Taylor v. Faurecia Automotive Seating Inc

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER For the reasons noted within, the court ORDERS that this case be transferred to the Western Division. This case has been reassigned to Judge Blackburn; please use case number 7:14-cv-277-SLB on all future pleadings. Signed by Judge William M Acker, Jr on 4/18/14. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(SAC )

FILED
2014 Apr-18 PM 04:05
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RACHELLIE TAYLOR,

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}
Plaintiff,
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v.
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}
FAURECIA AUTOMOTIVE SEATING, }
INC.,
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Defendant.
}

CIVIL ACTION NO.
14-AR-0277-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On April 8, 2014, this court conducted a hearing on the motion
of defendant, Faurecia Automotive Seating, Inc. (“Faurecia”), to
transfer the above-entitled case filed by plaintiff, Rachellie
Taylor

(“Taylor”),

District of

in

Alabama

District of Alabama.

the

to

the

Southern

Division

of

the

Northern

Western

Division

of

the

Northern

The question presented is which of these two

divisions within the Northern District of Alabama is both a proper
forum and the better forum of the two.
Taylor

complains

of

several

violations

by

Faurecia,

her

employer, of federal employment discrimination statutes, including
Title VII.

She appends several claims based on Alabama tort law.

Taylor resides in Hale County, which is not located within the
Northern District of Alabama, but, rather, is located in the
Southern District of Alabama. All of the events about which Taylor
complains took place within the Western Division of the Northern
District of Alabama at the manufacturing facility of Faurecia,

which is a supplier of materials to Mercedes-Benz, the operator of
a large automotive manufacturing plant also located within the
Western Division. The Northern District of Alabama is comprised of
thirty-one counties and is divided into seven divisions.

A map of

the Northern District, showing its seven divisions, is attached to
this opinion.

Juries for trials in the Western Division are drawn

from the Western Division and the Jasper Division.

The ten

counties in these combined divisions from which such juries are
drawn

are:

Marion,

Winston,

Walker,

Tuscaloosa, Bibb, Greene, and Sumter.

Fayette,

Lamar,

Pickens,

Jurors for trials in the

Southern Division are drawn from the Southern Division, which is
comprised of three counties: Blount, Jefferson, and Shelby.
trials in the Western Division are held in Tuscaloosa.

All

All trials

in the Southern Division are held in Birmingham.
While it is possible that a majority of the Mercedes-Benz
workforce resides in the Western Division, it only takes logical
deduction (and no empirical study) to reach the conclusion that a
significant portion of the Mercedes-Benz workforce lives outside
the Western Division, particularly, in Jefferson County and Shelby
County, both of which counties are contiguous to Tuscaloosa County,
and are within easy traveling distance of the Mercedes-Benz plant.
It is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty the
percentage of a venire summonsed for jury service in Tuscaloosa, as
compared to a venire called to serve on a Southern Division jury in

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Birmingham who would be employed by, or have a family member
employed by, Mercedes-Benz. For aught appearing, there would be as
many potential jurors with a Mercedes-Benz connection in the
Southern Division as in the combined Western and Jasper Divisions.
And, there is no reason to believe that persons in the Southern
Division are any less likely to like or to dislike Mercedes-Benz as
persons residing in the combined Western and Jasper Divisions.
The fact that counsel for Taylor and counsel for Faurecia both
have their law offices in Birmingham is not a factor that can
influence,

much

less

answer

the

question

convenience or inconvenience in this case.

of

the

relative

The convenience to

counsel for one or both parties is to be given little or no weight
in a forum non conveniens analysis.
F.3d 301, 202-206 (5th Cir. 2004).

See In re Volkswagen A.G., 371
In this case, traveling to

Tuscaloosa from Birmingham for both sets of counsel is equally
inconvenient.
The parties have not tried to shove Bishop v. C & P Trucking
Co., 840 F.Supp.118 (N.D. Ala. 1993), down this court’s throat.
Bishop would be persuasive except for the drastic change in the
scenery in the Northern District’s jury selection process that has
taken place since 1993. When this court decided Bishop, jurors for
all trials in all seven divisions within the Northern District were
randomly drawn from all thirty-one Northern District counties as a
whole, without regard to the division where the trial was set.
3

In

other words, when Bishop was decided, a litigant in the Western
Division was just as likely to be called upon to voir dire a juror
from Huntsville (in the Northeastern Division) as a prospective
juror from Tuscaloosa (in the Western Division). This explains why
this court in 1993 held that venue was proper in any division
within the Northern District.

Whether or not this court was

correct in 1993 when it eliminated the concept of divisional venue
in

the

Northern

District,

the

court

cannot

reach

the

same

conclusion in 2014, because jurors are no longer selected as they
were in 1993.

Taylor either was unaware of Bishop or knew that

Bishop does not fit the current facts.

Bishop no longer has

significance except, perhaps, for some of this court’s observations
that have now been reduced to dicta.
Taylor begins her argument for venue in the Southern Division
with the contention that the general venue factors listed in 28
U.S.C. § 1391 do not apply here, because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)
allows her to file her complaint, brought under Title VII, “in any
judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment
practice is alleged to have been committed.”

As reflected in the

attached map, the state of Alabama has three federal judicial
districts, the Northern, the Middle, and the Southern.

Taylor

lives in the Southern District with its main courthouse in Mobile.
She clearly could have filed her complaint in the Southern District
pursuant to this specialized venue statute designed especially for

4

employment discrimination cases.
the Northern District.

