2.3
Imperial High
Imperial Unified
9
2.3
Foothill High
Kern Union High
5
2.3
Azusa High
Azusa Unified
City
Fresno
Compton
Citrus Heights
Escondido
Rosamond
Cottonwood
Olivehurst
Victorville
Salinas
Arvin
Manteca
Fresno
Compton
Bakersfield
San Francisco
Willows
Compton
Mojave
Lower Lake
Anderson
Lake Isabella
Bakersfield
Imperial
Bakersfield
Azusa
s ou rc e s : University of California, Office of the President (1995, 1999).
a
Table excludes schools with fewer than 100 seniors.
including rates of admission that are over five times greater in high-SES schools than
in low-SES schools—is a cause for serious concern.
The administrators and the Regents of UC are aware that such inequalities exist.
UC’s admissions policies have changed since our data were collected, and some of
these changes are probably best understood as attempts to counteract the very inequalities we describe. One such innovation is the ELC program, which grants UC
eligibility to any California high school student in the top 4 percent of his or her
martin, karabel, & jaquez / unequal opportunity
147
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class. The program is designed specifically to reduce inequalities across high schools
in the percentage of students who are UC eligible. It has received a great deal of
attention since the Bush administration, in a brief before the U.S. Supreme Court,
described a similar plan operated by the University of Texas as an alternative to affirmative action (Olson et al. 2003, 17). In practice, however, the new eligibility standard alone does little to reduce inequalities of race, ethnicity, or SES in rates of UC
eligibility or admission, for two reasons. First, the vast majority of students who are
eligible for UC under the ELC program would have been eligible in any case (Geiser
1998; University of California, Office of the President 2002b, 4). Second, although
the ELC program may slightly increase the size of the UC pipeline for some schools
that are at the low end of the distribution, it will do little to reduce the vast inequalities between schools at the middle and the top. Moreover, as we have shown, the
greatest inequalities arise between a small group of elite schools and the rest. Thus,
the ELC program will do little to remedy the total inequality among the state’s secondary schools in the access that they provide to UC.15
Another recent innovation that may have some effect is UC’s policy of comprehensive review. This policy was designed in part to allow UC’s undergraduate campuses to evaluate applicants in comparison to their peers in the same high school,
which helps equalize rates of admission across schools (Board of Admissions 2002,
4). Comprehensive review has apparently had some success Airpincreasing rates of
in orts
ld
Wor
admission from poorly performing schools (Boardeof Admissions 2002, 17). The
s
ngel 1, 017
weight UC gives such contextual evaluation,Ahowever, 2 still too little to greatly
Los
t 2 is
s
v.
ssn
Augu
reduce the effect of racial,oviders A hivsocioeconomic inequalities on admission.
ethnic, and ed on
rc
Pr
The future of ervicepolicies1, a
both -5557 is uncertain. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s June
eS
15
Arilin
No.
2003 rulings on affirmative action at the University of Michigan, it appeared that
conservative groups were preparing to challenge both the ELC program and comprehensive review in court.16 The Center for Individual Rights, the law firm that represented the plaintiffs in the Michigan case, has asserted that programs like the ELC
are unconstitutional because they are designed to achieve racially diverse freshman
classes (Levey 2002). Another law firm, the Pacific Legal Foundation, has suggested
that comprehensive review may also be unconstitutional, and it has begun actively
soliciting plaintiffs to sue UC (see Stirling 2002). At this writing, the implications of
the Court’s rulings for these potential legal challenges are still unclear.
15. One qualification to this conclusion is in order. We have pointed out that the new eligibility
standard itself has had and will have little effect. By advertising the ELC program in high
schools throughout California, however, the UC may have encouraged some students to apply
who otherwise would not have done so. In particular, the results of a simulation conducted by
UC staff suggest that applications from Latinos, and to a lesser degree African Americans,
might have increased more slowly from 2000 to 2001 if the university had not undertaken this
marketing effort (University of California, Office of the President 2002b, 14). This effort nevertheless had relatively little impact on the overall level of inequality among schools. Many of the
new applications came from schools with historically high rates of admission to UC (2002b, 3).
16. Gratz v. Bollinger 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003); and Grutter v. Bollinger 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
148
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The threat to even such modest egalitarian measures is troubling. At present, relatively few students from schools with a low SES and schools where underrepresented
racial and ethnic groups predominate find their way into UC. For those students who
are admitted, a UC education is among the most reliable pathways to a good job. Preserving and expanding this pathway is crucial to the public mission of the university.
If even this limited pathway is closed, increasing numbers of Californians may find
themselves trapped at the bottom of the state’s two-tier economy.
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archives/state/srh/srh95.txt.
Velez, William. 1985. “Finishing College: The Effects of College Type.” Sociology of Education
58: 191–200.
APPENDIX
Our data come primarily from UCOP and the California Department of Education; they are
supplemented with 1990 census data from the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) that are aggregated at the district level. UCOP provided data on all individuals who
applied to UC for the fall 1999 semester. This information includes the five-digit Admissions
Testing Program (ATP) code for the high school and another code indicating whether the applicant was from a California public or private high school, a community college, or an outof-state institution. We aggregated these data by ATP code. The Department of Education
provided aggregate data on four-year high schools and K–12 schools from the 1998–99 school
year. These data are indexed by a fourteen-digit CDS code identifying the county, district,
and school. Five digits of the CDS code identify the district. This portion of the code is also
used to identify districts in the NCES data.
We matched CDS codes to ATP codes using a file provided by UCOP. Where UCOP data
martin, karabel, & jaquez / unequal opportunity
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provided insufficient information to make a match, CDS codes were assigned to records on
the basis of a name and city-level location match for public schools, and a name and countylevel location match for private schools. Following this operation, and after correcting some
errors in the identification of schools as public or private in the UCOP data, we were able to
match the state and federal government data to 96.0% of California public high schools and
79.0% of California private high schools listed in the UCOP data. Some proportion of the
unmatched schools presumably reflects irregular reporting to the Department of Education
by some private schools.
For the purposes of this paper, we excluded all schools with fewer than ten students enrolled in grades 9 through 12. We also excluded all schools listed by the California Department of Education that we were unable to match to UCOP data. This exclusion may bias the
overall per capita admissions upward, since excluded schools are likely to be those from which
no one has applied to UC recently enough to be included in UCOP’s ATP-CDS code matching file. The excluded schools include 83 public schools and 628 private schools.
The excluded public schools are relatively small (the median enrollment in grades 9
through 12 is 247 for the excluded public schools, compared to 1,796 for the included public
schools) and rural (63% were located in rural areas, compared to 12% of the included public
schools). Their SES is comparatively low, and they have slightly fewer African American and
Latino students on average. Thus, we suspect that their exclusion may bias our findings about
the association between admissions and high-SES schools downward (toward zero) and may
bias our findings about the association between admissions and race slightly upward.
Most of the private schools that were excluded are very small religious orts (the median
schools
Airp
enrollment in grades 9 through 12 is 25). We suspect thatWorld of the excluded private
many
eles 2017
schools are not currently operating. Of the others,Ang are ,cooperatives formed by homeLos somet 21
v.
us
schooling parents, and some are analogous to on Aug
Assn the “alternative” and “opportunity” schools in
iders chi
valternativesved standard academic curricula in traditional setthe public sector, which offer 1, ar
to
Pro
7
rvice
e Se . 15-555
tings. We supplemented the combined database with data on high school participation in
Arilin
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UC’s Early Academic Outreach Program that we obtained from the University of California
Outreach Advisory Board (1999) and data on the number of National Merit finalists obtained
from the National Merit Scholarship Corporation (1999).
The State of California Labor, 2003, Vol. 3, pp. 119–154, ISSN 1531-9037, electronic ISSN 1541-9045. © 2003 by
the Institute for Labor and Employment. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to: Rights
and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center Street, Suite 303, Berkeley, CA
94704-1223.
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Innovations in State and Local
Labor Legislation
neutrality laws and labor peace
agreements in california
JOHN LOGAN
The National Labor Rel ations Act (NLRA) has been widely
criticized in recent decades for its failure to protect employees against the actions of
increasingly aggressive anti-union employers. The counter-organizing campaigns
conducted by employers are now more expensive and more sophisticated than at
any time during the postwar period, and the professional anti-union industry is
worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually.1 Yet conservatives in Congress have
blocked every effort to enact federal legislation that would limit employers’ “union
prevention” efforts.
ts
The resolute and cohesive opposition of national employer ld Airpor
organizations and
Wor
trade associations has presented the principal obstacle eles 2017reform for three
to NLRA
Ang
1
Los two of ,
decades. Employer opposition was instrumental inugust 2 the largest labor law
n v.
s
rs As ved on A
reform campaigns in the pastProvide archi the defeat of the Labor Law Reform
quarter-century:
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Bill in the late 1970sServ . 15-5557
e and labor’s failed effort during the early 1990s to outlaw the
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employer practice of hiring “permanent replacements” for striking workers. In the
late 1970s and early 1990s union density was significantly higher than it is today, and
Democrats controlled both the White House and the Congress, yet businesses’ congressional allies successfully blocked these pro-labor bills by filibustering in the Senate. In response, organized labor began to explore strategies to advance its interests at
the state and local levels.
In the 1990s unions and their political allies have attempted to protect workers’
rights through state and local legislation. These imaginative initiatives have opened a
second front in labor’s longstanding conflict with business over labor law reform.
Business has continued to prevail at the federal level, but labor has enjoyed some
successes, particularly in California, at the state and local levels. Paradoxically, these
successes have provoked calls for strong federal intervention from business groups
that are normally hostile to any employment regulation emanating from Washington. These fervent advocates of states’ rights and economic liberalism have found
1. In 1990 one scholar estimated that employers were making over $200 million dollars per year in
direct payments to consultants, but that the true cost of anti-union campaigns rose to over $1
billion when one took into account management and supervisor time off to fight unions and
consultant-led opposition that continued after union election victories (Lawler 1990).
logan / innovations in state and local labor legislation
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themselves in the unaccustomed role of championing aggressive federal regulation of
labor-management relations.
Among the most important of these new state and local labor laws are neutrality
laws, which prohibit employers that receive state funds from using that money to
promote or deter unionization. The first such law with effective enforcement mechanisms was California’s Assembly Bill (AB) 1889, passed in September 2000; it
became effective in January 2001.2 Although designed to protect the integrity of state
funds, AB 1889 was expected also to benefit unions, as, in practice, employers regularly spend millions of dollars of state money opposing unionization, but rarely use
state money to encourage it.
Prior to the passage of AB 1889, California also took the lead in establishing several other innovative labor laws. In October 2001 Governor Gray Davis signed a
“card check recognition” law, AB 1281, which became effective in January 2002. This
amendment to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA)—landmark legislation
passed in 1968 that grants California’s public employees the right to organize—
requires employers to recognize unions for public employees when a majority sign
authorization cards.3 California has also passed legislation that expands collective
bargaining coverage to include home health care workers and a “responsible contractor” law, which promotes better wages and working conditions by requiring all busis
provide
nesses seeking city contracts, leases, or financial assistance tod Airport information on
l
Wor
s
past employment practices. In addition, the California legislature passed a number
gele 2017
s An t
Losomeuof 21,
of other pro-worker bills in recent ssn v. Aug s which were signed into law by
months,
sA
on
the governor, while othersowerer stillhwaiting his approval at this writing. These bills
vide rc ived
r
ice P 5571, a
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include theli“California5Living Wage Act” (AB 1093), which requires employers proe Se . 1 -5
Ari n
No
viding goods and services with state contracts over $100,000 and 100 or more
employees to pay a “living wage” of $10 per hour with health benefits or $12 per
hour without benefits; AB 226 (signed into law), which prohibits employers from
purchasing “dead peasant insurance”—that is, life insurance naming the employer as
the beneficiary, often without workers’ knowledge or consent—for their employees;
AB 274, an “unlawful employment practices” bill, which creates a rebuttable presumption that an employee terminated within ninety days for exercising rights
under state law is a victim of unlawful retaliation; SB 796, a labor code penalties bill,
2. AB 1889 was not an entirely novel law. It was modeled, in part, on more limited statutes in
New York, Illinois, and Massachusetts. The New York law prohibits the use of state money to train
supervisors in anti-union techniques; the Illinois law prohibits the use of state money to
influence unionization by employers in the public or education sectors; the Massachusetts law
prohibits government contractors from using state money to pay the salaries of individuals
whose primary purpose is to persuade employees to support or oppose unionization. None of
these laws, however, included effective enforcement mechanisms.
3. The law created a mandatory collective bargaining system for local and county employees and
for those in special districts. Similar provisions for state employees were provided with the passage of the Dill Act. School district employees are covered by the Educational Employee Relations Act.
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which allows employees to sue in a private action to recover penalties for labor code
violations that would normally be paid to the state (employees would keep 25% of
the penalty); and AB 311, which eliminates the existing one-week waiting period for
unemployment insurance for locked-out workers. At the city and county level, similar
efforts have yielded “labor peace” ordinances, an innovation pioneered by the city of
San Francisco and imitated elsewhere. Such ordinances, which are intended to minimize labor disruptions, generally require that employers receiving assistance from
the city or county sign a “labor peace” agreement with any union that requests it.
All these new initiatives have been met with vigorous opposition from business,
which has done everything in its power to defeat the laws in the political arena or,
failing that, to overturn them in the courts. The Washington-based Labor Policy
Association (LPA), which has long played a major role in opposing labor law reform
at the federal level, has now taken the lead in opposing state and local legislation
that guarantees neutrality and labor peace.4 The NLRA itself contains no explicit
provision preempting state and local labor laws, but these laws are potentially vulnerable to the broad doctrine, created by the federal courts between the late 1950s
and early 1970s, that upholds federal supremacy in questions of labor-management
law. Although the consolidation of this “preemption” doctrine has presented a major
obstacle to legislative innovation in labor relations at the state and local levels during
s
the past few decades, the courts have ruled that state action is notld Airport by the
preempted
r
Woa regulator. This soNLRA if the state is acting as a market participant rather eles as 017
than
Ang 2 2
Los hassan 1,
called proprietary exemption acknowledges sn v.a stateugu t exclusive legal interest in
that
As
nA
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how its funds are spent.5 Several vof eCalifornia’s o
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challenges, and their outcomes -will clarify the precise limits of federal preemption.
iline
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No.
AB 1889: THE NATION’S FIRST EFFECTIVE
STATE NEUTRALITY LAW
In September 2000 the California state legislature enacted AB 1889, whose purpose
was to “prohibit the use of state funds and facilities to assist, promote, or deter
union organizing.”6 In arguing for this bill, unions and their allies maintained that
4. The Labor Policy Association was recently renamed; it is now the HR Policy Association.
5. A detailed discussion of the preemption doctrine is beyond the scope of this paper and has, in
any case, been covered in dozens of law review articles. For critiques of a broad preemption
doctrine in labor relations, see Gottesman 1990; Silverstein 1991; and Estlund 2002. For
defenses of a broad preemption doctrine, see Cox 1972; and Gregory 1986. For a recent discussion of preemption issues relating to state neutrality and labor peace, see Hartley 2003.
6. AB 1889 is often referred to as the Cedillo bill. It (and its predecessor) was sponsored by Gil
Cedillo (D-Los Angeles), a former officer with SEIU Local 600 in Los Angeles. The bill was
authored by Scott Kronland and Stephen Berzon of the labor law firm Altshuler, Berzon, Nussbaum, Rubin and Demain.
logan / innovations in state and local labor legislation
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the suppression of organizing campaigns had “grown into a multi-million dollar
business” in recent years and that employers had spent tens of millions of dollars of
state funds on a wide variety of anti-union activities, such as hiring management
consultants, training supervisors to oppose unionization, and writing and distributing anti-union literature. While recognizing that state neutrality would not solve
entirely the problem of aggressive anti-union campaigns, advocates hoped that it
would at least “put an end to taxpayer financing of these campaigns.” The use of
state funds for anti-union activities, unions argued, not only represented an indefensible waste of scarce public resources but also effectively used “workers’ own tax dollars against them.”7 Thus, the law would ensure that the power and resources of the
state would no longer be used to “deprive employees of their right to choose or not
to choose a union.”8
Unions anticipated that the neutrality bill would affect employers in a wide range
of industries—including transportation, telecommunications, technology, and
manufacturing—that received money from a variety of different state agencies. The
California Employment Training Panel, for example, distributes grants to employers
to provide employees with vocational training. The use of that money for anti-union
purposes, unions argued, was “nothing less than the theft of state money.”9 Its principal target, however, was the health care industry, especially employers that received
s
state funds in the form of Medi-Cal reimbursements.10 Indeed,ort
irp several employer
rld A
Wothe national campaign by
ensive”
groups attacked the bill as simply the “latest offngeles in 017
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,2
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st
the Service Employees Internationalsn v. (SEIU) 21 organize an “already debilis Union Augu to
A
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id rs ch neutrality bill repeatedly cited the example of
tated profession.”11 Advocateseof the ived o
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No
7. Allen Davenport (director of government relations, SEIU Local 250), letter to Darrell Steinberg (chair, Assembly Labor and Employment Committee, California State Assembly), 7
April 2000, copy obtained from the California Labor Federation (hereafter abbreviated CLF).
8. Tom Rankin (president, California Labor Federation), letter to Senator John Burton (president
pro tempore, California State Senate), 21 August 2000, CLF.
9. Jonathan Hiatt and Scott A. Kronland (AFL-CIO), letter to Arthur F. Rosenfeld (general
counsel, NLRB), 10 January 2003, copy obtained from the National Labor Relations Board
(hereafter abbreviated NLRB).
10. The nursing home sector, for example, is heavily dependent on Medi-Cal funds: most skilled
nursing home facilities receive about two-thirds of their operating budgets from Medi-Cal
reimbursements. Only about 10 percent of the home health care industry is organized statewide, and SEIU has identified it as one of its highest organizing priorities in recent years. The
union is currently attempting to create an agreement with the major nursing home chains. It is
asking the chains to remain neutral during organizing campaigns in return for union assistance
in pursuing increased funding from the state legislature. Other health care facilities, such as
intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded, often receive close to 100 percent of their
operating budgets from Medi-Cal.
11. Charles H Roadman (president and CEO, American Health Care Association), letter to
Arthur F. Rosenfeld (general counsel, NLRB), 1 March 2002, NLRB; Jack M. Stewart (president, California Manufacturers and Technology Association), letter to Denise F. Meiners (Special Litigation Branch, NLRB), 3 July 2002, NLRB.
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Catholic Healthcare West’s two-year campaign against SEIU Locals 250 and 399 in
the late 1990s. The hospital chain is a major recipient of state tax dollars, receiving
over $400 million in Medi-Cal reimbursements in 1998 alone. While fighting
unionization at Mercy Healthcare in Sacramento and the St. Francis Medical Center
in Los Angeles, CHW spent millions of federal and state health care dollars on antiunion consultants.12
AB 1889 was not the first attempt to enact a state neutrality law in California: the
California Labor Federation had promoted such legislation for over a decade. In
1999 the state legislature passed a neutrality bill (Assembly Bill 442), but the governor vetoed it.13 In response, supporters made several changes to the bill: they removed
its detailed record keeping requirements, limited its application to the lifetime of
state contracts and to companies with contracts in excess of $50,000, introduced
limits on the action by potential plaintiffs in civil lawsuits, and inserted wording
that state funds could not be used either to promote or to deter unionization.
Claiming that the new bill was “virtually identical” to its 1999 counterpart,
employers dismissed these changes as insignificant. In particular, they disparaged the
idea that the bill was now neutral because it stated that public money could not be
used to encourage or to discourage unionization. As a “practical matter,” one employer
representative maintained, “the purported distinction is without a difference as
s
employers normally do not encourage their employees to unionize”irport
(Berman and
ld A
14
Wor did not prohibit
l s 01
McCoy 2002). Other employer groups pointed outnthatethe law7
2
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Los to st 21, check recognition or
v.
companies that received state funds from nagreeingugu card
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ers A which
granting organizers access to theoworkplace,ived o were identified as the “most powr vid
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e Se can take
Arilin
No.
the measure was “aimed more at curbing employer opposition to unionization than
their support for it” (Associated Builders and Contractors and Labor Policy Association 2003).
The revised version of the bill, AB 1889, prohibited private and public employers
from using state funds to “assist, promote, or deter” union organizing by their employees. The bill identified private employers as recipients of state grants, any employer
receiving a state contract for more than $50,000, and any employer receiving more
12. The hospital system, which is headquartered in San Francisco, caters to large numbers of lowincome patients who are covered by Medi-Cal. According to the CHW’s own financial records,
it paid the Malibu-based Burke Group over $2.6 million in 1998. The campaign against SEIU
also involved the Missouri-based consultants Management Science Associates.
13. Gray Davis, “AB 442: Veto Message” (1999). The governor’s veto message stated that the legislation’s record keeping requirements had the potential to “impose an unreasonable burden” on
businesses and significantly increase employers’ litigation costs “by providing countless opportunities for disgruntled employees to file civil actions merely in an effort to harass employers.”
14. The AFL-CIO claimed that the assumption that employers never pressure their employees to
join unions was “an incorrect assumption,” and it cited several cases in which this somewhat
unusual event had occurred. Jonathan Hiatt and Craig Becker (AFL-CIO), letter to Arthur F.
Rosenfeld (general counsel, NLRB), 28 June 2002, NLRB.
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than $15,000 during any calendar year. Private contractors could not be reimbursed
for such costs, and public employers who knowingly spend state funds in such a way
were liable for the amount of those funds. AB 1889 contained two further prohibitions: employers conducting business on state property under state contracts could
not use that property to hold meetings related to unionization; and contractors
could not assist, promote, or deter union organizing by employees who were performing work on a state contract. AB 1889 required employers to maintain financial
records sufficient to demonstrate that they have not used state funds for prohibited
purposes and, upon request, to provide these records to the state attorney general.
The law contained two enforcement mechanisms. First, the attorney general
could file a lawsuit against an employer to obtain injunctive relief, damages, and
penalties. Second, any taxpayer could file a lawsuit to enforce the statute, upon providing the attorney general with sixty days’ notice (Kronland, 2000).
In support of AB 1889, unions pointed out that several federal statutes already
prohibit federal funds from being used to influence employees’ decisions on unionization. The Job Training Partnership Act, the Workforce Investment Act, the
National Community Service Act, and the Head Start Programs Act all state that
public funds cannot be used to “assist, promote, or deter union organizing.”15 Just as
it is important to maintain the integrity of federal tax funds, they argued, it is essential to protect state tax dollars. Unions noted that the purposerportAB 1889 was to
of s
ld Ai
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advance the state’s legitimate interest in avoiding eles
entanglements in labor conflicts:
2017
Ang
Los to st 21, unionization, the bill “levrather than unfairly limiting employers’ .ability gu resist
nv
Au
Ass
eled the playing field” and viders chived on state would “stay out of labor-manageensured that the
Pro 1, ar
e
ment disputes” Servic 5-55Labor Federation 2000).
(California 57
riline No. 1
As its A
supporters pointed out, AB 1889 was not, strictly speaking, “neutrality” legislation. It did not require that employers remain entirely neutral during organizing
campaigns. Employers were simply prohibited from using public money to oppose
or promote unionization; they were not restricted from using their own funds to
oppose organizing campaigns. If the state allowed employers to use public money
to oppose union campaigns, supporters of AB 1889 argued, it was effectively taking
sides in private labor disputes. The neutrality required by AB 1889 was state neutrality, not employer neutrality. Opponents of the bill were not convinced.
Employer Opposition to AB 1889
Opposition to labor law reform has been unusually determined and cohesive, and
employers have fought even minor reforms affecting their ability to resist unioniza15. In particular, supporters of ab 1889 used Head Start as an example of a federal law with similar
restrictions. In November 1997 the Administration for Children and Families issued an Information Memorandum stating, “Funds appropriated to carry out this subchapter shall not be
used to assist, promote or deter union organizing” (U.S Department of Health and Human
Services 1997).
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tion. When the Clinton Department of Labor expanded the financial reporting
requirements for management consultants, for example, several influential employer
groups made reversal of that policy their top priority. Indeed, one of the first major
actions of the Bush administration was to rescind these rules.16 The shift in labor’s
focus to state and local legislation has not been lost on its opponents. According to
the LPA, the explanation behind recent state and local policy innovations was “quite
obvious” to any observer of labor-management relations.17
It started with the doomed effort to enact President Carter’s sweeping labor law reform
proposal in the late 1970s, and culminated in the failure of a Democratic Congress to
enact a ban on permanent striker replacements in the 1990s. . . . Labor’s solution? Look
to venues where labor’s political strength can bring such victories. (Yager 2003)
California is among the states where organized labor enjoys considerable political
influence.18 Employer groups have vigorously resisted efforts to enact progressive
labor legislation at the state and local levels in California and elsewhere. Employer
opposition to AB 1889 involved extensive political lobbying prior to and legal challenges after its enactment. The political debate on the bill was highly polarized, as
employer groups continually sought not to modify, but to kill the legislation
entirely. This was a “no compromise” issue for the business community, and nothing
s
rport
short of the defeat of AB 1889, in either the state legislature, the governor’s office, or
ld Ai
Wor
les
the courts, would satisfy them.
Ange 21 2017
Losexamining, in some detail because
v.
Employers’ arguments against AB 1889 are worth August
ssn on
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vidmajor hived
employer opposition has been rthe , arc obstacle to labor law reform and because
Po 1
7
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e have 15-5 used
the same arguments Se o.been 55 against every subsequent state neutrality bill.
Arilin
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Employer objections to AB 1889 fell into several categories. Most employer organizations claimed that the bill infringed upon their constitutional right to free speech, a
right that was also explicitly protected by Section 8(c) of the NLRA.19 The real
16. On the Labor Reform Bill, see Townley 1986; on consultant financial reporting, see Logan 2002.
17. For more on striker replacement, see Logan, forthcoming.
18. After two years of anti-union initiatives from a Republican-controlled legislature, Democrats
regained control of the California Assembly in 1996 with critical assistance from organized
labor; see Daily Labor Report 1996. The political environment in at least four states—New
Mexico, Maine, Illinois, and Maryland—became broadly favorable to the enactment of prounion legislation following the November 2002 elections, but lawmakers have attempted to
pass neutrality legislation only in Illinois, where Democrats control the house, senate and governor’s mansion for the first time in more than two decades. The Illinois state neutrality bill
passed the senate but died in the house on the last day of the legislative session in June 2003.
19. Contrary to employers’ contention that it protects their “free speech rights,” Section 8(c) of the
NLRA simply states that the board cannot use noncoercive employer speech as evidence of an
unfair labor practice. In response to employers’ free speech arguments, supporters of the bill
stated that it did not prevent employers from exercising their First Amendment rights; it
merely said that the state would not pay them to do so and that the decision not to subsidize a
fundamental right was not the same as an attempt to infringe upon that right.
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intention of the bill, they argued, was to eliminate altogether employer opposition
during union organizing campaigns. The California Chamber of Commerce argued
that the bill involved “clear violation of federal labor policy and unconstitutional
suppression” of employers’ free speech rights.20
Several employer groups claimed that AB 1889 would have a deleterious impact
on business performance, especially through the imposition of its onerous accounting provisions. For example, the Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC) warned
of its “devastating impact” on the construction industry, “which is often reliant on
state funding and is often the target of union organizing.”21 ABC argued that AB
1889 would impose a “mammoth accounting nightmare” on small businesses and
complained that, when enforced by government officials sympathetic to “top-down”
organizing, prohibited expenses could include “membership dues paid to business
associations” such as ABC. Employers that could not afford to pay prevailing union
wage rates, it concluded, would “either go out of business or move from the state’s
hostile environment.”22 The California School Bus Contractors Association attacked
the bill for imposing an “accounting nightmare” on employers that “choose to
remain free from collective bargaining.” The true intent of the bill, it complained,
was to enhance unionization where an employer had “chosen to work non union.”23
(Like several other employer groups, the School Bus Contractors appeared not to
s
rport
realize that the purpose of federal labor law is to protectoemployees’ choice of barld Ai
W r
es
gaining representatives, not employers’ “choice” Angel 1, union free). Other employer
to remain 2017
Los
t2
v.
ug s
groups claimed that the legislation sn onsend u
rs As would A investors the message that “Calivide rchived
o
fornia is a hostile renvironment”aand would “severely damage” the state’s business
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24 line S
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Some employer groups opposed the very notion that the state had a right to control funds transferred to employers in the form of state contracts. The Roofing Contractors Association announced that it was “fundamentally opposed to the concept
that the state has any say in what a contractor does with monies” received from statefunded contracts.25 The American Electronics Association also used the “whose
20. Julianne Broyles (director, Insurance and Employee Relations, California Chamber of Commerce), letter to Gil Cedillo (California State Assembly), 5 April 2000, NLRB.
21. Maurice Baskin (Venable, LLP, counsel for amicus curiae ABC), letter to Margery Lieber (assistant general counsel for special litigation, NLRB), 28 June 2002, NLRB.
22. Employers’ Group, “Sample Letter to Governor Davis,” 16 November 2000, NLRB.
23. Robert C. Cline (legislative advocate, California School Bus Contractors Association), letter to
Gil Cedillo (California State Assembly), 5 April 2000, NLRB.
24. Russell J. Hammer (president and CEO, Sacramento Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce),
letter to Carole Migden (California State Assembly), 8 May 2000, NLRB; Parke D. Terry (California Landscape Contractors), letter to Gil Cedillo (California State Assembly), 27 March
2000, NLRB.
25. Doug Hoffner (director of public affairs, Roofing Contractors Association of California), letter
to Gil Cedillo (California State Assembly), 17 April 2000, NLRB.
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money is it, anyway” argument, claiming that the by same logic, the state could forbid its employees from using their paychecks to “gamble or purchase birth control.”26
Employer groups also refuted the notion that AB 1889 would protect the integrity
of state funds. Rather than serving the public interest, they contended, the true
intent of the law was to increase the number of unionized employees in the state by
mandating employer neutrality. With the declining employee interest in collective
bargaining, one management representative argued, unions were resorting to enlisting
the support of state governments to “do their work” through legislation (Atkinson et
al. 2002). In response to the claim that AB 1889 would stop the misappropriation of
public money, the National Right to Work Committee stated that, by undermining
employers’ ability to resist unionization, it would “rob” the taxpayers’ “pocket books”
by forcing state contractors to pay “monopoly union wages.”27
Other employers worried that pro-union state officials would use the law to expose
the extent of their private spending on union suppression. As the California-based
Employers’ Group cautioned, “Compliance [with AB 1889] does not guarantee that
expenditures to avoid unionization will remain secret” (Pepe and North 2002).
A few employer groups were less vociferous in their criticism, reluctant to leave the
impression that they supported the misappropriation of state funds or opposed the
right to organize. The California Water Agencies called the bill a “well-intentioned
ports
effort to protect taxpayer dollars,” but criticized its “guilty unlessld Air innocent”
proven
Wor
es
approach to the misappropriation of state money.28 ngel 1, 2017 Motion Picture
A Likewise, the
Los
t2
s
v.
Association of America “appreciated rs Assn on AuguAB 1889 but cautioned that
the intentions” of
vide rchived
Pro consequence of sending film projects outside of
the law could have the “unintended 1, a
7
rvice
29
e Se . 15-555
California.” Arilin
No
Finally, employer groups argued that the impact of the law would clearly extend
beyond firms’ use of state money in at least two respects. First, they claimed that the
onerous record-keeping requirements of the law created “significant disincentives”
for firms to use their own money to oppose unionization. If firms chose to use private money to oppose unionization, they would be required to keep two sets of
accounts, and, as a result, might fall victim to union complaints and lawsuits. If, on
the other hand, employers remained silent when confronted with an organizing
campaign, they would be able to rest peacefully. Thus, employers argued, the bill
26. Chris Shultz (California government affairs manager, American Electronics Association), letter
to Darrell Steinberg (chair, Assembly Labor and Employment Committee, California State
Assembly), 4 April 2000, NLRB.
27. Reed Larson (president, National Right to Work Committee), letter to Gil Cedillo (California
Assembly), 17 April 2000, NLRB.
28. Kimberly Dellinger (legislative advocate, California Water Agencies), letter to Hilda Solis (chair,
Senate Industrial Relations Committee, California State Assembly), 22 June 2000, NLRB.
29. Melissa Patack (Motion Picture Association of America, California Group), letter to Gil
Cedillo (California State Assembly), 4 April 2000, NLRB.
logan / innovations in state and local labor legislation
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limited their speech both directly, by restricting their use of state money, and indirectly, by imposing burdensome accounting requirements on firms that use their
own money to resist unionization. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce concluded that
the law’s allegedly complex accounting requirements were nothing more than a
“devious burden designed to force employers into neutrality” (U.S. Chamber of
Commerce 2003). Second, employers claimed that the law would allow unions to
organize contractors while they were working on state projects, thus becoming the
employees’ exclusive bargaining agent for all future projects, which might not involve
state money. The law would, therefore, profoundly alter the balance of power in
labor-management relations “on an ongoing basis” (Associated Builders and Contractors and Labor Policy Association 2003).
Employers’ efforts to defeat AB 1889 failed. In September 2000 AB 1889 passed
the legislature on a strict party line vote. Influenced by the fact that the original bill
had been revised, Governor Davis signed AB 1889 into law. Employer groups were
not especially discouraged by this political defeat, for they recognized that the real
struggle over AB 1889 would take place in the courts. After the bill was signed, a coalition of employer groups announced their attention to challenge it. In late December 2000 they mounted an eleventh-hour effort to stop its enforcement, but the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California ruled that there was “insuffiports
cient evidence” to sustain their contention that the lawowasAir
ld unconstitutional and
W r
es
ng
preempted by federal law. The court foundAtheelemployers’ lawsuit “premature”
2017
Los
t 21,
gemployer had suffered actual harm
n v.a single us
because it failed to provide evidence s
As that on Au
ed
iders
Prov 1, archiv
as a result of the statute.
e
ervic 5-5557
S
After Ariline Nocourt declined their petition, management representatives conthe district . 1
ceded that they might “have to wait until an employer gets sued under the law”
before filing another legal challenge.30 They tried again sixteen months after the law
took effect. In April 2002 the National Chamber Litigation Center—the public policy legal arm of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—filed suit, seeking to enjoin
enforcement of AB 1889 on behalf of the U.S. and California Chambers of Commerce, five other employer associations, and seven individual businesses. The lawsuit
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that AB 1889 was unconstitutional
and preempted by the NLRA, the Labor Management Reporting Disclosure Act,
and the Medicare Act. The AFL-CIO and California Labor Federation intervened as
defendants.31
The plaintiffs attempted to enlist the support of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), the government agency charged with enforcing the NLRA; the NLRB
30. Brent North, quoted in Robertson 2001. North, a Newport Beach attorney, filed the suit on
behalf of the California Chamber of Commerce, the California Manufacturers and Technology
Group, the Employers Group, and the California Healthcare Association.
