Henderson v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, LTD. et al

Filing 218

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER directing as follows: (1) Goodyear/Dunlop's 145 Motion to Exclude Certain Factual and Expert Opinion Testimony of Dr. David Herrick is DENIED; (2) Goodyear/Dunlop's 146 Motion to Exclude Certain Factual and Expert Opinion Testimony of Wayne McCracken is DENIED; (3) Goodyear/Dunlop's 149 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as MOOT as it relates to previously dismissed Defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber; ruling is otherwise RESERVED; (4) Defendan t Goodyear/Dunlop's 150 Daubert Motion to Exclude Woehrle's Expert Testimony is DENIED as MOOT as it relates to previously dismissed Defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber; otherwise ruling is DEFERRED pending a Daubert hearing; (5) Plaintiffs' 151 & 152 Motion to Strike and/or Exclude Certain Testimony of Gary Bolden is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins on 10/22/13. (Attachments: # 1 civil appeals checklist)(djy, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
WILLIAM M. HENDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES
NORTH AMERICA, LTD., et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________
PAMELA STAFFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES
NORTH AMERICA, LTD., et al.,
Defendants.

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) CASE NO. 3:11-CV-295-WKW
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) CASE NO. 3:12-CV-510-WKW
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a products liability and personal injury case. Before the court are
five motions: (1) Goodyear/Dunlop’s Motion to Exclude Certain Factual and
Expert Opinion Testimony of Dr. David Herrick (Doc. # 145); (2)
Goodyear/Dunlop’s Motion to Exclude Certain Factual and Expert Opinion
Testimony of Wayne McCracken (Doc. # 146); (3) the Goodyear Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 149); (4) the Goodyear Defendants’

Daubert Motion to Exclude Woehrle’s Expert Testimony (Doc. # 150); and (5)
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike and/or Exclude Certain Testimony of Gary Bolden
(Docs. # 151 & 152). After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the
appropriate law, and the allegations set forth in the complaint, the court finds that
all motions are due to be denied.
I.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
II.
A.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Daubert Standard
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of

Evidence 702 and Daubert and its progeny. Rule 702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue;
(b) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
In Daubert, the Supreme Court made it clear that Rule 702 assigns the trial
court a gatekeeping role to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence

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admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”

Daubert v. Merrill Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 & 597 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co.,
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence
‘assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony rests both
on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.’” (quoting Daubert, 509
U.S. at 596)). This gatekeeping responsibility is the same when the trial court is
considering the admissibility of expert technical evidence. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S.
at 147.
In the Eleventh Circuit, expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702 if it
satisfies three broad requirements:
(1) The expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he
intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his
conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry
mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through
the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1999)). These
requirements are known as the “qualifications,” “reliability,” and “helpfulness”
prongs. See id.
When evaluating the reliability of scientific expert testimony, the trial judge
must assess “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
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applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592—93). Factors that may
bear on the reliability of expert testimony include (1) whether the expert’s theory
can be and has been tested, (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer
review and publication, (3) whether the known or potential rate of error of the
methodology is acceptable, and (4) whether the theory is generally accepted in the
proper scientific community. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1298 (11th Cir.
2004) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593—94). These factors are not definitive, but
will vary depending on the case. Indeed, the trial court has “considerable leeway
in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular
expert testimony is reliable.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. At the same time, the
trial court must remain mindful that “Daubert does not require certainty; it requires
only reliability.” Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1198 n.10
(11th Cir. 2010).

The focus of reliability “must be solely on principles and

methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
Moreover, whether the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact in
understanding the evidence or a fact in issue “goes primarily to relevance.”
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. “Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in
the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit said it this way: Assisting the trier of fact means
that “the trial judge ought to insist that a proffered expert bring to the jury more

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than the lawyers can offer in argument.” Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305
(5th Cir. 1992).
In the end, however, the court’s gatekeeping role under Daubert “is not
intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.” Allison v.
McGhan, 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999).

