Cobb v. State of Alabama et al
Filing
32
OPINION AND ORDER directing as follows: (1) plf Janie D. Cobb's 26 objections are sustained in part and overruled in part; (2) the 25 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Mag Judge is adopted in part and rejected in part; (3) Defendants State of Alabama, Bob Riley, Nancy Buckner, Conitha King, and Craig Nelson's 14 First MOTION to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part; (4) the following claims are dismissed: (a) Plaintiff Cobb's ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and Title VII claims agai nst the individual moving defendants in their personal capacity; (b) plf Cob's ADA, ADEA, and FMLA claims against def State of Alabama; (c) plf Cobb's ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and Title VII claims for money damages against the individual moving def endants in their official capacities; (5) said motion to dismiss is denied as to the following claims, which remain pending: (a) Plaintiff Cobb's ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and Title VII claims for prospective relief, as described in this opinion, against the individual moving defendants in their official capacity; (b) plf Cobb's Title VII claim for money damages against def state of Alabama; (6) because defendant Jackie Graham did not participate in the first motion to dismiss, this order is in applicable to her; (7) Plf Cobb's Title VI claim remains pending; (8) The moving defendants' alternative 14 motion for a more definite statement is denied; (9) because the Alabama Department of Human Resources is not a party, this order is inapplicable to it; further ORDERING that this cause is referred back to the magistrate judge for further appropriate proceedings. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/22/11. (Attachments: # 1 civil appeals checklist)(djy, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
JANIE D. COBB,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF ALABAMA,
et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:10cv502-MHT
(WO)
OPINION AND ORDER
In this lawsuit, plaintiff Janie D. Cobb, a pro se
litigant, charges that various officials of the State of
Alabama discriminated against her on the basis of age,
gender, and perceived disability in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621,
et seq.; the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29
U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.; Title VI and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq.; and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101,
et seq.
Cobb alleges that the officials required her to
work near toxic chemicals that eventually made her ill.
She asserts that they then forced her to take mandatory
sick leave without the FMLA’s protections.
She names as
defendants the State of Alabama as well as the following
individuals: former Governor Bob Riley, Nancy Buckner,
Conitha King, Craig Nelson, and Jackie Graham, all of
whom are sued in their personal and official capacities.
This
court
has
jurisdiction
under
28
U.S.C.
§
1331
(federal question) and 42 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights).
All the defendants, except Graham, have moved to
dismiss all of Cobb’s claims, except the Title VI one, on
sovereign
immunity
grounds.
The
magistrate
judge
recommends dismissal of the ADEA, FMLA, and ADA claims as
to all moving defendants, and the dismissal of the Title
VII claims against the individual moving defendants in
their personal and official capacities.
The magistrate
judge further recommends denying the moving defendants’
alternative motion for a more definite statement.
The
magistrate judge also set aside the res judicata issue
until summary judgment.
For the following reasons, the
2
magistrate
Cobb’s
judge’s
requests
recommendation
for
prospective
is
rejected
relief
under
as
to
these
statutes and is adopted in all other respects.
I.
Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this court conducts a de
novo review of a magistrate judge’s recommendation on a
motion to dismiss.
II.
Discussion
A.
As an initial matter, there is some confusion as to
whether the Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR)
is a party in this matter.
In his recommendation, the
magistrate judge refers to DHR as a defendant even though
the court docket does not list DHR as a party and there
is no evidence of service, or even attempted service, on
DHR.
the
Admittedly, DHR is referred to as a defendant in
motion to dismiss at issue.
However, upon a close
reading of Cobb’s complaint and her July 22, 2010, reply
3
to a court order seeking clarification, it is clear that
Cobb did not name DHR as a defendant in this case.
DHR
is
the
therefore
not
a
party.
To
the
extent
that
magistrate judge’s recommendation names and discusses DHR
as a party, this court will view that discussion as
surplusage.
B.
The magistrate judge recommends granting the motion
to dismiss the ADA, ADEA, and FMLA claims.
Cobb objects
to these findings, arguing that Alabama and its officials
are liable under these statutes.
The moving defendants
have not filed a response to this objection.