31. Several other employer groups and management law firms filed amicus briefs in support of this
challenge.
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has the authority to challenge state laws on grounds of federal preemption. The plaintiffs charged that AB 1889 was preempted by federal law, calling it a “pervasive regulatory scheme” that had been “written by unions [and] agreed to by a pro-union
Legislature and Governor.” They stated that the law “clearly favors union organizing
efforts by trying to mandate employer neutrality via state law.”32 In early 2002 several
employer organizations wrote to Arthur Rosenfeld, the general counsel of the
NLRB, requesting that he “treat this matter as the crisis that it has become” and seek
a Nash-Finch injunction, which would halt enforcement of the law, or file an amicus
curiae (friend of the court) brief supporting the employers’ court challenge.33 Noting
that pro-union lawmakers had introduced broadly similar bills in several other state
legislatures, the ABC appealed to the NLRB to discourage other states from “enacting such unlawful legislation.”34 Verizon Wireless argued that if the board were to
intervene against California’s “blatant usurpation of federal authority,” it would prevent the need for it to intervene against dozens of similar laws in subsequent months
and years.35
In May 2002 Rosenfeld requested that California Attorney General Bill Lockyer
explain why federal labor law did not preempt AB 1889 and asked business and labor
organizations for comments on employers’ request for NLRB intervention (Labor
Policy Association 2002). Lockyer and the AFL-CIO responded, stating that it
ports
would be inappropriate for the board to intervene in supportWothe Air
of rld employers’ legal
es
challenge. The NLRB does not generally become Angel 1, in 17
involved 20 litigation between
Los
t2
s
v.
third parties, the AFL-CIO pointed rout, sn the Augu challenge involved several
s As and on court
vide rchived
issues other than that of ice Pro preemption.36 After accepting submissions from
NLRA 71, a
rv
e Se . 15-555
No
Arilin
32. Peggy Goldstein (acting president and CEO, California Association of Health Facilities), letter to
Arthur F. Rosenfeld (general counsel, NLRB), 2 July 2002, NLRB; Harold P. Coxson (Ogletree,
Deakins, Nash, Smoak, and Stewart, P.C.), letter to Arthur F. Rosenfeld, 28 June 2002, NLRB.
33. Jack M. Steward (president, California Manufacturers and Technology Association), letter to
Denise F. Meiners (Special Litigation Branch, NLRB), 3 July 2002, NLRB. Nash-Finch
injunctions spring from NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971), the Supreme Court
decision that first recognized the NLRB’s ability to halt state action that infringes on its jurisdiction. Calling the NLRB the “sole protector of the ‘national interest’” in labor-management
relations, the court stated that the labor board possesses an “implied authority” to “enjoin state
action where its federal power preempts the field.” The Court reasserted the labor board’s
power to prevent enforcement of state laws in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S.
731, 738 (1983). The NLRB rarely exercises this power. however. Since 1971 the labor board has
sought Nash-Finch injunctions on only seven occasions; all were extreme cases where, the
board argued, there existed no alternative means of vindicating federal interests.
34. Baskin to Lieber, 28 June 2002.
35. William J. Emanuel (Jones, Day, Reavis, and Pogue, LLP, counsel for Verizon Wireless), letter to
Margery E. Lieber, assistant general counsel for special litigation, NLRB), 27 June 2002, NLRB.
36. Suzanne M. Ambrose (deputy attorney general, State of California), letter to Denise F. Meiners
(special litigation branch, NLRB), 27 June 2002, NLRB; Hiatt and Becker to Rosenfeld, 28
June 2002.
logan / innovations in state and local labor legislation
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business groups, labor organizations, and the state, the NLRB took no immediate
action against AB 1889.37
In September 2002 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
struck down large parts of the statute, ruling that federal labor law preempted it.
The court invalidated those sections that prohibited money obtained from state
grants or (more significantly) through participation in state programs from being
used to promote or deter unionization. It did not rule on the law’s applicability to
public employers or state contractors. The court dismissed the attorney general’s
argument that AB 1889 represented a valid exercise in the use of state money, ruling
that the law was a “traditional legislative enactment, not a proprietary act.” And
while the court recognized that several federal statutes contained provisions similar
to those found in AB 1889, it stated that these federal restrictions on the use of
money for anti-union activities supported the view that Congress had intended that
such matters be regulated at the federal level. Judge Gary Taylor also noted that AB
1889 would “prevent the free debate” of issues related to unionization that Congress
had intended to protect: “AB 1889 is preempted because it regulates employer speech
about union organizing under specified circumstances, even though Congress
intended free debate.”38 The court declared the law invalid on the grounds of NLRA
preemption; the ruling did not address the question of AB 1889’s relationship to the
s
r
First Amendment, which had constituted part of the case against port law. The ruling
ld Ai the
Wor than the NLRA—particalso did not address the bill’s relationship to federal gelesother17
laws
0
An
21, 2
Los
ularly the Medicare and Medicaid Acts—which weresalso cited in the plaintiff’s brief.
gu t
n v.
ss
Au
on
ers A
Predictably, employer rgroups archived the court’s Lockyer decision, while the
ovid welcomed
ice P 5571,
39
rv
AFL-CIO ilcriticized .its5-5
e Se
1 “plainly erroneous” ruling. The U.S. Chamber of ComAr in
No
merce celebrated the outcome as a “major victory for employer’s rights” and
announced that it would continue to fight against AB 1889 if the state took the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals. Stephan Bokat, general counsel of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, stated that the decision had ensured the continuation of a “free
and open debate on the relative merits of unionization” (U.S. Chamber of Com37. Employer groups also sought to enlist the support of the U.S. Department of Labor, on the
grounds that the 1959 Labor-Management Relations and Disclosure Act, which the Labor
Department enforces, preempts 1889. Under AB 1889’s “evisceration” of the LMRDA, they
claimed, employers are “deprived of their federally protected rights to engage in non-coercive
persuader activities.” The Labor Department declined to take action against the law. See
Stephen P. Pepe (O’Melveny & Myers, LLP), letter to Elaine L. Chao (U.S. secretary of labor)
and Arthur F. Rosenfeld (general counsel, NLRB), 7 December 2001, NLRB; and Eugene Scalia,
letter to Stephen P. Pepe, 25 January 2002, NLRB.
38. The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et al. vs. Bill Lockyer, et al., United States District Court,
Central District of California, Southern Division, 16 September 2002. Employer groups chose
the location of the ruling, Orange County, and most observers consider Judge Taylor a conservative judge. Taylor later denied a state motion to stay the judgment pending its appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court.
39. Hiatt and Kronland to Rosenfeld, 10 January 2003.
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merce 2002). One management law firm believed that the decision had established
beyond any doubt that employer free speech rights “trump” state neutrality laws and
that, as a result, employers facing legal proceedings under AB 1889 or those fearful of
such action could “take comfort” from the outcome (Atkinson et al. 2002). Noting
that the ruling had struck down the provision on employers that participate in state
programs, one health care representative called the ruling a “clear victory” for hundreds of long-term care facilities that receive Medi-Cal reimbursements (Hooper et
al. 2002). Employer groups also thought it likely that the ruling would halt the rush
in other states to enact neutrality bills. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce hoped that
the decision would discourage pro-union lawmakers and warned that other states
that were considering legislation designed to “prevent employers from engaging their
workers in an open debate” could expect the business community to “remain united
against that effort” (Daily Labor Report 2002a).
Following the district court’s decision, the attorney general temporarily suspended
enforcement of the entire law, pending an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court.40
Employer representatives recognized that the district court’s decision was not the
end of the matter. One employer law firm doubted that the ruling would “mark the
last work” on the state’s efforts to “muzzle” California employers (Brown 2002).
Another warned that, regardless of how “overreaching and blatantly unjust” AB 1889
s
might appear to employers, the threat of enforcement might notld Airpoover, for in
yet be rt
Wor
the past the Ninth Circuit Court had proved “less thanles 017 to employer
sympathetic
Ange 21, 2
41
Los
t
.
interests” (Atkinson et al. 2002).
sn v n Augus
rs As
In late May 2003, shortly beforedthe circuit d o
vi e rchive court’s deadline for amicus briefs, the
Pro 1, a
vice
NLRB voted 3–2li(alongrstrict -5557
e Se . 15party-appointed lines) to support the challenge to AB
Ari n
No
1889. The board rarely files amicus briefs in cases that do not directly involve one of
its own decisions. A few days after meeting with labor and business representatives,
the NLRB, which has a pro-management majority and general counsel for the first
time since 1993, authorized General Counsel Rosenfeld to file a brief arguing that
the NLRA preempts AB 1889.
The general counsel’s brief argues that, unlike the state of California, “Congress
generally favors robust debate of union representation issues as a means of enhancing the opportunity for employees to make a free and informed choice” (National
Labor Relations Board 2003). The majority on the board apparently accepts the con40. The attorney general could have continued to enforce those sections of AB 1889 not overturned
by the district court. The law contains a “severability clause,” which limits the scope of a ruling:
if the court holds invalid any portion of the law, “that invalidity shall not affect any other section.” When the district court struck down the law’s applicability to recipients of Medi-Care
reimbursements, however, continued enforcement of the law was rendered pointless.
41. The ninth circuit is one of the few remaining circuit courts with a Democratic majority, historically a significant factor in circuit court decisions relating to labor policy. One study of
NLRB success rates in the federal courts between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s found
wide variations between the different circuit courts (Brudney 2002).
logan / innovations in state and local labor legislation
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tention, expressed by employer groups, that laws such as AB 1889 represent a devious
effort to “de facto rewrite” the NLRA by undermining employers’ free speech rights
on a state-by-state basis. The brief characterizes the California law—which, it says, is
presented in the “guise” of protecting state funds—as “one state’s legislative
response” to the growing perception among pro-union circles that the NLRA no
longer adequately protects employees’ right to organize. Insisting that “partisan
employer speech” during organizing campaigns fosters “informed employee choice,”
the brief argues that the real intent of AB 1889 was to use the state’s considerable spending power to stifle such speech, thereby imposing its views of how employers ought to
conduct themselves when confronted with union organizing campaigns.
AFL-CIO President John Sweeney attacked the NLRB’s intervention, calling it an
“outrageous” decision and stating that it represents a “sharp departure from the
Board’s primary mission of protecting workers’ rights.” The California Labor Federation expressed “surprise.”42 Labor representatives stated that the board’s brief conflicts with two recent labor rulings on preemption and employer speech issued by
the D.C. circuit court, arguing that the “only consistency” between the court decisions and the board’s brief was the “anti-union position” (Daily Labor Report 2003c).
In contrast, Jackson-Lewis (the law firm representing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the California Association of Health Facilities) announced that its clients
s
rp against organized
were “extremely pleased” that the board had decided to interveneort
ld Ai
Wor efforts” (Jackson-Lewis
les
labor’s attempt to “jump start” its “struggling norganizing17
A ge 2 20
Los“extolled 1, virtues” of robust debate
2002). The LPA welcomed the brief, n v. August the
s which
n
s As
and delivered a “stinging vider rchivedto organized labor’s contention that any
repudiation” o
ro
ice P 5571, a
v
employer ispeech rinherently interferes with employee free choice (Labor Policy
e Se . 15-5
Ar lin
No
Association 2003a). Even if the circuit court rejects the board’s arguments, its decision to intervene against the California law will undoubtedly make it more difficult
for state officials and organized labor to argue that the NLRA does not preempt AB
1889.43
The circuit court is considering the state’s appeal on an expedited schedule, but as
of June 2003 it had not yet scheduled oral arguments or assigned a panel of three
judges—a crucial consideration in such cases. If the circuit court overrules the district court’s decision, the statute may enjoy an additional few months or years of
42. The AFL-CIO had argued that, if the board were to intervene, it should do so only to urge the
ninth circuit to reverse the “erroneous decision” of the district court. “Statement by AFL-CIO
President John Sweeney on NLRB Supporting Chamber of Commerce’s Lawsuit Against California Law Prohibiting Public Money to Influence Employees on Union Issue,” 4 June 2003;
Jonathan Hiatt (general counsel, AFL-CIO), letter to Arthur F. Rosenfeld (general counsel,
NLRB), 8 May 2003, NLRB.
43. Not only was the board split on whether to intervene against AB 1889 but it also left the general counsel to “formulate and express the arguments to be made against the California law.”
Thus, the NLRB’s brief to the circuit court arguably represents the opinion of none of the five
board members.
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enforcement. Employer groups would appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme
Court, however, hoping that the upper court would settle the issue, once and for all,
in their favor and “on a national scale” (Atkinson et al. 2002).44
AB 1889 in Operation
California’s state neutrality law took effect on 1 January 2001; the district court
overturned it on 16 September 2002. What was the impact of this controversial piece
of legislation during the twenty months of its operation? Prior to the law’s enactment, employer groups had claimed that AB 1889 would have a potentially devastating impact on California businesses. This prediction failed to materialize. Unions
filed only twenty-four requests for investigation with the state attorney general’s
office between January 2001 and December 2002—about one complaint per month
(five of the complaints were received after the district court invalidated the law) (see
Table 5.1). Three unions—SEIU, the California Nurses Association (CNA), and the
Teamsters—submitted twenty-one of the twenty-four requests. The SEIU was by far
the most active union, filing thirteen. As expected, the majority of complaints
involved private nursing homes and long-term care facilities or public and private
hospitals (most of which receive state money in the form of Medi-Cal rts
po reimbursed Air
W impact in the health
ments), indicating that the law has the potential for significant orl
les
Ange 21, 2017
care sector.
Los
st
v.
ssn on ugu
rs Aemployers A misappropriating state funds
The twenty-four complaints ovide
accused hived
of
Pr
arc
for a variety of prohibitedice -55571,
erv activities: hiring consultants and law firms to direct antieS
15
Arilin
No.
union campaigns; running anti-union orientation and training sessions for supervisors; paying supervisors and managers to conduct group and individual captive
meetings; paying employees to attend these anti-union meetings; creating and distributing anti-union literature; and, in a few cases, mounting elaborate public campaigns against unionization. Unions believed in particular that many employers
were using state funds to pay supervisors and employees for running and attending
“captive audience” meetings (i.e., mandatory anti-union meetings at the workplace
during working time).
Most of the complaints alleged that the employer was a recipient of state money, had
engaged in prohibited activities, and had failed to maintain accounts sufficient to demonstrate compliance. In several cases unions claimed that state funds represented the
employer’s predominant or exclusive source of income, thus making it likely that the
employer had misappropriated public money. Prominent management consultants
44. If the ninth circuit overturns the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court will almost
certainly hear employers’ appeal. If, on the other hand, the ninth circuit rules in
employers’ favor, it is extremely doubtful that the Supreme Court would agree to review
its decision.
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table 5 .1 . Union Requests for Investigations of AB 1889 Violations, 2001–2002
Union
Employer
Location
Date of
Complaint
ULP
Allegation
SEIU Local 399
Fountain View (nursing
homes)
Los Angeles
03-22-01
No
SEIU Local 399
A.B. Crispino and Company,
Inc.
Santa Monica
03-22-01
No
SEIU Local 399
Summit Care California
(nursing homes)
Torrance
03-22-01
No
SEIU Local 399
MEK Long Beach LLC
(nursing homes)
Long Beach
06-08-01
No
IBT Local 85
M.V. Transportation, Inc.
(paratransit services)
San Francisco
12-03-01
Yes
IBT Local 78
M.V. Transportation, Inc.
(paratransit services)
San Leandro
02-06-02
No
CNA
Palomar Pomerado Health
System (public hospital)
Escondido
and Poway
03-28-02
Yes
MMB Violationa
IUOE Stationary
Engineers Local 39
Golden Sierra Job Training
Agency (public employees)
Loomis
04-12-02
No
Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc.
Irvine
04-25-02
Yes
SEIU Local 1292
Siskiyou Training and
Employment Program, Inc.
Various
05-01-02
Yes
SEIU Local 250
Ensign Group, Inc.
(nursing homes)
Sonoma
05-16-02
No
IUOE Local 3
Rancho Murieta Community
Services District
Alameda
05-17-02
No
MMB Violationa
SEIU Locals 399 and
121RN
Valley Health System
(acute care hospitals)
Moreno
Valley
05-23-02
No
SEIU Local 790
Laidlaw Transit Services
San Joaquin
06-16-02
Yes
SEIU Local 399 and
the Nurse Alliance
Tenet Queen of Angels
Hollywood Presbyterian
Medical Center (acute care
hospital)
Los Angeles
06-17-02
Yes
CNA
Antelope Valley Health Care
District (public hospital)
Antelope
Valley
07-12-02
Yes
MMB Violationa
SEIU Nurse Alliance
Providence St. Joseph Medical
Center (acute care hospital)
Burbank
09-10-02
Yes
SEIU Locals 399
and 434B
CNA
IBT Local 952
172
s
rportMMB Violationa
ld Ai
Wor
Mid-Wilshire Health Care
Los Angeles les 04-22-02
Yes
Ange 21, 2017
Los
Center (nursing home)
gust
n v.
Ass d on Au
iders
St. Mary’s MedicalvSystemrchive Apple Valley
04-24-02
Yes
Pro 1, a
rv ce
(private ihospital)57
e Se . 15-55
Arilin
No
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table 5 .1 . (continued )
Union
Employer
Location
Date of
Complaint
ULP
Allegation
SEIU Local 1997
Oasis Rehabilitation, Inc.
(mental health center)
Indio
10-09-02
No
SEIU Nurse Alliance
Pomona Valley Hospital
Medical Center
(public hospital)
Pomona
10-24-02
No
IBEW Local 11
GTECH Corporation
(contractor with state
lottery)
Woodland
Hills and
Santa Fe
Springs
10-28-02
No
CNA
Cedars Sinai Medical Center
(private hospital)
Los Angeles
11-06-02
Yes
CNA/USWA
Long Beach Memorial Medical
Center (private hospital)
Long Beach
11-13-02
Yes
a
These complaints involving public employees also included allegations that the employer had violated AB 1281, an
amendment to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, by refusing to recognize the union on the basis of a majority of
rts
signed authorization cards.
Airpo
rld
s Wo
gele , 2017
s An t 21
s
v. Lo
ssn on Augu
rs A
vide rchived
ro
,a
ice P
and law firms withelong-established1reputations for no-holds-barred anti-unionism
Serv 15-5557
.
rilin
A
No
orchestrated several of the campaigns that generated complaints. The Burke Group ran
anti-union campaigns at Antelope Valley Health Care District and St. Mary’s Medical
Center; the American Consulting Group ran the campaigns at the St. Joseph Medical
Center and Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center; Cruz and Associates ran the MEK
Long Beach campaign; and Jackson-Lewis ran the Oasis Rehabilitation, Inc., campaign.
SEIU Local 250, for example, filed a complaint against Sonoma Health Care Center (Ensign Group), a nursing home that receives a majority of its total annual income
through Medi-Cal reimbursements. The anti-union consultant firm, Labor Relations
Services, Inc., of Newport Beach, orchestrated the nursing home’s anti-union campaign, providing Spanish- and Tagolog-speaking consultants to talk with employees,
who were largely Latino and Filipino. Local 250 provided the attorney general with
the names of employees who attended mandatory anti-union meetings; the names of
the consultants, managers, and supervisors who conducted group and individual
captive meetings; the date, time, and location of these meetings; information on
whether employees were paid for attending these meetings and, if so, out of
which funds; information on the anti-union consultants who orchestrated the
anti-union campaign; and copies of anti-union literature distributed to employees. Responding to the union’s “reckless accusations,” Sonoma Healthcare denied
logan / innovations in state and local labor legislation
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that it had used any state funds to discourage its employees from supporting
unionization.45
Not all of the complaints indicated clear violations of AB 1889. At least one
union, Teamster Local 78, apparently believed that AB 1889 required strict neutrality
from employers that received state money; it did not accuse the employer of misappropriating public funds, but merely stated that it had distributed anti-union literature to employees. The union believed that the company’s distribution was “in
violation of its obligation as a state contractor to remain neutral in a union organizing
drive.”46 One or two other unions appeared uncertain as to whether the employer had
received sufficient state funds to trigger the requirements of the law. One complaint
issued against Long Beach Memorial Medical Center involved both the employer’s
efforts to defeat an organizing campaign and its attempt to prevent the union from
securing a first contract for previously unionized employees. Another complaint,
against Tenet Queen of Angeles Medical Center, alleged that the employer had used
state funds to persuade its employees to revoke their union membership.47
The workplaces named in the complaints ranged from bargaining units of fewer
than 40 employees that received tens of thousands of dollars in state grants or contracts, to bargaining units of over 400 employees, mostly hospitals, that received
hundreds of millions of dollars in state funds. Between 1995 and 1999, for example,
s
Palomar Pomerado Medical Center received almost $270 Airport Long Beach
million,
orld
Wand Cedars Sinai Medical
Memorial Medical Center received over $600 ngeles 017
million,
A
,2
Los
st payments. Another hospital
Center received over $1,100 million v. Medi-Cal21
ssn inon Augu
sA
accused of misappropriatingider rchivedTenet Queen of Angels Hollywood Presbyrov state funds,
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terian Medical Serv 15-5
e Center, received over $74 million in Medi-Cal funds between 2000
Arilin
No.
and 2001, which accounted for over half of the hospital’s income.
Unions alleged that several hospitals had financed anti-union campaigns with tax
dollars by co-mingling Medi-Cal reimbursements with other sources of funds. The
CNA, for example, believed that the Antelope Valley Health Care District (north of
Los Angeles) had spent over $1 million in state money on its intensive anti-union
campaign (California Nurses Association 2002). The campaign lasted several
months. The Burke Group invoiced Antelope Valley for almost $55,000 for the
period 3–25 June 2002, during which time its two consultants reportedly worked
eleven to sixteen hours per day. The hospital’s anti-union literature, posters, and
45. Regina J. Brown (deputy attorney general), letter to Stephen P. Berzon (Altshuler, Berzon,
Nussbaum, Rubin, and Demain), 19 July 2002, copy obtained from the State of California,
Department of Justice (hereafter abbreviated SCDJ); Gregory K. Stapley (vice president and
general counsel, Ensign Group), letter to Bill Lockyer (attorney general, California Department of Justice), 16 May 2002, SCDJ.
46. Shelia K. Sexton (Beeson, Tayer & Bodine, for Teamsters Local 78), letter to California
Department of Justice, 19 February 2002, SCDJ.
47. David M. Johnson (Southern California director, CNA), letter to William Lockyer (attorney
general, State of California), 13 November 2002, SCDJ; David M. Johnson, letter to William
Lockyer, 6 November 2002, SCDJ.
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floor mats all contained the message that they were produced “in accordance with
the requirements of AB 1889,” but the CNA stated that the hospital’s consultants
and managers had engaged in many other anti-union activities for which they made
no claim of compliance with AB 1889.48
Health care unions contended that the anti-union campaigns repeatedly threatened patient care, since hospital management frequently ordered employees away
from patient-care duties to attend lengthy captive meetings and screenings of antiunion videos. At St. Mary’s Medical Center in Apple Valley (northeast of Los Angeles), nurses reported “numerous incidents” in which they were “pulled away from
the bedside to attend one-on-one anti-union meetings with their managers” (California Nurses Association 2002a, 2002b).49
Half of the complaints also alleged unfair labor practices, several of which had
been referred to the NLRB or California’s Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB). In addition, the four complaints involving public employees accused
employers of violating the state’s card check recognition law, AB 1281.50
Responses to these complaints by employers varied considerably. None admitted to
financial wrongdoing. Some responded that they would be happy to cooperate with
the attorney general’s office to demonstrate that they had not misappropriated state
money. Others, however, stated that they did not recognize the legitimacy of AB 1889
s
rp rt
and would not cooperate with any investigation into how they haddspentostate funds.
l Ai
Wor Services, refused to
es
One employer named in two separate complaints, LaidlawlTransit 17
Ange 21, 20
Los
t The firm’s lawyers stated
v.
comply with the “unconstitutional” and “unenforceable”us
g law.
Assn
n Au
id rs chived o
that Laidlaw would not be cowedvbyetherTeamsters’ “baseless accusations” and would
ro
ice P
71, a
continue its effortsntoServ 15-employees from supporting unionization.51
e dissuade 555
.
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No
In addition to the twenty-four union complaints, at least one employer attempted
unsuccessfully to use AB 1889 to justify denying a union access to a workplace notice
board, thereby violating a negotiated agreement that provided the union with such
access. Ruling against the employer’s illegal action, the NLRB dismissed its arguments concerning the requirements imposed by AB 1889 as “specious from the outset” and “empty of logic.”52
48. The Burke Group, invoice to Antelope Valley Hospital, 30 June 2002, SCDJ; Beth Kean (organizing director, CNA), letter to William Lockyer (attorney general, State of California), 12 July
2002, SCDJ.
49. See also Luisa Blue (president, SEIU Nurse Alliance) and Dave Bullock president, SEIU Local
399), letter to Bill Lockyer (attorney general, State of California), 24 October 2002, SCDJ.
50. AB 1281 is one of several laws around the country that provide card check recognition for certain
groups of employees. In January 2002 the New York legislature, for example, enacted a broadly
similar law (A 9202) that affects private-sector employees who are not covered by the NLRA.
51. Theodore R. Scott (Luce, Forward, Hamilton, and Scripps, LLP, for Laidlaw Transit Services,
Inc.), letter to Florice Hoffman (for Teamsters Local 952), 25 March 2002, SCDJ.
52. 338 NLRB 180, ATC/Vancom of California (May 2003). Opponents of the law have cited its
exemptions allowing pro-union activities such as union access to the workplace and the negotiation of voluntary recognition agreements as clear evidence of the law’s “one-sidedness.”
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If the number of union complaints was surprisingly small—especially when one
considers the many thousands of employers that receive state funds—the number of
cases pursued by the attorney general was even smaller.53 Prior to the district court’s
decision, Lockyer stated repeatedly that he was “strongly committed” to the enforcement of AB 1889. As a result of employers’ challenges, however, most of the attorney
general’s energies went into defending AB 1889 in the courts, rather than investigating and prosecuting cases of noncompliance. Indeed, prior to the district court’s
overturning of AB 1889, the attorney general had filed suit against only one
employer, Fountain View, Inc.54
Fountain View owns approximately twenty skilled nursing homes in California.
In 2001 SEIU Local 399 asked the attorney general to investigate three Fountain
View homes—Brier Oak Terrace Care Center in Los Angeles and Baycrest and Royalwood Care Centers in Torrance—for misappropriation of state funds. The union
argued that the company had used state money to hire management consultants
Russ Brown and Associates to deter its employees from supporting unionization.
Brier Oak, Baycrest, and Royalwood receive a majority of their total annual income
from participation in the Medi-Cal program. SEIU alleged that expenses associated
with Fountain View’s anti-union activities were paid from accounts in which MediCal funds were “co-mingled with other funds” and that the firm had failed to mainp s
tain records sufficient to demonstrate compliance with AB 1889.r55 ort
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Fountain View refused to cooperate with the geles 017 The company quesinvestigation.
2
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Los
t 1,
.
tioned the veracity of the evidence soffered againstsit2as well as the authority of the
sn v n Augu
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d
attorney general to investigateer financialo
rovid its chive records. It claimed that it had “numerous
ice P 5571, ar
erv and5that the amount of its non-state sources of income far
sources of ilfunding” 15eS
o.
Ar in
exceeded the sumN had allegedly spent on resisting unionization.56 Fountain View
it
53. In April 2002 Governor Davis announced that the number of certified small businesses participating in state contracting had reached 10,000, which marked a 30 percent increase over the
previous twelve months. One prominent opponent of the neutrality legislation, Verizon Corporation, estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 employers were affected by the various
provisions of AB 1889. According to the California Works Foundation, the number of employees
covered by state contracts exceeds 175,000 and that the total value of these contracts exceeds
$15 billion. Fifteen separate government departments account for over 90 percent of these state
contracts with private companies. Office of the Governor, “Governor Davis Gives Keynote
Address Announcing Small Business Partnerships with State Reaches 10,000,” Press Release, 24
April 2002; Emanuel to Lieber, 27 June 2002. For a complete list of state contractors, see State
of California, Department of General Services 2002.
54. Attorney General of California vs. Fountain View, Inc., Superior Court of the State of California
for the County of Los Angeles, Central District, 19 November 2001. Fountain View subsequently filed a cross-complaint against the state.
55. John J. Sullivan (associate general counsel, SEIU), letter to William Lockyer (attorney general,
State of California), 22 March 2001, SCDJ.
56. According to U.S. Department of Labor records, Fountain View paid Russ Brown and Associates $45,978.
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refused to provide the financial documentation required by the law, which it called
“fatally vague.”57
After three separate requests for records proving that Fountain View had not misappropriated state funds, the attorney general filed suit against the company in Los Angeles Superior Court in November 2001. The lawsuit attempted to compel the release of
accounting records sufficient to demonstrate compliance with AB 1889, underscoring
the vital importance of the law’s record-keeping requirement: it provided the only practical way to prove that an employer that receives both state and non-state funds had
used state funds for prohibited activities. The attorney general failed to gain an enforcement order against Fountain View before to the district court overturned the law.
Enforcement of AB 1899 was not limited to actions undertaken by California’s
attorney general. Under the provisions of the law, private individuals could pursue
legal claims against employers for noncompliance sixty days after filing a complaint.
Employer groups had singled out this aspect of the law, calling it a “bounty hunter”
provision and predicting that unions and disgruntled employees would use it to
harass innocent employers. One employer group predicted that this private right of
action would provide an “open invitation to endless litigation about how individual
employees perceived an employer’s feelings about unionization.”58 Despite these
pronouncements, only one union pursued enforcement on its own. SEIU Local 399
s
rpo t
brought suit against A.B. Crispino, owner of Santa Monica Convalescent rHomes, in
ld Ai
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May 2001, after waiting sixty days for the attorney general s initiate legal proceedgele to
17
s An t 21, 20
Loinvestigation. SEIU subsequently
ings. The attorney general’s office then closed .its Augus
nv
s
s As
on
settled the case after the nursing vider rchivedto pay it $13,000 in legal fees.59 The
Pro home agreed
ice 5571, a
Serv Fountain View, but that case is currently on hold, pendunion also filed suiteagainst 15-5
o.
Arilin
ing the outcome of the N
state’s appeal.
Opponents have used the twenty-four complaints filed by unions as evidence of
the law’s alleged “chilling impact” on employers’ free speech rights. Employer groups
have charged that unions coerced employers into neutrality agreements by accusing
them of AB 1889 violations and by threatening enforcement proceedings after the
The reported figure excludes costs that Fountain View incurred for management and giving supervisors time off to meet with consultants and conduct captive group and one-on-one
meetings with employees. It also does not include the costs of giving employees time off to
attend captive meetings. See Russ Brown and Associates, LM 21 (Receipts and Disbursements
Report) File No. C-0435, 2 April 2002, copy obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor.
57. John A. Lawrence (Radcliff, Frandsen, and Dongell, LLP), letter to Thomas P Reilly (deputy attor.
ney general, State of California), 5 June 2001, SCDJ. See also Office of the Attorney General 2001.
58. Parke D. Terry (California Landscape Contractors), letter to Gil Cedillo (California Assembly), 27 March 2000, SCDJ.
59. SEIU Local 399 v. AB Crispino & Company, Inc., Superior Court of the State of California,
County of Los Angeles, West District, May 23, 2001; Louis Verdugo, Jr. (senior assistant attorney general, State of California), letter to Jamie Rudman (Knee and Ross, LLP), 26 November
2001, SCDJ.
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complaints were filed. Such a charge resulted when Teamsters Local 952 offered to
withdraw its complaint against Laidlaw if the company consented to a neutrality
agreement.60 One of the bill’s opponents claimed that management’s voice was often
being “silenced by the threat of prosecution” (North 2002). Calling the attorney general’s enforcement actions “significant,” the LPA warned in June 2002 that “many
more” complaints and “numerous” enforcement actions “could be filed shortly.”61
These failed to materialize.
Employer groups have also charged unions with using the attorney general’s office
as a “clearinghouse” for unfair labor practice (ULP) complaints that should, more
appropriately, be filed with the NLRB. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated that
AB 1889 had “armed unions by allowing them to bring unfair labor practice claims
to the attorney general and the courts” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2003). Several
other employer groups—including the California Association of Health Facilities,
the LPA, and the ABC—have repeated this charge. Unions have provided this information to indicate the range of prohibited activities on which employers have spent
state money, not as evidence of any ULP against which they expected the attorney
general to take action. Indeed, in addition to their AB 1889 complaints, several
unions filed separate ULP complaints with the NLRB.
Undaunted by the small number of complaints, some employer groups have
s
pointed to one complaint filed by the CNA to illustrate theld Airportclear” impact of
“crystal
Wor
le
AB 1889 in undermining employers’ ability tonresists unionization and to provide
A ge 21, 017
o “bargaining2tool” (Associated Builders
La s
.
evidence that unions had used theslawvas August
sn
on
rs A
and Contractors and Labor iPolicycAssociation 2003). In late 2001 the CNA began
v de r hived
ro
ice P 5571, a
what employer Serv 15-5
e groups called a “heated organizing drive.” The union had accused
Arilin
No.
management of committing numerous unfair practices during its campaign to
unionize almost 600 nurses at the facility. In March 2002 the CNA filed a complaint
with the attorney general, stating that Palomar Pomerado Health System had made
a “serious and substantial misappropriation of state funds” to finance its “aggressive,
heavily funded” anti-union campaign. Three months later, according to employer
groups, the union revealed its “true motivation for threatening enforcement”: the
CNA withdrew its AB 1889 complaint and urged the attorney general to take no
action against Palomar, reporting that the hospital had now agreed to card check
recognition.62 Thus, for employer groups, the Palomar campaign provided concrete
60. Patrick D. Kelly (secretary treasurer, Teamsters Local Union No. 952), letter to Jim Byrne (general manager, Laidlaw Transit Service), 21 March 2002, SCDJ; Theodore R. Scott (Luce, Forward, Hamilton, and Scripps, LLP, for Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc.), letter to Florice
Hoffman (for Teamsters Local 952), 25 March 2002, SCDJ.