Where the basis of expert

testimony satisfies Rule 702, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking [debatable] but admissible evidence.”
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
B.

Summary Judgment Standard
To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and
the inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010). The court should
grant the motion if the pleadings, together with supporting materials in the record,
show that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Greenberg v.
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex

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Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

This responsibility includes

identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute
of material fact. Id. If the movant meets its evidentiary burden, the burden shifts
to the nonmoving party to establish – with evidence beyond the pleadings – that a
genuine dispute material to each of its claims for relief exists. Id. at 324.
A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party
produces evidence allowing a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor.
Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).
The modern standard requires more than a “mere scintilla” of favorable evidence.
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Conclusory allegations based on
subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
and do not preclude summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564
(11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
III.

BACKGROUND

Viewing the evidence and the inferences from that evidence in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs, as the court must do when considering a motion for

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summary judgment, Jean-Baptiste, 627 F.3d at 820, the court finds the pertinent
factual background is as follows.
A.

Procedural History
This case, originally filed in state court, was removed from Montgomery

County Circuit Court on April 18, 2011. The court denied Plaintiff Henderson’s
motion to remand. (Doc. # 23.) On July 27, 2012, the court consolidated this
action with Stafford v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America LTD, Case No.
3:12-cv-510, thus, adding an additional plaintiff, Pamela Stafford. (Doc. # 85.)
There have been myriad discovery disputes that have been resolved. The motions
for summary judgment and exclusion of expert witnesses followed.
B.

Facts
On July 18, 2010, Plaintiffs William M. Henderson (driver) and Pamela

Stafford (passenger) were involved in a motorcycle accident in Chambers County,
Alabama.

No other vehicles were involved.

The accident occurred when

Henderson lost control of the motorcycle because the rear tire blew out. (Doc. # 32
at 3.) Plaintiffs contend that the accident and resulting injuries were caused by “a
sudden and catastrophic deflation” of the allegedly defective tire mounted on the
rear of the motorcycle. (Doc. # 32 at 6.)
Plaintiffs filed suit against Harley-Davidson Motor Company Group LLC,
Harley-Davidson Motor Company, Inc., Harley-Davidson of Montgomery, Inc.,

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Goodyear Dunlop Tires of North America LTD, and Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company. The Harley Davidson defendants were all dismissed. (Docs. # 24 &
142.) By separate order, the court granted Defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 194.) The sole remaining
defendant is Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America LTD.
Plaintiff Henderson asserts four claims: Alabama Extended Manufacturers
Liability Doctrine (“AEMLD”), negligence, wantonness, and breach of warranty.
Plaintiff Stafford asserts three claims: AEMLD, negligence, and wantonness.
Plaintiffs allege that manufacturing and design defects in the subject Goodyear tire
on Henderson’s motorcycle caused the accident and Plaintiffs’ resulting injuries.
(Doc. # 32.)
IV.

DISCUSSION

This opinion provides a separate analysis for each pending motion. Part A
examines Goodyear’s two motions to exclude the testimony of Dr. David Herrick
and Wayne McCracken.

Part B examines Plaintiffs’ motions to exclude the

testimony of defense expert, Gary Bolden. Part C discusses Goodyear’s Daubert
motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert, William Woehrle.

Part D examines

Goodyear’s summary judgment motion.
A.

