Sumpter Lovelle Porter v. Lancaster State Prison et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. The Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he is granted thirty (30) days from the dat e of this Memorandum and Order within which to file a First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize the standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of which is attached. Plaintiff is further a dvised that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action, he may voluntarily dismiss it by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff's convenience. (See document for further details). (Attachments: # 1 Civil Rights Complaint Form, # 2 Notice of Dismissal Form) (mr)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SUMPTER LOVELLE PORTER,
Plaintiff,

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Case No. CV 18-0107 CJC (SS)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

v.

DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LANCASTER STATE PRISON, et al.,

LEAVE TO AMEND

Defendants.

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

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On January 5, 2018, Sumpter Lovelle Porter (“Plaintiff”), a

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California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights

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complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Dkt. No. 1).

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initial screening of complaints in civil actions where a prisoner

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seeks redress from a governmental entity or employee.

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§ 1915A(a). This Court may dismiss such a complaint, or any portion

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thereof,

(“Complaint” or “Compl.,”

Congress mandates that district courts perform an

before

service

of

process

if

the

28 U.S.C.

complaint

(1)

is

1

frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which

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relief can be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant

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who is immune from such relief.

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also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000)

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(en banc). For the reasons stated below, the Complaint is DISMISSED

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with leave to amend.1

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1-2); see

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II.

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ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

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Plaintiff sues (1) California State Prison-Los Angeles County

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at

Lancaster

(“CSP-LAC”);

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Warden

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(5) Correctional Officer Cortez; and (6) “Medical Staff & Mental

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Health Worker & Doctors.”

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whether he is attempting to sue the individual defendants in their

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individual or official capacity.

Lewandowski;

(2)

(4)

Warden

Asuncion2;

Correctional

(Compl. at 1).

(3)

Officer

Associate
Jones;

Plaintiff does not state

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The Complaint is captioned as a “Declaration of Sumpter L.
Porter” and is signed by Plaintiff under penalty of perjury.

A magistrate judge may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend
without the approval of a district judge. See McKeever v. Block,
932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
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The Complaint identifies the Warden’s last name as “Suncion.”
The Court takes judicial notice that Debbie Asuncion is the Warden
of CSP-LAC, as reflected on the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) website, and will refer to
her by that name. See http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Facilities_Locator/
LAC.html; see also In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016,
1024 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (court may take judicial notice of
information on “publicly accessible websites” not subject to
reasonable dispute).
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(Id.

2

1

at

1-3

(continuous

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exhibits the declarations of five other CSP-LAC inmates who state,

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also under penalty of perjury, that the statements in Plaintiff’s

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declaration are “true and correct,” (id. at 4-8), and several

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documents,

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request forms, inventory sheets, and an Administrative Segregation

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Unit (“Ad Seg”) Placement Notice.

including

pagination)).

prison

The

grievances,

Complaint

health

attaches

care

as

services

(Id. at 9-24).

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Although very brief, the Complaint is not entirely clear.

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Plaintiff appears to allege that he was placed in Ad Seg on October

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10, 2017. (Id. at 2). On December 6, 2017, Plaintiff was assaulted

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by unidentified “prison guards” and wrongfully placed on suicide

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watch by “medical staff” for a 24-hour hold.

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Plaintiff was on suicide watch, property was taken from his cell

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but was not inventoried. (Id. at 2-3). When Plaintiff was released

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from suicide watch and returned to his cell, he noticed that a

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number of items were missing.3

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(Id.).

While

(Id. at 3).

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Plaintiff does not identify what the missing property was in the
body of the Complaint, but a grievance dated December 11, 2017
attached as an exhibit to the Complaint states that the “stolen
property” includes, among other things, an address book,
headphones, legal work, prayer oil, glasses, two bags of coffee,
two bars of soap, two deodorants, one toothpaste, thirty stamps, a
canteen worth 25 dollars, and a full set of dentures. (Id. at 11).
The same grievance also appears to complain that when Plaintiff
was taken to suicide watch, staff broke his prayer beads, cut off
his “thermal top and bottom,” and removed his knee brace. (Id.).
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1

III.

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DISCUSSION

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Under

28

U.S.C.

§

1915A(b),

the

Court

must

dismiss

the

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Complaint due to pleading defects.

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a pro se litigant leave to amend his defective complaint unless

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“it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint

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could not be cured by amendment.”

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202,

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1212

and

(9th

Cir.

2012)

(citation

However, the Court must grant

internal

quotation

marks

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omitted).

For the reasons discussed below, it is not “absolutely

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clear” that at least some of the defects of Plaintiff’s Complaint

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could not be cured by amendment.

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DISMISSED with leave to amend.

The Complaint is therefore

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A.

The Complaint Violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a

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complaint contain “‘a short and plain statement of the claim

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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give

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the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

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grounds upon which it rests.’”

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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)).

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may be violated when a pleading “says too little,” and “when a

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pleading says too much.”

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Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).

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little.

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
Rule 8

Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th

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Here, the Complaint says too

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To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the

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violation of a right secured by the Constitution . . . committed

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by a person acting under color of state law.”