61. Daniel V. Yager (senior vice president and general counsel, LPA), letter to Margery E. Lieber
(assistant general counsel for special litigation, NLRB), 28 June 2002, SCDJ.
62. David M. Johnson (Southern California director, CNA), letter to William Lockyer (attorney
general, State of California), 28 March 2002, SCDJ; David M. Johnson, letter to William
Lockyer, 24 June 2002; Yager to Lieber, 28 June 2002, SCDJ.
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evidence that unions were using the threat of enforcement proceedings “as an
organizing tactic to achieve employer neutrality” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce
2003).
The LPA stated that the hospital’s dramatic change of heart—from vigorous resistance to voluntary recognition within a ninety-day period—provided a stark demonstration of the “dramatic degree to which the California law alters bargaining
power” between unions and employers. However, the CNA’s threat to initiate AB
1889 proceedings played little role in the card check decision. The critical factors
were changes in the hospital’s CEO and board of directors and the hospital’s subsequent decision to comply with AB 1281 (which guarantees card check recognition
for public employees).63 Nevertheless, employer groups have repeatedly cited the Palomar case—mostly recently in their briefs to the Ninth Circuit Court—as evidence
that state neutrality laws such as AB 1889 are, in reality, thinly veiled “pro-union
organizing tools” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2003).
The number of union requests for investigations and prosecutions by the attorney
general and the number of private lawsuits are not the only measures of the impact
of the legislation, and they perhaps are not the most important. Starting in March
2002 the Department of Health Services and other state agencies distributed to
employers that receive state funds forms that asked the recipients to agree to abide
s
r forms
by the provisions of AB 1889. Those who refused to sign and return theport within
ld Ai
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forty-five days faced termination from Medi-Calngeles other 7
and
01
A
21, 2
Los
Although no employer lost state fundingsfor v. reason,t employer groups claimed
n that Augus
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s A ed on
that, as a result of the distributioniderthese inotices, firms that depend on state fundProv of , arch v
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Ser 1 -5557
ing had been facedewithvthe 5“Hobson’s choice” of either losing their businesses or
rilin
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No.
64
signing away their protected rights. Not surprisingly, they argued, most had chosen financial survival over bankruptcy. Employer groups asserted, however, that certain companies with alternative sources of funding had decided not to conduct
business with the state. Employers also claimed, without providing any direct evidence, that unions officials had attempted to “apply pressure” to state agencies such as
63. In its account of the Palomar case to the NLRB, the LPA failed to mention that the PERB was
investigating the hospital for violation of state law by refusing to recognize the union based on
a card check and for unlawfully interfering with the rights of the nurses. In addition, a majority of the health care system’s nurses had voted for union representation in October 1995, but at
that time state law allowed the hospital to deny recognition because the union failed to win the
support of a majority of those eligible to vote. That law was overturned in 2001, thus giving
public employees the same right as their private counterparts.
64. The number of firms that receive all, or practically all, of their operating budgets from state
sources is a matter of considerable controversy. Employer groups have repeatedly claimed that
over 500 members of the California Association of Health Facilities receive their entire operating budgets from state grants or state programs and that AB 1889 would “obliterate” the free
speech rights of these employers. Supporters of AB 1889 contest this figure and argue that, in
any case, nothing in the law precludes these employers from seeking other sources of revenue
to finance their anti-union campaigns.
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the Department of Health Services in order to get them to “coerce” employers to
remain neutral during organizing campaigns.65
AB 1889 might have had a greater impact had the attorney general focused on
enforcement rather than lawsuits. Several unions reported limited successes in using
the law against employers that had a reputation for aggressively resisting unionization. Some of these employers decided to mount low-key and inexpensive antiunion campaigns and, in most cases, the overwhelming majority of employees voted
for unionization.
The first reported organizing victory in which the law was a factor involved the
Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU). Eighty-six days after AB 1889’s enactment, the
ATU used the law in an organizing campaign in Yolo County at Laidlaw Transit Services. The ATU reported that it had encountered “fierce” employer resistance in previous organizing campaigns with the company (California AFL-CIO News 2001).
This time, however, the union wrote to the Yolo County Transportation District, a
recipient of public money in the form of State Transit Assistance, requesting that it
remind its contractor, Laidlaw, of its obligation not to use state funds for the purpose of promoting or discouraging unionization. As a result, the union reported,
Laidlaw brought in a human resource expert, but “meetings were voluntary.” The
union won the NLRB election with a 41 to 6 vote.66
s
r o
Most other organizing campaigns involving AB 1889 were notpasrtstraightforward,
ld Ai
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les 017
suggesting that even if the law survives legal challenges, unions will face an uphill
2
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v.
struggle in dealing with anti-unionsemployers gust receive state funds. CNA, for
s n on Au
e s A ive
example, has attempted rtoviuser the hlawdin several of its organizing campaigns. As
o d
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most of theine Serv 1CNA faces are major recipients of state funds, the union had
employers 5-5
o.
Aril
potentially much N gain from AB 1889. Its experiences in recent campaigns suggest
to
that the law was most useful when used as part of a public campaign designed to
persuade the employer not to engage in aggressive anti-union behavior.
The CNA’s campaigns, along with those of several other unions, indicate that
65. Charles H. Roadman (president and CEO, American Health Care Association), letter to Arthur F.
Rosenfeld (general counsel, NLRB), 1 March 2002, SCDJ; Frank G. Vanacore (chief, Audit
Review and Analysis Section, Financial Audits Branch, Audits and Investigations), letter to participants in state programs, 15 March 2002, SCDJ; Theodore R. Scott (Luce, Forward, Hamilton, and Scripps, LLP), letter to Denise Meiners (special litigation branch, NLRB), 25 June
2002, SCDJ.
66. Donald Delis (president and business agent, Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 256), letter to
Terry Bassett (executive director, Yolo County Transportation District), 25 January 2001,
SCDJ. Other organizing victories in which AB 1889 played a significant role were those by
UNITE Local 75 against Mission Linen and GCIU Local 202M at Ivy Hill Printing in Glendale. At Mission Linen, the union convinced the company to agree to expedited union representation elections in five Western cities and negotiated a three-year agreements including
higher wages and improved health and safety protections for unionized workers. As with the
Laidlaw campaign, both Mission Linen and Ivy Hill involved relatively small bargaining units.
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even if AB 1889 survives, state officials will face considerable employer opposition
when enforcing the law. The fact that several employers that receive state funds continued to mount anti-union campaigns (most of which were not the subject of AB
1889 complaints) after the bill’s passage suggests that, contrary to the assertion of
employer groups, firms could comply with the neutrality law, yet still exercise their
right to oppose unionization.
Neutrality Legislation in Other States
California has not been alone in enacting legislation designed to prevent the use
of state tax dollars for anti-union activities.
In June 2002 the New York State Assembly passed a bill prohibiting employers
from using state money for certain purposes related to unionization.67 A coalition of
employer organizations opposed the bill, but to their dismay the bill passed both
houses with broad bipartisan support. The Business Council of New York (2002)
lambasted the state legislature’s “dizzying tilt” toward labor and asked despondently,
“Where does it stop?”68
On 30 September 2002, just two weeks after the California district court ruled
against AB 1889, Governor George Pataki signed New York’s neutrality bill into
ts
law.69 In contrast with AB 1889’s blanket prohibition on the use ofdpublicrmoney for
irpo
rl A
WoYork bill proscribes
s
activities designed to promote or deter unionization,ntheleNew 017
A ge 21, 2
Los
ttraining managers, super.
using state money for three specific anti-union actions:s
sn v n Augu
s As
visors, or other administrativerovider rchon d o
personnel ive methods to encourage or discourage
ice P
71, a
unionization; hiring orerv 15-attorneys, consultants, or other contractors to encoure S paying 555
.
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A
No
age or discourage unionization; and hiring employees or paying the salary and other
compensation of employees whose principal job duties are to encourage or discourage unionization. New York employers can still use state money to finance other
nonspecified anti-union activities, such as captive-audience meetings, providing they
are not conducted by someone whose principal job is to discourage unionization.
Not surprisingly, employer representatives in New York welcomed the California
court’s “instructive” decision and argued that, because their law was a virtual replica
of AB 1889, the legal outcome ought to be the same. On 30 December 2002, the day
67. The New York Legislature had enacted a law limiting the use of state funds in 1996 and revised
it in 1998. It did not include effective enforcement provisions or penalties for violations, and
New York unions complained that it was ineffectual: employers had evaded the law simply by
claiming that they were spending tax money to train supervisors on how to conform to federal
labor law. See Daily Labor Report 1998a, 1998b, 2002b.
68. Daniel B. Walsh (president and CEO, Business Council of New York State, Inc.), letter to
Honorable Members of the New York Senate, 1 July 2002, NLRB.
69. Governor Pataki has strong links to certain segments of the New York labor movement and
had earlier signed legislation providing card certification for the private sector workers who are
not covered by the NLRA. See Daily Labor Report 2001b.
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after the New York law went into effect, a coalition of health care and social service
associations urged the NLRB to intervene against the statute, arguing that the “sole
purpose” and “fatal flaw” of the law was to attempt to restrict employer speech.70 In
April 2003 a coalition of organizations representing over 550 non-profit and public
hospitals, nursing homes, and home care agencies filed suit in a New York district
court, seeking to overturn the law and halt its enforcement.71
As was the case in California, the employers’ legal challenge has slowed the regulatory process. The resources of the attorney general have gone primarily into defending
the law against employers’ challenge and the threat of NLRB opposition, rather than
investigating cases of noncompliance.72 At this writing, the NLRB has yet to
announce whether it intends to seek a Nash-Finch injunction or (more probably) file
an amicus brief in support of the court challenge. It seems likely that the NLRB will
not intervene unless the case reaches the appellate court, as was the case in California.
The California and New York laws are part of a nationwide movement to enact
legislation prohibiting the misappropriation of state funds (see the Appendix for a
list of these laws). Pro-union legislators in certain states have adopted a cautionary
approach until the outcomes of the litigation in California and New York are clearer.
Unions and their political allies have a long-term interest in avoiding the enactment
of legislation that would ultimately be blocked by federal preemption. Of particular
ports
concern are court rulings based on employers’ “super free speechirrights”—rights over
ld A
Wor are allegedly provided
les
and above those provided by the First Amendment—that 7
Ange 21, 201
73
Los neutrality legislation has been intro.
under Section 8(c) of the NLRA. Nevertheless, gust
sn v n Au
s As
duced in a number of Provider rchivehowever, these neutrality bills have suffered
states. To date, d o
ice
1, a
Serv 1 -555 vetoed by the governor, or have yet to be voted on.
defeat in thenlegislature,5been 7
ili e
Ar
No.
70. Jeffrey J. Sherrin (O’Connell and Aronowitz, for the Healthcare Association of New York
State, the New York State Health Facilities Association, the Cerebral Palsy Association of New
York State, the New York Association of Homes and Services for the Aging, and the New York
State Association for Retarded Citizens), letter to Arthur F. Rosenfeld (general counsel,
NLRB), 30 December 2002, NLRB.
71. Jeffrey J. Sherrin (O’Connell and Aronowitz, for Plaintiffs), complaint filed with United States
District Court, Northern District of New York, 3 April 2003. Claiming that the employer challenge is without merit, New York State has asked the District Court to summarily dismiss the
case.
72. A ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals against AB 1889 could, according to the Labor
Policy Association, “lead to similar rulings by other circuits regarding laws in New York, New
Jersey, and elsewhere” (Labor Policy Association 2003b). Since the NLRB intervened against
1889, moreover, employer groups appear more confident that the Ninth Circuit will rule in
their favor.
73. Unions point out that Section 8(c) does not protect employers’ free speech rights, but merely
states that noncoercive speech cannot be used as evidence of an unfair labor practice.
Employers have a First Amendment free speech right, not an NLRA free speech right. Thus,
unions argue, if laws prohibiting state-subsidy of anti-union activities do not violate the First
Amendment, they do not violate the NLRA’s provisions on employer communications.
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In 2001, in a parallel effort, the SEIU, the largest health care union in the nation,
selected six states as venues for “Healthcare Funds for Healthcare Only” bills—limited
neutrality legislation that would apply only to the health care industry. Pro-union
lawmakers introduced the bills in Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, and West Virginia, states in which SEIU has a strong organizing program
and political influence in the state legislature. The union excluded California and
New York because they were already in the process of passing their neutrality bills.
Although the California and New York laws were broader, the “Healthcare Only” bills
were more ambitious in one respect: they sought not only to prevent the misappropriation of health care funds but also to limit employer conduct. Under these bills, managers and supervisors would be prohibited from carrying out anti-union activities
during work hours among employees who care for Medicare beneficiaries.
Florida is the only state that has thus far passed “Healthcare Only” legislation.
Signed by Governor Jeb Bush in May 2002, the bill restricts the use of state funds to
promote or deter unionization only in nursing homes. Pro-union legislators won
passage by limiting the bill to nursing homes and agreeing to delete a private right of
action provision from the original bill. This omission may render the law ineffectual,
as state officials often lack the resources, expertise, and will to enforce such laws.
Still, the State Labor Federation has welcomed it as a “major win” for nursing home
s
rp “Healthcare
workers and residents.74 Elsewhere, however, the SEIU has suspended iits ort
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LABOR PEACE AGREEMENTS
In addition to neutrality bills at the state level, in recent years several cities and
counties have adopted so-called labor peace agreements, which can be either
“across-the-board” ordinances or project-specific measures.76 Over the past decade
at least a dozen cities and counties around the nation have enacted labor peace
agreements, including San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee County, and, most
recently, Washington, D.C.77 Labor peace agreements are increasingly common in
74. FL ST 400.334; Florida AFL-CIO 2002, 21.
75. Employer groups in California used a letter from the Maryland attorney general that stated
that federal law preempted the “Healthcare Only” bill as additional evidence against the law’s
legality. The AFL-CIO argued that the letter was “poorly reasoned and should be disregarded.”
Jonathan Hiatt, Craig Becker, and Stephen P. Berzon (for AFL-CIO and California Labor Federation), letter to Arthur F. Rosenfeld (general counsel, NLRB), 28 June 2002, NLRB.
76. In general, the courts have looked more favorably upon labor peace agreements actions that are
project-specific, rather than across the board.
77. In addition, at least six of the eighty-plus living wage ordinances around the country have
incorporated some type of labor peace provision.
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certain sectors of private industry, and several city and county agreements now
incorporate practices pioneered by unions and employers in the private sector during the past decade.
Under these measures, in return for financial assistance in the form of grants,
loans, contracts, or rent, or as part of a procurement policy, the governmental
entity requires that employers sign a labor peace agreement with any union that
requests it, thereby protecting the government’s proprietary interest by minimizing the probability of labor disruptions. Although labor peace agreements vary
considerably, in most cases employers must grant workplace access, provide
employee information (names, job titles, contact information, etc.) early in the
organizing campaign, and refrain from making disparaging statements about
the union. Some, but not all, of these agreements also require that employers
assent to card check recognition and neutrality. The union, in return, often must
agree to forego strikes, boycotts, or other disruptive organizing tactics and (more
controversially) must consent to the arbitration of disputes during the lifetime of
the agreement.
The hotel industry has been the principal target for several recent agreements.
Cities and counties often invest in hotel projects, which are particularly vulnerable
to labor disruptions in the early stages of development. Although the explicit ratios
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California has played a leading role in the development of labor peace agreements. San Francisco was the site of the first agreement in the country that involved
a public contract. In 1980 the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency sought a private sector partner for a luxury hotel development on city land. It favored the Marriott Corporation, but the Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Union
(HERE) Local 2 opposed granting the contract to the company, citing a history of
hostility to unionization. In return for HERE withdrawing its opposition, Marriott
agreed to card check recognition and neutrality during organizing campaigns. After
the union and company had reached agreement, the Redevelopment Agency
awarded the development contract to the Marriott Corporation. Marriott later
broke the neutrality agreement and Local 2 sued for enforcement. Although the city
did not formally require the hotel to sign a labor peace agreement, the hotel subsequently contended that the agency had effectively (and illegally) forced it to do so.
In 1993 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California rejected
Marriott’s argument. The court ruled that, even if the Redevelopment Agency had
forced Marriott to agree to card check and neutrality, the agency held a significant
proprietary interest in the hotel development project and thus could require an
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agreement intended to minimize the probability of labor disruption that might
threaten its investment.78
In 1998 San Francisco adopted a formal labor peace ordinance that requires the
hotels and restaurants in which the city has a proprietary interest to agree to recognize
unions on the basis of a majority of signed authorization cards; the ordinance applies
to hotels and restaurants with fifty or more employees.79 An employer lawsuit challenging the legality of the ordinance was withdrawn prior to any court ruling, and
the San Francisco Hotel Ordinance has become a widely emulated model for city
and county labor peace legislation.
The development of the ordinance took over a year and involved twenty-seven
drafts. Before its enactment, city officials met with representatives of both labor and
industry organizations, accepted testimony from expert witnesses and industry representatives, and incorporated several exemptions covering situations where the city
did not claim a strong proprietary interest. The criteria for establishing proprietary
interest incorporate a case-by-case determination of whether the ordinance applies
to any individual project. The San Francisco Hotel Ordinance has the greatest
record of success of any labor peace agreement in the nation. To date, at least a halfdozen new recognitions have taken place under the terms of the law, and its effects
have probably extended beyond projects in which the city has a direct proprietary
s
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interest. Since the enactment of the ordinance, the union has increasedrits market
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share in the San Francisco hotel industry from 65 to 80geles 2017
percent.
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to organize employees through a card check. The rule stipulated that parties had thirty
days to reach a private agreement after a union requested the check. If the parties
failed to reach an agreement, the airport commission would impose a model labor
peace agreement, in which employers were required to provide full employee information, allow reasonable workplace access during non-working time, agree to card check
recognition, and submit disputes to binding arbitration. The airport agreement
affected between 6,000 and 8,000 concessionaire, airline services, and rental car
employees in approximately seventy firms. One employer, Aeroground, challenged the
airport ordinance in federal court. In 2001, stating that the plaintiff had demonstrated
a probability that the courts would find the agreement to be preempted by the NLRA,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary
injunction against enforcement in cases not involving a direct contractual relationship
between the airport and airline service firms.80 The court ruled that the airport
78. Hotel Employees Local 2 v. Marriott Corp., 1993 WL 341286 (N.D. Cal. 1993). For a full account
of the case, see Kronland 2003.
79. City of San Francisco Ordinance 97-97-62 (16 January 1998).
80. Areoground, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 170 F. Supp. 2d 950 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The
labor peace rule covered a broad range of contracts, including leases, subleases, and permits of
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commission was not acting as a market participant because the agreement operated
“essentially as a licensing scheme” and was not project specific. Unions enjoyed significant political support on the airport commission when the agreement was enacted, and
many observers thought that it was drafted too hurriedly and included too few
exemptions for situations in which the city did not possess a strong proprietary interest.
Labor Peace Agreements in Other States
All three San Francisco labor peace agreements are related to city redevelopment
projects. A second, less common, form of labor peace agreement is related to city or
county procurement policy. In September 2000 Milwaukee County passed an ordinance that covers contractors that conduct more than $250,000 in business in the
areas of social and mental health services and transportation services for the elderly
and disabled. The ordinance does not mandate employer neutrality during organizing campaigns, but it requires employers to provide unions with complete and accurate information on bargaining unit employees, refrain from distributing to employees
“false or misleading information” on unionization, and grant union organizers “timely
and reasonable” workplace access, providing that they do not interfere with the
employer’s business. The ordinance also forbids unions from “misrepresenting to
s
rport
employees the facts and circumstances surrounding their employment,” and from
ld Ai
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striking or picketing during organizing campaigns.eInsJune 17
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s terms
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The Metropolitan Milwaukee rAssociation of Commerce (MMAC) challenged
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empted by federal law. The case was dismissed in district court. The MMAC
appealed, and the appellate court sent back the case to the lower court, saying that it
was “ripe for review.”81 The district court’s forthcoming decision will likely become
the leading decision on the status of labor peace agreements.
As a result of the growing popularity of labor peace agreements, employer groups
have promoted bills preventing local legislators from linking city or county contracts or financial assistance to employers’ willingness to sign labor peace agreements. In 2001, for example, the Louisiana legislature passed a bill that prohibits
city or council lawmakers from requiring employers to sign labor peace agreements
airport property and contacts to provide services at the airport. The court later determined that
Areoground fell under the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act, not the NLRA (and thus was
not affected by the labor peace/card check rule), and the Areoground case became moot. The
airport has continued to apply the labor peace rule in cases in which it has a direct contractual
relationship with airline service firms.
81. Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 7th Circuit, No. 022292, 8 April 2003. For more, see Daily Labor Report 2000b, 2000c, 2003a.
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in return for contracts, grants, or other forms of financial assistance.82 In several
other southern states, employer groups are promoting legislation that will restrict
the ability of city and country lawmakers to enact labor peace agreements or living
wage ordinances. Although these laws will likely face the same kind of legal challenges faced by the bills they are intended to prohibit, they are likely to increase in
popularity with anti-union legislators.83
CONCLUSION
Neutrality laws and labor peace agreements have raised passions in part because they
continue the familiar debates that have dominated labor law reform campaigns since
the 1970s. Organized labor views these laws as a way to curb the problem of public
subsidy of anti-union campaigns, while businesses see them as an attempt to restrict
employer prerogatives.
Employer groups have grown increasingly strident in their opposition to these laws.
Paradoxically, the growing popularity of state neutrality bills and labor peace agreements has produced calls for more assertive federal regulation of labor-management
relations from business sources that are normally hostile to any such intervention. The
s
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pro-management Employee Relations Law Journal (2002, 2) orecently questioned
ld Ai
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whether it is “time for a ‘New Deal’ for employers”—thateis,stime 17 the federal govAng 21, 20for
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Traditionally, employers have resisted further federal legislation on the basis that regulation of the employment relationship should be left to the states, in part because the
states were perceived as more understanding of the interests of employers. Recently,
however, some employers have begun to rethink this assumption.
Faced with a slew of pro-worker state and local labor laws and confident of the proemployer stance of the administration in Washington, many business representatives
are starting to ask “whether the time has come for employers to advocate an exclusive role for the federal government” in labor-management relations (Employee Relations Law Journal 2002, 2).
The LPA—an organization not known for its love of either federal regulation or
82. House Bill 1740; see Louisiana Legislative Update, 19 June 2001. Arizona and Tennessee have
enacted similar legislation prohibiting cities and counties from enacting living wage ordinances. See McCracken 2003.
83. Most observers believe that unions would benefit from local and state control of labor peace
and neutrality legislation, even if this decentralization of labor policy produced hostile legislation in conservative regions of the country, as unions are already very weak in most such areas.
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the NLRB84—has pleaded with the board to reassert strong federal control over labor
policy. Announcing that it was “time to stop the balkanization of American labor
law,” LPA Vice President Daniel Yager insisted that the NLRB seize the initiative during this “critical period in history.” The board’s response (or lack thereof) to state neutrality and labor peace legislation, Yager (2003) argued, would determine
whether we continue to have the centralized scheme envisioned by Congress . . . or a
patchwork quilt of individual requirements and prohibitions. The resulting balkanization of labor laws is neither what was intended nor would it best serve the
interests of the affected parties. . . . It is up to General Counsel Arthur Rosenfeld . . .
to halt this trend.
Prior to the NLRB’s decision to file an amicus brief against AB 1889 in May
2003, the LPA appeared impatient with the board’s apparent reluctance to act decisively to “protect the national interest” by invoking a Nash-Finch injunction or by
filing an amicus brief. Asserting that the NLRB’s general counsel has power of
“awesome dimensions,” Yager accused the board of dereliction of its duty to intervene against AB 1889. As a result of the board’s disinclination to “assert itself,” Yager
feared that the country was already sliding inexorably towards a “de facto Canadian
system” of industrial relations, in which state legislatures, rather rthan the federal
s
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government, would assume primary responsibility efor establishing and enforcing
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labor policy.85 If the board failed to intervene, he st 21, 20its inaction would create
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the appearance that businessdgroups s ed on touoverturn the legislation were simply
i ers chseeking
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pursuing their Service 5571, a
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5-5
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would “remind” state 1 local lawmakers that they do not possess the authority to
No. and
regulate such matters and would “prevent perversion of the centralized administration” of labor policy that Congress had intended.86 The present period, Yager concluded, is one of those “rare occasions” when the NLRB must act to “protect the
integrity” of federal labor law.
The LPA is not alone in calling for stronger federal intervention against “antibusiness” legislation at the state and local levels. The National Chamber Litigation
Center lamented that the NLRB had failed to “move quickly” against AB 1889,
despite several requests for intervention, and bemoaned the fact that California
employers had sustained “continued liability” as a result of its inaction (Business
Advocate 2002). The Business Council of New York State warned the NLRB that
state neutrality laws would severely undermine the “laboratory conditions” in representation campaigns that it had “arduously created and steadfastly defended” over
84. In 1997, for example, the LPA argued that Congress should consider abolishing the NLRB and
transfer its functions to the federal courts. See Yager 1997.
85. Labor policy in Canada is largely a provincial, rather than a federal, matter. Federal law covers
only about 10 percent of Canadian employees.
86. Yager to Lieber, 28 June 2002.
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the previous half century.87 Likewise, the coalition of health care and social service
employers that challenged New York’s neutrality law insisted that it “impermissibly
infringes upon and conflicts” with the NLRA and added that, in the interests of
“national uniformity,” the NLRB must intervene to ensure that employers were not
subjected to “varied restrictions from state to state.”88
The success of lawmakers in California and New York has also spurred pro-union
lawmakers in other states to attempt to replicate their achievements. Pro-union legislators in Oregon, Washington, and several other states have recently introduced
state neutrality bills on the assumption that the current financial crisis provides the
ideal political environment for legislation designed to protect the integrity of public
funds. They believe that bills prohibiting the misappropriation of state tax dollars
will get a friendly reception even from some lawmakers who would normally oppose
labor-supported legislation. The haste to introduce neutrality bills, even in states
where they have little chance of political success, suggests that, for some lawmakers,
they may simply be the “flavor of the month.”
The rush in state and local legislatures to enact neutrality laws and labor peace
agreements raises the critical question of whether this legislation represents the best
use of labor’s political capital, which is limited even in states such as California and
cities such as San Francisco. Even if the California and New York bills withstand
s
legal challenge, their ability to counteract intensive anti-unionism remains largely
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unproven. Without the benefit of a reasonable period of enforcement, it is difficult to
Wor
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gauge their impact. Of all the labor peace ordinances n sthe1statute books, only the
Los on t 2 ,
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San Francisco hotel ordinance has ebeen enforced
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success in practice. This rwould not71, the first time that organized labor has gone to
v
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considerable lengths to promote legislation that may not assist greatly with its princiNo
pal goal of organizing the unorganized, and it is probably not the first time that the
business community has vigorously resisted legislation that may not fundamentally
lessen its ability to fight unionization. State and local policy innovations that raise no
preemption or constitutional issues (such as responsible contractor legislation or legislation expanding collective bargaining coverage) attract less intense opposition,
stand more chance of surviving legal challenges, and may prove more effective at circumventing aggressive anti-union campaigns.
Nevertheless, the appeal of neutrality laws is easy to understand. First and foremost, labor law reform is currently off the agenda in Washington. For the foreseeable future, the bills most likely to find their way to the floor of the Congress are
those supported by labor’s opponents, such as the recent Norwood bill outlawing
card check recognition.89 Legislation limiting the public subsidy of aggressive anti87. Daniel B. Walsh (president and CEO, Business Council of New York State, Inc.), letter to
Arthur F. Rosenfeld (general counsel, NLRB), 31 December 2002, NLRB.
88. Sherrin to Rosenfeld, 30 December 2002.
89. In May 2002 House member Charles Norwood (R-Georgia) introduced the so-called Workers’
Bill of Rights (H.R. 4636), which is designed to ensure that secret ballot elections are the exclusive route to union certification.
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unionism will need to come from state and local lawmakers. The attraction of state
neutrality is not limited to practical political considerations, however; it is also
linked to the longer-term case for NLRA reform. Part of the failure of organized
labor’s campaign to reform the NLRA has been its inability to articulate a simple,
popular message to the general public. Issues such as card check recognition and
outlawing permanent replacements are of obvious importance to most within the
labor community, but, thus far, organized labor has largely failed to explain to nonunionists why these measures are essential for workplace democracy.
Some evidence does suggest that the principle behind state neutrality legislation is
popular with the public. Most non-union workers believe that employers have the
right to hold anti-union views and to convey their views to employees, but they generally oppose the state’s subsidy of anti-union campaigns. Few think that state funds
for patient care should be used to pay management consultants $200 to $300 per
hour to oppose unionization among low-paid immigrant employees in nursing homes,
or that state grant money disbursed for biomedical research should be used to pay
employees to attend mandatory anti-union meetings, or that funds intended for
vocational training for employees should be spent on anti-union literature, videos,
and web pages. A fuller understanding of state neutrality laws and labor peace ordinances might persuade the wider public that they have a direct stake in restricting
ts
aggressive anti-unionism. Organized labor has an issue—preventing the misuse of
irpor
rld A
Woit has not mounted highstate funds—that enjoys widespread support, yet thus far 7
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01
profile public campaigns on the issue. v. Los A ust 21, 2
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Au
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As a result of the precarious legal hived on neutrality bills, unions have studiously
iders status of
Prov 1, arc
avoided public Service -5557support them, working instead through their allies in
campaigns to
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Arilin legislatures. Neutrality and labor peace laws have been passed with
state and local No.
little fanfare. And, for good reasons, state and local politicians have steered clear of
basing their defense of these bills on the need to restrict aggressive anti-union campaigns.90 The purpose of the legislation is to safeguard public money, they insist, not
to lower the considerable barriers to organization. Employer groups, who undoubtedly understand the widespread appeal of the principle underlying these laws, have
been much more vociferous in opposition to these bills than unions have been in
their support. Employers, moreover, have a clear message: they have repeatedly
argued that neutrality laws impose crippling accounting procedures and “muzzle”
employers while allowing free rein to organizers, thereby effectively imposing unionization on reluctant employees. If the courts strike the laws down, labor’s political
capital will have been largely depleted without advancing the case for labor law
reform with the public.
Although the legal status of the California and New York bills remains tenuous,
two recent rulings in federal court may give their cases a boost. The D.C. Circuit
90. Business opponents of the California and New York neutrality laws have repeatedly cited
speeches by labor officials and their political allies legislation as evidence that its true purpose is
to enhance unionization, not to protect the integrity of public money.
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Court ruled against unions twice in the past year, but in doing so it delineated the
limits of employers’ free speech under the NLRA and limited the doctrine of federal
preemption in cases where government has a proprietary interest.91 These rulings,
together with the Ninth Circuit Court’s decision to consider the legality of AB 1889,
may provide the basis for a robust defense of neutrality laws.92
Alternatively, the federal courts may well decide that employers have a legal right
to spend state tax money allocated to health care or job training on union suppression. If the challenges to neutrality laws reach the Supreme Court, pro-union legislators will at least receive additional guidance on the best areas for future policy
innovation. A final ruling against state neutrality laws and labor peace agreements
might consign them to a footnote in the history of federal labor law. Or perhaps
defeat in the courts will galvanize the supporters of workers’ right to organize,
impelling them to invent new and even more imaginative ways to secure governmental neutrality in labor disputes. In any event, organized labor will doubtless continue to face robust opposition from business to any legislation that limits employers’
ability to finance and implement aggressive anti-union campaigns.
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91. Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, et al., v. Joe Allbaugh, et al., 295 F. 3d 28
(D.C. Cir. July 12, 2002); UAW-Labor Employment and Training Corp. v. Chao, 2003 WL
1906339 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2003. The Chao decision upholds a Presidential Executive Order
that requires employers that receive federal contracts to post notices informing employees of
their so-called Beck rights. The court stated that employers’ “free speech rights” under Section
8(c) of the NLRA are strictly limited and are essentially no greater than those provided by the
First Amendment; thus, the requirement that federal contractors post Beck notices in no way
interferes with these rights. In Allbaugh the district court rejected a challenge by the Building
Trades to overturn a Presidential Executive Order that prohibits the use of project labor agreements on federally funded construction projects. The court ruled that the preemption provision
of NLRA can be implemented only when the government acts as a regulator; the provision does
not come into play when the government acts as a proprietor, interacting with private participants in the marketplace. Paradoxically, unions won the Garmon and Machinist cases; these rulings were responsible for creating the doctrine of broad federal preemption that has generally
prevented the enactment of pro-union laws at the state and local levels.
92. At the present time, only one Supreme Court decision, the 1993 “Boston Harbor” ruling,
explains in any detail the nature and extent of the so-called proprietary exemption to the doctrine of federal preemption in labor relations. Building & Construction Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors (“Boston Harbor”), 507 U.S. 218 (1993).
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———. 2001c. “SEIU Wins Election at Home Health Agency.” 13 June: A-9.
———. 2001d. “Union’s State Claim on Medicare Funds Preempted,” 8 March: A-8.
———. 2002a. “Federal Judge Rules Certain Provisions of California Labor Neutrality Law
Preempted,” 4 October: A-8.
———. 2002b. “New York Enacts Law Barring Use of State Funds in Union Organizing
Drives.” 1 October: A-7.
———. 2002c. “NLRB Asks New York, New Jersey Officials to Explain Their New Labor
Neutrality Laws.” 9 December: A-1.
———. 2002d. “N.Y. Assembly Passes Bill Barring Use of State Funds to Discourage Organizing.” 28 June 2002: A-8.
———. 2003a. “Milwaukee Labor Neutrality Law is Ripe for Judicial Review, Seventh Circuit Says.” 10 April: A-1.
———. 2003b. “NLRA Preempts California Neutrality Law, Board Argues in Amicus Brief
to Ninth Circuit.” 6 June: A-1.
———. 2003c. “NLRB 3–2 Authorizes General Counsel to Oppose California Labor Neutrality Law.” 2 June.
Employee Relations Law Journal. 2002. “Rethinking Federalism: Is It Time for a ‘New Deal’
for Employers?” 28 (2): 2.
