Adair v. Honda Manufacturing Alabama, LLC
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART to the extent that it seeks a more definite statement and DENYING IN PART to the extent that it seeks a dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice 9 MOTION to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 2/21/2013. # 1 Exhibit A) (JLC).
2013 Feb-21 PM 03:47
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
HONDA MANUFACTURING OF
) Case No.: 1:12-CV-3022-VEH
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to this court’s repleader order (Doc. 7) entered on October 3, 2012,
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc. 8) on January 2, 2013. Pending before the
court is Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss (Doc. 9) (the “Motion”) filed on January 16,
2013. The Motion seeks an order dismissing Plaintiff’s amended pleading or
alternatively an order requiring Plaintiff to provide a more definite statement of her
claims. (Id. at 9).
On January 18, 2013, the court entered a briefing order on the Motion. (Doc.
10). Pursuant to this briefing order, Plaintiff filed a response to the Motion (Doc. 12)
on February 1, 2013, and Defendant replied (Doc. 13) on February 8, 2013.
The court held a hearing on the Motion on February 20, 2013. As explained
below, the Motion is DENIED to the extent that it seeks a dismissal of this lawsuit
with prejudice, but is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks a more definite statement.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the
complaint provide “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of her entitlement to relief, Rule 8
does not mandate the inclusion of “detailed factual allegations” within a complaint.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). However at the same
time, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “[O]nce a claim has
been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent
with the allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. “While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief.” Id. (emphasis added). “Under Twombly’s construction of
Rule 8 . . . [a plaintiff’s] complaint [must] ‘nudge [any] claims’ . . . ‘across the line
from conceivable to plausible.’ Ibid.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51.
A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin
to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Rule 12(e) provides:
A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which
a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous
that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must
be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the
defects complained of and the details desired. If the court orders a more
definite statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice
of the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the
pleading or issue any other appropriate order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
Defendant premises its Motion upon Plaintiff’s alleged failure to adhere to the
requirements of Twombly and its progeny when filing an amended complaint on
January 2, 2013. For the reasons stated in open court during the hearing and
consistent with the court’s denial (Doc. 7) on October 3, 2012, of Defendant’s first
attempt (Doc. 6) at obtaining a dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims based upon comparable
unpersuasive arguments, the Rule 12(b)(6) portion of the Motion is DENIED.
However, as articulated during the hearing, the Rule 12(e) part of the Motion
is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED to replead her
claims within ninety days of the entry date of this order. Such amended pleading
Allege that Plaintiff worked over 40 hours in at least some work weeks
and was not paid overtime for that week or weeks involving additional amount(s) of
Clarify the time frame(s) in which Plaintiff is alleging she was not paid
overtime during the course of her employment with Defendant. To satisfy this
requirement, Plaintiff should allege the year in which the first overtime violation
happened through the year in which the last one occurred or until the present (if
Plaintiff is a current employee of Defendant and contends that such violations are still
occurring). Additionally, Plaintiff should specify whether overtime violations
occurred for all position(s) that she has held or alternatively only with certain
position(s) and/or shift(s) within certain department(s) and/or under certain
Restate her allegations about Defendants’ rounding practice (Doc. 8 ¶
13) to more accurately reflect Plaintiff’s position.
Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to the alternative relief requested
by Defendant, but is otherwise DENIED. As stated above, the deadline for Plaintiff
to restate her claims is within ninety days of the entry date of this order.
Additionally, due to the similar, if not identical nature of the motions to dismiss
that are pending in 376 of the other 383 cases that resulted from the court’s
decertification order (Doc. 194) entered in the related lawsuit of Burroughs v. Honda,
1:08-CV-1239-VEH, on July 19, 2012, the court is persuaded to apply its decision
here in those other actions. Accordingly, the clerk is DIRECTED to deny by margin
order all of those pending motions based upon the court’s reasoning contained
DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of February, 2013.
VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a list of the cases that resulted from the
court’s decertification order (Doc. 194) entered in the related lawsuit of Burroughs
v. Honda, 1:08-CV-1239-VEH, on July 19, 2012. Nearly all of these lawsuits have
motions to dismiss pending and those that do not are expressly noted on the list.
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