Grigor Marsikyan v. Porsche Cars North America Inc et al

Filing 12

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by JudgeJudge S. James Otero. Order remanding case to Los Angeles Superior Court. cc order, docket, remand letter to Los Angeles Superior Court, No. BC 470563 (Case Terminated. Made JS-6) (Attachments: # 1 remand letter) (lc)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

DATE: January 30, 2012

CASE NO.: CV 11-09411 SJO (CWx)
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Grigor Marsikyan v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., et al.

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PRESENT: THE HONORABLE S. JAMES OTERO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Victor Paul Cruz
Courtroom Clerk

Not Present
Court Reporter

COUNSEL PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF:

COUNSEL PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT:

Not Present

Not Present

========================================================================
PROCEEDINGS (in chambers): ORDER REMANDING CASE TO LOS ANGELES COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT [Docket No. 1]
On November 10, 2011, Defendant Porsche Cars North America, Inc. ("Defendant") removed this
action from Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Notice of Removal ("Notice"), ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff Grigor Marsikyan ("Plaintiff") filed his Complaint in state court on September 28, 2011.
(Notice Ex. 1 ("Compl.").) For the following reasons, the Court REMANDS this action to Los
Angeles County Superior Court.
I.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges two causes of action against Defendant: general negligence and
products liability. (Compl. 3.) On November 25, 2010, Plaintiff drove his 2003 Porsche Cayenne
on the 210 Freeway near Carnelian Road and subsequently experienced a motor vehicle collision.
(Compl. 4.) Plaintiff alleges that the car's airbag did not deploy upon collision. (Compl. 4.)
Plaintiff argues that Defendant had a duty to ensure that his vehicle's features were in proper
working condition and that Defendant breached this duty by failing to provide a car with a
functioning airbag. (Compl. 4.)
As a result of the collision, Plaintiff contends that he suffered a loss of wages, hospital and medical
expenses, and general damages. (Compl. 3.) The Complaint does not state any numerical figure
regarding the amount of damages sought. (Compl. 3.) Under Question 14 on the Complaint form,
which asks for the Plaintiff's prayer for relief, Plaintiff only requested that the amount of
compensatory damages be "according to proof." (Compl. 3.) On November 9, 2011, Defendant
filed an answer in state court, listing nineteen affirmative defenses in response to Plaintiff's
allegations. (Notice Ex. 1 ("Answer").) On November 10, 2011, Defendant removed the action
to this Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and 1441(a).
(Notice ¶ 6.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

DATE: January 30, 2012

CASE NO.: CV 11-09411 SJO (CWx)
II.

DISCUSSION

A defendant may remove an action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. § 1441. Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all
defendants where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. § 1332(a).
A.

Sua Sponte Challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court raises the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. "If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction," the district court is
mandated to remand the case. See id. § 1447(c) (2006). The Ninth Circuit has held that "a court
may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the pendency
of the action." Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, the Court finds
it appropriate to determine whether jurisdiction exists.
B.

Complete Diversity

Plaintiff is an individual residing in California. (Compl. ¶ 1.) A person is a "citizen" of the state
where he or she is domiciled. Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
A person's residence can be prima facie evidence of citizenship. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, 520 (10th Cir. 1994).
Defendant is a company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Georgia.
(Notice ¶ 8.) "A corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
The Supreme Court held that "the phrase 'principal place of business' refers to the place where
the corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities."
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, -- U.S. --, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1186 (2010). Therefore, Defendant is a citizen
of both Delaware and Georgia.
Although Plaintiff has also filed his complaint against Doe Defendants 1 to 10, the Court may
disregard the citizenship of fictitious entities for the purposes of determining whether complete
diversity exists. § 1441(b)(1). Because Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of different states,
complete diversity exists in this case.
C.

Amount in Controversy Requirement

The Ninth Circuit has held that courts must "strictly construe the removal statute against removal
jurisdiction" and reject federal jurisdiction "if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first
instance." Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). "The strong presumption
against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that
removal is proper." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For removal based on diversity
jurisdiction, the removing party has the burden of showing that "the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). "Where it
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

DATE: January 30, 2012

CASE NO.: CV 11-09411 SJO (CWx)

is not facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing
party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the
jurisdictional threshold." Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th
Cir. 2003); accord Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). The removing
party "need[s] to provide evidence establishing that it is more likely than not that the amount in
controversy exceeds that amount." Valdez, 372 F.3d at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts may consider facts "presented in the removal petition as well as 'any
summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at time of removal.'"
Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090 (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377
(9th Cir. 1997)).
Here, it is not facially evident from the Complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy. (See
generally Compl.) Plaintiff did not provide his annual earnings during the time of the accident to
support his claim for lost wages, nor has he provided a total monetary cost for his medical
expenses incurred. (See generally Compl.) The only indication that Plaintiff gives to the Court
regarding an amount in controversy is where Plaintiff identifies the action as "an unlimited civil
case," one exceeding $25,000. (Compl. 1.) Other than this one identification, the Complaint is
devoid of monetary figures and general facts from which the Court could infer a true amount in
controversy. (See generally Compl.)
Because no amount in controversy is alleged in the Complaint, Defendant carries the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that more than $75,000 is in controversy. See
Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090. This Court has held that a preponderance of the evidence standard
is not met when a defendant provides arbitrary calculations "based on many assumptions that
leave the court to speculate as to the value of too may variables." Dupre v. Gen. Motors, No. 10CV-00955, 2010 WL 3447082, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010). In proving the amount in
controversy, Defendant's "calculations [must be] good faith, reliable estimates based on the
pleadings and other evidence in the record." Ellis v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 2011 WL 499390, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Feb.10, 2011). The removing defendant must also "set[] forth . . . the underlying facts
supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds [the statutory minimum]." Gaus,
980 F.2d at 567 (emphasis in original). Conservative estimates without a factual basis are "vague
and conclusory" and do not satisfy the "more than likely" standard. Keller v. Gaspari
Nutrition, Inc., No. CV 10-09927, 2011 WL 837797, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2011).
Defendant contends that the amount in controversy meets the threshold requirement because
Plaintiff seeks damages for his personal injuries, including "the loss of his left arm." (Notice ¶ 9.)
The Court, therefore, examines if any "summary-judgment-type evidence," exists to support proper
removal. Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090. Nowhere on the form Complaint does Plaintiff allege that
he suffered the loss of his left arm, and Defendant offers no summary-judgment-type evidence to
support its claim that Plaintiff seeks recovery for such a loss. Even if Plaintiff did lose his arm as
a result of the collision, Defendant's statement describing the loss is vague; it is unclear whether
Plaintiff has lost only function in the arm (and if so, whether the loss of function temporary or
permanent) or whether Plaintiff's arm was amputated. In either scenario, the Court would be
required to speculate as to the value of Plaintiff's losses based upon too many uncertain variables.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

DATE: January 30, 2012

CASE NO.: CV 11-09411 SJO (CWx)

Defendant presents no argument regarding the level of damages typically awarded to plaintiffs
who successfully recover for the loss of an arm.
Because Defendant has failed to meet its burden to establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the Court remands this action.
III.

RULING

For the foregoing reasons, the Court REMANDS this case to Los Angeles County Superior Court.
This action shall close.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

cc: order, docket, remand letter to
Los Angeles Superior Court, No. BC 470563

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