Estlund, Cynthia L. 2002. “The Ossification of American Labor Law.” Columbia Law Review 120(6): 1527–1612.
rts
Airpo
Florida AFL-CIO. 2002. Final Legislative Report and Legislator s World Paged electronic
Rankings.
le
7
An e
document. Retrieved 17 July 2003 from www.flaflcio.org. g 21, 201
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gust
n v. Preemption: State Laws Facilitating OrGottesman, Michael. 1990. “Rethinking rs AssLaw on Au
Labor
ed
ide
ganizing.” Yale Journal on iRegulation 7(5):rchiv
Prov 1, a 355–426.
e
erv c 5-5557
e
Greater New OrleansSAFL-CIO. 2001. Louisiana Legislative Update 2001. Unpaged
1
Arilin
No.
electronic document dated 19 June. Retrieved 17 July 2003 from www.gnoaflcio.org/
LALegUpdate.html.
Gregory, David L. 1986. “The Labor Law Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance
or Last Hurrah?” William & Mary Law Journal 27(3): 507–582.
Hartley, Roger. 2003. “Preemption’s Market Participant Immunity—A Constitutional Interpretation: Implications for Living Wage and Labor Peace Policies.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law 5(2): 229–258.
Hooper, Lundy, and Bookman, Inc. 2002. “AB 1889 Preempted by NLRA.” Health Law Perspectives. Unpaged electronic document dated November. Retrieved 17 July 2003 from
www.health-law.com/publications/articles/20030530.
Jackson Lewis. 2003. National Labor Relations Board Will Oppose Enforcement of California’s
Labor Neutrality Law. Unpaged electronic document. Retrieved 17 July 2003 from
www.jacksonlewis.com/publications/articles/20030530/default.cfm.
Kronland, Scott A. 2000. A.B. 1889: A Summary. Prepared for the California Labor Federation.
Copy obtained from the California Labor Federation.
———. 2003. “An Update on NLRA Preemption of State and Local Laws and on the Regulator/Proprietor Distinction.” Paper presented at AFL-CIO LCC Conference, New Orleans.
Labor Policy Association. 2002. NLRB General Counsel Considering Enjoining California
Neutrality Law. Unpaged electronic document dated 30 May. Retrieved 15 May 2003 from
www.nlrbwatch.com.
logan / innovations in state and local labor legislation
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———. 2003a. In Brief Opposing California Neutrality Law, NLRB Extols the Virtues of
“Robust Debate of Union Representation Issues.” Unpaged electronic document dated
6 June. Retrieved 17 July 2003 from www.hrpolicyy.org/news/news_detail.asp?IDϭ
1188.
———. 2003b. NLRB Decides to Weigh In against California Neutrality Law. Unpaged
electronic document dated 31 May. Retrieved 15 May 2003 from www.nlrbwatch.
com.
Lawler, John. 1990. Unionization and Deunionization. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
Logan, John. 2002. “Consultants, Lawyers and the ‘Union Free’ Movement Since the
1970s.” Industrial Relations Journal 33(3): 197–214.
———. Forthcoming. “‘Labor’s Last Stand in National Politics’? The Striker Replacement
Campaign and the Failure of Labor Law Reform.” In Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, edited by Bruce Kaufman and David Lewin.
McCracken, Richard. 2003. “Making State and Local Laws II.” Paper Presented at the AFLCIO LCC Conference, New Orleans.
North, Brent. 2002. “The Impact of AB 1889 on Union Activities.” Employers Group Newsletter—
Capitol Review. Unpaged electronic document dated 26 September. Retrieved 17 July 2003
from www.employersgroup.com/Data/newsletter/2002/06/Capitol_Review.asp.
Pepe, Steve and Brent North. 2002. “An Overview for Employers Group Members on AB
1889: Compliance Issues Employers Group.” Employers Group—News for HR. 26 Septems
ber. Unpaged electronic document. Retrieved 17 July 2003 from iwww.employersgroup.
rport
ld A
com/News/LatestNews/AB1889artl.asp.
Wor
les
7
Ange Court Challenge From Business.”
Robertson, Kathy. 2001. “New Unionization LawsSurvives21, 201
Lo
gu 17
n v. Retrieved st July 2003 from www.bizjournals.
Sacremento Business Journal, Januarys2001. on Au
A s d
e
iders
com/sacramento/stories/2001/01/01/daily13.html.
Prov 1, archiv
rvice -5557
e1991. “Against Preemption in Labor Law.” Connecticut Law Review 24(1):
eS
Silverstein,riEileen. o. 15
A lin
N
1–53.
State of California, Department of General Services, Procurement Division, Master Agreements and Contracts Section. 2002. Statewide Checklist of Statewide Contracts, Statewide
Food Contracts, State Price Schedules, Master Agreements. Sacramento: Department of General Services.
State of California, Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General. 2001. Attorney
General Bill Lockyer Files Lawsuit Against Nursing Home Company for Failing to Comply
with State Labor Law. Press release dated 19 November.
State of California, Office of the Governor. 2002. Governor Davis Gives Keynote Address Announcing Small Business Partnerships with State Reaches 10,000. Press release dated 24
April.
Townley, Barbara. 1986. Labor Law Reform in U.S. Industrial Relations. Aldershot:
Gower.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Chamber Litigation Center. 2002a. California AB
1889 Overturned: Employers Given OK to Discuss Unionization with Workers. Unpaged electronic document dated 20 September. Retrieved 15 July 2003 from www.uschamber.com/
nclc/news/alerts/alert020920.htm.
———. 2002b. “Employer Rights Under the NLRA.” The Business Advocate: A Periodic Update of the Activities of the National Chamber Litigation Center 24(1): 3–5.
Yager, Daniel V. 1997. NLRB–Agency In Crisis. Washington D.C.: Labor Policy Association.
194
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———. 2003. “Time to Stop the Balkanization of American Labor Law: General Counsel
Arthur Rosenfeld Should Move Against State/Local Regulation of Labor Relations.”
NLRB Watch. Unpaged electronic document dated 4 April. Retrieved 15 May 2003 from
www.nlrbwatch.com/news/2003/Balkanization_of_Labor_Law.htm.
Zachem, Susan. 2002. GCIU California Coalition Lays Claim to First Victory. Unpaged electronic document. Retrieved 17 July 2003 from www.gciu.org/archives/02j-f/404morg.
shtml.
rts
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A P P E N D I X . Summary of State Neutrality Bills
State
Bill
Purpose
Fate
Arizona
HB 2503
To restrict the use of state funds by state
contractors
Died in committee,
January 2001
Arizona
HB 2548
To restrict the use of state funds by state
contractors
Died in committee, 2002
California
AB 442
To restrict the use of state funds by private
and public employers for anti-union
activities
Passed by legislature, 1999
Vetoed
California
AB 1889
To restrict the use of state funds by private
and public employers for pro- or
anti-union activities
Passed by legislature, August
2000
Signed into law, September
2000
Colorado
SB 130
To restrict the use of state funds by state
contractors
Passed by senate, April 2002
Died in house committee
Connecticut
HB 6936
To restrict the use of state funds by health
care facility providers
Passed by house, June 2001
Died in senate committee
Connecticut
SB 763
To restrict the use of state funds by state
contractors
Died in committee, 2001
Florida
HB 957
SB 1042
Florida
HB 767
SB 1378
s
Georgia
riline
A
SB 271
ts
irpor
ld A
To restrict the use of state funds by health orPassed by house
les W 0Died in senate committee,
care facility providers
Ange 21, 2 17
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May 2001
gust
n v.
rs As
u
on A
e
To restrict ithe userchstate funds by nursing
ov d a of ived
e Pr
,
facilities
ervichome 5571
S
-5
No.
15
Passed by legislature
Signed into law, May 2002
Died in senate, March 1999
“Bill to Provide for State Neutrality
in Union Organizing”
Hawaii
To restrict the use of state funds by
employers (specifies prohibited activities)
Died in committee,
March 2003
Illinois
HB 726
To prohibit the recipients of state funds
from using those funds to promote,
assist, or deter unionization
Died in committee,
March 2001
Illinois
HB 3395
To prohibit the use of state funds by
employers that had reimbursement
agreement with state; to require that
unions be given equal access to
employees and prohibit captive
meetings during working hours
Died in committee,
April 2001
Illinois
HB 3011
To restrict the use of state funds by health
care facility providers
Died in committee,
April 2001
Illinois
HB 3395
To prohibit the use of state funds by
employers that had reimbursement
agreement with state; to require that
unions be given equal access to
employees and prohibit captive
meetings during working hours
Passed by senate, April 2003
Died in house committee,
June 2003
196
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A P P E N D I X . (Continued )
State
Bill
Purpose
Fate
Indiana
Bill 1980
To prohibit any employer with a
reimbursement agreement with state
from using state funds to support
or oppose unionization
Passed by house
Died in senate committee,
March 2001
Iowa
HJ 215/256
HF 126
To prohibit the use of state funds by
employer that was reimbursed by the
state, received grants from the state,
had contracts with state, or participated
in state programs
Died in committee,
February 2001
Louisiana
SB 1078
To prohibit employers from using state
funds to assist, promote, or deter
unionization
Died in committee,
July 2001
Maine
LD 1394
HP 1037
To restrict the use of state funds by health
care facility providers
Passed by legislature
Vetoed, June 2001
Maryland
HB 1246
To restrict the use of state funds by health
care facility providers
Died in committee,
March 2001
Massachusetts
To restrict the use of state funds by health
care facility providers
Massachusetts
HB 630
s
rport
ld Ai Pending
“An Act to Ensure Proper Expenditurerof
Wo
eles
7
and Accounting for s Ang 21, 201
State Funds”
o
.L
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A
To prohibits ed on from using state
iders employers
Prov 1, torchiv promote, or deter
funds a assist,
ice
57
Serv 15-55unionization
.
riline
Missouri
HB 1816
A
Died in house, February
2000
No
Missouri
HB 2209
To prohibit employers from using state
funds to assist, promote, or deter
unionization
Died in committee, 2002
Missouri
HB 308
“An Act Relating to Union Organizations
Limitations on Private Employer Use of
State Funds”
Pending
New Hampshire
SB 162
To limit the use of state funds by private
contractors (specifies prohibited
activities, including using state funds
to “defend against unfair labor
practice charges”)
Died in committee, 2002
New Jersey
Executive
Order 20
To require card check and neutrality from
state contractors that provide uniforms
for state employees (may be modified in
near future)
Signed into law, June 2002
New Jersey
AB 2958
To prohibit the use of state funds to pay
consultants, train supervisors, or pay
salaries of other employees whose
primary responsibility is union
avoidance (similar to New York
neutrality law)
Pending
logan / innovations in state and local labor legislation
197
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A P P E N D I X . (Continued )
State
Bill
Purpose
Fate
New York
SB 6328
To prohibit the use of state funds to “train
managers, supervisors, or other
administrative personnel regarding
methods to discourage union
organization”
Passed by legislature,
April 1998
Signed into law
New York
AB 8568
SB 4385
To prohibit the use of state funds to pay
consultants, train supervisors, or pay
salaries of other employees whose
primary responsibility is union
avoidance
Passed by legislature, July
2002
Signed into law, September
2002
North Dakota
SB 2434
To provide limits on the use of state funds
for union organizing
Died in committee,
February 2001
Oregon
HB 3645
S 778/776
To prohibit the use of state funds to
encourage or discourage unionization
(similar to AB 1889)
Died in committee, 2001
Oregon
SB 494-A
Passed by senate, June 2003
To prohibit the use of state funds to
Pending in house
oppose or support union organizing
efforts by workers employed by public
rts
agencies, organizations that receive state
Airpo
grants, and contractors for services who World
les
receive 50 percent or more of theire 1, 2017
Ang funds
Los
st 2
from the state ssn v.
Augu
Pennsylvania
HB 1531/
To e Provthe , archiv funds by state
restrict
use of state
ervic 5-55571
1659ine S
contractors
1
l
iders
Ari
Tennessee
HB 20
SB 413
Washington
West Virginia
A
n
ed o
No.
Died in committee,
May 2001
To provide for state neutrality in labor
organizing
Pending
HB 2016
To prohibit the use of state funds to
encourage or discourage unionization
(similar to AB 1889)
Died in house committee,
March 2003
HB 2920
SB 534
To prohibit nursing home facilities and
home health care providers from using
state funds to deter unionization;
prohibit anti-union meetings during
work shifts in which employees care
for Medicaid patients
Died in committee, 2001
The State of California Labor, 2003, Vol. 3, pp. 157–198, ISSN 1531-9037, electronic ISSN 1541-9045. © 2003 by
the Institute for Labor and Employment. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to: Rights
and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center Street, Suite 303, Berkeley, CA
94704-1223.
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Living Wage Ordinances
in California
MICHAEL REICH
Since 1994 living wage ordinances have been passed and, in
varying degrees, implemented in over ninety-five local governmental entities in the
United States; among them (as of July 2003) are twenty-one California cities.1 Of
the six largest cities in California, four have adopted living wage ordinances: Oakland, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Jose.2 Outside of California, the major
cities in the United States that have passed living wage laws include: Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New
York, and St. Louis. Brenner (2003) estimates that close to 40% of the population of
s
rport
large U.S. cities live in cities with living wage ordinances.3 By thisAmeasure, living
ld i
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wage policies have spread rapidly and widely. Yet our understanding of their dimenAnge 21, 2017
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sions and impacts is only beginning to emerge.. August
sn v
rs As ved on
vide cities ipassed living wage ordinances? What do
What is a livable wage? Whyohave arch
r
ice P
71,
we know about rtheir Serv . 15on5workers, employers, and taxpayers? Given the state
e impacts -5 5
ilin
A
No
and local fiscal crises now affecting California, as well as many other states, what
does the future hold for living wage policies?
As their name suggests, living wage ordinances set a mandated wage floor—an
hourly rate that is identified as a livable wage for the locality—and defines the
employees who are covered. Most often, the ordinance applies only to employees
working on municipal service contracts over a given threshold, such as $25,000.
Table 6.1 lists all the known California cities with living wage ordinances, the dates
they were passed, the mandated wage and benefit levels, the types of employers and
I am grateful for research support from the Institute for Labor and Employment. I would also like
to thank Mark Brenner, Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, David Fairris, Peter Hall, Ken Jacobs, and the
anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Carolina Briones, David
Runsten, and Sarah Zimmerman for sharing their preliminary data on living wage impacts.
1. Campaigns to pass similar laws are underway in a large number of localities.
2. The other two cities are San Diego and Sacramento. Advocates in San Diego have discussed
introducing a living wage ordinance, and in September 2003 the Sacramento City Council
voted preliminary approval for a living wage ordinance.
3. As in the rest of the United States, most of the California ordinances are in medium and
smaller cities as diverse as Hayward and Pasadena.
reich / living wage ordinances
199
200
$9.13 with benefits
$10.50 without
Indexed to CPI: 9.45/
10.87 in 2002
12 paid days off
March 1998
November 2002
Oakland
Extended to Port
of Oakland
Service contracts
$9.00 with benefits
$10.25 without
January 2002
Marin
Collective bargaining supersession
Worker retention
No public funds for anti-union activities
Restricts use of part-time workers
Service contracts: $25,000
$8.32 with benefits
$9.46 without
June 1999
Los Angeles County
Anti-retaliation language
Collective bargaining supersession
Worker retention (separate ordinance)
Service contracts: $25,000
Subsidies: $1 million
Property contacts
$8.53 with bene fits
$9.78 without
Indexed to city employee
retirement benefits
12 paid days off
March 1997
Amended 1998
Los Angeles
Anti-retaliation
Collective bargaining supersession c
Service contracts: $25,000
Municipal employees
March 1999
Hayward
$9.26 with benefits
$10.71 without
August 2002
Fairfax
Service contracts: $10,000
Subsidies: $15,000
Municipal employees
June 2000
Amended
October 2000
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rts
Service contracts: $25,000
Subsidies: $100,000
Property contacts
Anti-retaliationb
Labor Relations Provisions
$13.00 with bene fits
$14.75 without
Coverage/Threshold
City employees
Service contracts: $25,000
Non-profits: $100,000
Subsidy recipients: $100,000
Property contracts. a All businesses in Marina Zone
with $350,000 in annual gross receipts
Wage/Benefit Level
$10.76 with bene fits
$12.55 without
May be adjusted by
city council
Date Passed
Berkeley and
Berkeley Marina
City
table 6 . 1 . Living Wage Ordinances in California, as of September 2003
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October 2001
April 2000
August 2000
Richmond
San Fernando
San Francisco
Living Wage
reich / living wage ordinances
January 2000
$10.45 with bene fits
$11.70 without bene fits
$10.25
Annual increase of 2.5%
through 2005
Employer must provide
health benefits or pay
into a city fund
12 paid days off
October 2001
San Francisco
Redevelopment
Agency
Anti-retaliation language
Collective bargaining supersession
For-profit service contracts: $425,000
Non-profit contracts: $50,000
Property contracts
Workers whose performance a ffects safety
or security
Labor Peace/Card Check
(separate regulation)
Anti-retaliation language
rts
San Francisco
Airport-Quality
Standards Program
Employer must provide
health benefits that
meet standards or pay
$1.50 an hour into a
fund for the uninsured
For-profit service contracts: $25,000
Non-profit contracts: $50,000
Property contracts
Service contracts: $25,000
Subsidies: $25,000
$7.25 with benefits
$8.50 without
6 paid days off
For-profit service contracts: $25,000
Non-profit contracts: $50,000
Airport property contracts
In Home Support Services Public Authority
Service contracts: $25,000
Non-profit contracts: $100,000
Municipal employees
Property contracts
$12.47 with bene fits
$13.44 without
$10.25 with annual
increase of 2.5%
through 2005
$9.00 for non-pro fits
12 paid days off
Non-retaliation
Collective bargaining supersession
Anti-retaliation language
Collective bargaining supersession
Municipal employees
Service contracts: $25,000
$8.20 with benefits
$9.61 without
$9.00 for temp agencies
June 2001
September 1998
Pasadena
Service contracts
Subsidies
$9.00 with benefits
$11.25 without
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San Francisco Health
Care Accountability
July 2002
Oxnard
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201
202
November 1998
Date Passed
October 2000
Santa Clara County
Santa Cruz
May 2001
September 2002
October 1997
Ventura County
Watsonville
West Hollywood
Labor peace
Worker retention
Collective bargaining supersession
Labor Relations Provisions
Anti-retaliation
Cannot use city funds for anti-union activity
Labor peace for city temporary workers
Anti-retaliation
Collective bargaining supersession
Service contracts: $20,000
Direct grants: $100,000
Coverage/Threshold
Subsidies
Service contracts: $10,000
Service contracts
Employers within the Coastal Zone with more than
$5 million in annual gross receipts and
50 employees
Service contracts: $25,000
Contracts in 14 categories
Service contracts: $25,000
$10.10 with bene fits
$11.35 without
Indexed
Wage/Benefit Level
$10.00 with bene fits
$11.65 with bene fits
$12.071 without bene fits
Indexed annually
$10.50 with bene fits
$13.00 without
10 paid days off
$8.00 with benefits
$10.00 without
$11.65 with bene fits
$12.71 without
Indexed annually
10 paid days off
$8.00 with benefits
$9.30 without
$9.00 for temp agencies
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rts
s o u rc e s : ACORN Living Wage Resource Center; Employment Policies Institute; Reynolds 2003.
a
Property contracts place wage conditions on leases of public property.
b
Anti-retaliation prohibits retaliating against workers for reporting violations or in other ways exercising rights under the ordinances.
c
Collective bargaining supersession states that provisions may be set aside in a collective bargaining agreement.
May 2000
Repealed in 2003,
prior to
implementation
Santa Monica
Amended 2002
September 1995
San Jose
City
ta ble 6 . 1 . (continued )
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contracts that are covered as well as coverage thresholds, and labor relations provisions that are part of the ordinance.4
The wage column in Table 6.1 shows how high the mandated wage levels are in
these ordinances and how much they vary across jurisdictions. The lowest wage
mandate without health care coverage is $8.50 per hour and the highest without
health care coverage is $14.75. Among large cities, the mandated wage, without
benefits, ranges from $9.78 in Los Angeles to $11.70 in San Francisco. These rates
compare favorably to the California minimum wage—$6.75 since January 2002—
and the federal minimum wage—$5.15 since September 1997.
The living wage concept derives from a social norm, namely that an employer in
the United States pay wages that permit one full-time worker to support a family of
four at a “livable” standard of living. The underlying moral principle is that workers
obtain dignity when they can support their families without government assistance.
The underlying economic principle is that U.S. business and government employers
were able to meet such a norm until the mid-1970s and that subsequent improvements in education levels and labor productivity make this norm even more affordable for employers today. Living wage ordinances specifically mandate that taxpayer
dollars be used according to such moral and economic principles.
What wage rate, then, constitutes a livable wage? The term “livable” is best unders
stood as an attempt to improve upon two related but highly flawed Airport that a
concepts:
ld
Wor
l s
feasible family budget can be based on the state or federaleminimum wage and that
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.
the federal household poverty level reflects an accuratest
sn v
ugu assessment of the income
rs As ved on A
vide requires that the state minimum wage be
needs of the poor. Californiaro
statutearchi
ice P
1,
benchmarked at iaine Sethat1permits a worker to meet a minimal standard of living,
level rv . 5-5557
rl
A
No
as calculated by household budget studies that used to be defined and published by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The budget studies disappeared long ago, and so
did the benchmarking of California’s minimum wage policy.
The household poverty level is set by the federal government using a methodology that simply multiplies by three the cost of food from a basic nutrition diet, using
the proportion of income that once went to food expenditures. In 2003 the official
federal poverty level for a four-person household was about $18,000, equivalent
approximately to $9.00 per hour for one year-round full-time worker. The federal
approach, which dates to the 1960s, does allow for differences in household size, but
it does not provide any allowance for differential housing costs across cities, nor does
it include a very big item—child care expenses—that was exceptional in the 1960s
and is now the norm. Today’s living wage advocates frequently seek to meet the federal poverty standard while emphasizing its limitations.
4. Typically, the ordinances contain a health benefit incentive and some type of wage indexing.
A number of ordinances also contain conditions on worker retention, and they can be superseded by collective bargaining agreements. In these respects California ordinances are similar
to those in the rest of the United States.
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A “self-sufficiency” standard that allows a family to “make ends meet,” has also
been widely used in living wage campaigns. Unlike the poverty standard, this more
expansive approach takes into account the importance of local differences in the
costs of housing, transportation, and child care. The website of the Economic Policy
Institute provides self-sufficiency budgets that have been calculated for 400 communities in the United States, with separate calculations for different numbers of adults
and children in the household.5
Budgets that meet the self-sufficiency standard for California are generally twice
as high as those based on the federal poverty standard. In the Los Angeles–Long
Beach area, for example, such a budget ranges from $29,258 for a family with one
adult and one child to $49,683 for a family with two adults and three children; the
comparable figures for San Francisco are $38,431 and $62,161. Since child care costs
tend to be substantial, the wage rates required for self-sufficiency are higher for households with several pre-school age children, and they are much lower, close to the poverty standard, when households contain two working adults and no dependents.
In 1999, according to the recent decennial census, the median income of all Los
Angeles households stood at $42,189, while median income in San Francisco stood
at $55,221. The Economic Policy Institute reports that 33.1% of all California households do not meet the self-sufficiency standard. It thus appears likely that perhaps twos
fifths of the households in Los Angles and San Francisco do notAirport standard.
meet the
ld
Wor level as the floor. VariaEvery local living wage policy must choose a ngeles wage17
single
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tion among different household structures therefore tcreates an ambiguity in how one
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equivalents, per household, in a locality.6 This approach usually involves a household with between one and two full-time earners who support a family of four. The
next step is to calculate a self-sufficiency income for that household and the hourly
wage needed to meet it.
The high wage levels generated by the self-sufficiency standard sometimes create
anxiety among local policy makers. Although the self-sufficiency level is often cited
to justify a living wage mandate, no existing living wage ordinance has set a floor at
the self-sufficiency level. In practice, the actual wage level (and coverage levels) chosen represents some compromise involving the local self-sufficiency level, the costs as
estimated by prospective studies, and the contending political forces in the city.
The issues involved are illustrated by San Francisco’s living wage ordinance, which
was passed and implemented in 2000: its $10.00 per hour mandate was 74% higher
than the statewide minimum wage level of $5.75 then in effect and was still 48%
5. See the Economic Policy Institute website (http://www.epinet.org). The institute uses the term
“basic” rather than “self-sufficiency.” The concept of a basic consumption good in economics
has a fascinating history; see the excellent discussion in Brown 2002.
6. The term “full-time equivalents” takes into account that many earners work part-time or part
of the year.
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table 6 .2. Cost of Living Indices for California
Metropolitan Areas, 2002
Metropolitan Area
San Francisco
Oakland
San Diego
Los Angeles-Long Beach
Orange County
Average, 324 urban areas
Indexed to 100.0
(Cost of Living,
National
Average)
Indexed to 5.15
(Federal
Minimum
Wage)
184.1
139.5
137.8
135.2
134.6
100.0
$9.48
$7.18
$7.10
$6.96
$6.93
$5.15
s o u rc e : Association of Community and Economic
Development Research Professionals (www.accra.org).
n ot e : San Francisco PMSA consists of San Francisco, San
Mateo, and Marin Counties. Oakland PMSA consists of
Alameda and Contra Costa Counties.
greater than the $6.75 per hour state minimum wage that went into effectsin 2002.
rport
ld Ai
In comparison, the self-sufficiency budget for a San Francisco family with one parWor
eles
An per hour 17
ent working full-time calls for a wage of over $17.00 g t 21, 20(California Budget
Los
.
sn v n Augus
Project 2002).
o
rs As
vide rchived
o
Advocates for livingervice Pr 571, a point out that simply adjusting the 1968
wage ordinances
5
S
1 -5
national minimumewageofor5inflation would yield a minimum wage of $8.54 (in
Arilin
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2003 dollars). Moreover, average worker productivity has grown by more than 50%
in the intervening years and low-paid workers are more educated today than in the
1960s. Consequently, an even higher minimum wage would appear to be economically affordable.
The continuing growth in living cost differentials across metropolitan areas,
mainly driven by housing costs, has created additional pressure for local living wage
ordinances. In 2002, as Table 6.2 shows, the cost of living in San Francisco was 184%
above the national average. Housing costs alone were more than 300% of the
national average.7 Housing costs are relatively more burdensome for low-income
renter and homeowner households, which tend to spend a higher percentage of their
incomes on housing than more affluent households do. This point is particularly apt
7. See the ACCRA website (http://www.accra.org). ACCRA stands for Association of Community and Economic Development Research Professionals. The ACCRA index draws on data
concerning homeowners’ costs but not renters’. The data collected by the National LowIncome Housing Coalition (http://www.nlihc.org) shows, however, that apartment rents and
house prices correlate highly and positively across metropolitan areas. This means that the
ACCRA index would generate similar results if renters’ costs were included.
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for San Francisco. However, as Table 6.2 shows, it also applies to the rest of California’s urban areas, which all have living costs well above the national average for metropolitan areas.8
In contrast to the nearly universal coverage of minimum wage laws, the workers
who are covered under local living wage ordinances usually represent a small proportion of a city’s low-wage workforce. As Table 6.1 shows, most living wage ordinances
are limited to the employees of businesses who hold municipal service contracts. A
smaller number of ordinances, less than half of the total in the United States, also
cover employees of businesses that receive substantial financial assistance from the
city.9 This narrow scope means that most low-wage workers in a city are not covered
by the law. In this regard the first Los Angeles ordinance, passed in 1997, was typical;
Brenner, Wicks-Lim, and Pollin (2003) estimated that it affected less than 2% of the
city’s lowest decile of wage earners. This low coverage rate raises the question of
whether traditional living wage ordinances have changed or can change the conditions within the larger low-wage labor market.
Two developments have significantly increased the coverage of living wage ordinances. In Los Angeles, Miami, Oakland, and San Francisco, ordinances have been
extended to cover employers who are tenants on city-owned property. The provision
primarily affects the cities’ airports; in Los Angeles and San Francisco airport workers
s
comprise half of all the workers covered.10 Employment atdtherport
l Ai nation’s largest airWorabout a third of them are
les
ports generally ranges from 20,000 to 50,000 workers, and017
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low-paid. Comparable policies havesn v. underust
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The second development involves the addition of a geographic dimension to local
e Se . 15-5
Arilin
No
living wage ordinances. This expansion has already begun with the inclusion of airports, which of necessity are geographical entities. It has also already occurred in
some coastal California cities, which have extended ordinances to areas on or near
the city’s waterfront.11 Potentially even more significant, a few cities are experimenting with extending their living wage ordinance to all employers in the city, which
would establish a municipal-level minimum wage. (I discuss the implications of
these developments at the end of this essay.)
Because minimum wage rates, which are not indexed, have not kept up with the
growth of self-sufficiency income levels in California, living wage advocates often
emphasize these low-wage workers’ unmet needs. In San Francisco, for example, the
rallying cry in a current living wage campaign is “Six seventy-five is not enough.”
8. San Francisco had the highest cost of living index in 2002 of all metropolitan areas in the
United States.
9. In many cities, policy makers have provided exemptions or waivers for many employers, especially those who are non-profit organizations, further limiting coverage.
10. A 2003 statewide Florida law effectively repealed living wage coverage at Miami-Dade Airport.
Workers there had already received living wage raises, however.
11. Such ordinances are in effect in Berkeley, Oakland, and San Francisco.
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Opponents of living wages see labor markets as operating benignly, with minimum wage jobs serving as teenagers’ first stepping-stones to careers and wages that
increase with experience. These opponents argue that the public costs of the policies
will either be very large, as wage increases are passed on in higher contract costs, or
that employers will reduce employment if they cannot pass on their cost increases. A
further argument states that employers will substitute more educated workers when
pay rates increase, so that the intended beneficiaries will actually lose rather than
gain from the policies. These arguments derive from a coherent set of theoretical
propositions, but their importance depends on the extent to which they apply
empirically. I return in the next section to discussing the evidential basis for these
propositions.
The arguments that advocates have developed touch on not only labor market
failures and the failures of national- and state-level minimum wage policies; they
also refer to efficiency and fairness failures in municipal out-sourcing policies, to the
leverage of local governments over service providers, and, finally, to a demonstrated
potential affordability of the policies.12
First, increasingly deregulated labor markets have not eliminated poverty-level
wages. On the contrary, over the past two decades real wage rates have fallen for
workers in the bottom two-fifths of the wage distribution, even as labor productivity
s
has grown. Even the sustained economic expansion of the late 1990srport
ld Ai brought only
Wor
small real wage gains, and these were eliminated in ngeles 017 recession and
the subsequent
A
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jobless recovery.
gust
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Pay inequality grew faster in rCalifornia hivedin the rest of the nation, and real pay
ovid
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for the bottom quintile rv .wage earners declined while the cost of living in the state
e Se of 15-5
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No
outstripped the rest of the country. Indeed, the number of working but poor families did not fall during the 1990s expansion and has risen subsequently (California
Budget Project 2003). Real wages in California, in short, have stagnated at best, and
have failed to match long-term trends in productivity growth. This wage stagnation
suggests either a market or a policy failure that could be corrected through policy
interventions.13
Second, the decline in low pay resulted especially from a specific policy failure,
namely the decline in real value of the national minimum wage, which has fallen
12. Although each point rests on a substantial research literature, I can only present them in a
summary form here, and I cite the main research sources only partially; see the more extensive
discussions in Reich and Hall 2001 and Reich, Hall, and Jacobs 2003.
13. I am not suggesting that wage growth and productivity must grow at the same rate, but rather
that the market-oriented marginal productivity theory of wage distribution suggests that they
should and would. The phrase “market failure” refers to the fact that the labor market has not
functioned in this way. My previous work, and that of many others, has suggested that longterm “sharing” of productivity gains depends upon institutional rules and that these rules
have changed significantly since the mid-1970s. See Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982 for a
more complete account.
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substantially since 1968 and stands considerably below the federally defined poverty
level for a single wage-earner with a spouse and two children. Wage rates at the low
end of the distribution are much more affected by movements in mandated national
and state minimum wage policies than by immigration or by skill-biased technical
change (Card and DiNardo 2002; Lee 1999). As many studies have shown (see, for
example, Brown 1999), moreover, recent increases in the minimum wage have not
restrained employment or economic growth.
Third, this national-level policy failure has only partly been addressed at the state
level. Eleven states have set a state minimum wage above the national level, but none
provides a living-level wage. Moreover, in California and in some other regions of
the nation, urban housing costs have risen substantially, creating a higher cost of living that national and statewide policies do not address. Localities have stepped into
this vacuum with living wage ordinances.
Fourth, declining wage rates in municipal services result from efficiency and fairness failures involving contracting out, or outsourcing. In many jurisdictions in the
1980s, taxpayers were told that local services could be made cheaper through outsourcing. The theory was that competition would reduce costs by squeezing publicsector wage overpayments and by increasing worker productivity without affecting
service quality. Subsequent research showed that when outsourcing reduced direct
s
rport
costs, it did so primarily by reducing workers’ pay below private-sector levels, reducld Ai
Wor
ing service levels and quality, and retaining hiddeneles 017
administrative costs in the public
Ang 21, 2
Los
sector (Sclar 2000). Voters and legislators. have therefore supported living wage mangust
nv
s
u
on A
rs As
dates because they wantPto vide archived
ro correct these efficiency and fairness failures. They do not
ice
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want taxpayer dollars 15-5557 below-poverty wage rates.
riline No.
A
We need to remember that the quality and quantity of local services, which are
largely functions of pay rates and staffing levels, are determined in large part through
taxpayers’ ability and willingness to pay. Just as is the case for local public employees
such as school teachers or firefighters, the wages paid to the employees of service
contractors are set not only by a market exchange but also by a political exchange.
Taxpayers want equitable treatment of workers as well as a fair return for their taxes,
but contractors’ wage rates can vary substantially and yet be consistent with efficiency
and quality. As the expression goes, “you get what you pay for.”
Fifth, living wage policies are targeted to local public services, which are not only
paid for by taxpayers; they must be performed locally. Consequently, local governments have some leverage over service providers. They need not be concerned that
the ordinances will drive contractors to relocate to another area. On the contrary,
living wages can function as a local economic development policy, insofar as redistribution of local income to low-savings and local-spending households can increase
multiplier effects on the local economy and, perhaps, relocate spending from overserved to underserved neighborhoods.
