Adams v. The City of Montgomery - Maintenance Department

Filing 115

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION AND ORDER directing, as to this court's opinion and order 73 , that: (1) plf Willie Adams's 109 motion to reconsider and vacate pursuant to FRCP 59 is denied as untimely; (2) plf Adams's 109 motion to reconsid er and vacate under FRCP 60(b) is granted as to the retaliation claim arising out of the May 28 Employee Counseling Record and is denied in all other respects. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/30/12. (Attachments: # 1 civil appeals checklist)(djy, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE ADAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:10cv924-MHT
(WO)

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION AND ORDER
Following the revelation of previously undisclosed
evidence, Adams v. City of Montgomery, civil action no.
2:10cv924-MHT (M.D. Ala. May 29, 2012) (Thompson, J.)
plaintiff

Willie

Adams

moves

to

vacate

and

for

reconsideration of this court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant City of Montgomery in
part.

Adams v. City of Montgomery, 2012 WL 1414979 (M.D.

Ala. Apr. 24, 2012) (Thompson, J.).

For the reasons that

follow, the reconsideration motion will be granted in
part and denied in part.

I.

TIMELINESS

Adams seeks relief under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 59 and 60.

Under Rule 59(e), a motion to alter

or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days
after

entry

of

judgment.

This

court

summary-judgment order on April 24, 2012.

entered

its

As such, Adams

had until May 22 to file a timely Rule 59 motion.

Adams,

however, filed his Rule 59 motion two days late, on May
24.
Rule 60 has a more flexible timeliness requirement.
A movant seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) must
file a motion within a “reasonable time” and “no more
than one year after the entry of the judgment.”
Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

Fed. R.

Here, Adams promptly filed his Rule

60(b) motion after the discovery revelations came to
light the weekend prior to trial (May 4th to 6th).

Thus,

Adams’s motion will be considered under Rule 60(b)’s
heightened standards for reconsideration.

2

See Jones v.

Southern Pan Services, 450 Fed. App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (noting that an “untimely Rule 59
motion to vacate is properly treated as a Rule 60(b)
motion”).

II.

RULE 60(b) STANDARD

“A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(2) based on
newly discovered evidence requires all of the following:
(1) the evidence must be newly discovered since the
summary

judgment

order;

(2)

the

movant

must

have

exercised due diligence in discovering the new evidence;
(3)

the

evidence

cannot

be

merely

cumulative

or

impeaching; (4) the evidence must be material; and (5)
the new evidence must be such that it would produce a
different outcome in the underlying action.”

Rease v.

AT&T Corp., 239 Fed. App’x 481, 483 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).

A Rule 60(b)(2) motion is “an extraordinary

motion and the requirements of the rule must be strictly
met.”

Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff’s Office, 329

3

F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003). “Similarly, a Rule
60(b)(6) motion, by which a court has discretion to grant
[relief] for any other reason justifying relief from the
operation

of

the

judgment,

is

intended

only

for

extraordinary circumstances.” Toole v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

III.

DISCUSSION

Adams seeks reconsideration of two parts of this
court’s summary-judgment order.

First, Adams contends

that the discovery revelations related to the timing of
supervisor James Ivey’s notification of Adams’s internalaffairs complaint creates a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether the Employee Counseling Record was
retaliatory.

On this point, Adams has met his burden at

each stage of the Rule 60(b)(2) inquiry.
Some of the “Lilley documents” were disclosed after
the court granted summary judgment on this claim; indeed,

4

these Lilley documents came to light the weekend prior to
the scheduled trial date.

And, while Adams may not have

exercised due diligence as to all the evidence that was
improperly withheld, the existence of investigator Walter
Lilley, Jr., was hidden from Adams’s attorneys throughout
discovery.
notice

that

As such, Adams’s attorneys had no reasonable
anyone

besides

city

attorney

C.

Michael

“Mickey” McInnish had information regarding the internalaffairs investigation.
The

Lilley

documents

were

material,

not

merely

cumulative, and would have produced a different outcome
at the summary-judgment stage.

Stated succinctly, Adams

was transferred to the ditch-crew on May 28, 2008, and
the counseling record signed by Ivey was dated for that
same day.

Adams says that he was given the May 28

counseling record on May 29, at the same time as a letter
of reprimand.

Although the court initially concluded

that this timeline precluded a retaliation claim related
to the counseling record, the Lilley documents raise the

5

specter that Ivey may have been notified about Adams’s
internal-affairs

complaint

on

May

28.

Ivey

was

interviewed by internal-affairs investigator Lilley on
May 29 and may have scheduled the meeting the prior day.
As such, the Lilley documents create a genuine dispute
over whether the May 28 counseling record was written or
signed

by

Ivey

after

his

notification

of

Adams’s

internal-affairs complaint and, therefore, may have been
retaliatory.

(To be clear: there is no genuine dispute

of material fact related to the ditch-crew transfer.
Adams’s

notification

of

his

ditch-crew

precipitated his internal-affairs complaint.
ditch-crew

transfer

was

not

in

retaliation

transfer
Thus, the
for

the

grant

of

internal-affairs complaint.)
Second,

Adams

objects

to

this

court’s

summary judgment on his race-discrimination claim as it
relates to the Service Maintenance Worker III position.
Adams,

however,

has

not

presented

any

new

evidence

concerning this claim and simply seeks to reopen an

6

already resolved issue.
discovery

Adams’s invocation of the city’s

violations–-which

were

unrelated

to

this

issue–-is too speculative to overcome the high hurdle
erected by Rule 60(b).
*
Accordingly,

it

is

*

*

ORDERED,

as

to

this

court’s

opinion and order, Adams v. City of Montgomery, 2012 WL
1414979 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2012) (Doc. No. 73), that:
(1) Plaintiff Willie Adams’s motion to reconsider and
vacate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59
(Doc. No. 109) is denied as untimely.
(2) Plaintiff Adams’s motion to reconsider and vacate
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (Doc. No.
109) is granted as to the retaliation claim arising out
of the May 28 Employee Counseling Record and is denied in
all other respects.
DONE, this the 30th day of May, 2012.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE