Webster S. Lucas v. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Dept et al

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND by Magistrate Judge Kenly Kiya Kato, re Complaint - (Referred), 1 . (SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS) (Attachments: # 1 CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT FORM, # 2 NOTICE OF DISMISSAL) (dts)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No. CV 17-3289-JFW (KK)

WEBSTER S. LUCAS,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFFS
DEPT., et al.,

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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Defendants.

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

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Plaintiff Webster S. Lucas (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis, filed a Complaint (“Complaint”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section

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1983”) against defendants Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Jim

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McDonnell – Sheriff, and Deputy Sneed (“Defendants”). As discussed below, the

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Court dismisses the Complaint with leave to amend.

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II.

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ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
On April 24, 2017, Plaintiff constructively filed1 a Complaint pursuant to

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Section 1983 against Defendants. ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1. Plaintiff sues (1)

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Sheriff Jim McDonnell, in his individual and official capacity, for failing to train his

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deputy sheriffs to properly classify incoming arrestees; (2) Deputy Sneed, in his

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individual and official capacity, for negligently allowing another inmate to attend

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Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing; and (3) the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s

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Department for the actions of its deputies. Id. at 5.

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According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is a registered sex offender. Id. at 5, 8.

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Plaintiff alleges on October 19, 2016, defendant Deputy Sneed “allowed an inmate

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to sit in” Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing at Antelope Valley Courthouse during

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which Plaintiff was being charged with failure to register as a sex offender. Id.

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Plaintiff claims when he and the inmate returned to their holding cell, the inmate

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began “‘yelling’ ‘we have a child molester here!’” Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges the

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inmate “began instigating other inmates to beat [him] up or kill [him].” Id. at 8.

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Plaintiff alleges that on the same day, defendant Los Angeles County

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Sheriff’s Department “failed to properly classify Plaintiff upon Plaintiff’s reception

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in to the L.A. County Jail.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges he was classified as a

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“‘General Population Inmate’ instead of a K-6Y Inmate who are separately housed

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in Administrative Segregation Housing and kept away from General Population

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inmates.” Id. Plaintiff claims this misclassification placed his life in danger. Id.

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As a result of Defendants’ alleged actions, Plaintiff claims he has become

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“mentally affected with flashes of seeing [himself] lying in a pool of blood with

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broken and smashed head, ribs, etc.” Id. at 25. Plaintiff further alleges that on

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January 2, 2017, he “was interviewed by a psychiatrist” regarding the “flashes [he]

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Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se prisoner gives prison authorities a
pleading to mail to court, the court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on
the date it is signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010).
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suffer[s] [from] as a result of the incidents which occurred on October 19, 2016.”

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Id. at 14. Plaintiff claimed he “was satisfied with the conversation [he] had with

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the physician,” but would like a follow-up appointment because “the flashes have

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slowed, but not gone away.” Id. at 14.

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As a result of these claims, Plaintiff seeks damages against defendants Los

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Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and Jim McDonnell for $150,000 and

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against defendant Deputy Sneed for $100,000. Id. at 6.

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III.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

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As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must screen the

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Complaint and is required to dismiss the case at any time if it concludes the action

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is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or

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seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

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1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).

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In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for screening

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purposes, the Court applies the same pleading standard from Rule 8 of the Federal

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Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 8”) as it would when evaluating a motion to

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dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Watison v. Carter,

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668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain a

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“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

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relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

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A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim “where there is no

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cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a

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cognizable legal theory.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2007)

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(citation omitted). In considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must

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accept as true all of the material factual allegations in it. Hamilton v. Brown, 630

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F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the court need not accept as true
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“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

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unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th

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Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Although a complaint need not include detailed

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factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

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‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d

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1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.

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1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the

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court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged.” Cook, 637 F.3d at 1004 (citation omitted).
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,

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however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

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pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889-90 (9th Cir.

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2008) (citation omitted). “[W]e have an obligation where the p[laintiff] is pro se,

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particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

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p[laintiff] the benefit of any doubt.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir.

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2012) (citation omitted).
If the court finds the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a

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claim, the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v.

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Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Leave to amend should be granted

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if it appears possible the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if

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the plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103,

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1106 (9th Cir. 1995). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear a complaint

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cannot be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend.

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Cato, 70 F.3d at 1107-11; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th

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Cir. 2009).

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IV.

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DISCUSSION

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A.

PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT

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DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO

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PROTECT AGAINST DANGEROUS CONDITIONS

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In the Complaint, Plaintiff has not specifically identified which constitutional

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rights he claims Defendants have violated. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to

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allege Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right by misclassifying him,

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allowing an inmate to sit in on his pretrial hearing, and placing him in general

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population, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim.

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1. Applicable Law

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Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from

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physical harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L.

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Ed. 2d 811 (1994). Specifically, “prison officials have a duty . . . to protect

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prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. at 833.

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To state a claim for such an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must

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show both objective and subjective components. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898,

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904 (9th Cir. 2002). The objective component requires an “objectively

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insufficiently humane condition violative of the Eighth Amendment” which poses

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a substantial risk of serious harm. Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir.

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1996). The subjective component requires prison officials acted with the culpable

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mental state, which is “deliberate indifference” to the substantial risk of serious

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harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06, 97 S. Ct.

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285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the

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Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement

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unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

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safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

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drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
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inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Additionally, claims of negligence or gross

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negligence are not actionable under Section 1983 in the prison context. Farmer, 511

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U.S. at 835-36, n.4.