Finally, and perhaps most important, prospective studies of the potential costs to
municipalities showed that the ordinances would increase operating costs by negligible
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amounts for most contractors. A typical finding was that the ordinances would
increase operating costs by between 1% and 2% and that the costs that would be
borne by the city would amount to less than 1% of municipal revenue. Moreover,
local government spending on welfare or health care might be less necessary.14
IMPACTS OF CALIFORNIA’S LIVING WAGE LAWS
The debate over living wage laws has been accompanied by a research literature that
generally consists of prospective studies. For some cities, dueling studies have emerged
from opposing camps. Prospective studies generally count the number of workers
and firms that would be affected by living wage ordinances and calculate the benefits
to the workers, the costs to the employers, and the likely costs to the city if
employers pass their increased costs on in the form of higher service contracts. Many
of the prospective studies suggest that, as crafted, living wage ordinances usually
generate costs on the order of 1% to 2% of operating costs for the great majority of
contracting businesses, a range that is unlikely to show up in an increased bid price,
and that overall costs to the city are likely to constitute an even smaller percentage of
local revenue. Other prospective studies come to less benign conclusions. Oppots
irpor
nents of living wage laws argue that the policies may have s World A consequences,
undesired
ele
7
such as larger increases in city contract costs, adverseAng t 21, 201reductions among
Los employment
gus
n v.
Ass d incumbent and targeted workers by
contractors’ workforces, and the replacement of on Au
e
iders
Prov 1, archiv
e
a more educated and advantaged workforce.15
ervic 5-5557
S
Since some Ariline wage laws have been in place for several years, it should be posliving No. 1
sible to advance the debate beyond the prospective studies and to examine the actual
impact of the policies. The next section reviews previous research on the impacts of
minimum and living wages, discusses some of the methodological issues involved in
measuring the impact of a living wage policy, and summarizes the impact studies
that have been conducted for Los Angeles and San Francisco.
14. The Los Angeles study by Pollin and Luce (1998) was the first to present such findings. Pollin
and his coauthors have found similar results for other cities as well (Pollin 2003). Peter Hall,
Ken Jacobs, and I have conducted prospective costs studies for San Francisco, the San Francisco Airport, and the Port of Oakland; we have obtained similar numbers.
15. For examples of such studies, see the website of the Employment Policies Foundation (http://
www.epf.org). Unfortunately, some of the opponents’ studies draw upon survey data that was
collected from employers using cover letters that announced the political agenda of the study.
The resultant reporting bias casts serious doubt on the findings. For an example and critique
involving San Francisco, see the discussion in Reich, Hall, and Hsu 1999. For examples
involving Los Angeles and Santa Monica, see the website of the Political Economy Research
Institute, or PERI (http://www.umass.edu/peri). This controversy parallels a controversy from
the mid-1990s involving biases in data on minimum wage effects at fast-food restaurants; see
Card and Krueger 2000.
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Research on Minimum Wage Impacts in California
California’s recent minimum wage increases provide an important background to
the debate on living wages. The findings of Card and Krueger (1995) and Reich and
Hall (2001) regarding wage compression and employment are especially pertinent
because of their focus on California. Card and Krueger looked at impacts in California after the state raised its minimum wage in 1988–89, comparing its experience to
that of a group of southern states that did not increase the minimum wage in this
period. They found no measurable adverse employment impacts and some,
although short-lived, real wage gains for low-wage workers.
Using a similar methodology, Reich and Hall examined the impacts of the 1996–
98 California minimum wage increase from $4.25 to $5.75, comparing employment
and pay trends in high-wage and low-wage industries. Employment grew in lowwage industries that were more affected by the minimum wage at the same rates as in
high-wage industries, indicating that the policy did not generate any negative
employment effects. Reich and Hall did find longer-lasting wage compression effects
than did Card and Krueger, and they also found that the policy impacts were concentrated among workers in low-income families.
More recently, the California Budget Project examined the impacts of the 2001–02
California increases—from $5.75 to $6.25 and then to $6.75—and found that
s
rport
ld Ai
employment grew faster in California than in the rest of the United States (CaliforWor
les
nia Budget Project 2002). Indeed, from 1996 Ange 21,California’s minimum wage
2002, 2017
Los to ust
n v.
ug
increased nearly 60%, yet theestate’ssemployment growth rate was higher than that
rs As ved on A
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of the rest of the nation—18.3% versus 12.6%.16
rvice -55571,
e Seminimum wage research on California examines a policy that has
In sum,ilrecent No. 15
Ar in
much broader coverage than living wages and finds benign effects. The mandated
wages are much smaller than in typical living wage ordinances, however, and therefore these studies provide only limited guidance to the impacts of setting much
higher floors.
Research on Living Wage Impacts
To date, most living wage research studies have been prospective studies, estimating
the costs and benefits of the policies prior to their adoption.17 Prospective studies
often are undertaken to provide guidance to policy makers. Their quality and
16. For a more detailed discussion, see Reich and Laitinen 2003, as well as the survey article by
Brown (1999).
17. Previous surveys of living wage policies include Pollin and Luce 1998 and Luce 2002. Neumark and Adams (2000), although attempting to study the impacts of living wage policies, do
not have any direct data on workers or employers covered by living wages. See also the California Living Wage Resources website (http://iir.berkeley.edu/livingwage) for studies of individual California living wage laws.
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findings vary considerably, depending in part on the quality of the data that the
authors collect. Generally, the more systematic studies rely upon local governments’
contract databases, combined either with regional input-output data and Current Population Survey (CPS) data on pay by industry and occupation, or with researchers’ surveys of the affected contractors.
The first major such study, by Pollin and Luce (1998), pointed out that the
national minimum wage ceased to function as a “living” wage in the 1980s and then
estimated how alternative living wage policy choices might affect Los Angeles
workers, employers, and taxpayers. Their approach has been repeated for other jurisdictions.18 Although individual workers are predicted to benefit, these studies generally find that impacts on other workers, employers, and taxpayers will likely be
limited. As previously mentioned, Brenner, Wicks-Lim, and Pollin (2003) reported
that about 2% of the lowest decile of wage earners in Los Angeles were covered or
affected by the living wage ordinance.19
More recently, what might be dubbed adoption studies (such as Luce 2002) have
documented the growing number of cities that have adopted living wage ordinances.
These studies have shown that policies have been gradually broadening in coverage
and scope. Martin (2001) examined the political and economic characteristics of a
sample of cities that were among the first to adopt living wage ordinances. He found
s
rport
that political mobilization variables provided an important independent determild Ai
Wor (2003) collected
es
nant of adoption (see also Nissen 2000). Levi, Olson, and lSteinman
nge
2017
o A
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and summarized a large number of descriptions Augcharacteristics of living wage
n v.
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ice 557
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Impact studies, the last group of studies, evaluate the effects of living wage ordinances some time after they have been adopted and implemented. Three different
approaches to studying these impacts have emerged. One approach, represented by
Zabin and Martin (1999) and by Luce (2003), relates the effectiveness of living wage
laws to the monitoring and enforcement processes that are instituted following their
passage, which in turn are related to the continuing involvement of activist organizations. This approach demonstrates through case studies that the “social movement”
effects that are prominent in the adoption studies influence implementation as well.
This literature relies on interviews, often with local officials, and does not seek to
measure quantitatively the impacts of the policies on workers and employers.
A second approach, represented by Neumark and Adams (2000), uses national
CPS data to examine the effects of the ordinances through a cross-sectional regres18. Other examples include Reich, Hall, and Hsu 1999; and Zabin, Reich, and Hall 2000.
19. The prospective studies have expanded recently to include research on possible municipalwide minimum wages. Pollin, Brenner, and Luce (2002) study the potential impact of the
$6.15 minimum wage in New Orleans, and Reich and Laitinen (2003) study the potential
impact of an $8.50 or higher minimum wage in San Francisco. Both papers take up questions
of business relocation.
reich / living wage ordinances
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sion methodology. Their findings suggest that some types of living wage ordinances
create benefits that accrue widely to low-income urban families; particularly effective
are ordinances that cover employees in firms receiving business assistance from the
city. Their large econometric effects appear overstated, however, when compared to
the small number of affected contracts found in the case studies.20
A third approach uses before and after comparisons of surveyed firms and workers
in an individual living wage city. The studies by Brenner on Boston (2003) and by
Fairris on Los Angeles (2003) provide excellent examples of such work.21 Both
authors find substantial positive wage effects for covered workers and negligible disemployment effects.
Methodological Issues
Living wage ordinances are targeted to benefit low-paid workers while the costs
are borne by businesses and the city’s taxpayers. The costs to taxpayers depend upon
the extent to which the higher wage floors generate higher payroll costs and, then, to
the extent that these higher costs are passed on in the form of more expensive service
contracts. Costs can also be shifted to the targeted workers, to the extent that contractors cannot obtain pass-throughs of their higher labor costs and respond instead
p rts
by reducing their workforce or by switching their hiringd toira odifferent pool of
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workers.
Ange 1, 2017
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Computing the benefits of these ssn v. August
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on
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calculation of the number of workers on
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Arilin
No.
directly covered but receive increases because workers just below them receive
increases. Using this approach, Fairris (2003) has reported that approximately 10,000
workers and 375 firms in Los Angeles are covered or affected by the city’s ordinance.22
20. Neumark and Adams assume that the passage of ordinances is either exogenous or reflects the
weight of local public-sector unions, while the adoption literature emphasizes the presence of
strong community-based organizations, suggesting substantial omitted variables bias that may
explain their findings. Neumark and Adams are attempting to address these issues in their
work in progress.
21. Brenner and Luce, forthcoming, which examines firm data for Boston, Hartford, and New
Haven, is another example.
22. To provide some comparative perspective, Brenner (2003) estimates that about 1,000 workers
have benefited from Boston’s living wage ordinance, which set a base wage of $9.11 at the time
of his survey; the rate was raised to $10.25 per hour (for new or renewed contracts) in September 2001. A prospective study (Zabin and Kern 2003) of Sacramento’s proposed ordinance
estimated that 500 workers would benefit at a mandated wage of $8.60, and 2,000 workers
would benefit at a mandated wage of $10. The Center for Policy Initiatives estimates that a
proposed $11.95 living wage would benefit 1,600 employees of for-profit service contractors in
San Diego. At the other extreme, New York City’s living wage law for home care workers,
scheduled to go into effect, is expected to raise pay for about 50,000 workers.
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A number of indirect adjustment mechanisms, comparative trends among living
wage and non-living wage contractors, and potential spillover effects further complicate the benefit calculations.23 The indirect mechanisms (often referred to as “selection effects”) include entry and exit of businesses from the ranks of city contractors
and the entry and exit of their workers from their payrolls; both presumably are
related to the length of time that a contractor has been under the ordinance. The
comparative trends include the relative growth rates of employment and pay in
different sectors that might have occurred without the ordinance. The spillover
effects concern the extent to which the labor market for comparable workers is
affected by pay increases given to the covered workers.
The extent to which costs have increased because of a living wage ordinance can
also be computed simply by examining the affected contracts and comparing their
before and after costs for comparable service levels (Sclar 2000). Here too, though,
selection effects and comparative trends among nonliving wage firms must be considered and the extent to which employers have shifted costs back to the targeted
groups must also be computed.
Moreover, as the recent literature on contracting out has emphasized, the quality
of municipal services and the hidden administrative costs to cities that are not
included in contracts can also vary. If living wage ordinances shift contracting
s
rpo
dynamics from competition over price to competition over quality, iandrtfirms that
ld A
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pay higher wages tend to provide higher quality services,les cost
ge then2017
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tracts and to increase the proportion archived competitively also constitutes an
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A final consideration for understanding employer costs concerns possible adjustments to the ordinance; these mechanisms are often referred to as efficiency wage
effects. One insight provided by efficiency wage theory is that firms that make identical products or services can be diverse in their human resource policies and yet be
efficient and profitable. For example, higher pay rates induce more efficient management and utilization of the workforce, while also motivating employees to be more
effective at the workplace. Studies of living wage impacts thus need to examine
changes in human resource policies and worker performance.
In the current context, the most important efficiency wage adjustment mechanisms include: the effects on employee turnover, which in turn affect costs related
to quits and replacements; the effects on unscheduled absenteeism; and the effects
on worker effort, whether imposed through management edict and supervision or
provided voluntarily by workers. Hiring standards and training of incumbent
23. A related question concerns whether the $1.25 incentive to provide employee health benefits
has been effective in expanding employer-based health coverage. Conceptually, it should be
possible to examine how many firms opted to add health benefits as well as how many employees chose to take up the new offers.
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workers can also be affected. These efficiency wage adjustment mechanisms
can mitigate the direct labor cost increases that are mandated by living wage
ordinances.
Many of these issues are nicely illustrated by the Brenner (2003) study of living
wage impacts in Boston. Brenner surveyed contracting firms in 2001, three years
after the ordinance was implemented and when the living wage mandate stood at
about $9.00 per hour. He collected data not only on wages but also on changes in
employment, turnover, absenteeism, employee morale, and contract cost changes
over the period of implementation.
Brenner divided his sample into two groups: living wage contractors who had to
raise wages to comply with the ordinance (the treatment group), and those that were
already in compliance because they were already paying more than the mandated
level (the control group). He then compared before and after effects.24
Brenner found that about one-fourth of contractors, most of them non-profit
organizations in social services, raised pay in response to the ordinance. Comparing
the treatment and control groups, Brenner found significant positive wage effects.
Among affected firms, the proportion of workers earning less than $9.25 per hour fell
from 31% in 1998 to 4% in 2001, while the percentage among unaffected firms
remained constant, at about 3%. Using CPS data to generate a comparison, Brenner
s
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affected firms and unaffected firms alike, although because affected firms were significantly more likely to transform part-time into full-time jobs, they experienced faster
employment growth (based on full-time equivalencies).
These studies suggest that a systematic calculation of benefits and costs requires a
detailed data set that goes well beyond the administrative data that cities ordinarily
collect on their contractors. The methodology must be well designed to take these
indirect mechanisms into account. That these are high standards to meet helps to
explain why it has taken some time to carry out these studies.
24. This technique, which is designed to hold constant changes that were unrelated to the ordinance, represents a standard method that is generally referred to as “difference-in-difference.”
Its primary assumption is that the living wage firms that make up the treatment group are not
systematically different from the firms in the control group. In most difference-in-difference
studies, this assumption does not hold perfectly, but the resultant biases can be manageable
rather than fatal. The technique also presumes the absence of spillover effects from the treatment group to the larger population. This assumption is likely to hold when the number of
covered firms and workers is small compared to the local labor market, as is the case in Los
Angeles, but not when the number covered is relatively large, as is the case at the San Francisco Airport.
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THE LOS ANGELES LIVING WAGE LAW
The Los Angeles living wage ordinance was first passed in March 1997 and went into
effect the following month. The campaign for the ordinance was led by LAANE,
which continues to be active in enforcement of the ordinance. At the time of passage, Los Angeles was the second city in California and only the tenth in the nation
to adopt a living wage ordinance. The Los Angeles ordinance broke new ground
because it covered a much more comprehensive group of contractors and workers
than did earlier laws in Baltimore or Milwaukee.
The original version of the Los Angeles ordinance specified a living wage level of
$7.25 with employee health benefits or $8.50 without. At the time, the state minimum wage had just been increased from $4.25 to $5.15 and was slated to rise to $5.75
early in 1998. Consequently, the living wage level (without health benefits) exceeded
the state’s minimum wage by 47.8%. Coverage included city service contractors and
larger recipients of local economic development funds. The ordinance also indexed
the wage mandate to future increases in retirement pay for city employees.
Los Angeles amended the ordinance in November 1998, primarily to expand coverage among businesses holding leases at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), to
add city employees, and to create a small-business exception for city lessees. The
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amendments included administrative changes that strengthened the ordinance’s monrport
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$8.53 with health benefits and $9.78 without. This livingust 21level (without benefits)
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more), to recipients of business subsidies of $1,000,000 or more, and to companies
that have a lease from the city (most of these contractors operate at LAX). Implementation has been phased in when leases come up for renewal. Additional provisions call for twelve paid and ten unpaid days off per year.
Other components of the ordinance are also worth noting. Non-profit contractors, who are most often involved in delivery of social services, are exempt from the
ordinance if their CEO’s pay is less than eight times the pay of their lowest-paid
employee. Employers are required to inform employees who are paid less than
$12.00 per hour of their potential eligibility for the federal earned income tax credit
(EITC). Finally, collectively bargained contracts may supersede the ordinance, provided that both union and management agree to do so.
Using the city’s database of living wage contractors, Fairris (2003) assessed the
impacts of the Los Angeles ordinance on employers by collecting information from
a stratified sample of covered establishments.25 He also surveyed a comparable sample
25. Sander and Williams (2003) are conducting a separate study, but it is still in progress and has
not yet been released publicly. These authors have undertaken forty case studies of Los Angeles city contracts, with a focus on how costs have changed and whether employment or productivity has been affected.
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of Los Angeles establishments that were not contractors and were not covered by the
ordinance. His “before” dates ranged from 1997 to 2002 for living wage contractors,
depending on when they became subject to the living wage ordinance, and 2000 for
the control group. The “after” date was 2002 for both groups.
Like Brenner, Fairris used the difference-in-difference methodology that compares
before-and-after patterns between the treatment and control groups, and he was
careful to check whether the treatment group and the control group differed in
important ways. Although Fairris found some possible biases, they appear small; the
“before” wage rates in the two samples, for example, were virtually identical.
Fairris’s principal finding is that pay for employees covered by living wage contracts rose significantly faster than pay for the control group, by about $1.70 on average and $1.60 for firms that first came under the ordinance in 2002. This difference is
remarkably close to the $1.52 difference between the state’s minimum wage and the
city’s living wage in 2002. Fairris did not find any tendency for contractors to
increase their offers of health benefits as a result of the ordinance, but he also found
that they were and are more likely than non-city service contractors to offer health
benefit coverage in any case. He did find that the living wage contractors on average
added two days more of paid time off to employee benefits, compared to the
employers in the control group.
s
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he irport
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tion of both improved employee job satisfaction and labor productivity. He also
found a significant reduction in the use of overtime, but not in the incidence of
training.
Fairris found much greater reductions in turnover among the covered firms: onethird lower on average, which is a large effect. His attempts to control for confounding factors still leave estimates of turnover in a range that is from one-fourth to onehalf lower than turnover among non-contractor firms. He traced the lower turnover
to the higher wage rates offered and, using a conservative estimate ($807) of the cost
of replacing a low-skilled worker, he calculated that lower turnover saves about 6% of
the increased wage bill per worker, per year.
There is good reason to believe that the replacement costs per worker are likely to
be much higher than reported by the contractors in the Fairris data. Using survey
data from hotel, retail, and restaurant employers in Santa Monica, Pollin and Brenner (2003) found that replacing a nonmanagerial worker cost on average $2,090;
even higher replacement costs have been reported by Reich, Hall, and Jacobs (2003)
for a number of cities. Higher replacement costs mean that the savings from turnover reductions are even greater. Using data only from his covered service contractors
in Boston, Brenner (2003) found that the median replacement cost per employee
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was approximately $2,500. Brenner estimated that turnover costs are equivalent to
approximately one-eighth of the total payroll costs of the workers affected by the
Boston living wage ordinance. Since the Los Angeles ordinance increased workers’
wages by approximately one-fourth, turnover reductions alone could save employers
half of the cost of meeting the mandate.
Fairris could not examine many of the important issues surrounding the Los
Angeles ordinance. In particular, he could not consider how many employees
received increases, whether the number of workers employed changed, or whether
firms changed the composition of their workforces.26 His data also cannot tell us
whether costs to the city went up as a result of the ordinance, or whether the quality
of city services improved. Equally important, for statistical reasons Fairris excluded
leaseholders and some service contractors at LAX from his sample. Consequently,
we have greater confidence that his results are representative of non-airport contractors, but we have no insight about the ordinance’s impact at the airport, where the
environment is somewhat different and where perhaps half of the city’s covered
employees are located. Nonetheless, this study provides the most persuasive evidence
yet that the Los Angeles ordinance did increase pay for targeted workers. It also
demonstrates that paying higher wages significantly reduces turnover, thereby setting into motion human resource policies that can improve the well-being and proports
ductivity of workers in the long run, while generating some employerirsavings in the
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San Francisco passed and implemented its first living wage policies in 2000. The
mandated wage initially was set at $9.00 per hour with a separate $1.50 per hour
incentive for employee health benefits, as well as twelve paid days off per year.
The wage level was to increase to $10.00 after one year and then to increase by
2.5% per year through 2005. The current policies are actually comprised of a
series of ordinances that cover three main groups of workers (see Reich, Hall, and
Jacobs 2003).
The first group of covered workers consists of the employees of service contractors,
as in other cities. Nonprofit organizations—mainly deliverers of social services—are
not exempt from the law, as they are in most other cities with living wage ordinances, although they were given greater latitude to pass wage costs on in higher
26. An ongoing survey of living wage contractors, directed by David Runsten of UCLA, will help
to fill these important gaps. Runsten’s preliminary analysis of his data indicates that over fourfifths of employers did not change employment levels. Some employers at LAX have reduced
staffing levels, but their magnitude and their relation to recent declines in airport activity are
not yet known.
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contract costs. Following a subsequent budgetary report, the living wage level for
nonprofits was frozen at $9.00; it increased as originally mandated among for-profit
contractors.
Using a then-proposed living wage level of $11.00, one prospective study (Reich,
Hall, and Hsu 1999) estimated that about 6,000 employees of service contractors
would be affected by the law and that cost pass-throughs would cost the city about
$30 million. The city subsequently determined that the budgetary allocation
required to pay for this component of the policies was virtually identical to the estimate in their study.
The second group of workers who are covered by the living wage ordinance consists of home care workers. Previously, home care workers had functioned as independent contractors who were matched one-on-one with service recipients. Recent
legal changes created an employer of record in San Francisco County: In-Home
Support Services (IHSS), a quasi-governmental entity. With the advent of IHSS,
home care workers’ pay increased substantially from minimum wage levels. Nonetheless, it was estimated that 6,700 IHSS workers would get wage increases as a
result of the living wage law and that virtually all the costs of these increases would
be borne by state and federal sources (Reich, Hall, and Hsu 1999).
Howes (2003) carefully studied the actual impact of living wage laws and simults
taneous collective bargaining developments on the IHSS workers in San Franirpor
rld A
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Howes found that the wage increases resulted in a major expansion of labor supply
into home care employment, so that more needs in home care were met. Virtually
all of the increased costs were borne from federal and state sources, causing substantial new money to enter the city’s economy. Turnover among home care workers fell
by 30%, turnover of provider-recipient pairs fell by 20%, and the proportion of
matches between providers and clients who spoke the same language improved substantially, indicating an improved quality of service.
The third group of workers who are covered by the San Francisco living wage
ordinances consists of employees at San Francisco International Airport (SFO). The
ordinance that covers airport employees, dubbed the Quality Standards Program,
was passed by the Airport Commission in January 2000; it was implemented in
April for airline services contracts and in October for airline employees. The program established hiring, training, and compensation standards for all of the eighty
employers with workers in security areas or performing security functions. The standards, which exceeded those set at the time by the Federal Aviation Administration,
cover some 8,300 workers, including baggage screeners, skycaps, baggage handlers,
airplane cleaners, fuelers, and boarding agents—anyone whose performance affects
airport security and safety. The design and enforcement of the QSP resulted from
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concerted organizing and negotiations by labor, innovative policy making by public
officials, and enlightened acceptance by key employers.
The QSP is the subject of a large-scale impact analysis that I conducted with Peter
Hall and Ken Jacobs (Reich, Hall, and Jacobs 2003).27 Following a standard evaluation methodology, we surveyed business and working conditions and performance at
SFO before and after the implementation of the policies. We faced the usual challenges of isolating the impacts of the program from other changes taking place.
Since our sample was not large enough to support multivariate controls, our method
for identifying policy effects relies on a series of first-difference comparisons.
For our main comparisons we obtained data from representative samples of all the
covered firms both before and after the policy went into effect. These comparisons
were made easier because all but one of the firms were operating at the airport at
both points in time and because all faced the same changes in the airport’s business
environment. We controlled for effects that were not directly related to the QSP in
the period of study, 1998–2001, such as any changes in passenger volume, the opening of the new International Terminal, improvements in management-labor relations, and the overall strength (or weakness) of the national and regional economy.
From the inception of the QSP in April 2000 to our data collection ending date of
June 2001, almost 90% of the 11,000 ground-based non-management workers at
s
SFO—approximately 9,700 workers—obtained a wage increase. TheAirport increases
ld largest
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were recorded among entry-level workers in QSP-coveredles 017
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workers, including security screeners, baggage handlers, fuel agents, customer service
agents, ramp workers, and cabin cleaners. For example, security screeners, who averaged $13,400 a year with no benefits prior to the QSP, earned $20,800 plus full
benefits by January 2001, a 55% increase in wages, and a 75% increase in total compensation. Prior to the new city and airport policies, 55% of the ground-based nonmanagerial jobs paid an average of less than $10.00 an hour. By June 2001 only 5%
of these jobs were paying an average of less than $10.00 per hour. The proportion of
entry-level positions receiving $10.00 per hour or more increased from less than 3%
to over 80%.
Prior to the QSP, lower wages in the airport labor market were concentrated
among employees of airline service contractors. The pay increases mandated by the
QSP significantly reduced the pay differences between in-house (airlines) and contracted out (airline services) ground-based jobs.
27. A preliminary report, issued in October 2001 in the wake of the September 11 attacks, focused
on the recent pay increases among SFO’s security screeners and the resultant steep decline in
screener turnover (Reich, Hall, and Jacobs 2001). This report was influential in national policy
debates that led to a doubling of pay for airport screeners throughout the United States.
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Large declines in turnover were evident among jobs that received the largest wage
increases: turnover rates fell by 80% for airport screeners and by 44% for cabin
cleaners. Employee turnover fell dramatically for firms that experienced the greatest
increases in wage costs. For those firms experiencing an increase in wage costs of 10%
or more as a result of the QSP, turnover rates fell by approximately three-fifths (from
almost 50% per year to 20%). In contrast, the turnover reduction was negligible
(from 17% to 14%) among firms experiencing an increase in wage costs of less than
10% as a result of the QSP.
Unlike most other living wage policies, which typically cover only a small number
of workers and have limited spillover impacts on the local labor market, the policies
at SFO had a major impact on the labor market. About 8,000 of the 11,000 lowwage ground-based nonmanagerial workers received wage increases as a result of
these policies. Other benefits to workers included new health benefits for approximately 2,000 workers and improved health packages or a wage premium for all
8,300 workers covered by the QSP. Hence, the living wage policies at SFO effectively
established a binding minimum wage norm in this distinct labor market. These
wage increases substantially reduced the overall level of wage inequality in the airport labor market.
The total costs of the wages, health benefits, leave, and employer-paid taxes that
s
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can be directly or indirectly attributed to the living wage policiesoare $57.8 million
ld Ai
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per year, equivalent to 0.7% of airline revenues. geles costs7
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We also iexamined whether the QSP pay increases generated improvements in work
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effort or productivity. Our employer survey found that higher wages and better
benefits at SFO did translate into improved worker performance. Employers were
more likely to report improvement than deterioration in overall work performance
(35%), employee morale (47%), absenteeism (29%), disciplinary issues (44%), equipment maintenance (29%), equipment damage (24%), and customer service (45%).
Employment of ground-based airline and airline service workers rose 15.6% during the period in which the living wage policies were implemented, a time when airport activity levels increased by about 4% and airport officials forecast that the
opening of a new terminal would generate greater levels of activity. Airport activity
subsequently declined in concert with the downturn in the Bay Area economy and
the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001.
One concern with living wage laws is that they may lead to the displacement of
intended beneficiaries of the policy. We found some evidence that the ordinances
slightly changed hiring patterns of firms, specifically the hiring of more male workers
in some low-wage occupations. The QSP also entailed the intentional raising of education requirements for screeners, but this requirement was not used to displace any
incumbent workers. There is no evidence that the QSP changed hiring patterns by
race or age.
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In summary, the SFO experience with living wages indicates that such policies
can substantially increase pay and benefits, reduce pay inequality, and improve services, all at minimal cost. Some of the SFO lessons, especially those related to the
savings that employers realize through efficiency wage effects, would appear to apply
in many other contexts. Pollin and Brenner (2000), for example, found that reduced
turnover and absenteeism, lower supervision costs, and greater worker effort together
offset about 20% to 25% of living wage costs. Our results for SFO are even higher
(see Reich, Hall, and Jacobs 2003). In one extremely important dimension—pay for
airport security screeners—SFO has already served as a model that has been adopted
nationwide. Can SFO’s experience with living wage ordinances be replicated more
broadly? The impressive scale of the impacts at SFO derives from three distinct characteristics that can be relevant in other contexts, although they also differentiate this
experiment from policies enacted elsewhere. First, since the wage policies at SFO are
binding for such a large proportion of the workers in a discrete labor market, they
are perhaps more comparable to a local minimum wage ordinance than to most living
wage ordinances. Second, beyond simply improving wages and benefits, the SFO policies address a wider range of employment standards and regulations, notably in hiring
and training requirements. Such an institutional context might be more conducive to
generating the observed efficiency wage-type effects. Third, the policies were implep s
mented in a context that maximized the likelihood that their costs lwould ort borne by
d Air be
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consumers, rather than through reduced levels of businesss or contractor effort, or
Ange 21, 2017
Los ifupresent together, may suffice
through increased costs to taxpayers. These sn v. Aug st
conditions,
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PROSPECTS FOR LIVING WAGE ORDINANCES
Until this year the number of cities with living wage ordinance grew steadily, in both
California and the rest of the United States, as Table 6.3 shows. The increases in 2001
and 2002 were particularly remarkable. Cities continued to pass living wage ordinances
even in the face of the national recession that began in 2000, the shocks to tourism
after 11 September 2001, and the subsequent fiscal crises of many states and localities.
As of mid-2003, the momentum has slowed, at least insofar as the number of
ordinances on the books is concerned. Only eight new ordinances were passed in the
first half of the year—none in California—although campaigns are still underway in
many cities.28 The upsurge in local budget crises in 2003 may have made passage of
28. Based on a LexisNexis search, these are Santa Fe (February), Atlanta (passed in March by City
Council but not yet signed by the mayor), Prince Georges County, Maryland (June), and
Palm Beach County, Florida (June). The ACORN Living Wage Resource Center website
(http://www.livingwagecampaign.org) also lists four other smaller cities that passed ordinances in June and July.
reich / living wage ordinances
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table 6 .3 . Number of Living Wage Ordinances
Passed, California and U.S., January 1994–July 2003
ca l i f o r n i a
u n i t ed s tat es
Year
By Year
Cumulative
By Year
Cumulative
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
0
1
2
0
3
2
5
3
5
0
0
1
3
3
6
8
13
16
21
21
1
2
4
7
11
15
13
24
18
8
1
3
7
14
25
40
53
77
95
103
s o u rc e s : ACORN Living Wage Resource Center; Employment
Policies Institute; Luce 2002.
n ot e : Figures for 2003 are for January through July.
s
rport
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further living wage ordinances more difficult. nAny s 017 implies some local
A ge 21, 2
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budgetary costs, and policy makers sn v. deficitsst looking for cuts rather than
facing Augu are
on
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increases.
vide rchived
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S say 15This is notetoerv that5living wage developments have stopped altogether. Three
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trends are visible. First, in many cities that have ordinances in place, efforts are
underway to improve the enforcement mechanisms already on the books. Los Angeles, for example, working with LAANE, began such an effort two years after the first
ordinance went into effect. San Francisco set up a systematic contract enforcement
office program in 2001; the enforcement mechanisms—including random audits
and a complaint-driven procedure—were significantly upgraded in 2003. In one of
the first such cases in the nation, Hayward was sued in July 2003 to enforce living
wage provisions in a contract with an employer who was involved in a collective bargaining dispute.29
Second, in a number of California cities, efforts are underway to broaden local
policies to include publicly subsidized development projects. One approach seeks to
improve the accountability of local governments’ economic development funds and
their subsidies to firms. The city would be required to collect information on and, in
29. For a fuller discussion of implementation issues and an innovative classification of living wage
cities according to the extent of enforcement activity, see Luce (2003). The study done by
Zyblikewicz (2003) for the California Works Foundation represents another excellent discussion of implementation issues.
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its decision making, take into account not only the number and quality of jobs that
purportedly would be generated but also overall community impacts involving
housing, transit, health care, and other issues.30 Thus, community advocates in such
cities as Los Angeles, Oakland, San Diego, and San Jose have begun calling for
“Community Benefit Assessment and Impact Reports” before building permits are
issued for large-scale projects that are publicly subsidized. Such initiatives would go
beyond living wage issues in public contracts and would affect a broad set of urban
development projects. The curtailment of tax breaks, or at least some demonstrated
return from them, makes particular sense in a time of budget deficits.
Third, in a number of jurisdictions, living wage ordinances are beginning to be
defined in terms of a geographic area rather than on the basis of individual service
contracts. This trend began with the inclusion of property contracts at airports in
Miami, Los Angeles, Oakland, and San Francisco. In these cases the contractors are
located on a distinct contiguous area, with covered employers accounting for a
much greater density among all employers in the area than is the case in ordinances
based on service contracts. The trend continued in some small geographic entities,
beginning in the Berkeley Marina, which is covered by a living wage ordinance, and
in Santa Monica, where an attempt was made to cover much of the city’s waterfront
and many nearby retail developments; the ordinance was repealed in 2003 before it
s
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could be implemented.
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Santa Fe, a city with a private-sector workforce ofnabout 26,000, has passed an
gele 2017
sA
Locitywide 21,
t minimum wage of $8.50.
v.
ordinance, scheduled to take effect next year, for a Augus
Assn on
ders hiv with
viemployers ed at least 25 employees and includes
The Santa Fe ordinance covers rall
o
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S $10.50 5 subsequent years. Similar efforts are underway in
scheduled increaseseto erv . 15-in557
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New Orleans and San Francisco. Voters in New Orleans passed a municipal minimum wage at $6.15, one dollar higher than the state minimum; this ordinance subsequently was rejected by a state court and currently is the focus of efforts in the state
legislature. An initiative to create a San Francisco municipal minimum wage at $8.50
has qualified for the November 2003 ballot; if passed, the ordinance would be the
first in California and would have the largest coverage to date.31
In a time of budgetary shortfalls, the costs of geographic-based ordinances fall not
on the public budget but upon the private sector, making such initiatives more
appealing to policy makers and voters. Moreover, the intense publicity created by
living wage campaigns has spotlighted how difficult it is to live on the minimum
30. An agreement reported in the Los Angeles Times in 2001 concerning the Staples Center in Los
Angeles represents a model for these efforts. For another important example, based in San
Jose, see WPUSA 2003. See also Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2002. A number of examples in Los Angeles and San Jose in which living wage standards became negotiated into collective bargaining agreements illustrate how the policies can affect workers who are not
formally covered by living wage policies.