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U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Complaint violates Rule 8 because Plaintiff

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does not clearly identify the nature of each of the legal claims

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he is bringing, the specific facts giving rise to each claim, or

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the specific Defendant or Defendants against whom each claim is

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brought.

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respond to the Complaint.

West v. Atkins, 487

Without more specific information, Defendants cannot
See Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen.

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Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (a

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complaint violates Rule 8 if a defendant would have difficulty

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understanding and responding to the complaint).

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Moreover, because Plaintiff’s verification of his Complaint

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under oath is sufficient to attest to the truth of the matters

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asserted, the declarations by other inmates are unnecessary.

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addition, because Plaintiff is not required to provide evidence

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supporting his claims at this stage of the litigation, the exhibits

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attached to the Complaint are similarly unnecessary.

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Complaint must state what relief Plaintiff is seeking by this

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action.

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amend.

In

Finally, the

Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed, with leave to

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B.

CSP-LAC Is An Improper Defendant

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The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages against

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states and their agencies under section 1983.

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496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990); Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d
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See Howlett v. Rose,

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747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (“California has not waived its Eleventh

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Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in

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federal court.”); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

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1989) (dismissal of civil rights action “as to the Department of

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Prisons was proper” because “[t]he Nevada Department of Prisons,

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as a state agency, clearly was immune from suit under the Eleventh

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Amendment”).

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to Eleventh Amendment immunity and CSP-LAC is an improper Defendant

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in this suit.

Because the CDCR is a state agency, it is entitled

However, a plaintiff may seek monetary damages under

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section 1983 from state employees in their individual capacity.

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See Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1098 (9th Cir. 1982) (“State

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officials must be sued in their individual capacity in an action

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for monetary damages.”).

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C.

Plaintiff

Fails

To

State

A

Claim

Against

The

Individual

Defendants

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To establish a civil rights violation, a plaintiff must show

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either

the

defendant’s

direct,

personal

participation

in

the

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constitutional violation, or some sufficient causal connection

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between the defendant’s conduct and the alleged violation.

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Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011).

See

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1.

The Warden And Associate Warden

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Government officials may not be held liable under section 1983

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simply

because

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conduct.

their

subordinates

engaged

in

unconstitutional

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
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Where

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a plaintiff names a supervisor as a defendant but does not allege

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that the supervisor directly participated in the constitutional

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violation, a “sufficient causal connection” to the violation may

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be shown where the supervisor “set ‘in motion a series of acts by

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others, or knowingly refused to terminate [such acts], which he

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knew or reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict

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the constitutional injury.’”

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903, 907 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Larez v. City of Los Angeles,

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946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also Preschooler II v.

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Clark County Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007)

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(a supervisor may be held accountable only “for his own culpable

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action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his

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subordinates,

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deprivations of which the complaint is made, or for conduct that

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showed

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others”).

a

for

reckless

his

or

Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d

acquiescence

callous

in

the

indifference

to

constitutional

the

rights

of

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Plaintiff names the Warden and Associate Warden as Defendants,

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but the Complaint does not include any allegation stating what

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Plaintiff

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constitutional right that was violated by their purported actions.

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The Warden and Associate Warden are not liable under section 1983

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simply because they run CSP-LAC and Plaintiff believes that someone

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at the prison violated his rights.

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against the Warden and Associate Warden are dismissed, with leave

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to amend.

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claims without a legal and factual basis.

believes

they

did

or

did

not

do,

or

identify

any

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims

Plaintiff is expressly cautioned that he must not allege

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2.

Correctional Officers Jones And Cortez

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3

The caption of the Complaint names Correctional Officers Jones

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and

Cortez

as

Defendants.

However,

there

are

no

factual

5

allegations in the body of the Complaint stating what Plaintiff

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believes Jones and Cortez did (or did not do), or explaining why

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their actions violated his civil rights.

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allegations, Plaintiff has not plausibly pled that these Defendants

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were personally involved in violating his rights or that their

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actions had any causal connection to the purported constitutional

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violations.

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Cortez are dismissed with leave to amend.

Without more specific

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Jones and

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3.

Unnamed Health Care Providers

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Plaintiff also sues “Medical Staff & Mental Health Worker &

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Doctor,” none of whom he identifies by name.

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not favor actions against “unknown” defendants.

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Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a plaintiff

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may

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defendants is not known before filing the complaint.

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Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980).

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a court gives the plaintiff “the opportunity through discovery to

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identify unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery

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would not uncover the identities.” Id. A plaintiff must diligently

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pursue discovery to learn the identity of unnamed defendants.

sue

unnamed

defendants

when

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8

the

Generally, courts do

identity

Wakefield v.

of

the

alleged

Gillespie v.

If that is the case,

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Here, however, the claims against the unnamed Defendants must

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be dismissed because the Complaint fails to state what each of

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these

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Plaintiff’s rights.

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Defendant, Plaintiff must identify each Doe Defendant as “Doe No.