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2. Analysis

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First, as to defendant Deputy Sneed, it appears Plaintiff is simply alleging

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defendant Deputy Sneed acted negligently, which is insufficient to state an Eighth

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Amendment claim. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36, n.4. In fact, the Complaint

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specifically alleges defendant Deputy Sneed is “responsible for his negligent

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conduct in allowing another inmate to sit in on Plaintiff’s hearing.” Compl. at 5.

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Second, Plaintiff does not offer any facts alleging any of the Defendants even

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knew Plaintiff was a sex offender. Similarly, Plaintiff fails to present any facts from

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which the Court can conclude any Defendant had direct or personal knowledge of

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the risk Plaintiff would face being placed in general population while classified as a

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sex offender. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege

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Defendants failed to remedy their mistake upon discovering the misclassification.

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In fact, Plaintiff appears to concede he was later separated from dangerous inmates

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when he stated that he “was attempted to be placed in cell 44,” with the inmate

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who sat in on Plaintiff’s hearing and who announced Plaintiff was a “child

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molester,” but instead was placed in cell 43. Compl. at 27. Moreover, Plaintiff

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attaches a report from the ACLU SoCal – Jails Project, which includes a note from

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defendant Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department stating Plaintiff confirmed he “had

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not been assaulted” and the “incident had been resolved.” Id. at 22.

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Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff alleges the failure to properly classify him

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was the result of Defendants’ failure to train, Plaintiff still does not state a claim.

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To sufficiently state a claim for failure to train, Plaintiff must allege facts to show

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the failure to train is “so obvious” and “so likely to result in the violation of

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constitutional rights,” that “the failure to provide proper training may fairly be said

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to represent a policy for which the [entity] is responsible, and for which the [entity]
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may be held liable if it actually causes injury.” Manzanillo v. Lewis, No. 12-CV-

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05983-JST, 2017 WL 131979, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2017) (citing City of

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Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1200, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412

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(1989)).
Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate

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indifference claim for failure to protect against an “objectively insufficiently

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humane condition.” Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 938.

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B.

PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT

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LOS ANGELES SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT OR AN OFFICIAL

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CAPACITY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS DEPUTY SNEED

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AND SHERIFF JIM MCDONNELL

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1. Applicable Law

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An “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as

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a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S. Ct. 3099,

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87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985); see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72, 105 S. Ct.

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873, 83 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1985); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th

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Cir. 1991). Such a suit “is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party

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in interest is the entity.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Because no respondeat

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superior liability exists under Section 1983, a state actor is liable only for injuries

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that arise from an official policy or longstanding custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

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Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611

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(1978); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L.

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Ed. 2d 412 (1989). A plaintiff must allege facts to establish “that a [state] employee

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committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental

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policy or a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard

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operating procedure of the local governmental entity.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979

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F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

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In addition, a plaintiff must allege the policy was “(1) the cause in fact and (2) the
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proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911,

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918 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355

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(9th Cir. 1981)).

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2. Analysis

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Here, assuming Plaintiff had adequately alleged a constitutional violation, he

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has failed to state a claim against defendant Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, and

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against defendant Jim McDonnell or Deputy Sneed, in their official capacity,

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because he does not allege Defendants were acting pursuant to any policy, practice,

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or custom of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department on the day of the alleged

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incident. Further, even if Plaintiff had alleged a policy, practice, or custom, he has

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failed to present any facts which show the policy, practice, or custom was “(1) the

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cause in fact and (2) the proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation.”

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Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. Hence, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against

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defendant Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department or an official capacity claim against

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defendants Jim McDonnell or Deputy Sneed. See Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346.

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V.

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LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is subject to dismissal. As the

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Court is unable to determine whether amendment would be futile, leave to amend

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is granted. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per

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curiam).

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT within twenty-one (21) days of the
service date of this Order, Plaintiff choose one of the following two options:
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Plaintiff may file a First Amended Complaint to attempt to cure the

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deficiencies discussed above. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a

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blank Central District civil rights complaint form to use for filing the First

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Amended Complaint, which the Court encourages Plaintiff to use.

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If Plaintiff chooses to file a First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must clearly

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designate on the face of the document that it is the “First Amended Complaint,” it

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must bear the docket number assigned to this case, and it must be retyped or

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rewritten in its entirety, preferably on the court-approved form. Plaintiff shall not

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include new defendants or new allegations that are not reasonably related to the

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claims asserted in the Complaint. In addition, the First Amended Complaint must

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be complete without reference to the Complaint or any other pleading, attachment,

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or document.

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An amended complaint supersedes the preceding complaint. Ferdik v.

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Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). After amendment, the Court will

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treat all preceding complaints as nonexistent. Id. Because the Court grants

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Plaintiff leave to amend as to all his claims raised here, any claim raised in a

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preceding complaint is waived if it is not raised again in the First Amended

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Complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Alternatively, Plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss the action without

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prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). The Clerk of Court

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is directed to mail Plaintiff a blank Notice of Dismissal Form, which the Court

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encourages Plaintiff to use.

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The Court advises Plaintiff that it generally will not be well-disposed toward

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another dismissal with leave to amend if Plaintiff files a First Amended Complaint

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that continues to include claims on which relief cannot be granted. “[A] district

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court’s discretion over amendments is especially broad ‘where the court has

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already given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint.’”

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Ismail v. County of Orange, 917 F. Supp.2d 1060, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citations

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omitted); see also Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261. Thus, if Plaintiff files a First

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Amended Complaint with claims on which relief cannot be granted, the First

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Amended Complaint will be dismissed without leave to amend and with

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prejudice.
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Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file a First

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Amended Complaint will result in this action being dismissed with prejudice

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for failure to state a claim, prosecute and/or obey Court orders pursuant to

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

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Dated: May 11, 2017
HONORABLE KENLY KIYA KATO
United States Magistrate Judge

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