31. For a detailed prospective study of this initiative, see Reich and Laitinen 2003.
reich / living wage ordinances
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wage, especially in cities with high housing costs. This problem affects all employees,
not just those of businesses that have service contracts with the city. The publicity
and associated equity pressures may therefore generate more pressure for citywide
ordinances. Whether efforts to establish municipal minimum wages will succeed is an
open question. Whether or not they succeed, it appears that living wage campaigns
have already begun to affect wage norms for many workers, not just those affected by
the early living wage ordinances.
REFERENCES
Brenner, Mark. 2003. “The Economic Impact of the Boston Living Wage Ordinance.” Paper
presented at the Living Wage Research Conference, University of California, Riverside.
Brenner, Mark, and Stephanie Luce. 2002. Living Wage Implementation and City Contract
Costs: Evidence from New England. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta.
Brenner, Mark, Jeanette Wicks-Lim, and Robert Pollin. 2003. Measuring the Impact of Living
Wage Laws. PERI Working Paper 43. Amherst: Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
s
Brown, Charles. 1999. “Minimum Wages, Employment, and the Distribution of Income.” In
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California Budget Project.Prov Making iEnds Meet: How Much Does It Cost to Raise a Family
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———. 2002. Minimum Wage Increases Bring Real Wage Gains to California Workers. CBP
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Card, David, and John DiNardo. 2002. Skill Biased Technical Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles. NBER Working Paper 8769. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Card, David, and Alan B. Krueger. 1995. Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the
Minimum Wage. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
———. 2000. “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply.” American Economic Review 90: 1397–
1420.
Elmore, Andrew. 2002. “Contract Costs and Economic Development in Living Wage Localities.” Unpublished paper.
Fairris, David. 2003. “The Impact of Living Wages on Employers: A Control Group Analysis
of the Los Angeles Ordinance.” Paper presented at the Living Wage Research Conference,
University of California, Riverside.
Gordon, David, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich. 1982. Segmented Work, Divided
Workers. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gross, Joel, Greg LeRoy, and Madeline Janis-Aparicio. 2002. Community Benefits Agreements:
Making Development Projects Accountable. LAANE Report. Paged electronic document.
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Howes, Candace. 2003. “The Impact of Paying a Living Wage to Essential Social Service
Workers: Homecare in San Francisco County.” Paper presented at the Living Wage Research Conference, University of California, Riverside.
Katz, Lawrence. 1986. Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Lee, David S. 1999. “Wage Inequality in the United States during the 1980s: Rising Dispersion or Falling Minimum Wage?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3): 977–1023.
Levi, Margaret, David Olson, and Eric Steinman. 2003. “Living Wage Campaigns and Laws.”
Working paper, University of Washington, Seattle.
Luce, Stephanie. 2002. “Labor Market Deregulation and the U.S. Living Wage Movement.” Paper presented at the Living Wage Research Conference, University of California,
Riverside.
———. 2003. Fighting for a Living Wage: The Politics of Implementation. Working paper. University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Martin, Isaac. 2001. “Dawn of the Living Wage—The Diffusion of a Redistributive Municipal Policy.” Urban Affairs Review 36 (4): 470–496.
Neumark, David, and Scott Adams. 2000. Do Living Wages Reduce Urban Poverty? Working
Paper 7606. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Nissen, Bruce. 2000. “Living Wage Campaigns from a ‘Social Movement’ Perspective.” Labor
Studies Journal 25 (3): 29–50.
Pollin, Robert. 2003. Evaluating Living Wage Laws in the United States. PERI Working Paper
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61. Amherst: Political Economy Research Institute, University rld Airpo
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Pollin, Robert, Mark Brenner, and
quences: Evaluating the New Orleans Living Wage Proposal.” Journal of Economic Issues 36
(4): 843–875.
Pollin, Robert, and Stephanie Luce. 1998. The Living Wage: Building a Fair Economy. New
York: The New Press.
Reich, Michael, and Peter Hall. 2001. “A Small Raise for the Bottom.” The State of California
Labor 1: 123–148.
Reich, Michael, Peter Hall, and Fiona Hsu. 1999. “ Living Wages and the San Francisco
Economy: The Benefits and the Costs” In Report of the Bay Area Living Wage Research
Group. Berkeley: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California. Available online at http://iir.berkeley.edu/livingwage.
Reich, Michael, Peter Hall, and Ken Jacobs. 2001. Living Wages and Airport Security: Preliminary Report. Los Angles and Berkeley: Institute for Labor and Employment, University of
California. Available online from. http://iir.berkeley.edu/livingwage.
———. 2003. Living Wages and Economic Performance: The San Francisco Airport Model.
Berkeley: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California. Available online from.
http://iir.berkeley.edu/livingwage. Paper presented at the Living Wage Research Conference, University of California, Riverside.
———. Forthcoming. “Efficiency Wages and Living Wages: Getting Back on a High Road
in San Francisco.” Industrial Relations.
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Reich, Michael, and Amy Laitinen. 2003. Raising Low Pay in a High-Income Economy: the
Economics of a San Francisco Minimum Wage. Berkeley: Institute of Industrial Relations,
University of California. Available online at http://iir.berkeley.edu/livingwage.
Reynolds, David. 2003. Living Wage Campaigns: An Activist’s Guide to Building the Movement
for Economic Justice. Washington, D.C.: ACORN Living Wage Resource Center, with
Wayne State University Labor Studies Center.
Sander, Richard, and Douglass Williams. 2003. “The Los Angeles Living Wage: Who Bears
the Cost?” Paper presented at the Living Wage Research Conference, University of California, Riverside.
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Sclar, Eliot. 2000. You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization.
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Working Partnerships USA. 2003. A Community Plan for Accountable Development. WPUSA
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Zabin, Carol, and Jen Kern. 2003. “The ERA Report: A Critique.” Unpublished paper.
Zabin, Carol, and Isaac Martin. 1999. Living Wage Campaigns in the Economic Policy Arena:
Four Case Studies from California. Berkeley: Center for Labor Research and Education,
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Zabin, Carol, Michael Reich, and Peter Hall. 2000. Living Wages at the Port of Oakland.
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Zyblikewycz, Helena. 2003. “Low-Wage Workers and State s World Assessing the Impact of a
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Statewide Living Wage in California.” Unpublishedg 21,Goldman School of Public PolLos
v.
ust
icy, University of California, Berkeley.sn on Aug
rs As ved
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The State of California Labor, 2003, Vol. 3, pp. 199–226, ISSN 1531-9037, electronic ISSN 1541-9045. © 2003 by
the Institute for Labor and Employment. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to: Rights
and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center Street, Suite 303, Berkeley, CA
94704-1223.
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Recent Developments in
California Labor Relations
DANIEL J.B. MITCHELL
C a l i f o r n i a’s s lu g g i s h e c o n o m y a n d t h e d i f f i c u lt bu d g e t
challenges faced by state and local governments affected labor relations in the
public and private sectors alike during 2002–03.1 Roughly half of California’s
union-represented workers are employed in the public sector, and the state’s fiscal
situation in many cases threatened their jobs and salaries. Californians were also
concerned with gaps in the health insurance system; although much private insurance coverage is provided through employers, many state residents still lack health
insurance, especially those with low wages and incomes. Health services were also
ts
important in another area: union organizing efforts, especially amongAirpor Another
ld nurses.
Wor
es
focus of concern in the state was the tourism and travel lindustry,7which faced not
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.
only the 2001 terrorist attacks but also a downturn following
sn v
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CALIFORNIA UNION CONTRACTS
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collects “major” collective bargaining
contracts—those covering 1,000 or more workers—and summarizes them on the
Internet.2
1. Except where indicated, information on developments cited below comes from newspapers,
trade journals, and Internet sources, and generally covers the period through late July 2003,
depending on information availability. The author thanks Chandra Keller for assistance in preparing this chapter.
2. A listing of California contracts from these files was published in the previous edition of the
State of California Labor. The tabulations on which this section is based are based on information from these files that was updated as of March 2003. The full set of national files from which
the California contracts were drawn can be found at http://www.bls.gov/cba/cbaindex.htm. The
BLS contract files are not necessarily up to date and may be incomplete. Nonetheless, they
provide valuable information.
The BLS files indicate the state to which a contract applies. In some cases more than one
state is listed or a contract is identified as national. For purposes of this chapter, only contracts
that are reported as exclusively in California are tabulated, with two exceptions: those in the
mitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
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Total Construction
15%
Total Manufacturing
6%
Total Public
58%
Total Other Private
21%
fig u r e 7.1. Major California Contracts, by Industry, as of March 2003
s ou rc e : U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
n ot e : Includes longshore and entertainment industries.
ports
Air
California contracts in the BLS files can be sorted by industry. As Figure 7.1 illusorld
les Wwithin the private sector, a
trates, 58% of the contracts are in the publicssector, and, 2017
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n v.
s
major share of contracts is in the construction ugu
industry. Figure 7.2 shows the distrirs As ved on A
e
o id
bution of workers covered. v 1, archiclose to half of unionized workers under major
e Pr Note that
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contracts inine Sdata. set are in the public sector.
Aril this No 1
The importance of the public sector and the construction industry suggests that
major unions in the state should be linked to those sectors. The BLS data confirm
that supposition, as Figure 7.3 shows. Included are unions with important publicsector representation, such as the Service Employees International Union (SEIU,
which has both public and private contracts), the National Education Association
(NEA), the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), and the American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME); 34% of the workers covered by major contracts are members of these four unions. Construction unions are
also prominent, as is the Screen Actors Guild (SAG). Retailing is represented by
the United Food and Commercial Workers (UCFW), which has major contracts in
the supermarket industry (for details, see Milkman and Rooks, this volume).
entertainment and West Coast longshore industries. Because these sectors are of evident
importance to the state, the contracts are included even though they cover some non-California
workers. These exceptions have little effect on the contract distribution, but they do affect
worker distribution. In particular, worker coverage in the private sector, and at the Screen
Actors Guild, is overstated. Analysis of California union membership data is consistent with
these findings.
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Total Construction
14%
Total Manufacturing
5%
Total Public
44%
Total Other Private
37%
fig u r e 7.2. Workers under Major California Contracts, by Industry,
as of March 2003
s ou rc e : U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
n ot e : Includes longshore and entertainment industries.
rts
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AFSCME 3% AFT 2%
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.
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IUOE 3%
LIUNA 4%
NEA 5%
PPF 1%
UFCW 14%
SAG 9%
UBC 3%
SEIU 24%
fig u r e 7.3 . Workers under Major California Contracts, by Union,
as of March 2003
s ou rc e : U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
n ot e : Includes longshore and entertainment industries.
mitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
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4th Quarter
2003
Not available
2002
2001
2000
1999
3rd Quarter
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
2nd Quarter
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
2003
rts
1st Quarter
rpo
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2001
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2000 Not available
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2002
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40%
Projected Increases Minus
Projected Decreases in Employment (percent)
fig u r e 7.4 . Employers’ Projections of Employment
Growth, California, 1999–2003
s ou rc e : Manpower, Inc., Net Employment Outlook Series.
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The general economic slump that began in 2001 continued to affect California, and
the rest of the nation as well, during 2002–03. Because of the dot-com bust, Northern California experienced a sharper economic decline than Southern California did
(Pastor and Zabin 2002). By early 2003, employment in San Jose and San Francisco
had fallen by over 10%.
A rough picture of the state’s job market from 1999 to 2003 is provided by Figure
7.4, which presents the results of the Manpower, Inc., employment survey. This survey asks employers whether they expect to hire workers, lay off workers, or maintain
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table 7 .1. First-Year Median Union Wage
Settlements in California and the United States,
1999–2002
pr i vat e s ecto r
Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
s tat e a n d l o c a l
government
California
California
3.6%
4.0
4.1
4.2
U.S.
3.0%
3.4
3.5
3.5
4.0%
3.0
5.0
3.6
U.S.
3.0%
3.5
3.5
3.5
s ou rc e : Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Daily Labor Report
(various issues) (Washington: BNA, 1999–2002).
n ot e : California contracts without sufficient information to
compute a percentage are omitted. The private sector includes
public enterprises such as transit agencies.
employment levels in the quarter following the survey date. The figure shows the
orts
increasing
difference between the percentage of employers who anticipated rld Airp their pay
Wo
s
roster and the percentage planning a decrease for eachngele , from 1999 though the
A quarter 2017
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second quarter of 2003.3 According tosthe sn v. nemployment expectations in Calis survey, Augu
er A ved o
vidsecond iquarter of 2001 and remained depressed
fornia declined substantially inro 1, arch
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for several quarters.
Arilin
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recovery. However, employers looking toward the third quarter were showing signs
of pulling back in hiring, suggesting a full recovery might be delayed.
The UCLA Anderson Forecast predicted an upturn in employment, but expected
that job growth would not climb above 2 percent per annum until the latter part of
2004.4 According to its projections, payroll employment growth in the state will go
back to a longer-term trend growth rate of about 2.5 percent per annum by late
2004. Employment growth in the state and local government sector, however, was
notably retarded by the fiscal crisis that developed as the economy softened and government receipts fell precipitously. Even a resumption of employment growth at the
pre-recession rate will not make up all the jobs lost during the slump.
Despite the soft economy, first-year wage adjustments in union contracts from
1999 to 2002 generally continued to run ahead of national settlements, as Table 7.1
shows. It is reasonable to expect that, given the particularly severe state and local
budget crunch in California, future public-sector settlements will show smaller gains.
3. Data for the first quarter of 2000 are not available for California. Because there is substantial seasonality in the series, the chart is broken down by quarters to reflect the substantial seasonality.
4. See UCLA Anderson Forecast 2003.
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Unlike the recession of the early 1990s, California’s slack economic performance
during 2001 and 2002 did not disproportionately affect its private sector. Many
unionized workers in the private sector are outside manufacturing and so are more
insulated from world economic trends than are those involved in goods production.
Thus, it is quite possible that private-sector wage settlements in California could
continue to outpace those in the nation as a whole.
CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS IN 2003
Appendix A provides a list of selected union management agreements in California
that expire in 2003; the data are drawn from the tabulations of the Bureau of National
Affairs, Inc. (2003). Although public-sector contract expirations occur throughout
the year, a concentration appears in June, at the end of the fiscal year. Negotiations
in the public sector often extend over a long period, and the budget problems of
state and local governments may well prolong the process. Budget difficulties may
also lead to the reopenings of public-sector contracts that are not officially due to
expire in 2003. Notable expirations in the private sector include those involving janitors in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and the Bay Area in April, various construction
s
rport
ld Ai
agreements in the May–July period, and supermarket contracts in the Southern CalWor
les
ifornia area in October.
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Major Labor Issues in the Public Sector
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The public sector has been deeply affected by California’s growing budget woes.
The state budget—specifically the General Fund, which provides financing for the
bulk of state programs other than transportation—was running a substantial deficit
at the end of the 2002–03 fiscal year, raising the specter of pay freezes or cuts and
layoffs for state and local employees and reductions in public services that would
likely curtail state and local programs.5 Although large figures were being reported in
the media at this writing, such numbers can be misleading since budget officials are
in the habit of summing together past deficits, current deficits, and future deficits
(calculated under varying assumptions). By May 2003, this sum—the so-called
“shortfall”—had reached $38 billion.
More meaningful was the actual cash deficit (disbursements minus receipts) for
2002–03, which came to $10 billion and which would have been about $3 billion
5. Origins of the state budget crisis have been reviewed elsewhere and need not be repeated here
(see Hirsch and Mitchell 2003). In essence, the state became heavily dependent on capital gains
taxes on stock options and other stock transactions in the late 1990s and ran a deficit at the
business cycle peak. When the economy turned down and the stock market went into substantial decline, the deficit widened owing to the fall in state revenue.
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higher were it not for one-shot receipts, especially bond sales related to the tobacco
settlement (California Controller 2003). Despite cutbacks and revenue enhancements that had already occurred, the legislative analyst and the governor both projected an ongoing structural deficit of $7 to $8 billion that would need to be
corrected in future years. Meanwhile, state bond ratings were downgraded as lenders
became increasingly nervous about California’s fiscal condition.
The legislature was unable to reach agreement on the 2002–03 budget until September 2002, more than two months past the end of the fiscal year. Because California’s constitution requires a two-thirds vote in the legislature to pass a budget,
bipartisan agreement is ultimately required. The state controller warned that if a budget was not passed “on time” in 2003—which it was not—the state’s ability to borrow
would be jeopardized and a cash crisis could ensue. Budget crises in previous years
forced the state to pay its creditors, including its employees, in “warrants” of uncertain value rather than cash. A California Supreme Court decision in early May 2003
introduced a further complication by appearing to require the state controller to pay
state employees no more than the minimum wage should a budget impasse last
beyond 30 June.6 That is, even if the necessary cash were on hand, it might not be
applied to meet the full state payroll.
State and local finances are intimately linked in California because revenue is
s
transferred between the state and local government entities. For Airporeason, the
that rt
ld
Wor relations. As buds
state’s fiscal dilemma has broad implications for state and local labor 7
gele 201
s An t
Loexample, 21, July 2003 the Orange
gets tightened, labor relations became tenser. v. Augus in
sn For n
rs As
County Employees Associationodemanded,vbutowas refused, travel expense records
vide rchi ed
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of judges and courteadministrators. The union sought to show that there was waste
.
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No
in the county’s court budget that could otherwise have been used for pay increases.
School districts are especially affected by the budget crunch. In September 2002
seven unions and the Los Angeles Unified School District agreed on a plan to maintain existing health care benefits and to increase wages. The current contracts expired
in June 2003, however, and wage and job security issues were back on the table. In
initial bargaining the union asked for a 6 percent pay increase; the district offered no
increase and indicated it would seek to save money by furloughing teachers and
other employees.
In November 2002 the state legislature cancelled a special income tax credit
enjoyed by schoolteachers. Although the cancellation is just for taxes covering year
2002 (payable in 2003), it may well be extended to future years. The California
Teachers Association indicated strong opposition when the legislature threatened to
roll back budgetary incentives for school districts to reduce class size.
The Los Angeles Community College District announced in February 2003 that
it might need to furlough various administrators, a plan opposed by an International
6. Controller Steve Westly indicated that, based on the court decision, he could pay more than
the minimum wage, but such an action could spark litigation by taxpayer groups.
mitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
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Brotherhood of Teamsters local representing those employees. Other districts, including Compton and Santa Monica, announced various cutbacks, sparking union
objections. Union faculty members at the Ventura County Community College
District, however, voted to accept various pay and other concessions in exchange for
an early retirement incentive plan.
The stock market drop that contributed to the decline in state revenue also
adversely affected the portfolios of public pension plans. During the 2002–03 budget
debate, a move to suspend the state’s contribution to the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the country’s largest state pension fund, in
exchange for an interest-bearing IOU was ultimately rejected. A new proposal, to
borrow from the outside market to make contributions, emerged in the debate over
the 2003–04 budget. Unless returns improve, legislators will feel increasing pressure
to incorporate some combination of employer and employee contributions to
ensure adequate funding. Either development would make less money available for
the wages and benefits of public workers.7
The state’s budget woes generated difficulties elsewhere in the public sector. The
influential California Correctional Peace Officers Association, which represents prison
guards, pulled out of talks on pay concessions after the state announced plans to
close a women’s prison.8 Unions representing workers at the Los Angeles County
s
rport
courts rejected a suggestion that employees work for accrueddvacation time in lieu of
l Ai
Wor to be closed after the
es
pay. And in July 2003 an Oakland fire station was lscheduled
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Losto reach 1, agreement over a city prot an
Firefighters and city negotiators were n v. Augus
s unable
n
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posal to raise worker contributionsctoived o pension plan.
vide r h their
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State Health Insurance Policy for California Workers
One public policy issue that remains on the state’s agenda despite the budget crisis
is health insurance coverage. Even if a dramatic policy change is not possible in the
offing, the focus on covering the state’s uninsured is likely to lead to a rethinking of
the issue. A major change in California’s policy could spark imitation by other states.
A relatively high proportion of California’s population is not covered by health
insurance. The nonelderly residents of California (i.e., those not eligible for federal
Medicare) largely obtain their coverage—if they have it—through employers. (Those
7. A court decision restricting the pay levels of portfolio managers at CalPERS and another state
pension plan covering teachers in April 2003 has complicated the administration of those programs. There is also litigation pending against the University of California’s pension plan to disclose details of its private equity investments. The University’s pension situation is also
complicated by the possibility that it would lose the contract to manage the Los Alamos
National Laboratory. Lab employees are included in the University pension system and a loss of
the contract could involve some loss of pension fund assets.
8. The prison guards have been repeatedly spotlighted as major contributors to state election
campaigns. Public controversies have arisen concerning overtime pay and other matters.
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on “welfare” receive coverage through Medi-Cal.) Many employers, however, especially low-wage employers, do not provide health coverage.
California has been debating health insurance policy since the World War I era.
In 1945 Governor Earl Warren proposed a single-payer plan that was defeated in the
legislature. Two years later he proposed a “pay-or-play” approach that was also
defeated. In the 1990s California voters defeated initiatives that featured both
single-payer and employer mandates.9 Although some progress was made in the
late 1990s in covering children of the working poor through the Healthy Families
program, large gaps in coverage remain. Those without coverage often wind up in
the emergency rooms of public hospitals. This method of providing health care is
expensive, inefficient, and ineffective, and it contributes to the fiscal problems of
local governments.
The failure of the Clinton plan for mandated employer-based coverage in 1993–
94 quieted the debate over universal coverage for a time, but rising health care premiums in the early 2000s revived the topic. Only one state—Hawaii—mandates
employer coverage. Pressure for a state solution in California—since none has been
forthcoming at the federal level—has led to new proposals. For example, in late
2002 the CEO of Blue Shield of California called for a system based on employermandated coverage, with tax-funded benefits for California residents not eligible for
s
rport
employee benefits.10
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Two approaches have been proposed in the California lLegislature. One, put forAnge 21, 2017
Los replace current programs with
t
ward by California state senator Sheila Kuehl, .wouldugus
sn v n A
s As
a state-run “single-payer” fund. ovideKuehlived ois broadly similar to Canada’s proThe r rch plan
Pr
71, a
r ice
vincially run system. Thevalternative proposal, identified with state senate leader John
e Se . 15-555
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No
Burton, would mandate employer coverage with a “pay-or-play” option: employers
would either buy coverage from a private carrier or pay to join a state fund. The system
would be similar to workers’ compensation. Indeed, the proposal is partly linked to
the medical component of workers’ comp (which is, as noted below, having a cost
control problem).
While it is unlikely that any major change in California’s health insurance system
will materialize in the immediate future, modest changes are occurring. For example, in January 2003 four Bay Area counties announced a plan to use tobacco-related
funding and other sources to expand health insurance for children.11 In another
example, under a new statute, AB 2178, California employers covered by living-wage
ordinances can purchase health insurance from a special plan run by nonprofit organizations for small employers. Such covered employers need not meet the small-size
9. See Mitchell 2002.
10. See Los Angeles Times 2002a.
11. Governor Davis requested that the federal government allow localities to provide matching
funds for federal assistance in maintaining coverage of children of the working poor, since state
matching funds are restricted by the budget crisis. It is unclear at this writing whether the
request will be granted.
mitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
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criterion normally required for such access. Governor Davis signed the new law in
September 2002.
Developments Unrelated to the Budget
Although California’s budget constraints clearly had an impact on labor relations
in the public sector, not all labor issues revolved around the state’s fiscal condition.
A Los Angeles Times exit poll after the November 2002 elections found that 17 percent of voters were union members and another 11 percent were in households containing a union member. These two groups voted for Democratic Governor Gray
Davis by 57 percent and 50 percent, respectively, compared with 44 percent of other
voters.12 Absent the union-linked voters, Davis and his opponent, Bill Simon Jr.,
would have been essentially tied. It is likely that unions will play a major role in the
2003 gubernatorial recall election, opposing the replacement of Governor Davis. In
Los Angeles, municipal and other unions played an active role in defeating a proposal to create separate cities in the San Fernando Valley and in Hollywood.
California’s Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) reported a notable
increase in activity surrounding the filing and processing of unfair labor practice
charges in 2001–02, as shown in Table 7.2. Fifteen representation elections were
s
rport
held, and all but one resulted in representation by a labor organization. Six decertifild Ai
Wor representation intact.13
l union
cation elections were held, with four polls leavinges 017
Ange 21, 2
Los
.
Nine called for the recision of a “fairn share fee” ust
s v n Aug (agency shop) arrangement. Recis As
sions resulted in two cases; videotherhsevenoelections left the arrangement in place.
the r rc ived
ro
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About 70,000erv 15-5557
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.
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American Postal Workers Union (APWU), which represents 340,000 of the 750,000
postal workers in the United States. Citing the U.S. Postal Service’s financial problems, APWU agreed in December 2002 to a two-year extension to a contract that
would have expired in November 2003. The extension matches a contract negotiated by the National Association of Letter Carriers in June 2002.14 A similar extension was negotiated by the National Postal Mail Handlers Union, an affiliate of the
Laborers’ International Union of North America.
Apart from postal workers, there are probably over 180,000 federal workers in
California. Most received a 4.1 percent wage increase in 2003, reflecting pay
adjustments approved by Congress in February, which were 1 percent higher than
those recommended by President Bush. Passage of the Homeland Security bill in
12. Los Angeles Times 2002b. The other voters cast 45 percent of their votes for Republican candidate Simon, a statistically insignificant difference from their 44 percent for Davis. Unions,
especially those in the public sector and construction, were major contributors to the Davis
campaign.
13. One led to decertification; the other was awaiting final decision when the PERB report was
issued.
14. The smaller Rural Letter Carriers has a contract expiring in 2004.
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table 7.2 . Public Employment Relations Board Charges and Their Disposition, 1994–2002
1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02
Unfair labor practice
charges filed
532
546
660
621
604
511
461
935
Disposition
Charges withdrawn
Charges dismissed
Complaints issued
169
139
152
151
138
213
155
172
338
188
149
278
176
158
312
149
173
216
139
153
193
184
354
240
460
502
665
615
646
538
485
778
Total
s ou rc e : Public Employment Relations Board, Annual Report (various issues) (Sacramento: PERB, 1995–2002).
November 2002 enabled the consolidation of twenty-two federal agencies into the
Department of Homeland Security. Reflecting demands made by the Bush administration, the legislation exempts many of the new department’s employees from
union representation. In California these policies especially affect airport security
s
rport
screeners, who are employees of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
ld Ai
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les a 17
The American Federation of Government Employeesefiled 20lawsuit in January
Ang
1,
Losat TSA.2In late April 2003 TSA
v.
2003 that sought to overturn the ban onsunions August
s n on
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announced that it would reduceidthearchived of screeners at several California
number
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airports.
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A possible strike of Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) bus and train supervisors represented by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) in Los Angeles County was averted in August 2002. The new
contract provided for a committee to work out ongoing benefit issues and called for
wage inequity adjustments. The agreement was reached after two years of negotiations. Meanwhile, mechanics and maintenance workers at MTA represented by the
Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) continued to negotiate after the expiration of
their contract in January 2003. And ATU drivers for the MTA threatened strike
action when their contract expired in June 2003. Governor Davis formed a fact-finding
panel to investigate the dispute. Under state law, the governor can block a strike for
sixty days in an effort to promote a settlement.
At the University of California, Berkeley, lecturers struck for two days early in the
2002 fall semester over ongoing issues of job security. Similar short strikes occurred
later at other campuses. A contract was eventually signed in July 2003, resolving
some of these concerns and raising pay levels. Meanwhile, in June, another group of
professionals—doctors employed by Los Angeles County—voted to decertify their
union three years after voting for union representation. The Union of American
Physicians and Dentists indicated that it might file legal objections to the decertifimitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
237
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cation election. The doctors lost a flexible benefit plan after they organized, and the
union began litigation against the county, citing a state law that prevents employers
from rescinding benefits when employees join a union. The lawsuit was still pending
at this writing.
In April 2003 the Los Angeles Unified School District removed 250 bus routes
previously under contract to Laidlaw Educational Services and awarded them to
another operator. Laidlaw had experienced a Teamsters strike a year earlier. When
the Teamsters complained that the new operator was nonunion, the district denied
that its decision was antiunion and pointed to various deficiencies in Laidlaw service. Meanwhile, candidates backed by United Teachers Los Angeles were elected to
the district’s school board in March.
In January 2003 CalPERS settled an age-discrimination lawsuit by agreeing to pay
out $250 million to public safety employees whose disability retirement benefits had
been cut back because they were hired at an older age. The settlement effectively nullified a portion of the California Government Code that gave fewer benefits to
workers who were hired after age 30. In February 2003 Sean Harrigan, a vice president of the Food and Commercial Workers, was elected president of the CalPERS
governing board, defeating San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown. Harrigan cited
restraining health costs, which CalPERS pays for many public workers, as a major
s
rport
objective.
ld Ai
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l s 0
In April 2003, in County of Riverside vs. SuperioreCourt,17
2
Ange
Los that st 21, unions representing pubCourt unanimously voided SB 402,ssn v. Augu allowed
legislation
sA
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lic safety workers to requestider rchiinterest arbitration in the event of an impasse
rov binding ve
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with their ilemployers.15-5
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Ar in
No
workers do not have the right to strike, and the law was intended to provide a substitute. The court ruled that the law improperly put governmental decision making
into the hands of an arbitrator.
EMPLOYMENT-RELATED PUBLIC POLICIES
Changes in public policy have far-reaching effects on employees throughout California, whether they are in the public or the private sector. Until recently, federal and
California state law required employers to provide unpaid family leave for maternity
and similar reasons. In September 2002 California adopted new legislation that provides for paid family leave under its state disability program starting in 2004. The
program is to be funded through employee contributions. Allowable leaves will be
up to six months in duration.
Employers in California must provide workers’ compensation coverage. In the
state’s “pay-or-play” system, they may either obtain coverage from a private carrier or
buy insurance from the State Compensation Insurance Fund. In early 2003 the State
Fund was considering a halt on new policies because of rising medical costs and an
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inadequate “rainy day” reserve. Various private carriers have exited the state market,
exacerbating the problem.15 State Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi sought
to assure employers that they would have continued access to the State Fund if other
coverage could not be obtained.
Meanwhile, various benefit increases under the program went into effect on 1 January 2003, raising the maximum weekly payout for temporary or permanent total
disability to $602. Maximum weekly benefits under California’s unemployment
insurance program rose to $370 per week. Employer groups complained that the
program would likely require new payroll taxes in 2004. In the first quarter of 2003
the trust fund for unemployment insurance stood at 0.55 percent of wages in California, below the U.S. average of 0.77 percent.16
Apparel workers in San Francisco received $865,000 in back pay after Wins of
California Inc. declared bankruptcy. Wins, a contractor for several big-name retailers,
employed mostly workers of Chinese origin. The wages, distributed in October
2002 by the state labor commissioner, came from a special fund established by a
state law enacted in 1999. Funded by a tax on apparel employers, the law provides
back pay for workers who are shortchanged by employer bankruptcies or similar situations. Community organizations were said to have played an important role in
obtaining the payment.
s
r or
Federal law requires employers with one hundred or more workersptot give sixty
ld Ai
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es
days advance notice of mass layoffs. State legislationgenacted 0in7
1
n el
os A st 21, 2
Lof seventy-five or more workers.
extends the requirement down to employers Augu
n v.
Ass d n
e
i ers
Another new bill, SB 1818, insuresdthat rall istateolabor protections apply to workers
Prov 1, a ch v
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regardless of their eimmigration status. The new law was promoted by a U.S.
1
Arilin
No.
Supreme Court decision in 2002 that denied certain federal labor law remedies to
undocumented workers.17 AB 1599, passed in September 2002, added age discrimination in employment to the list of state prohibitions. A state court decision in
2001 had rejected a state-level claim for age discrimination on the grounds that age
was not specifically mentioned in California antidiscrimination law. The new act
overrides that decision.
Despite notable legislative successes by unions, not all bills favored by organized
15. A 2002 report published by the Upjohn Institute found that experiments with “carve-outs” for
workers’ comp in construction in California have neither produced great success in reducing
costs nor done damage (Levine 2002). Changes in state law permit carve-outs pursuant to collective bargaining agreements in timber and aerospace. The Workers’ Compensation Insurance
Rating Bureau submitted recommendations of a 10.6 percent increase in premiums to the California Department of Insurance in April 2003.
16. Texas and New York, the next two largest states, had essentially exhausted their trust funds by
the fourth quarter; their ratios were zero.
17. Huffman Plastics Compounds v. NLRB (122 S. Ct. 1275). The national AFL-CIO filed a complaint with the International Labor Organization in November 2002 over the Court’s decision,
alleging that it violates international agreements on workers’ rights.
mitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
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labor were signed into law.18 AB 2989, a bill that would have required ordinary
workers to receive severance pay when such pay was offered to managers, was vetoed
by the governor. A tightened ergonomics standard for repetitive motion injuries, AB
2845, was also vetoed. And AB 2242, a bill that would have applied a cost-of-living
escalator to the California minimum wage, died in the senate.19
MAJOR LABOR ISSUES IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported only two major work stoppages—those
that affect 1,000 employees or more—in California’s private sector in 2002. The
Teamsters struck Delta Dental, an insurance carrier, from July 19 to August 12 in a
dispute involving 1,200 workers. The strike was settled with a four-year contract that
provides pay increases but also increases weekly hours. More prominently, a lockout
in the maritime industry (discussed below) affected 10,500 workers in California and
other West Coast states and lasted from 27 September until 9 October 2002. Settlements and other labor relations developments in the private sector are reported
below by industry.