Defendant Goodyear/Dunlop’s Motions to Exclude certain Testimony of
Dr. David Herrick and Wayne McCracken (Docs. # 145 & 146)
1. Dr. David Herrick
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Dr. David Herrick is a medical physician, board certified in pain
management and anesthesiology. (Doc. # 174-1.) He is also Plaintiff William
Henderson’s pain management doctor. Relevant to this case is Dr. Herrick’s pain
management expertise. Herrick is of the opinion that Henderson is permanently
disabled due to the pain he continually suffers as a result of the injuries he received
in the motorcycle accident. (Doc. # 174-2.) Further, it is his opinion that, due to
the level of pain and the level of medication prescribed to Henderson for his pain,
Henderson is unable to work. (Doc. # 174-3.)
Defendant Goodyear objects on hearsay grounds to many of the facts
provided to Dr. Herrick, both through the medical records he reviewed and from
Plaintiff himself. Goodyear argues that Dr. Herrick’s opinions are unreliable under
Rule 702, Daubert, and its progeny because the opinions are based upon these
hearsay statements. Some of those “unreliable” opinions are the following:
a. “Mr. Henderson was involved in a motorcycle accident that resulted
in significant injury.”
b. “He was transported by helicopter from the accident scene to the
emergency room and was subsequently hospitalized for an extended
period of time in the ICU from those injuries.”
c. “His injuries included a burst compression fracture and wedge
compression fractures of multiple thoracic vertebrae.”
d. “He required intubation and mechanical ventilation resulting in a
subsequent tracheostomy.”
(Doc. # 145 at 2.) Further opinion testimony objected to by Goodyear is the
following:

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a. “Mr. Henderson experienced a significant injury to the thoracic spine
from the accident resulting in extensive thoracic fusion surgery for
treatment of unstable thoracic fractures.”
b. “Spinal fusion involving multiple levels of thoracic spine is a very
challenging and dangerous surgery that is fraught with peril.”
c. “The purpose of the surgery, in general, is not so much to return the
spine to its normal position, appearance and alignment as it is to
prevent further injury and disability from instability.”
d. “Mr. Henderson experienced an injury to the left ulnar nerve.”
(Doc. # 145 at 4.) Defendant also objects to the opinion of Dr. Herrick that
“Henderson is permanently disabled due to the injuries he received in the
motorcycle accident and his resulting continued level of pain.” (Doc. # 145 at 5.)
Dr. Herrick’s reliance on other doctors’ medical records and his patient’s
own statements are the type of evidence contemplated under Rule 703 because
they are the type of evidence that medical doctors “reasonably rely on . . . in
forming an opinion on the subject.” The advisory committee notes to Rule 703
specifically explain that a physician may rely on a wide range of sources in
forming medical opinions, including facts that the doctor learns “other than by his
own perception”:
[T]he rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions beyond
that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice in
line with the practice of experts themselves when not in court. Thus,
a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information
from numerous sources and of considerable variety, including
statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses,
technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X rays. Most of
them are admissible in evidence, but only with the expenditure of
substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating
witnesses. The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance
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upon them. His validation, expertly performed and subject to crossexamination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes.
Fed. R. Evid. 703 Advisory Committee Notes (1972). To the extent Dr. Herrick’s
testimony is cumulative, the court will address appropriate objections at trial.
Defendant’s motion to exclude certain testimony of Dr. David Herrick is denied.
2. Wayne McCracken
Wayne McCracken is an accident reconstruction expert offered by Plaintiffs.
Defendant Goodyear objects to testimony relating to the sufficiency of loadbearing capacity of the subject tire, and any testimony relating to the sufficiency of
the information included in the Harley-Davidson Operator’s Manual. However,
this portion of Defendant’s motion need not to be addressed based on Plaintiffs’
withdrawal of said opinions. Footnote 1 on page 2 of Plaintiffs’ response states the
following:
Plaintiff hereby withdraws any opinions from Mr. McCracken relative
to the topic that the subject tire did not have adequate load carrying
capabilities, that the motorcycle could have been equipped with a tire
with greater load carrying capabilities, and that information relative to
weight distribution in the Harley-Davidson Manual was inadequate.
While Mr. McCracken is qualified to give such opinions, these issues
are no longer in dispute, and Plaintiff withdraws them while reserving
the right to reintroduce these opinions if the Defendants raise them in
the future.
(Doc. # 173 at 2, n.1.)
Goodyear further objects to McCracken’s testimony relating to maintaining
control of a motorcycle when a sudden loss of air situation occurs, or a sudden air11

out in a tire occurs. (Doc. # 146 at 5.) Defendant argues that McCracken’s
testimony is unreliable and not supported by any facts. McCracken formulated his
opinions based on his investigation of the accident scene and the motorcycle itself,
and his opinion satisfies the Daubert requirements. Moreover, McCracken is
certified as a Professional Engineer in four states (Alabama, Kentucky,
Mississippi, and Georgia) and earned his engineering degree from Duke
University. He held an American Motorcyclist Association racing license for
numerous years and raced motorcycles professionally for five years.

