Lloyd v. The Housing Authority for the City of Montgomery, Alabama

Filing 55

ORDER that the Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate Judgment 49 is DENIED. Signed by Honorable Judge Mark E. Fuller on 7/3/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist) (jg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
CURTIS LLOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 2-10-cv-1103-MEF
(WO)

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE
CITY OF MONTGOMERY,
ALABAMA,
Defendant.

ORDER
The plaintiff, Curtis Lloyd, filed a Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate Judgment
(Doc. # 49) after the Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Montgomery
Housing Authority (Docs. # 47, 48). Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a party to file such a motion “no later than 28 days after the entry of the
judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). By filing the motion 26 days after the Court entered a
final judgment, Lloyd filed in a timely manner, thereby satisfying the rule’s procedural
requirements. His attempt to satisfy the rule’s substantive standard is another matter,
however.
“The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are newly-discovered evidence
or manifest errors of law or fact.” In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999). It

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is not a vehicle for relitigating old matters. Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington,
408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005). Nor does Rule 59 allow a party to raise arguments or
present evidence that he could have raised or produced before the entry of the final
judgment. Id.
Here, Lloyd fails to produce newly-discovered evidence or argue (let alone
establish) that the Court made a manifest error of law on his disability claim. He instead
relies primarily on rehashing arguments the Court has already rejected, although he does
cite to Robertson v. Alabama Department of Economic & Community Affairs, 902 F.
Supp. 1473 (M.D. Ala. 1995), for the first time, arguing that its holding precludes the
entry of summary judgment. He never addressed Robertson’s significance at the
summary judgment stage, however, so he has waived that argument and cannot raise it
now.1 See Michael Linet, 408 F.3d at 763 (“Linet however cannot use a Rule 59(e)
motion to . . . raise [an] argument . . . that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.”). More importantly, the Court has already rejected Lloyd’s attempt to create a
genuine issue of material fact on his disability claim by conflating two different time
periods.2 The same problems are inherent in Lloyd’s arguments on his retaliation claim.

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It is also worth noting that the Robertson court did not address the specific question at issue
here. Instead, it focused only on the reasonableness of the accommodation requested by the plaintiff.
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Lloyd has done this twice now by failing to distinguish between the period when he
undoubtedly did not have a disability that substantially limited a major life activity (the 22 years in which
he worked as a janitor for the MHA without incident, two of which were at Smiley Court) and the time in
which he had a disability that substantially limited his ability to work but did so to such an extent that he
was no longer a qualified individual with a disability (the period after his second stint at Smiley Court

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Because Lloyd has failed to produce newly discovered evidence or establish that
the Court made a manifest error of law by granting summary judgment in the MHA’s
favor, it is hereby ORDERED that his Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate Judgment
(Doc. # 49) is DENIED.
Done this the 3rd day of July, 2012.
/s/ Mark E. Fuller
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

that aggravated his asthma and hypertension to the point where he could no longer work in the sun and
around cleaning chemicals).

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