The federal National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regulates labor relations for
ports
d Air
the private sector (and the U.S. Postal Service). The board lconducts representation
Wor
les
and other elections and adjudicates unfair slaborepractice1charges (ULPs) against
Ang 21, 20 7
Lo
v.
ust
employers and unions. Such ers Assn often Aug during organizing campaigns or
charges d on arise
ovid
hive
during negotiations.cDuring7theafederal fiscal year ending 30 September 2002, the
e Pr
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greatest number of o. 1 labor practice charges in California were filed against hosArilin
N
pitals (Table 7.3). This area of health care was the center of intensive organizing
efforts and some tense negotiations, especially regarding nurses (discussed below). A
related area, nursing and residential care facilities, also made the top ten list of
ULPs. Individuals filed the largest number of charges, as shown in Table 7.4. Charges
filed by the Teamsters and the SEIU accounted for over one-fourth of the 2,958
charges filed.
Far fewer ULPS were filed against unions. The hospitals ranked fifth among
industries filing these charges (Table 7.5). The Teamsters and the SEIU topped the
list of unions charged, receiving over one-fourth of the 850 charges filed in California (Table 7.6).
18. The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation has tended to support litigation that
would limit political use of dues and agency fee monies collected by unions. In April 2003, for
example, it filed a class-action suit against the Professional Engineers in California Government in an attempt to force a refunding of such payments that the suit alleges were improperly
collected by the union.
19. In January 2003 the California Industrial Welfare Commission voted against an increase in the
state minimum wage, which currently is $6.75.
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table 7. 3. Top Ten Industries
Charged under NLRB Section 8(a)
Unfair Labor Practice Filings,
California, Fiscal Year 2002
Industry
table 7.4. Top Ten Parties Filing
Unfair Labor Practice Charges under
NLRB Section 8(a), California,
Fiscal Year 2002
Number
Hospitals
Special trade contractors
Administrative and support services
U.S. Postal Service
Broadcasting and telecommunications
Food manufacturing
Waste management and remediation
services
Transit and ground passenger
transportation
Accommodation
Nursing and residential care facilities
292
219
175
148
134
105
103
99
90
83
All California 8(a) cases
2,958
Party
Number
An individual
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Service Employees International Union
International Union of Operating Engineers
Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees Union
Communication Workers of America
American Postal Workers Union
United Brotherhood of Carpenters
International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers
United Food and Commercial Workers
All California 8(a) Cases
536
420
382
v183
92
80
73
64
59
46
2,958
rts
Airpo
2017
s o u rce: National rld Relations Board.
s Wo Labor
s ou rc e : National Labor Relations Board.
le
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Los
t
.
sn v
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rs As ved on A
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ovid archi
table 7.6. Unions Charged under
e Pr
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ervic 5-55571
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NLRB Section 8(b) Unfair
1
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No.
table 7. 5. Top Ten Industries
Filing Unfair Labor Practice Charges
under NLRB Section 8(b),
California, Fiscal Year 2002
Labor Practice Filings, California,
Fiscal Year 2002
Industry
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Service Employees International Union
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America
American Postal Workers Union
International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers
United Food and Commercial
Workers Union
International Longshoremen and
Warehouse Union
International Union of Operating Engineers
National Association of Letter Carriers
137
100
63
All California 8(b) Cases
850
U.S. Postal Service
Special trade contracting
Administrative and support services
Accommodations
Hospitals
Broadcasting and telecommunications
Building, developing and general
contracting
Food beverage stores
Support activities for transportation
Food manufacturing
All California 8(b) Cases
Union
Number
70
64
64
51
43
39
32
32
29
29
850
s ou rc e : NationaltLabor Relations Board. v e l o p m e n t s sio u c a l i fNationallLabor Relations Board.
mi chell / recent de
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Number
241
44
41
38
37
35
34
23
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Aerospace
At one time, before the end of the Cold War, developments in aerospace labor relations might well have been centered in Southern California; in 2002, however, the
UCLA Anderson Forecast estimated that the total number of people employed in California aerospace was 131,000, down from 383,000 in 1986. The Forecast did see some
growth in aerospace employment over the next few years, based on limited recovery of
the airline industry and increased military demand. Boeing, for example, received additional orders for C-17 military transports in August 2002, which will keep its Long
Beach plant (formerly a McDonnell-Douglas facility) open into 2008. The plant employs
about 7,000; the United Auto Workers (UAW) represents the production workers.20
Nonetheless, the aerospace industry retains little of its former importance to California. Companies such as McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed, once headquartered
in Southern California, have been absorbed and restructured and no longer have
headquarters in the state. Only one Fortune 500 aerospace company, NorthropGrumman, is still based here. The Northrop component of this merged firm was historically a largely nonunion operation.21
Difficult labor negotiations at Boeing in 2002 involved plants in the Northwest
and Midwest represented by the International Association of Machinists, but plants
in California were not affected.22 It is likely that those settlementsrtand the general
s
irpo
economic climate surrounding the industry will have an orld A on negotiations in
W impact
les
California when contracts at Boeing and Los Ange Martin1facilities expire in 2004
Lockheed 21, 20 7
t
.
sn v
ugus
and 2005, respectively.
rs As ved on A
vide
i
One Californiarvice Pro 71, arch was renegotiated with the Machinists in Febaerospace contract
e
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1
ruary at Arilin
BF Goodrich 5
No. Aerostructures Group, a parts manufacturer in Chula Vista
and Riverside. The three-year agreement, for 1,200 workers, includes wage increases
and continued escalator adjustments.
Agriculture
Thanks to its omission from federal coverage under the original Wagner Act of
1935, agriculture is the largest component of the private sector whose labor relations
20. Boeing has about 35,000 employees in Southern California (about 24,000 in Los Angeles
County), and is one of the area’s largest private employers.
21. Northrop and Grumman merged in 1994 as part of the general restructuring of the aerospace
industry after the end of the Cold War. Northrop did have some independent unionization at
one time, but most of its operations were nonunion and the company was well known for its
early operation of a grievance-and-arbitration system that emulated such arrangements in the
union sector.
22. In February 2003 the NLRB upheld a 2002 election in which Boeing engineers in California
and Florida decertified the Southern California Professional Engineering Association. The
decertification was partly the result of employees’ unhappiness with the association’s decision
to link with the Office Employees.
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table 7.7. Decisions and Orders
are regulated largely by the state. Starting in the
Issued by the Agricultural Labor
1970s the Agricultural Labor Relations Board
Relations Board
(ALRB), California’s counterpart to the federal National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), has adminisCalendar
Decisions and
tered a state statute dealing with union recognition
Year
Orders Issued
procedures and unfair labor practices. Since agriculture accounts for only about 2 to 3 percent of state
1998
9
wage and salary employment, the ALRB has a
1999
7
much lower caseload than the NLRB does, and it
2000
5
issues only a few decisions each year.23 Table 7.7
2001
5
provides data on ALRB’s issuance of decisions and
2002
9
orders in 1998 through 2002.
Relatively few California farm workers are repres o u rce: Agricultural Labor Relations Board.
sented by a union. For those who are, a major concern in the state legislature in 2002 was the failure
of workers to reach a “first contract” settlement with their employers. As in the rest
of the workforce, a union win in a representation election does not guarantee that
the employer and the union will be able to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement. State Senate President Pro Tempore John Burton initially proposed a bill, SB
s
1736, that would provide for mandatory binding arbitration ld Airpounion and
when rt
Wor enacted the previles
employer reach an impasse. The bill was modeled onnlegislation 17
A ge 21, 20
Los
ous year covering so-called backstretch workers .at horse ust
sn v n Aug racetracks. After the Burtons As
o
backed bill cleared the legislature,ider UniteddFarm Workers (UFW) urged Goverv the rchive
ro
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nor Davis to signliit, mounting 5
e Se . 15- demonstrations in Sacramento against the backdrop
Ari n
No
of the ongoing gubernatorial election campaign. Employers, represented by the
California Farm Bureau, strongly opposed the bill.
In a compromise, Governor Davis signed AB 1736, legislation that provides a
complicated mediation procedure to resolve first contract impasses. The legislation
limits the number of cases that can be disputed and includes a “sunset” provision,
which requires that the governor reauthorize SB 1736 in 2008. The ALRB enacted
regulations implementing the new law in early 2003. In response to grower complaints about provisions that required them to give unions access to their financial
records, the ALRB modified its regulations to accord with federal standards on such
disclosures. Actual use of the mediation procedure is likely to be the subject of litigation; the Pacific Legal Foundation filed a lawsuit challenging the process in February
2003. An early test of the legislation may involve Pictsweet Mushroom Farms in Ventura, where an impasse has continued since 1987. In July 2003 the UFW requested
mandatory mediation at Pictsweet.
23. Agricultural wage and salary employment in California ranges from 300,000 to 500,000, in a
highly seasonal pattern. Decisions and orders of the ALRB involve both unfair labor practices
and election outcomes.
mitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
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In February 2003 the UFW replaced the Coastal Berry of California Farm Workers
Committee as the representative of 900 workers at Coastal Berry in an ALRB election
in Watsonville. UFW officials regarded the Committee as an employer-dominated
entity, although the ALRB accepted it as a legitimate organization.24 A new contract
was negotiated in June, providing pay and benefit increases.
Also in February a group representing farm workers in Florida began a hunger
strike at the Irvine headquarters of Taco Bell. The demonstration was part of a campaign to raise piece rates for workers at Taco Bell suppliers. The ALRB received a
petition from workers at the E&J Gallo Winery for a decertification election in
March. The election was held, but the uncounted ballots were sealed, pending an
investigation into UFW charges that a company representative had pressured
workers to sign the petition. The ALRB issued a complaint accusing the winery of
unfair labor practices in April. A decision had not been reached as of this writing.
Controversy continued over the importation of guest workers in cases of alleged
labor shortages.25 A grower in San Diego County was successfully sued on grounds it
offered more favorable housing and wages to guest workers than to U.S. residents.
The grower was ordered to provide equal conditions to its U.S. resident workers.
The United Farm Workers (UFW) proposed that tax credits be given to agricultural employers who provide health insurance to their workers. Under the proposal,
s
rport
the credits would replace existing sales tax exemptions fordagricultural machinery
l Ai
Wor
les
and other farm inputs that were adopted in a budget compromise in 2001.
Ange 21, 2017
Los misdemeanor charges in work acci.
A new state law allowing felony srather than gust
sn v n Au
o
rs A
dents resulted in indictmentsdof a rdairyman and his foreman in February 2003. The
vi e chived
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indictmentsine Serv 15-5 a farm accident two years earlier, in which two employees
stemmed from
o.
Aril
were overcome byN
fumes from a liquid manure pool and drowned. Also in the safety
area, the UFW and other farm worker advocates proposed in April that the California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board (CalOSHA) implement a ban
on hand weeding. Proponents pointed to back injuries that result from the practice.
Growers, particularly organic growers who cannot use herbicides, oppose the effort.
The employment concerns of farm workers also attracted the support of celebrities. Movie star Ed Begley Jr. wrote, produced, and directed a musical based on the
life of Cesar Chavez that opened in Los Angeles in March 2003. Several actors participated in the effort to enact the ALRB mediation legislation (described above),
including Warren Beatty, Robert Redford, Jack Nicholson, Barbara Streisand, and
Martin Sheen. Dolores Huerta, a co-founder of the UFW, received the $100,000
Puffin/Nation prize for her work in various social causes. The seventy-two-year-old
Huerta pledged to use the money to train community activists.
24. State law follows federal law in banning employer-dominated labor organizations, or so-called
company unions.
25. The Immigration and Reform Act of 1986 allows employers to hire foreign workers temporarily when domestic workers are not available.
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Airlines
Before deregulation, California was the home base for such long-gone airlines as
Western and PSA, smaller carriers that were absorbed by other companies. Under the
old Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code definition, over 180,000 employees
were found in California “air transportation” in 2000. At the end of 2002 that number was below 130,000.26 Service to and within California today is provided mainly by
surviving major carriers such as United and American Airlines and by low-cost operations such as Southwest Airlines and JetBlue Airways. These two no-frills airlines have
remained profitable. At Southwest, the Machinists negotiated a six-year agreement for
customer service representatives and clerks in December 2002 with wage increases
and other benefits, and in January 2003 the independent Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal
Association replaced the Teamsters in a National Mediation Board election.
The larger carriers have had financial difficulties for several years. Their problems
were exacerbated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and were further
worsened by the Iraq war of 2003 and a decline in travel to and from Asia after the
outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). The most dramatic impact of
the airline slump was probably felt by United Airlines, which has roughly 20,000
California employees. About one-fifth of United flights originate in California, especially from Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and San Franciscos Internarport
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per share and was de-listed from the New York Stock Exchange. Bond rater Fitch
Ratings consequently reported a “negative outlook” for LAX, although the airport
remained highly rated. Employees owned 55 percent of United Airlines before the
company filed for Chapter 11 protection. The airline’s Employee Stock Ownership
Plan was officially terminated in July 2003; employees will receive some value for
their shares although the amounts were not clear at this writing.
United and the Machinists had experienced particularly difficult contract negotiations in the months leading up to the bankruptcy. In January 2003 a federal bankruptcy judge gave the airline permission to cut Machinist wages below contract levels.
Other unions at United had earlier agreed to concessions. In July workers covered by
the Machinists contract, apparently upset by all that had transpired, voted to join
another independent union, ending their association with the Machinists.
26. Use of the Standard Industrial Classification was discontinued in 2003, making later data
incompatible.
27. US Airways filed bankruptcy in August 2002, but it has a much more limited presence in California than United does. It ultimately won loan guarantees from the ATSB in February 2003.
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United’s bankruptcy did not lead to bankruptcy at rival American Airlines. American, which is not employee controlled, sought large wage concessions from its pilots
(who have an independent union) and its other workers. American approved large
bonuses for executives during or shortly after unions had voted on pay concessions.
The firm withdrew the bonuses when news of the bonuses became public and the airline’s CEO resigned. After the controversy quieted, the unions at American accepted
or re-accepted concessions. Concessions made by the pilots were reported to be less
severe than those contained in the initial agreement. The financial future of American
remains uncertain at this writing. American is also a major presence at LAX and SFO.
Other carriers that serve cities in California, such as Delta and Northwest Airlines, also sought concessions. Alaska Airlines began hinting in April 2003 that it too
might take such action, although no specific demands were made. Hawaiian Airlines
sought bankruptcy protection in March 2003. It tentatively proposed closing its
bases in California for its California pilots, seeking to avoid the costs of lodging
them at Hawaiian hotels. At America West, pilots rejected a tentative agreement in
March 2003, although pay cuts and similar concessions were not on the table.
Defined-benefit pensions in the airline industry are insured by the federal Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). It appeared likely that a number of these
retirement plans might be terminated and turned over to the PBGC in underfunded
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debate, Congress agreed to allow commercial airline pilots to carry guns in the cockpit under certain circumstances; the provision was included in the legislation that
created the Department of Homeland Security in November 2002. The Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA), the largest pilots’ union, expressed concern about a new
program under which a pilot’s license, or the licenses of other certified airline
workers, could be revoked prior to a hearing by federal authorities.28 More traditional safety concerns were reflected in ALPA’s disappointment regarding the Burbank Airport Authority’s decision to abandon efforts to construct a new terminal,
which would have been located farther from the runways than the existing structure
is. Construction was blocked by local residents who were concerned that a new terminal would increase air traffic and aircraft noise.
Construction
In March 2003 the State Building and Construction Trades Council of California
voiced concern about a potential diversion or nonexpenditure of Proposition 42
28. ALPA has challenged the new program in federal court.
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funds. Prop 42 requires that tax revenue from gasoline sales, which previously went
to the General Fund, be spent on transportation projects. Governor Davis proposed
suspending the proposition to help address the state’s burgeoning deficit. Prop 42,
enacted in March 2002, was supported by construction unions but opposed by
public-sector unions. Budget problems could also affect state apprenticeship funds,
and the construction trades sought to protect these funds from cutbacks.
In May 2003 the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) negotiated an innovative contract with electrical contractors in Santa Clara County
(which was hard hit when the dot-com bubble burst). The new contract provides no
wage increase in the first year of its two-year life, and it gears second-year wage
increases to the level of construction activity. Increased activity could raise wages by
as much as $2.05. In June electrical workers in the San Francisco area also approved
a contract after rejecting two prior proposals. This contract diverts the entire firstyear pay increase to health care and leaves the second-year split between health care
costs and wages to be determined.
The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBC) also negotiated an interesting contract in June 2003 that reflects market conditions in Northern
California. Under the agreement, which is actually an extension of an existing contract expiring in 2008, a series of wage increases are scheduled with some regional
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Such agreements, which had been promoted by the Clinton administration, are
intended to guarantee labor peace during the life of the project. Litigation against
the executive order issued by Bush ended when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to
hear an appeal in January 2003. The ban was generally supported by nonunion
construction contractors and opposed by construction trade unions. It will affect
construction on federal projects in California as well as elsewhere.
Electrical Equipment
General Electric’s contracts with its unions expired in June 2003. GE does have
some union-represented workers in California, although most are outside the state.
The unions—chiefly the Communications Workers of America (CWA) and United
Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE)—engaged in a two-day
strike in mid-January 2003, protesting an increase in health care copayments.29 The
strike, which received national media coverage, helped focus public attention on
29. CWA merged with the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and
Furniture Workers (IUE) in 2000, thus inheriting representation at GE.
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the issue of employer-provided health insurance. The issue is receiving special attention in California, and high-profile negotiations centering on health care between
GE and its unions would reinforce that debate.
Unions also put pressure on GE management in the pension area by pushing a
stockholder proposal related to executive compensation. In the past, earnings from
the pension fund were summed with corporate earnings to determine executive
bonuses. GE agreed to revise its procedure to exclude pension income. The fact that
the pension fund suffered losses in 2002 and 2001 may have played a part in the corporation’s willingness to accept the change. The California state pension plan, CalPERS,
has backed a stockholder resolution to tie executive pay at GE more closely to performance targets.
The eventual GE contract, negotiated in June, provides for some increase in the
health care payments by employees, but the unions argued that the percentage share
of the burden was preserved. The parties estimated that the contract, which contains
both guaranteed and escalator adjustments, would raise wages by about 3.9% per
year over a four-year term. Various pension improvements were also included.
Entertainment
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crisis—and similar federal subventions.
Union officials in Los Angeles also expressed concerns about the operation of the
Entertainment Industry Development Corporation (EIDC). This entity was created
to promote local film production and jobs as a semiautonomous, albeit governmentsponsored, corporation. Charges of financial irregularities led to the resignation of
EIDC’s president in December 2002. The EIDC did report that production days in
Los Angeles neighborhoods rose slightly from 2002 to 2003.
Members of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) voted in July to reject the merger that had been
proposed by union officials in April. SAG members narrowly defeated the proposal,
which required membership approval of both organizations. Seventy-five percent of
AFTRA approved the consolidation, but the SAG vote was about 2 percent short
of the 60 percent margin needed for approval.
Officials estimated that a merged organization would have 150,000 members.
Many actors—an estimated 40,000—currently belong to both unions, and a merger
might avoid disputes over jurisdiction as movie technology shifts from film to digital
production. A merger plan also fell through in 1999. Merger proponents at SAG
suggested there would be further efforts at combining the two unions, and the issue
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seems likely to play a prominent role in the upcoming officer elections at SAG in
November 2003.
In October 2002 a group of television writers filed a class action lawsuit against
networks, production studios, and agencies, charging that these organizations discriminated against writers over the age of forty. Their action failed to convince a
California Superior Court judge, who ruled in January that the plaintiffs would have
to file separate class-action suits against each organization. On the other hand, also
in January, a federal court ruled that an employee covered by the International Association of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE) could sue to recover alleged underpayment of overtime from an employer. The ruling stated that since the employer’s
union contract was silent on whether work on several projects should be aggregated
for overtime calculations, labor law did not preempt the employee’s suit. Because of
the contingent nature of work in this industry, the question of long hours is an issue
of concern. In another entertainment industry development, SAG deplored condemnations on talk radio of well-known actors who opposed the war in Iraq in the
spring of 2003.
Various entertainment unions united with producers to lobby against a loosening
of restrictions on media ownership by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC). After the Commission eased restrictions in June 2002, instituting far-reaching
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tion of music videos in December 2002. In February 2003 IATSE signed a threeyear basic agreement with Hollywood studios. The contract covers a reported 30,000
production workers and includes various wage and benefit gains. A representation
dispute between Teamsters and Clear Channel Communications at a Rolling Stones
concert in San Francisco’s Pac Bell Park was averted in November 2002 after Mayor
Willie Brown intervened.
California’s Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board adopted new rules
in 2002 to protect workers using TV news vehicles with high microwave masts. In a
highly publicized incident in 2000, a reporter was nearly electrocuted when a mast
touched overhead electrical cables.
The Writers Guild of America created a website through which creative works
intended for radio, television, film, video, or interactive media can be registered electronically. It provides a less cumbersome method of registration than sending such
works to the Guild by mail.
Another area of entertainment that is important to California is professional
sports: the state is home to five—one-sixth—of the nation’s major league baseball
teams. A major league strike was averted with a settlement in August 2002, allaying
fears that the baseball season would end as it did in 1994, without a World Series.
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A strike would have had short-term ripple effects on stadium workers and suppliers
and California’s tourism industry. Commentators also worried that a strike could
erode fans’ interest in professional baseball. The contract, which extends to 2006,
provides for a complex system of revenue sharing and taxes on payrolls above a designated threshold.
Food Processing
A heavily Latino workforce at Brawley Beef, a meatpacking plant in Brawley, California, voted to be represented by a joint entity composed of the UFCW and the
Teamsters in September 2002. A new contract with wage and benefit increases was
reported as ratified in May 2003. Health care issues were featured in the food industries as they were in others. Workers at various California canneries settled a new
three-year contract with the Teamsters in July 2003 that continued complete
employer-paid health insurance. If health costs continue to rise, however, employee
co-pays could be triggered in the third year of the contract.
Health Care30
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trict and the California Nurses Association (CNA) led to an investigation by the
state attorney general as to whether state funds were being used to discourage unionization.31 The incumbent board chair of the Antelope Valley District had been
defeated in board elections the previous November, and two CNA-backed candidates had been elected.32 Nurses at the large Cedars-Sinai Medical Center complex
in Los Angeles also voted for CNA representation in an NLRB-administered election in December 2002. The hospital management filed objections to the election,
but a federal labor board judge overturned the objections in March, following hearings in February.
Nurses at the University Medical Center in Fresno won a legal victory in July
2003. The facility was originally owned by Fresno County but was privatized in
30. Also included in this section is the health care sector, whether public or private, for-profit or
nonprofit.
31. Application of the California law to private employers receiving state funds was blocked by a
federal judge in October 2002, on grounds the state requirement was preempted by federal
labor law. This decision, however, would not apply to a state or a local hospital.
32. In an odd development, the outgoing chair was accused of backing SEIU after his election
defeat. He denied the allegation.
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1996. Although the CNA had previously represented the nurses, the new owners
refused to recognize the union. When the NLRB ruled that CNA representation
should be continued, hospital management appealed to the courts. The D.C. Court
of Appeals ruled in the union’s favor.
At Kaiser-Permanente in Northern and Central California, CNA negotiated a
four-year pact that ended mandatory overtime. Work hours have been a particular
concern of nurses in California and elsewhere in recent years. Proposed minimum
nurse-to-patient ratios are now on the table pursuant to state legislation. The two
largest nurses’ unions in the state, CNA and the Service Employees International
Union (SEIU), strongly supported the legislative approach. Similar proposals are
now being put forward in the U.S. Congress. Negotiations are also being handled
privately, as in the Kaiser case. Thus, a July 2002 contract between CNA and Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) hospitals in Santa Clara provides for arbitration
of disputes over staffing ratios. Workload considerations affected organizing drives as
well. At Pomona Valley Hospital, SEIU organized nurses by emphasizing workload
issues; nurses voted for representation at that facility in September 2002.
Complaints by CNA concerning patient-care infractions at San Ramon Regional
Medical Center, a Tenet Healthcare Corporation facility, produced citations by state
authorities. A hospital spokesperson blamed the organizing drive that was underway.
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Medical Center, and other local hospitals. After an acrimonious recognition dispute,
SEIU reached a first contract for nurses at Garfield Medical Center in Monterey
Park in March 2003. Meanwhile, SEIU won representation elections at various
HCA facilities in the Los Angeles area in early 2003. And CNA won a nurses’ election at Mary-San Pedro Hospital near the Port of Los Angeles in July 2003.
In December 2002 both parties declared victory in a lawsuit brought by the
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation against SEIU. The union represents 80,000 home health care workers in Los Angeles County who, under a special
arrangement with the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, are employed by
the county rather than by individual disabled persons. A federal court directed SEIU
to refund a portion of the dues it had collected from these aides, but, in the same ruling, the court dismissed the Right to Work foundation’s challenge to the constitutionality of the representation plan established in 1997. Meanwhile, in October 2002 the
County Board of Supervisors approved pay raises for the aides following a dispute
with SEIU over a proposed ballot proposition that would have increased their wages.
At the other end of the pay scale, physicians became increasingly concerned about
the loss of professional control to managed care administrators. Whereas some doctors
have unionized over the issue, a group at County Memorial Hospital in Ventura used
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litigation to protect their interests in an April 2003 lawsuit against hospital management. The doctors, who accused management of eroding professional control, have
received outside financial support from the California Medical Association and
the American Medical Association. Hospital management has received support in
the litigation from the California Healthcare Association, a trade association.
Bargaining in the health care industry reflected the wide loss of “traditional” definedbenefit pension plans that resulted from the Enron scandal. A new defined-benefit
plan was a key provision of a first contract for CNA-represented nurses at Long
Beach Memorial Medical Center. The settlement was reached in December 2002,
after two short strikes in the fall. A defined-benefit plan was also part of the package
in the Kaiser-Permanente accord described above.
Other strikes in the health industry also ultimately produced settlements. At
Queen of Angeles–Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, for example, SEIU
reached a three-year settlement after two short strikes. The agreement raised wages
and reduced the employees’ share of health insurance costs.
Unions in the health care industry used techniques other than bargaining and
strikes to pressure employers in California. After a scandal at Tenet hospitals involving alleged unnecessary procedures and improper billing, SEIU and the California
State Employees Association pressed CalPERS, to investigate the firm. SEIU noted
ports
that insufficient staffing ratios were part of the problem. A lsubsequent investigation
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had been giving to other employees. CNA, which was not part of the deal, denounced
the plan and said it would file unfair labor practice charges.
Celebrity power was fielded by SEIU in a recognition dispute at Providence St.
Joseph Medical Center in Burbank. The union enlisted Ellen Crawford, who plays a
nurse on the popular TV hospital drama show ER, to demonstrate for recognition
after a representation election in favor of unionization in September 2002. Troy
Evans, another ER star, had been similarly recruited in March.
The UCLA hospital system was forced to borrow funds from the campus administration to pay its bills in December 2002. A consultant was hired and was expected
to recommend job cuts that the system’s administrators hoped could be accomplished through attrition. Unions in the UCLA system were said to be monitoring
the system. Apparently only the nurses, who are represented by CNA, were assured
that they would not be laid off.
A program that provides compensation to health care workers who become disabled by smallpox was adopted by Congress and signed into law by President
George Bush in April 2003. Federal policy has encouraged workers to receive smallpox vaccinations, but industry unions have been reticent to recommend vaccination absent a federal compensation system. Few California health workers had
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received vaccinations before the legislation was passed. Indeed, the San Francisco
Department of Public Health imposed strict regulations on those workers who did
agree to be vaccinated, prohibiting contact with patients for two to three weeks
after the shots.
High Tech
The dot-com bust and the generally soft economy continued to affect Silicon
Valley and the high-tech industry generally. A number of firms announced mandatory unpaid leaves rather than outright layoffs, including the Hewlett-Packard
Company (HP) and Gateway. Others, such as Computer Sciences Corp. in El
Segundo, mandated that employees use up their vacation time. A group of “contract” workers began litigation against HP, arguing that the firm was using their
contingent status to deny them required overtime pay. Meanwhile, in early 2003
Fortune Magazine designated one hundred firms nationally as “Best Companies to
Work For.” Of the fifteen that were in California, fourteen were in the computer or
Internet industry.33
Dot-coms and other high-tech firms in California made heavy use of stock-related
pay during the boom era. Efforts by the Financial Standards Accounting Board
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contractors” for janitorial services. SEIU identifies five of the fourteen high-tech
“Best Companies” as using such contractors.35 SEIU has targeted Yahoo! as a firm
that is not meeting its demands, and Yahoo!’s cleaning contractor was served with an
NLRB complaint in December 2002, alleging unfair labor practices in its actions to
oppose unionization. On the other hand, some high-profile Silicon Valley companies such as eBay and Genentech have been supportive of SEIU efforts and reportedly assisted in the resolution of the 2003 janitors’ contract.
High-tech workers gained a means of protest over working conditions courtesy of
a California Supreme Court decision in June 2003. A fired Intel worker had sent
numerous e-mails to other company employees denouncing firm practices. The
court ruled that employers could not use the courts to halt such tactics, although
they could attempt to block such e-mails by technical means.
33. The one non-high-tech firm was Vision Service Plan, an insurance carrier.
34. The London-based International Accounting Standards Board has been moving toward recommending expensing of employee stock options.
35. These firms are Xilinx, Adobe, Agilent, Silicon Graphics, and Sun Microsystems. SEIU also
listed HP among the firms that use “responsible” cleaning contractors.
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Hotels
Hotels are an important element of California’s tourism industry. In San Francisco the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE) settled a longstanding dispute with the San Francisco Marriott, reaching a first contract in August
2003. The union had originally supported construction of the hotel on the understanding that a “card check” would be recognized. Although the hotel opened in
1989, it was not until 1996 that the union achieved recognition with the assistance of
Mayor Willie Brown. The new agreement generally follows labor agreements with
other San Francisco hotels.
Similarly, in Santa Monica a lengthy recognition dispute between HERE and
Loews Hotel ended with a card check in December 2002. The hotel agreed to binding interest arbitration if a first contract could not be negotiated. Unions and community organizations had earlier succeeded in having the city council enact a living
wage ordinance that would have boosted wages at beachfront hotels and other area
employers; the ordinance was effectively repealed by the voters in a referendum in
November 2002.
Unionization at Native American gaming establishments remains an ongoing
issue in California. Complicating the picture is the state’s budget crisis: the governor
hopes to negotiate greater state revenues from tribal casinos in exchange for concesrts
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to be handled by a tribal panel. Representation disputes exist at other tribal casinos,
however, and a legislative hearing in April 2003 was devoted to labor conditions at
these establishments.
Janitors and Building Services
SEIU’s national Justice for Janitors campaign gained widespread recognition in
the early 1990s when a major breakthrough in organizing occurred in Los Angeles
(see Erickson et al. 2002). In 2000, following a three-week strike, Los Angeles janitors were able to reach an accord with cleaning contractors that provided wage and
benefit increases; the agreement was facilitated by the intervention of local political
and religious leaders.36 In early March 2003, as this contract moved toward its 30
April expiration date, Mayor Jim Hahn indicated his support for the city’s janitors. A
new contract was reached in early May. The agreement runs for five years and
36. See Erickson 2002. A children’s book about the strike of 2000, ¡Sì, Se Pueda! Yes, We Can!, by
Diana Cohn, was published in 2002 by Cinco Puntos Press.
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provides modest wage increases, but preserves fully paid family health insurance, reflecting the growing interest in health insurance generally and for low-wage workers
in particular. Although the market for Los Angeles commercial office space was
depressed by the general economic slump, vacancies and rents appeared to be stabilizing at around the time negotiations occurred. Bay Area markets, however, continued to exhibit rising vacancies and falling rents.
Open participation of representatives of building owners and managers was an
interesting element of the negotiations in Los Angeles. The Justice for Janitors campaign had in the past faced problems related to legal issues concerning secondary
pressure, picketing, and strikes. Janitors are generally employed by cleaning contractors rather than the owners and managers of the buildings they clean, yet it is the
owners and managers who are key to the decision to use union-represented labor and
who ultimately pay the cleaning costs. Participation of owners and managers at the
bargaining table established a link between the contractors and the owners and managers, and the legal issues faded. If these bargaining arrangements become the norm
in other cities, the issue of secondary interests will recede from janitorial unionization and bargaining. Thus, the negotiations in Los Angeles could potentially set a
pattern for negotiating arrangements, apart from whatever pattern might be set by
the contract terms.
s
rport
Accords reached in other parts of the country predated the negotiations in Los
ld Ai
Wor of 2002, for examAngeles. A new contract was reached in the Boston areageles fall 17
in the 0
An
21, 2
Los
ple, involving some cleaning firms that alsosare v. Auguint the Los Angeles area. Simsn important s
sA
on
ilar developments occurred in Provider rchived 2003 and in the Chicago area only
Minneapolis in early
ice 5571, a
a few weeks before e Serv 15-5 date of the Los Angeles contract. Settlements were
the expiration
Arilin
No.
also reached in other west coast cities, notably Seattle and Portland, and in Denver.
Within California, janitors in San Jose, Orange County, and Sacramento also
reached settlements in 2003. A one-week strike occurred in June in Sacramento,
leading some elected officials to relocate their offices to avoid picket lines. In addition,
the Sacramento City Council officially supported the janitors’ campaign. Health care
coverage or improvement was an element in all of these negotiations. In San Francisco related negotiations by SEIU for building guards also led to new contracts. The
scene in San Francisco for janitors was complicated by a decertification attempt.
Workers, upset with a national SEIU trusteeship of their local, petitioned the NLRB
in an effort to establish an independent union, and the NLRB issued a complaint
against SEIU in response.37 Negotiations on a new contract for San Francisco janitors continued, however. A new settlement had not been reached at this writing, and
health care costs remained a major issue.
37. This effort was supported by the California State Employees Association, which became a local
of SEIU in 1988, but has been attempting to disaffiliate. The SEIU also is the subject of an
NLRB complaint that nonstrikers during the 2000 dispute were unfairly penalized. A hearing
was scheduled for April 2003. The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation was supporting this complaint.
mitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
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In the Los Angeles area the L.A. County District Attorney prosecuted several
nonunion cleaning subcontractors associated with Encompass Services—a bankrupt
Texas-based firm—for labor violations. The owners were arrested in September 2002
and charged with various offenses including avoidance of paying wages owed.
Apparently, the owners would open and close cleaning firms under different names,
using family members as the ostensible management. The prosecution was, in part,
the rest of complaints by the Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund, which was
established by SEIU and unionized contractors in the Los Angeles area. The fund is
financed by a one-cent-per-hour employer contribution, pursuant to the 2000
labor-management agreement.