His

experience includes over forty years in the motorcycle industry. He took courses
in accident reconstruction at the University of North Florida. He has been an
active member of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) for over twenty
years, and within that organization he is a member of the accident reconstruction
subcommittee which peer-reviews submitted publications. As a member of the
subcommittee, McCracken regularly reviews and approves articles which address
side forces concerning “stiffness” of pneumatic tires which suffer different failure
modes. He has investigated over 2,000 motor vehicle wrecks, and reconstructed
400–500 accidents which resulted from tire failures.
To the extent that McCracken’s opinions have gaps, Defendant may counter
those opinions through cross-examination and the presentation of contrary
evidence.

See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.

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McCracken’s opinions have been

formulated in a scientifically and methodologically reliable fashion. Goodyear’s
motion to exclude certain opinion testimony of Wayne McCracken is moot as it
pertains to the opinions withdrawn by Plaintiffs, and is denied as to the remaining
opinions.
B.

Plaintiffs’ Motions to Strike and/or Exclude Certain Testimony of Mr.
Gary Bolden (Docs. # 151 & 152)
Plaintiffs argue that Bolden’s experience is not sufficient to establish

admissibility and that Bolden’s opinion is not reliable under 702 and Daubert.
Plaintiffs take issue with the fact that Bolden is not an expert specifically in
motorcycle tires, alleging that this lack of experience makes him unqualified to
testify in this case. Plaintiffs’ disagreement with Bolden’s opinion does not mean
Bolden got the facts wrong, as Plaintiffs allege in their motion. (Doc. # 151 at 11.)
Bolden observed facts – the condition of the tire at issue – and then rendered an
opinion of the cause of those observed factual conditions. The extent to which
these conclusions are speculative may be established by cross-examination and
other evidence in the case.
Bolden is qualified to give his opinions in this case pursuant to Daubert.
“[S]o long as the expert is at least minimally qualified, gaps in his qualifications
generally will not preclude admission of his testimony, as this relates more to
witness credibility and thus the weight of the expert’s testimony, than to its
admissibility.” Trilink Saw Chain, LLC v. Blount, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 1293,
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1304 (N.D. Ga. 2008). Indeed, “an expert’s training does not always need to be
narrowly tailored to match the exact point of dispute in a case.” Id. (citations
omitted). Bolden possesses the requisite experience to offer his opinions. He is an
engineer with forty-four years of tire design and manufacturing experience and he
has performed forensic tire failure analysis for more than thirty-five years,
including on numerous bias ply constructed tires like the subject tire in this case.
He has published multiple peer reviewed research articles on forensic tire failure
analysis, including on the same principles he employed in reaching his opinions
regarding the subject tire in this case. Plaintiffs may address any related issues
through cross-examination.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the

testimony of Gary Bolden is denied.
C.

Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the opinion testimony of expert William
Woehrle on the basis of Daubert (Doc. # 150)
The specific Daubert factors aid a trial judge in determining reliability;

