Federal National Mortgage Association v. Watkins et al

Filing 5

ORDER that the Clerk of the Court REMAND this action back to Maricopa County Superior Court. Signed by Judge G Murray Snow on 3/22/12. (Attachments: # 1 Letter of Remand)(TLJ)

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WO

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Federal National Mortgage Association, )
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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Theo Charles Watkins, Jr. et al.,
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Defendants.
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No. CV-12-577-PHX-GMS
ORDER

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The present action was improperly removed and the Court lacks subject-matter

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jurisdiction over it; accordingly, the Court remands this case to Maricopa County Superior

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Court.

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Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject-matter jurisdiction

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only over those matters specifically authorized by Congress or the Constitution. Kokkonen

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v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As the proponent of the Court’s

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jurisdiction, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing it. Abrego Abrego v.

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The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006).

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The Notice of Removal states that the present action arises under federal law. (Doc.

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1 at 4). A review of the complaint, however, reveals that it is a straightforward forcible

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detainer, otherwise known as an eviction action. To be sure, Defendants may be able to assert

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a valid federal defense based on a the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act

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(“PTFA”), Pub.L. No. 111–22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009), or based on other federal

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statutes or Constitutional provisions. Nonetheless, the assertion of a federal defense to a

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state-law claim does not convert the state-law claim into one “arising under” federal law for

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purposes of federal question jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392

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(1987) ([“F]ederal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face

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of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”) (emphasis added). See also Moore-Thomas

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v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the “well-pleaded

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complaint rule”). Nor can the counterclaims which have been filed by Defendants suffice to

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establish federal question jurisdiction. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation

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Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (“[A] counterclaim—which appears as part of the

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defendant’s answer, not as part of the plaintiff's complaint—cannot serve as the basis for

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‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”).

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Defendants contend that this Court nonetheless has federal question jurisdiction under

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the artful pleading doctrine. “The artful pleading doctrine allows removal where federal law

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completely preempts a plaintiff’s state-law claim.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana 522

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U.S. 470, 475–476 (1998). For Defendants to invoke this doctrine, however, Congress must

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have “intended the scope of a federal law to be so broad as to entirely replace any state-law

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claim.” Marin General Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 945 (9th Cir.

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2009) (citing Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, Inc. v. Cent. States Joint Bd. Health & Welfare

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Trust Fund, 538 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2008)). None of the federal statutes or Constitutional

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provisions cited by Defendants completely preempt Plaintiff’s detainer claim. Defendants

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contend that Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

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(“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2605 et al. RESPA, however, expressly states that it does not

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completely preempt state laws. 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (“This chapter does not does not annul,

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alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this chapter from complying

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with, the laws of any State with respect to settlement practices, except to the extent that those

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laws are inconsistent with any provision of this chapter, and then only to the extent of the

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inconsistency.”). See also Homesales, Inc. v. Frierson, 2009 WL 365663, at *2 n.8 (C.D.

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Cal. Feb. 11, 2009) (“An unlawful detainer action is a true state law claim, and neither
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RESPA nor TILA completely preempts state law claims.”). Nor does the PTFA completely

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preempt Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer action. See Federal Nat’l Mortgage Association v.

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Hammond, 2011 WL 2516498, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2011) (“The PTFA is not a

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recognized area of complete preemption.”).

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In sum, Plaintiff’s claim is a purely state-law claim, and Defendants cannot create

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federal question jurisdiction by filing federal defenses or counterclaims. In the absence of

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subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court is empowered to sua sponte order summary remand.

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See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4) (requiring district courts to examine notices of removal and their

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exhibits and authorizing summary remand in appropriate circumstances); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)

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(requiring district courts to remand cases if it appears, at any time before final judgment is

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entered, that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction).

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court REMAND this action
back to Maricopa County Superior Court.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2012.

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