Maritime
Although the West Coast’s longshore lockout of 2002 was not confined to California, the bulk of the 10,500 workers in the bargaining unit represented by the
International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) was employed in the state.
When difficult negotiations with the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) went past
the 30 June 2002 contract expiration date, Bush administration officials began signaling that a work stoppage would lead to a Taft-Hartley injunction. This may well
rts
have delayed the ultimate settlement since a court-ordered cooling-off period would
Airpo
orld
Wdate.
les
have removed the usual pressure of a contract expiration 017
Ange 21, 2
Los
Negotiations continued, but in ssn v. Augusthe PMA announced a lockout,
late September t
A
rsengaged innslowdowns. The lockout caused considcharging that port workers vide rchived o
o were a
e Pr
,
ervic 5-55571 range of firms, from retailers depending on imports
S
erable economic disruption to a
riline No. 1
A
for Christmas sales to the Los Angeles Opera, which was unable to obtain shipbound sets and props. In early October President Bush used the Taft-Hartley Act to
reopen the ports. A federal judge directed the parties to continue negotiations
during an eighty-day cooling off period, during which terms of the expired contract
would remain in effect. Even with the injunction, employers continued to accuse
unions of work slowdowns.38 The parties eventually reached a settlement in November, and ILWU members ratified a six-year contract in January. It provides shippers
and stevedoring firms the right to implement new laborsaving technology but protects union jobs and provides for wage and benefit increases.39
The maritime industry in California is also affected by homeland security concerns. Various plans are being considered or have been implemented for security
checks of cargo and port and shipping workers. The AFL-CIO Transportation Trades
38. The U.S. Justice Department investigated the complaints and found evidence that both sides
contributed to reduced productivity, but the infractions were not of sufficient magnitude to
warrant penalties.
39. A dispute between the ILWU and the Machinists over certain jurisdictional issues surfaced
during the larger negotiations with the PMA. These issues had not been resolved at the time of
this writing.
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Department has been generally supportive of a bill that would provide identification
cards for port workers, but the ILWU has called for protections for workers against
unjust dismissals on security grounds. Port officials and users have pushed the federal government for funding to increase security but relatively little support has been
received.
ILWU history has been dramatized in a play about the union’s founder, Harry
Bridges. The one-man play, “From Wharf Rats to Lords of the Dock,” ran in San
Francisco in the summer of 2002, before the lockout, and again in the spring of
2003. The play, written by Ian Ruskin, has been performed in various venues since
2000. It was presented in the Los Angeles harbor area in July 2003 and will be
included in a PBS film directed by Haskell Wexler.
Petroleum
Labor contracts in the petroleum industry were renegotiated in 2002 and will not
expire until early 2006. Hence, no major negotiations have occurred or are scheduled to occur in California, the third-largest oil producing state, in 2003.
Unocal Corp., a Southern California–based oil producer with over $5 billion in
annual revenue, has faced continuing controversy concerning its activities abroad.
s
The company is facing civil litigation in California regarding laborAirport abuses in
rights
ld
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Myanmar (Burma), and it may be tried on similar chargesein federal court.40 Under
2
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Los Bank 21,
v.
pressure from shareholders, especially Amalgamated ugust (owned by the Union of
ssn on A
s A ed
Needletrades, Industrial and ProviderEmployees, or UNITE) and other labor and
Textile
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erv adopted a new statement of labor rights principles in
religious groups,line S
Unocal 15-5
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No.
March 2003. The firm pledged to uphold core labor rights abroad as designated by
the International Labor Organization.
A suit against Occidental Petroleum, another California-based firm, was filed in
federal court in April. The case cites alleged human rights abuses related to Occidental’s operations in Colombia.
Publishing
A representation dispute at the Chinese Daily News in Monterey Park continues.
Employees voted for CWA representation in an NLRB election held in early 2001,
but the paper’s management was still challenging the election at this writing.
40. At this writing, Unocal was considering appealing to the California Supreme Court to dismiss
the suit against it. Unocal’s motion to dismiss its federal suit was to be reviewed by the U.S.
Court of Appeals in June. In a tangentially related case, Nike has appealed a 2002 California
state Supreme Court decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. Under the decision, Nike could be
sued for false advertising if it were shown to have incorrectly asserted in ads that its shoe suppliers abroad met appropriate labor standards.
mitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
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Railroads
There are about 13,000 railroad workers in California. Under a binding arbitration agreement for a contract that became amendable in 1999, members of the
Transportation Communications Union (TCU) will receive pay increases through
2004, but will pay an increased share of health insurance costs. In another arbitration award, United Transportation Union (UTU) workers were given jurisdiction
over remote-controlled locomotives in freight yards. The UTU has been involved in
a jurisdictional dispute with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) for an
extended period. Attempts to merge the two unions failed in 2002, and BLE is now
considering a merger with the Teamsters. Under the Railway Labor Act, agreements
do not “expire” in the railroad industry but instead become amendable, pursuant to
the statute’s negotiating procedures.
Retail
Rite Aid Corp., a major national chain of drugstores, reached agreements with its
clerks and pharmacists in Southern California for new contracts with the United
Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) in July 2002. The chain was reported to
be in financial difficulties after a corporate accounting scandal. Rising health care
s
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insurance costs were reported to be a major issue. Theonew agreements retained
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Ang premiums,
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for services were increased. Retail Assn d in Southern California also reached agreers grocers on A
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ments with UFCW iand the Teamsters in October.
e Pr
,
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Drug Arilingrocery. retailers remained concerned about inroads by nonunion Waland e No 1
Mart, which reportedly has plans to open about forty stores in California. Unions
have called on some California city councils to make zoning decisions that would
essentially exclude new Wal-Marts from being constructed.41
Telecommunications
Workers at landline-based telephone services in California are heavily unionized
and have contracts that do not expire until 2004. Wireless communications services
have been growing rapidly in California, however, and pose an organizing challenge
in many cases. A recent study identifies California as the largest national center of
corporate headquarters for this industry, and 60,000 workers are reported to be in
wireless communications. Key areas of concentration are the Bay Area and San Diego
(San Diego Regional Technology Alliance 2002). In some areas of the country the
Communications Workers of America (CWA) has been able to negotiate “neutrality”
clauses for card-check recognition of wireless workers employed by landline firms.
41. Inglewood’s city council withdrew an ordinance that would have blocked a Wal-Mart after
receiving advice from its city attorney.
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Trucking
Controversy continues over a NAFTA provision that would allow Mexican
trucking firms free access to U.S. roadways; Mexican trucks are currently restricted
to commercial zones within twenty miles of the U.S.–Mexico border. Implementation of the provision stalled during the Clinton administration, in large part owing
to objections over safety issues that were raised by the Teamsters. The Bush administration sought to implement the NAFTA provision but was blocked by a federal
court injunction in January 2003. Among the groups bringing suit were the Teamsters, the California Federation of Labor, and the California Trucking Association.
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer also joined the plaintiffs in the suit. The
injunction was issued on the grounds that the administration had not adequately
considered the negative impact that older Mexican diesel trucks would have on the
environment.
During 2002 and 2003 the Teamsters concluded major agreements with United
Parcel Service (UPS) and the Motor Freight Carriers Association (MFCA). The
2002 UPS agreement provided for pay increases over a six-year period and an
increase in full-time jobs. UPS also agreed to a neutrality clause with regard to future
representation elections. No strike was involved in this settlement, but some UPS
business was reportedly lost to rival carriers when the possibility of a strike loomed.
ts
irpor
The Machinists also negotiated a multiyear deal with UPS in World A2003. The final
March
les
year of the new contract includes a me-too clause Ange 21, 2017 same adjustproviding for the
Los
v.
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ments that the Teamsters will negotiate Assn UPSnin ug
rs with ed o A 2008.
vide
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The negotiations for rvice Pro 571,Master Freight Agreement between the Teamthe National arch
e
5
eS
15-5
sters and the MFCA were .complicated by the liquidation of Consolidated FreightArilin
No
ways Corp., which declared bankruptcy in a California court in September 2002.42
Over 1,900 California workers lost their jobs. The Teamsters and Machinists brought
suit against Consolidated, alleging unpaid wages and other losses of benefits. The
Teamsters reached an accord with the surviving “less-than-truckload” freight companies in February 2003 on a five-year pact that provides pay increases and continued
health care at no cost to workers. The new agreement also bans subcontracting work
to Mexican trucking firms.
The Teamsters also negotiated a five-year accord with major automobile transportation firms in July 2003; some of these firms operate in, or are based in, California.
Under the new contract base wages are frozen for the first two years, but a fully
employer-paid health insurance plan is protected. An escalator clause, triggered by
inflation above 3 percent, was also included.
Teamsters Local 396 in Covina won a federal court order against C&N Waste
Services, a California waste hauling firm, requiring recognition, back pay, and pay42. Also in the background is a longstanding representation dispute with Overnite Transportation
that has involved ongoing litigation and decertification elections. Overnite has a presence in
various California metropolitan areas.
mitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
259
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ment to various health and welfare funds. The owners of the firm reportedly shut
down a unionized firm and then created C&N as a nonunion entity. After threats
of arrest for contempt of court, the owners of the firm agreed to the back pay and
other terms.
Utilities
California’s electricity crisis of 2001 continued to reverberate in the private sector.
The crisis, the origins of which are still being investigated and litigated, led to the
bankruptcy of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), a major utility in Northern California. An offer by the company for a new agreement with the Utility
Workers Union of America (UWUA) was heavily rejected in a membership vote in
December 2002. A new offer for a five-year contract with a wage reopener after three
years was voted on in May 2003; despite the firm’s bankruptcy, the proposal did not
involve pay concessions. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(IBEW) reached a settlement with PG&E in April 2003, but agreed only to offer it
to the membership with a “neutral” recommendation.
s
rport
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7
Ange 21, 20 eight California firms in
The National Center for Employee Ownership included 1
Los
gust
n v.
Au
its list of the top one hundred rs Ass ed oowned by a majority of their workers (as
e companies n
o id archiv
Profvemployees) in 2002. The two largest were Science Applimeasured by the ervice 5571,
number
S
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riline No. 15 San Diego (a research and computer systems firm with
A
cations International of
Other Developments in the Private Sector
41,000 employees) and Parsons Corp. of Pasadena (an engineering and construction
firm with 12,000 employees).
Standard & Poor’s reported in April 2003 that of the twenty-nine Californiabased firms listed in the S&P 500, twenty-six had underfunded defined-benefit pension plans. Three—Northrop Grumman Corp., Hewlett-Packard Co., and Chevron Texaco Corp.—had liabilities exceeding $2 billion. The decline in the stock
market was a major cause of the shortfalls. Reconciling the underfunding will raise
the direct cost of labor compensation and could squeeze other pay and benefit
increases.43
43. David E. Feller, professor emeritus at UC Berkeley, died in February 2003; he was eighty-six.
Before joining the law school faculty, Feller was a nationally recognized appellate lawyer. As
general counsel for the Steelworkers union, he argued the famous “Arbitration Trilogy” cases
before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1960. In these cases the Court strongly endorsed voluntary
“rights” arbitration to settle grievances and limited the ability of lower federal courts to secondguess arbitration decisions. Feller was a major force in organizing the Faculty Association at
UC Santa Cruz, the only such association in the University of California system with bargaining rights secured in a PERB representation election.
260
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CONCLUSION
California remains an area of union organizing despite its economic difficulties. The
health care industry, and nursing in particular, is a hotspot in current organizing
drives. California’s union sector is especially concentrated among public employees,
however, and state and local budget problems in California will make negotiations
in government difficult over the next few years. Unions in the state have developed
notable clout in the political arena. Their support was important in the outcome of
the 2002 gubernatorial campaign as well as many other races.
Public policy in the employment arena has supported various union objectives in
recent years, including increases in workers’ compensation and unemployment
insurance benefits. California also has adopted the nation’s only state-level policy of
paid family leave. The current debate over universal health coverage for California
workers is likely to be more protracted than the controversies surrounding other workplace issues have been. Because California is the largest state and often sets trends, and
because federal policy in the health care area is unlikely to change in any fundamental
way in the near term, any action taken in regard to health care will receive national
attention.
California’s economy has bifurcated the state’s private sector geographically. The
national slump has affected all parts of the state, but the dot-com bust orts particuAirp has
orld
larly depressed the Bay Area. The Southern California eles W 17
economy remains stronger,
g
, 20
s An
but a full recovery is not expected for somentime. California1is especially vulnerable
v. Lo ugust 2
ss
A
A
n
to difficulties in the airline industry. ers rchofed ostate’s workers are employed by airrovid Many iv the
ice P 5571, a
lines, airports, and e Serv related facilities and are directly affected by decreases in
closely 15-5
o.
Arilin
tourism and travel. AndN
public-sector labor relations will be affected throughout the
state by the state’s ongoing budget crisis. Given the state’s economic outlook, labor
relations, in both public and private sectors, will be operating in a distressed environment in the immediate future.
REFERENCES
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 2003. 2003 Source Book on Collective Bargaining: Wages,
Benefits, and Other Contract Issues. Washington: BNA.
California State Controller. 2003. General Fund Cash Basis Report for the Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 2003. Paged electronic document. Retrieved 29 July 2003 from www.sco.ca.gov/
ard/genfun/gencash03/gencash03.pdf.
Erickson, Christopher, Catherine Fisk, Ruth Milkman, Daniel J.B. Mitchell, and Kent
Wong. 2002. “Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles.” In California Policy Options 2002,
edited by Daniel J.B. Mitchell. Los Angeles: UCLA School of Public Policy and Social
Research.
Hirsch, Werner Z., and Daniel J.B. Mitchell. 2003. “Making California’s State Budget More
User-Friendly and Transparent: Further Thoughts.” In California Policy Options 2003,
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edited by Daniel J.B. Mitchell. Los Angeles: UCLA School of Public Policy and Social
Research.
Los Angeles Times. 2002a. “California Insurer Urges Universal Health Coverage.” 4 December: C5.
———. 2002b. “Times Exit Poll Results.” 7 November: A34.
Mitchell, Daniel J.B. 2002. “Impeding Earl Warren: California’s Health Insurance Plan That
Wasn’t and What Might Have Been.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 27: 947–
976.
Pastor, Manuel, and Carol Zabin. 2002. “Recession and Reaction: The Impact of the Economic Downturn on California Labor.” The State of California Labor 2: 37–59.
San Diego Regional Technology Alliance. 2002. California’s Wireless Wonders: A Study of California’s Wireless Industry. San Diego: SDRTA.
UCLA Anderson Forecast. 2003. The UCLA Anderson Forecast for the Nation and California:
2nd Quarter 2003–4th Quarter 2004. Los Angeles: UCLA Anderson Forecast. Earlier editions also consulted.
rts
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Ange 21, 2017
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ervic 5-55571
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A P P E N D I X . Selected Union Management Contracts Expiring in California in 2003,
by Expiration Date
Employer or Contract Name
Union
Number of
Workers
Month of
Expiration
Los Angeles County
Los Angeles County
Los Angeles County
MEBA
IUPA
AFSCME
6,750
1,250
2,650
1-03
1-03
1-03
Los Angeles County
SEIU
3,800
2-03
Kern County
SEIU
5,800
3-03
EBSCSM Building Maintenance Bay Area Agreement
Maintenance Contractors Agreement
(Los Angeles County)
Maintenance Contractors Agreement
(Orange County)
Rockwell Semiconductor Systems
SEIU
2,000
4-03
SEIU
6,500
4-03
SEIU
IBEW
3,000
550
4-03
4-03
1,050
800
900
1,000
5-03
5-03
5-03
5-03
1,800
5-03
2,000
5-03
1,600
1,150
5,500
5-03
5-03
5-03
ATU
LIUNA
UA
1,500
14,000
9,000
6-03
6-03
6-03
OPCM
5,500
6-03
IBT
2,500
6-03
1,800
15,000
1,500
1,500
1,000
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
Campbell Soup Co.
IBT
Glass and Glazing Contractors
PAT
Industrial Employers and Distributors Association
ILWU
s
rport
ld Ai
National Electrical Contractors Association (Oakland) IBEW
Wor
les
National Electrical Contractors Association
Ange 21, 2017
Los
t
.
(Santa Clara Valley)
IBEW
sn v
ugus
rs As ved on A
e
National Electrical Contractors Association rchi
rovid
ice P 55 , a
ervCounties) 71
(San Diego and Imperial 15-5
IBEW
eS
Arilin
No.
National Electrical Contractors Association and
Western Line Constructors (Northern
California and Nevada)
IBEW
San Francisco Electrical Contractors Association
IBEW
San Francisco Employers Council
SEIU
Alameda Contra Costa Transit Authority
Associated General Contractors
Associated General Contractors
Associated General Contractors, Building Industry
Association, and Southern California
Contractors Association
Associated General Contractors, Building Industry
Association, and Southern California
Contractors Association
California Plumbing and Mechanical Contractors
Association
California Processors, Inc.
California State University
Catholic Healthcare West (Sacramento)
Catholic Healthcare West (San Francisco)
UA
IBT
AFT
CNA (independent)
CNA (independent)
mitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
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A P P E N D I X . (Continued)
Employer or Contract Name
Union
Number of
Workers
Month of
Expiration
Fresno Unified School District
SEIU
3,100
Garden Grove Unified School District
SEIU
2,500
Kern County
SEIU
5,000
Kern, Inyo, and Mono Counties Sheet Metal and
Air Conditioning Contractors
SMWIA
2,200
Lodi Unified School District
NEA (independent)
1,200
Los Angeles, City of
IAFF
3,000
Los Angeles, City of
IUPA
9,300
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority
ATU
4,300
Los Angeles Unified School District
NEA (independent)
43,500
Mason Contractors Exchange of Southern California LIUNA
1,200
Mechanical Contractors Association
UA
2,100
Newport-Mesa Unified School District
AFT
1,000
Northern California Mechanical Contractors
Association
UA
2,100
Northern California Painters Employers
s
rport
ld Ai 1,000
Bargaining Council
PAT
Wor
s
Riverside County
LIUNAAngele 1, 2017
2,000
Los
t2
v.
n SEIU Augus
Riverside County
2,100
Ass d on
e
iders
Sacramento County
2,200
Prov 1, archiv SCEO
7
rvice
Sacramento County
AFSCME
550
e Se . 15-555
Arilin
No
Sacramento County In-House Supportive
Services Authority
SEIU
6,350
San Diego County
SDCDSA (independent)
2,000
San Francisco, City of
IFPTE
1,800
San Francisco, City of
SEIU
3,000
San Francisco City and County
SEIU
10,000
San Francisco Community College District
AFT
1,000
San Francisco Unified School District
SEIU
1,000
San Joaquin County
SEIU
1,050
San Jose, City of
SJPOA (independent)
1,400
Southern California General Contractors
LIUNA
35,000
Southern California Painters
PAT
3,000
University of San Francisco
AFT
650
Western Steel Council
BSOIW
500
6-03
6-03
6-03
Alameda County
Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers
(Multistate)
California, State of
6,500
7-03
37,000
7-03
1,400
3,750
7-03
7-03
California, State of
264
SEIU
IATSE
Physicians and Dentists
(independent)
ASCME
t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
6-03
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A P P E N D I X . (Continued)
Employer or Contract Name
Number of
Workers
Union
Month of
Expiration
Hotel Employers’ Council of Southern California
Northern California Drywall Contractors Association
Paratransit Inc.
San Francisco Maintenance Contractors
IUOE
PAT
ATU
SEIU
500
1,200
900
4,000
7-03
7-03
7-03
7-03
Stanford University, Linear Accelerator Center
SEIU
1,100
8-03
Los Angeles County
Los Angeles County
Los Angeles County
SBCTC
JCIR
SEIU
1,500
1,500
35,900
9-03
9-03
9-03
Coastal Berry Co.
Coastal Berry of
California Farm
Workers Committee
(independent)
SEIU
1,200
10-03
1,900
10-03
UFCW
5,350
10-03
80,000
10-03
3,900
6,500
600
1,400
11-03
11-03
11-03
11-03
1,000
5,850
2,350
500
12-03
12-03
12-03
12-03
Long Beach Unified School District
Retail Food, Meat, Bakery, Candy, and General
Merchandise Agreement (Los Angeles)
Retail Food, Meat, Bakery, Candy, and General
Merchandise Agreement (Southern California)
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Fresno County
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General Motors Corp.
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n ot e : A list of union abbreviations may be found at the beginning of this volume.
The State of California Labor, 2003, Vol. 3, pp. 227–265, ISSN 1531-9037, electronic ISSN 1541-9045. © 2003
by the Institute for Labor and Employment. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to:
Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center Street, Suite 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.
mitchell / recent developments in california labor relations
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About the Contributors
Frank D. Bean is Co-Director of the Center for Research on Immigration, Population, and
Public Policy and Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Irvine. His most
recent book is America’s Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity (2003) (with Gillian
Stevens).
Kate Bronfenbrenner is Director of Labor Education Research at Cornell’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations. Kate, who received her Ph.D. from Cornell in 1993, worked for
many years as an organizer and union representative. She is the co-author and editor of several books on union strategies including Organizing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies
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(1998) and Ravenswood: The Steelworkers’ Victory and the Revival of AmericanAirport(1999) and
Labor
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has published numerous articles, chapters, and monographs on union and7
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in organizing and bargaining campaigns and the impact s global 21, and investment policy
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on workers and unions.
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e Sestudent-5 Collective Bargaining, Labor Law, and Labor History at
Robert Hickey AraliPh.D. No. 15 in
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Cornell’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations and a graduate research associate in the
Office of Labor Education Research. Prior to coming to Cornell, he worked for many years as
an organizer and union representative for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Rob,
who received his MS degree from Cornell in 2003, is the author and co-author of several articles and monographs on union bargaining and organizing strategies in the global economy.
Sean W. Jaquez is an associate attorney with Jones Day in Los Angeles. He received his B.A.
in Sociology from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1999 and his J.D. from Stanford
Law School in 2002. He has interned with the U.S. Department of Education, Civil Rights
Division, and with the ACLU of Northern California. Currently he is involved in grassroots
efforts to develop and implement solutions to the growing educational and social concerns
facing his hometown of El Monte, California.
Jerome Karabel is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, and a
Senior Fellow at the Rockridge Institute, a progressive think tank in Oakland, California. He
is the principal investigator of a Ford Foundation–funded study of the effects of the elimination of affirmative action on the University of California and the author of “The Rise and Fall
of Affirmative Action at the University of California,” which appeared in the Journal of Blacks
in Higher Education in 1999. He is working on a book that is tentatively titled “The Chosen:
Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, 1900–2003.”
about the contributors
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John Logan teaches in the Department of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics
and Political Science. He has published articles on U.S., Canadian, and U.K. industrial relations
in several journals, including Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, Industrial Relations Journal, Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations, and Historical Studies in Industrial Relations.
B. Lindsay Lowell is Director of Policy Studies at the Institute for the Study of International
Migration of Georgetown University. His research interests are in immigration policy, labor
force, and economic development. He is the co-editor of Sending Money Home: Hispanic
Remittances and Community Development (2002). He received his Ph.D. in Sociology, with an
emphasis in demographics, from Brown University.
Isaac Martin is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of California Institute for Labor and
Employment. In 2004 he will assume a position as Assistant Professor of Sociology and
Urban Studies at the University of California, San Diego. In addition to his work with Jerome
Karabel on admissions to UC, he has conducted a variety of other research on the relationships among politics, state and local public policy, and inequality. His research on living wage
policies was published in the Urban Affairs Review in 2001. He is currently working on a book
about grassroots tax revolts in the United States and Europe since World War II.
Ruth Milkman is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, and
Director of the UC Institute for Labor and Employment. Her research and writing has
ranged over a variety of issues surrounding work and labor organization. Her recent books
rts
include Farewell to the Factory: Auto Workers in the Late TwentiethAirpo (1997) and the
ld Century
Worin Contemporary California
for Unions
edited volume Organizing Immigrants: The Challenge geles 017
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Los workers ,and their relationship to orga(2000). Her current research focuses on n v.
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School of Management and holds a joint appointment in the UCLA School of Public Policy
and Social Research. He is an expert on wage determination and labor issues and has written
extensively on such topics as concession bargaining, flexible pay plans, employee benefits,
social insurance, and other aspects of labor market analysis. He is co-editor of the journal
Industrial Relations and past president of the North American Economics and Finance Association. He is the former director of the UCLA Anderson School’s Forecasting Project.
Michael Reich is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley, and the
Research Chair of the Institute for Labor and Employment. His numerous books on labor economics include Labor Market Segmentation (1975), Racial Inequality (1981), Segmented Work,
Divided Workers (1982), Social Structures of Accumulation (1994), and Work and Pay in the
United States and Japan (1997). His current research focuses on wage and benefit mandates.
Daisy Rooks is a graduate student in Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Her research focus is on job retention and turnover among staff organizers in the contemporary U.S. labor movement. Recent publications include “The Cowboy Mentality: Organizers
and Occupational Commitment in the New Labor Movement,” in Labor Studies Journal
(2003), and “Sticking It Out or Packing It In? Organizer Retention in the New Labor Movement,” in Rebuilding Labor: Organizing and Organizers in the New Union Movement, edited
by Ruth Milkman and Kim Voss (forthcoming).
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t h e s tat e o f c a l i f o r n i a l a b o r / 2 0 0 3
LAX - General Description
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LAX - General Description
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General Description
LAX is the fourth busiest passenger airport in the world, second in the United
States, and was named Skytrax’ 2017 Top 10 Most Improved Airports. LAX
served more than 80.9 million passengers in 2016 an increase of almost 8
percent from 2015. As of March 2017, LAX offers 692 daily nonstop flights to
91 U.S. cities and 1,220 weekly nonstop flights to 78 international destinations
in 41 countries on 66 commercial air carriers. LAX handled 697,138 aircraft
operations (landings and takeoffs) in 2016.
FAA Control Tower and
Theme Building
LAX ranks 14th in the world and fifth in the U.S. in air cargo tonnage
processed, with more than 2.2 million tons of air cargo valued at over $101.4
billion. LAX is part of a system of two Southern California airports – along with Van Nuys general aviation
– that are owned and operated by Los Angeles World Airports, a proprietary department of the City of
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Cargo Facilities
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facility in March 1998, and in April 2009 opened a 12,700-square-foot
refrigeration facility. In 2011, mercury opened a 16,000-square-foot refrigeration facility and perishables
center, the largest of its kind among all U.S. West Coast airports.
Economic Impact
LAX is a dynamic airport that creates, attracts and supports economic activity throughout Southern
California. An economic study based on 2014 operations reported LAX generated 620,610 jobs in
Southern California with labor income of $37.3 billion and economic output (business revenues) of more
than $126.6 billion. This activity added $6.2 billion to local and state revenues and $8.7 billion in federal
tax revenues.
The study also reported that LAX’s ongoing capital-improvement program creates an additional 121,640
annual jobs with labor income of $7.6 billion and economic output of $20.3 billion, $966 million in state
and local taxes, and $1.6 billion in federal tax revenues.
Capital Improvement Program
A $14-billion LAX Modernization Program is underway at LAX, generating nearly 40,000 local jobs.
Completed projects include the New Tom Bradley International Terminal, which opened in 2013 with new
gates for latest-generation aircraft; new concourses and seating areas; premier retail and food-andbeverage offerings; and expanded areas for more efficient passenger and checked-luggage security
screening, as well as immigration and customs processing.
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Several other major airfield and facility projects are underway or have been completed, including a
replacement Central Utility Plant, new taxiways and taxi lanes. Underway are nearly $2 billion in
renovations in Terminals 1, 2, 7 and 8 being undertaken by LAWA and the airline lessees in those
terminals, while Westfield is revitalizing all the food-and-beverage and retail concessions in Terminals 1
and 3 with an emphasis on “Putting the L.A. back into LAX,” by featuring dining and retail choices that
reflect Los Angeles’ diverse cuisine, culture, and lifestyle. Westfield completed transforming the entire
food-and-beverage and retail programs in Terminals 2 and 6 in 2016.
Two major projects are underway. The $1.6-billion Midfield Satellite Concourse Project will feature 12
new aircraft gates -- including many for the latest-generation aircraft – and new taxiways/taxilanes and
utility improvements. It will provide added flexibility when other gates are taken out of service and
reduce use of the LAX remote gates, where passengers are now bussed to deplane and board flights.
Substantial completion of the North Gates is anticipated in late 2019, with operational activities to begin
soon thereafter. A second phase is expected to add seven gates on the south side in the future.
To address the growing traffic congestion in and around LAX, the $5.5-billion LAX Landside Access
Management Program (LAMP) has begun to give airport guests choices that provide a first class, swift,
convenient, and reliable way to access LAX. The program includes five major elements: a 2.25-mile
Automated People Mover (APM) that will connect three on-airport stations to Metro Rail and transit
services -- finally providing a seamless connection to public transportation; a Consolidated Rent-A-Car
center; two Intermodal Transportation Facilities for additional parking, ground transportation services,
and meet-and-greet activities; and roadway improvements. LAMP is expected to ortsdelivered by 2023.
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The central complex features nine passenger terminals connected by a U-shaped, two-level roadway.
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transportation are on the Lower/Arrivals-Level. Restaurants, cocktail lounges, gift shops, newsstands,
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duty free shops for international flights, restrooms, public telephones, business centers, airline lounges,
and other convenient services for the traveling public are located in the terminals.
Other amenities include a first-aid station in the Tom Bradley International Terminal and Interactive
Visitors Centers (kiosks) with passenger information and direct telephone connections to area
hotels/motels, public ground transportation services, and car rental firms serving most Southland
communities. Free LAX shuttle service is provided between all terminals, Economy Parking Lot C/LAX Bus
Transit Center, and the Metro Rail Green Line Aviation Station connecting with Los Angeles County’s
public rail system.
The iconic Theme Building complex, topped by an observation deck, features a space-age design. A
cafeteria on the ground level is open to the public from 6 a.m. to 3 p.m. weekdays.
Airfield and Terminals
The airport has four east-west parallel runways: 24 Right/6 Left is 8,925 feet; 24L/6R is 10,285 feet;
25R/7L is 12,090 feet, and 25L/7R is 11,095 feet. All are 150 feet wide except 25L/7R, which is 200 feet
wide.
The nine passenger terminals, west remote gates, and on-the-airfield airline commuter gates total nearly
145 aircraft parking spots.
Air Traffic Control
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The 277-foot-tall air traffic control tower began operation on April 1, 1996. It is uniquely designed to
service LAX’s four parallel runways. Federal Aviation Administration employees control the air space
above LAX and ground controllers handle their duties for each of the four runways. Flight data and gatehold positions are operated from the central position of the tower cab.
Public Parking
Nearly 8,000 parking stalls are available in eight parking structures located opposite the roadways from
the passenger terminals. In addition to the Central Terminal Area parking, LAX has a capacity of over
4,500 parking stalls available in Economy Parking Lot C.
Free shuttle bus service to airline terminals is provided from Lot C, located one-half mile northeast of the
airport. Adjacent to Lot C is the LAX Transit Bus Center, which connects public bus systems with the
courtesy LAX shuttle bus service to/from the terminals provided by the airport. Also adjacent to the
entrance of Lot C is the LAX Cell Phone Waiting Lot at 96th Street and Vicksburg, where motorists may
wait for arriving passengers up to two hours FREE.
Public Transportation
Among the modes of transportation available at LAX are: airport buses, door-to-door shuttle vans, local
and long-distance buses, light rail, rental cars, smartphone app-based ride-sharing, taxicabs, and
limousines. A free, frequent shuttle bus connects LAX with Metro’s Green Line Light Rail; another route
transports connecting passengers between airline terminals; and a third route transports passengers
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from Economy Parking Lot C and the LAX Bus Transit Center.
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The airport’s FlyAway® bus service provides frequent, dailys Angel 1, 2017
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In addition to airlines providing wheelchairs and other services for travelers with disabilities and the
elderly, LAX also provides: extra-wide parking spaces in all parking facilities, elevators, curbside ramps,
accessible restrooms, and Telecommunications Devices for the Deaf (TDD) or speech-impaired installed
in all airline terminals. Service-animal relief areas are located inside all terminals, as well as outside at
three locations. LAX also provides a free shuttle van equipped with a lift for wheelchairs that operates
between Economy Parking Lot C and all airline terminals, as well as between terminals. The van service
is available on-call and operates daily. A special assistance vehicle also is available to transport
passengers with disabilities or access or functional needs between terminals and aircraft gates located on
the airfield.
Brief History
Originally known as Mines Field, the LAX site began as a general aviation field in 1928. During World War
II, it was used for military flights. Commercial airline service started on December 9, 1946, when four
major carriers (American, Trans World, United and Western airlines) relocated overnight from Burbank,
establishing Los Angeles Airport as the region’s premier air facility. A month later, Pan American Airlines
moved from Burbank to Los Angeles. In 1950, it was officially named Los Angeles International Airport
and designated “LAX” (the “X” is a space filler for when airport codes expanded from two letters to three
to accommodate the growth in aviation). The airport grew in the 1950s, and the Jet Age arrived on
January 25, 1959, when an American Airlines Boeing 707-123 landed at LAX. By 1961, more than one
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million jet flights were logged at LAX. The present Central Terminal Area complex was constructed in
1961, along with a 12-story, 172-foot-tall combination airport administration building and Federal
Aviation Administration air traffic control tower. The airport’s iconic Theme Building was built. The era of
wide-body jets – B-747s, DC-10s, and L-1011s – began in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, LAX added the
Tom Bradley International Terminal, a second-level roadway, concourses connecting terminals with
satellite gates, and parking structures. Major growth in air travel and air cargo marked the 1990s and
made modernizing the airport for the 21st Century a vital concern. The LAX Master Plan process began in
1994. The LAX Gateway Pylons were lit August 2000. The Master Plan was approved by the City Council
in 2005 and construction began on the first Master Plan project, the South Airfield Improvement Project,
in 2006. Milestones have been achieved in the LAX Modernization Program that is expected to be
completed in 2023.
For more information about LAX, please visit www.lawa.aero/lax or follow on Twitter @flyLAXAirport, on
Facebook at www.facebook.com/LAInternationalAirport, and on YouTube at
www.YouTube.com/laxairport1.
Information about LAX’s ongoing multi-billion-dollar LAX Modernization Program, real-time traffic
conditions, and wayfinding during construction, visit www.LAXisHappening.com.
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City of L.A. | Disclaimer | Accessibility | Privacy | Notices | Sitemap | Comments/Contact Us
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