She chose, however, to file in

This court respectfully disagrees with

Taylor’s expansive assertion that the above-referenced specialized
venue statute allowed her to pick a particular division within an
appropriate district and thus to lock in place her chosen venue.
This does not mean, of course, that her picking the Southern
Division of the Northern District was a jurisdictional mistake. It
was not.

This court does not have to express itself on what a

Southern District judge should have done if Taylor had filed in the
division

of

the

Southern

District

farthest

from

the

Western

Division of the Northern District.
The only fact that arguably could make the Southern Division
of the Northern District a more physically convenient forum than
the Western Division is that the lawyers for both parties have
their offices in the Southern Division. As previously stated, this
is not a legitimate factor.
The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, if applied to the
undisputed facts in this case, would exclude the Southern Division
from consideration and would designate the Western Division as the
appropriate forum.

Why? (1) The defendant has its place of

business in the Western Division; (2) all of the operative events
took place in the Western Division; (3) all of the pertinent
records are located in the Western Division; and (4) all witnesses,
except for the plaintiff herself, reside in the Western Division.

5

These facts narrow the focus of the inquiry to two factors, both
raised by plaintiff: (1) does the “interest of justice” call for
venue in the Southern Division? and (2) what is the significance of
plaintiff’s choice of forum?
The court could not sua sponte have transferred this case to
the Western Division, because venue is not “wrong” in the Southern
Division.

If it were “wrong”, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) would be the

applicable transfer authority.

In this case, the movant must meet

the standards not of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), but of 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a), which provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.
Taylor concedes, of course, that her action could have been brought
in the Western Division.
might

not

be

sorely

Although the “parties and witnesses”

inconvenienced

by

having

to

travel

to

Birmingham instead of to Tuscaloosa, Faurecia would obviously
suffer significant inconvenience if forced to come to Birmingham.
There will be no physical inconvenience to either party if the case
is tried in Tuscaloosa.
The relative physical convenience question is not where Taylor
places her emphasis.

She contends that the case should not be

transferred to the Western Division “in the interest of justice”.
In her affidavit submitted in opposition to Faurecia’s motion to
transfer, Taylor says, inter alia:
6

I believe that I would face a hostile court and jury if
I brought my complaint in the Western Division.
* * * * *
Defendant is a large employer in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and
I do not believe that I would receive a fair trial if I
filed my case in the Western Division.
(emphasis added).
During

the

oral

hearing

on

defendant’s

transfer

motion,

Taylor’s counsel informed the court that it was a mere inadvertence
by their client when she swore that she believed she would face a
“hostile court” in the Western Division.

They assured this court

that Taylor did not truly believe that any judge assigned to the
Western Division

would

be

unfair

to her.

Taylor’s

counsel,

however, did not retreat from the belief, which they shared with
their client, that she could not get a “fair trial” in the Western
Division.

Counsel urged the probability that Western and Jasper

Division jurors would operate under the influence of Mercedes-Benz
and Faurecia. This court cannot, of course, prevent Taylor and her
counsel from believing what they believe, but this court cannot
join them in believing for an instant that she cannot receive a
fair trial in the Western Division.

This court is flattered by

Taylor’s implied belief that she can get a fair trial in this
court, but this court cannot shake the universal presumption that
trials will proceed fairly in any federal forum in which venue is
proper.

Venue is as proper in the Western Division as it is in the

Southern Division,

and

there

is
7

no

evidence

to

overcome

the

presumption enunciated in Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Igoe, 212
F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1954); Chance v. E.I. DuPont, 371 F.Supp. 439
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); and Patterson v. Louisville & NR Co., 182 F.Supp.
95 (S.D.Ind. 1960).

This is not a case in which serious pretrial

publicity can be anticipated, as it might be, for instance, if
Taylor

were

Tuscaloosa.
Mercedes-Benz

suing

the

University

of

Alabama

or

the

City

of

There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
or

Faurecia

exercises

undue

influence

prospective jurors in the Western and Jasper Divisions.

over
Taylor

therefore fails in her attempt to prove that a transfer to the
Western Division would be against the interest of justice.
This leaves the court with the obligation to consider Taylor’s
only remaining argument, namely, the presumption in favor of the
forum selected by plaintiff.

While it is true that as a general

rule a plaintiff’s choice of forum is given a significant weight,
that deference to plaintiff’s choice can be over-weighed by other
factors if they weigh heavily in favor of a transfer.
Moore’s

treatise

describes

a

fact

that

in

significantly subtracts from Taylor’s argument.

Professor

deciding

venue

Professor Moore

says: “{T}he plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded less weight if
[the chosen forum] is not the plaintiff’s residence.” 2 Moore’s
Federal Practice, § 111.13[1][c][ii] (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.).
(emphasis added).

In the instant case, Taylor is neither a

resident of the Southern Division, nor of the Western Division.
8

She is a resident of the Southern District in Hale County, next
door to the Western Division of the Northern District.

It is clear

that it will be more physically convenient for plaintiff and for
defendant to try this case in Tuscaloosa than in Birmingham.
Plaintiff’s choice of the Southern Division as a forum, while not
insignificant, is materially diminished as a factor because of her
personal residence.

In this court’s balancing of all factors, her

choice is overridden by the combination of the other factors.
Conclusion
Because the court finds that under the overall circumstances
in this case, Faurecia has met its burden of proving that the
better forum is the Western Division, this court, in an exercise of
its considerable discretion, will order, and does hereby ORDER,
that the case be transferred to the Western Division.

The Clerk

shall effectuate this order.
DONE this 18th day of April, 2014.

_____________________________
WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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