Before
jumping into the sovereign-immunity thicket, the court
highlights four categories of claims and defendants to
serve as guideposts: (1) claims against officials acting
in their individual capacity; (2) claims against the
State;
(3)
claims
against
state
officials
in
their
official capacities for retrospective relief; and (4)
4
claims
against
state
officials
in
their
official
capacities for prospective relief.
First,
the
magistrate
judge
properly
recommends
dismissing the claims against officials in their personal
or individual capacity.
Under Eleventh Circuit case law,
officials acting in their individual capacity are not
personally liable under the ADA, ADEA, and FMLA.
See
Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 2007)
(ADA); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir.
1995) (ADEA); Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 687 (11th
Cir. 1999) (FMLA).
Second, the magistrate judge correctly found that
Alabama has sovereign immunity with respect to these
claims.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has directly
spoken
to the issue of whether Congress validly abrogated the
States’ sovereign immunity when it enacted the ADA and
ADEA.
See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (ADA); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (ADEA).
5
And notwithstanding
the Supreme Court’s holding on the FMLA’s family-leave
provisions, Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721 (2003), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has held that Congress failed to abrogate validly the
States’
sovereign
immunity
in
the
FMLA’s
provisions, which are at issue in this case.
self-care
See Garrett
v. Univ. of Ala. Bd. Of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th
Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds Garrett, 531 U.S. at
374; see also Batchelor v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 242
Fed.
Appx.
652,
653
(11th
Cir.
2007)
(unpublished)
(affirming Garrett’s validity post-Hibbs).
Absent a
valid waiver or abrogation, Alabama may not be sued in
federal court for either money damages or injunctive
relief.
See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
Third, the magistrate judge’s recommendation for the
dismissal
of
Cobb’s
requests
for
damages
against
officials in their official capacities should be adopted.
An official-capacity suit for damages is treated the same
as a suit against the State itself.
6
See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).
Because Alabama may
not be sued for money damages under these causes of
action, the official-capacity requests for damages must
fail.
Finally,
the
court
turns
to
the
question
of
prospective relief against the state officials in their
official capacities.
The magistrate judge’s reasoning
reveals
conflating
two
errors:
claims
officials and the State itself;
against
state
and construing Cobb’s
requests for prospective relief as retrospective relief.
The magistrate judge incorrectly rejected relief against
the
state
officials
because
he
believed
that
suits
against state officials should be treated the same as
suits against the State itself.
16 (Doc. No. 25).
See Recommendation, at
While this is true for money damages,
the Supreme Court held in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908),
that
official-capacity
suits
for
prospective
relief may proceed, regardless of sovereign immunity.
7
Of course, Ex parte Young’s “legal fiction” only
encompasses
relief.
requests
for
injunctive
or
declaratory
Young’s exception to sovereign immunity is not
triggered if the requested “prospective relief is the
functional equivalent of money damages.” Summit Medical
Assoc., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th Cir.
1999); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668
(1974) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the award of retroactive payments as compensation).
The
magistrate
for
judge
reasoned
that
Cobb’s
requests
prospective relief against the state officials in their
official capacities were, in fact, retrospective because
they
sought
damages
“the
and
violations
of
functional
addresse[d]
federal
past
law.”
equivalent
of
monetary
conduct,
not
ongoing
Recommendation,
at
11.
Accordingly, he recommends dismissing those requests for
relief on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
The question, then, is whether Cobb’s requests for
relief against state officials in their official capacity
8
are accurately characterized as seeking prospective or
retrospective
relief.
In
determining
whether
Young
applies, “a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward
inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing
violation
of
federal
law
and
seeks
relief
properly
characterized as prospective.’” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v.
Public Service Comm. of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645
(2002) (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,
521
U.S.
261,
296
(1997))
(alteration
in
original).
After an examination of the complaint, it is clear that
the magistrate judge improperly lumped together Cobb’s
requests
for
prospective
relief
and
treated
them
as
requests for retrospective relief.
Cobb’s complaint requests several distinct forms of
prospective
relief.
First,
Cobb
seeks
immediate
reinstatement to her old position (or a higher one).
Comp. at a (Doc. No. 1).
defendants
expunge
all
Second, she asks that the
adverse
employment
records
relating to the unlawful disability discrimination.