however, sometimes other questions may be more useful. U.S. v. Frazier, 387
F.3d 1244, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). “[E]xpert testimony is admissible if it concerns
matters that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person.” Id. (citing
U.S. v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985)). As to methodology, the court
finds that “[a] trial setting . . . will provide the best operating environment for the
triage which Daubert demands.” Rafaela Cortes-Irizarry v. Corp. Insular De
Seguros, 111 F. 3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 1997).
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Goodyear contends that William Woehrle is not qualified to testify as to
design defects of the subject tire and that his opinions are not based on a reliable
methodology. (Doc. #150-1 at 8-9.) Defendant bases this argument on the fact
that Woehrle has never designed a tire, would not hire himself to design a tire, does
not have an engineering degree, and was not considered a design engineer by
Uniroyal, the tire manufacturing company that employed him. (Doc. # 150 at 4-5.)
Woehrle’s extensive experience is focused directly on defective tires. He
worked for many years at Uniroyal analyzing and testing tire failure for all
manufacturing, research, and development company-wide. Though Woehrle never
designed and created a tire himself,1 he has extensive knowledge and experience
determining how tires fail and how to properly manufacture a good, working tire.
His ability to create a tire is not necessary, as Defendant implies.
Defendant relies heavily on the Tenth Circuit’s recent opinion affirming a
district court’s exclusion of Woehrle’s testimony. See Ho v. Michelin N. Am., Inc.,
No. 11-3334 2013 WL 1277023 (Mar. 29, 2013) (affirming Ho v. Michelin N. Am.,
Inc., No. 08-1282-JTM 2011 WL 3241466 (July 29, 2011)). Woehrle has testified
in many cases throughout the years, and there is a distinction between the facts in
the Ho case and the facts here. In Ho, the plaintiff asserted a claim of failure to
warn, a subject about which the Kansas district court found Woehrle was not

1

Notably, Woehrle has built a “production tire” before.
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qualified to speak. In this case, Plaintiffs are not asserting a claim for failure to
warn. But the Kansas District Court also excluded Woehrle’s testimony on tire
design. The Daubert motion was granted in Ho, which resulted in a grant of
summary judgment in favor of Michelin, based on the plaintiff’s inadequate
response to the defendant’s Daubert motion. Indeed, the Ho Court commented on
the plaintiff’s failure to prove that Woehrle’s testimony met the Daubert standards
because there was an improper and irrelevant focus on the defense expert’s
qualifications in comparison to Woehrle’s qualifications. Id. at *3.
Woehrle’s vast experience in the testing and manufacture of tires inherently
involves design issues and recommendations that would change a design of a tire
based on its poor testing, though Woehrle is not a tire designer himself. Based
upon the parties’ representations, there is very limited literature available that is
specific to this type of tire failure. Furthermore, in McCloud ex rel. Hall v.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., LTD, 479 F. Supp. 2d 882 (C.D. Ill. 2007), the
same defendant argued a similar Daubert motion that the court denied after
holding a Daubert hearing. Plaintiffs have submitted Woehrle’s supplemental and
rebuttal report, which includes recent testing he conducted to address Defendant’s
concerns. The court has given Defendant permission to redepose Woehrle based
on the new reports submitted (Doc. # 191), but no such permission has been
sought.

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Based on the information and arguments currently available, it is not
possible to resolve this motion (and the summary judgment motion linked to it)
without a Daubert hearing. The parties shall be prepared to discuss scheduling a
Daubert hearing at the pretrial conference.
D.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 149)
Because Defendant’s summary judgment motion hinges solely on the

exclusion of Woehrle’s expert testimony, further analysis is necessary after the
Daubert hearing.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED as follows:
(1)

Goodyear/Dunlop’s Motion to Exclude Certain Factual and Expert Opinion
Testimony of Dr. David Herrick (Doc. # 145) is DENIED.

(2)

Goodyear/Dunlop’s Motion to Exclude Certain Factual and Expert Opinion
Testimony of Wayne McCracken (Doc. # 146) is DENIED.

(3)

Goodyear/Dunlop’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 149) is DENIED
as MOOT as it relates to previously dismissed Defendant Goodyear Tire &
Rubber; ruling is otherwise RESERVED.

(4)

Defendant Goodyear/Dunlop’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Woehrle’s Expert
Testimony (Doc. #150) is DENIED as MOOT as it relates to previously

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dismissed Defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber; otherwise ruling is
DEFERRED pending a Daubert hearing.
(5)

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike and/or Exclude Certain Testimony of Gary
Bolden (Docs. # 151 & 152) is DENIED.
DONE this 22nd day of October, 2013.
/s/ W. Keith Watkins
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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