Luis C. Sanchez v. K. Santoro
MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) Order to Show Cause Why This Action Should Not Be Dismissed As Untimely by Magistrate Judge Kenly Kiya Kato. Response to Order to Show Cause due by 3/3/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Dismissal Form) (dts)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Date: February 2, 2017
Title: Luis C. Sanchez v. K. Santoro
Present: The Honorable KENLY KIYA KATO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Attorney(s) Present for Petitioner:
Attorney(s) Present for Respondent:
(In Chambers) Order to Show Cause Why This Action Should Not Be
Dismissed As Untimely
Petitioner Luis C. Sanchez (“Petitioner”) has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (“Petition”) by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. However, the
Petition appears to be untimely on its face. The Court thus orders Petitioner to show cause why
this action should not be dismissed as untimely.
STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
On August 31, 2010, in Los Angeles County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted of
mayhem with a gang enhancement in violation of sections 203 and 186.22(b)(1)(C) of the
California Penal Code. ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1, Pet. at 2. Petitioner was sentenced to a
term of fourteen years. Id. Plaintiff did not appeal his conviction or sentence. Id. at 2-3.
Following the conviction, Petitioner filed three state habeas petitions. Id. at 4. The first
state habeas petition was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court and denied on August 19, 2016. Id.
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On September 26, 2016, Petitioner filed the second state habeas petition in the California
Court of Appeal. Pet. at 4. On October 11, 2016, the California Court of Appeal denied the
petition. See California Courts, Appellate Courts Case Information, Docket (Feb. 1, 2017, 4:24
On November 7, 2016, Petitioner filed a third state habeas petition in the California
Supreme Court. See California Courts, Appellate Courts Case Information, Docket (Feb. 1,
2017, 4:24 PM)
_no=S238254. On December 21, 2016, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. Pet. at
On January 11, 2017, Petitioner constructively filed1 the instant Petition alleging his
sentence is “subject to the requirements of the Determinate Sentence Act, under which
enhancements for determinant terms are imposed at one-third of the enhancement term.” Id. at
THE PETITION WAS FILED AFTER AEDPA’S ONE-YEAR LIMITATIONS
Petitioner filed the Petition after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Pet. at 9. Therefore, the requirements for
habeas relief set forth in AEDPA apply. Soto v. Ryan, 760 F.3d 947, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2014).
AEDPA “sets a one-year limitations period in which a state prisoner must file a federal habeas
corpus petition.” Thompson v. Lea, 681 F.3d 1093, 1093 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Ordinarily, the limitations period runs from the date on which the prisoner’s judgment of
conviction “became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (“Section 2244(d)(1)”).
Here, Petitioner’s conviction became final on October 30, 2010, i.e., sixty days after the
date of Petitioner’s conviction. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.308(a); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390,
114 S. Ct. 948, 127 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1994). AEDPA’s one-year limitations period commenced the
Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se prisoner gives prison authorities a pleading to
mail to court, the court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on the date it is signed.
Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). This Court presumes Petitioner gave
his Petition to prison authorities on the date it was signed.
The Court refers to the pages of the Petition as if they were consecutively paginated.
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next day, October 31, 2010, and expired on October 31, 2011. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). However,
Petitioner filed the instant Petition on January 11, 2017. See Pet. at 11. Therefore, in the absence
of any applicable tolling, the Court deems the Petition untimely by over six years and two months
under Section 2244(d)(1). Thompson, 681 F.3d at 1093.
STATUTORY TOLLING DOES NOT RENDER THE PETITION TIMELY
“A habeas petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of
limitations while a ‘properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review
with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.’” Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777,
780 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“Section 2244(d)(2)”)). Statutory tolling
does not extend to the time between the date on which a judgment becomes final and the date on
which the petitioner files his first state collateral challenge because, during that time, there is no
case “pending.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, Section
2244(d)(2) “does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the
state petition was filed.” Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).
Here, AEDPA’s one-year limitations period commenced on October 31, 2010. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Following the commencement of the limitations period, Petitioner filed
three state habeas petitions. While the date Petitioner filed the first state habeas petition is
unknown, the first petition was denied August 19, 2016. AEDPA’s limitation period expired on
October 31, 2011. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Assuming that first petition was filed sometime
in 2016, it appears AEDPA’s limitation period expired well before Petitioner filed his first state
habeas petition. See id. Section 2244(d)(2) does not permit reinitiation of the limitations period.
See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823. Therefore, statutory tolling does not render the Petition timely.
EQUITABLE TOLLING DOES NOT RENDER THE PETITION TIMELY
In addition to the statutory tolling provided for by Section 2244(d)(2), the “AEDPA
limitations period may be tolled” when it is “equitably required.” Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001,
1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The “threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling
[under AEDPA] is very high.” Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). A court may grant equitable tolling only where
“‘extraordinary circumstances’ prevented an otherwise diligent petitioner from filing on time.”
Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). The petitioner “bears a heavy burden to
show that [he] is entitled to equitable tolling, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Rudin v.
Myles, 781 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Petitioner does not claim entitlement to equitable tolling and the Court has not
found any basis to support such a claim. Thus, equitable tolling does not render the Petition
timely. See Bills, 628 F.3d at 1097.
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Accordingly, based upon the Petition as currently submitted, Section 2244(d)(1) appears
to bar this action. Petitioner is therefore ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this action should
not be dismissed as untimely by filing a written response no later than March 3, 2017.
Instead of filing a response to the instant Order, Petitioner may request a voluntary
dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). The Clerk of the
Court has attached A Notice of Dismissal form. However, the Court warns any dismissed
claims may be later subject to the statute of limitations under Section 2244(d)(1), as amended by
AEDPA, “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
The Court warns Petitioner failure to timely file a response to this Order will result
the Court dismissing this action with prejudice as untimely, and for failure to prosecute and
comply with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
The Clerk of Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Petitioner at his
current address of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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