9
Id.
at g.
Finally, she explicitly seeks prospective relief
for her FMLA claims: a declaratory judgment on the FMLA
claim, id. at d; and an injunction requiring compliance
with the FMLA, id. at e.
Young’s
“ongoing
and
continuous
requirement”
for
prospective relief is satisfied here. Summit, 180 F.3d at
1338.
Reinstatement
prospective relief.
is
a
quintessential
form
of
See Cross v. State of Ala., State
Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d
1490, 1503 (11th Cir. 1995); see also State Employees
Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 96
(2d Cir. 2007) (commenting that every circuit to address
the question has held that sovereign immunity does not
bar
reinstatement
Regarding
after
expungement,
an
the
unlawful
termination).
existence
of
adverse
employment records predicated on unlawful discrimination
is an ongoing constitutional violation.
If the disputed
records were to remain in her file, Cobb could one day be
unfairly
maligned
by
these
10
allegedly
discriminatory
records.
(11th
Cf. Camp v. Cason, 220 Fed. Appx. 976, 982
Cir.
employment
2007)
(treating
records
for
claim
for
expungement
of
Privacy
Act
violation
as
prospective relief); Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992 (2d
Cir. 1994) (holding that erroneous listing on child-abuse
registry was an ongoing due process violation). And, of
course, a request for declaratory and injunctive relief
pursuant to the FMLA is prospective relief.
However,
Cobb
does
conflate
her
requests
for
prospective and retrospective relief in some respects.
When requesting reinstatement, she also asks for the
“return [of] los[t] benefits.” Comp. at a.
To the extent
that this request is construed as “back pay,” Cobb is
seeking retrospective relief. See Lussier v. Dugger, 904
F.2d 661, 669 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the reward
of certain retroactive pay and benefits “would constitute
the payment of money damages from the state treasury”).
Additionally,
Cobb
seeks
medical
and
out-of-pocket
expenses, back pay, and liquidated damages under the
11
FMLA.
Comp. at h-j.
These requests for relief are
retrospective and, therefore, are barred by sovereign
immunity.
See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677 (“[A] federal
court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment...may not include a retroactive award which
requires the payment of funds from the state treasury.”)
(internal citations omitted).
Although the magistrate
judge erred by treating Cobb’s request for liquidated
damages under the FMLA as a request for punitive damages
under Title VII, Cobb’s request still fails because it is
retrospective.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:
(1) Plaintiff Janie D. Cobb’s objections (Doc. No.
26) are sustained in part and overruled in part.
(2) The magistrate judge’s recommendation (Doc. No.
25) is adopted in part and rejected in part.
12
(3) Defendants State of Alabama, Bob Riley, Nancy
Buckner, Conitha King, and Craig Nelson’s first motion to
dismiss (Doc. No. 14) is granted in part and denied in
part.
(4) The following claims are dismissed:
(a) Plaintiff Cobb’s ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and
Title VII claims against the individual moving
defendants in their personal capacity.
(b) Plaintiff Cobb’s ADA, ADEA, and FMLA
claims against defendant State of Alabama.
(c) Plaintiff Cobb’s ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and
Title VII claims for money damages against the
individual moving defendants in their official
capacities.
(5) Said motion to dismiss is denied as to the
following claims, which remain pending:
(a) Plaintiff Cobb’s ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and
Title
VII
described
claims
in
for
this
prospective
opinion,
13
relief,
against
as
the
individual moving defendants in their official
capacity.
(b) Plaintiff Cobb’s Title VII claim for
money
damages
against
defendant
State
of
Alabama.
(6)
Because
defendant
Jackie
Graham
did
not
participate in the first motion to dismiss, this order is
inapplicable to her.
(7) Plaintiff Cobb’s Title VI claim remains pending.
(8) The moving defendants’ alternative motion for a
more definite statement (Doc. No. 14) is denied.
(9) Because the Alabama Department of Human Resources
is not a party, this order is inapplicable to it.
It is further ORDERED that this cause is referred
back to the magistrate judge for further appropriate
proceedings.
DONE, this the 22nd day of August, 2011.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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