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1, Doe No. 2,” etc., in the body of the Complaint and show how each

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Defendant individually participated in the alleged constitutional

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violations, whether or not Plaintiff knows the Defendant’s name.

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Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed, with leave to amend.

Defendants

did

in

their

individual

capacity

to

violate

To state a claim against more than one unnamed

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D.

Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Relating To His Placement On
Suicide Watch

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As noted above, the Complaint attempts to sue various unnamed

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health care providers and alleges that medical staff “made the

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wrong call” by placing him on suicide watch.

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is unclear whether Plaintiff is attempting to allege that that his

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24-hour

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Amendment due process rights or his Eighth Amendment right to be

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free from cruel and unusual punishment.

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constitutional basis, these claims fail.

placement

on

suicide

watch

(Compl. at 2).

violated

his

It

Fourteenth

Whatever the intended

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1.

Fourteenth Amendment

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The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from deprivation of

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life, liberty or property without due process of law.

Serra v.

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Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010); Wolff v. McDonnell,

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418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).

However, “lawfully incarcerated persons
9

1

retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests.”

Hewitt

2

v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983). “‘[A]s long as the conditions

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or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is

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within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative

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of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself

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subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial

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oversight.’”

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2013) (quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)).

Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir.

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10

The Due Process clause does not directly confer a liberty

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interest

in

12

conditions.

13

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224–25 (1976)); Anderson v. County

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of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]here is no liberty

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interest in remaining in the general population.”).

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inmate

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confinement “imposes an atypical and significant hardship . . . in

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relation to the ordinary incidents of prisoner life.”

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Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); Chappell, 706 F.3d at 1064

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(quoting same).

may

avoiding

a

transfer

to

more

adverse

confinement

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (citing

possess

a

state-created

liberty

However, an

interest

when

his

Sandin v.

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To

determine

whether

23

significant

24

challenged

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inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and

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thus comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; 2) the

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duration of the condition, and the degree of restraint imposed;

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and 3) whether the state’s action will invariably affect the

hardship,
condition

the

a

restraint

court

‘mirrored

considers

those

10

is

an

atypical

and

“1)

whether

the

conditions

imposed

upon

1

duration of the prisoner’s sentence.”

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850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87).

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example, the Supreme Court has determined that while “[m]any of

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the restrictions on a prisoner’s freedom of action [at a mental

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health care facility] might not constitute the deprivation of a

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liberty interest retained by a prisoner, . . . the stigmatizing

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consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary

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psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner

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to mandatory behavior modification treatment for mental illness,

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constitute

the

kind

of

11

procedural protections.”

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d

deprivations

of

liberty

that

For

requires

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980).

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13

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert a due

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process claim arising from his 24-hour placement on suicide watch,

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the claim fails.

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were while he was on suicide watch, how the conditions differed

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from the general population, why they constituted an “atypical and

18

significant hardship,” and whether he was subjected to mandatory,

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involuntary treatment while under observation.

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Complaint must be dismissed, with leave to amend.

21

Sherman, 2017 WL 1549937, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2017); (prisoner-

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plaintiff’s allegation that he was “placed on a 24-hour suicide

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watch

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requirements necessary to state a conditions of confinement claim

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under

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1342368, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010) (plaintiff failed to state

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due process claim arising from placement on suicide watch where he

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did not describe the conditions at the medical facility or explain

without

the

Due

Plaintiff does not explain what the conditions

blankets

Process

or

clothes

Clause”);

11

does

Jacobs

not

v.

Accordingly, the
See Trujillo v.

meet

the

Sullivan,

extreme

2010

WL

1

how being placed on suicide watch was an atypical and significant

2

hardship).

3
4

2.

Eighth Amendment

5
6

It is also possible that Plaintiff may be attempting to claim

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that his placement on suicide watch constituted cruel and unusual

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punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

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suffering

on

prisoners

that

is

“totally

Infliction of

without

penological

10

justification” violates the Eighth Amendment.

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452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).

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infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment

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forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”

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312, 319 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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The punishment must constitute “shocking and barbarous treatment.”

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Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 494 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985).

Only

Rhodes v. Chapman,

“the unnecessary and wanton

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.

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The Complaint vaguely alleges that Plaintiff’s placement on

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suicide watch caused “harm and pain,” but fails to describe what

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that harm and pain were, or explain why the placement constituted

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shocking and barbarous treatment. Accordingly, the Complaint fails

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to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, and must be dismissed,

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with leave to amend.

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IV.

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CONCLUSION

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4

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed with

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leave to amend.

If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action,

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he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum

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and Order within which to file a First Amended Complaint.

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amended complaint, the Plaintiff shall cure the defects described

9

above.

Plaintiff

shall

not

include

new

defendants

In any

or

new

10

allegations that are not reasonably related to the claims asserted

11

in the original complaint.

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shall be complete in itself and shall bear both the designation

13

“First Amended Complaint” and the case number assigned to this

14

action.

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complaint in this matter.

The First Amended Complaint, if any,

It shall not refer in any manner to any previously filed

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17

In

any

amended

complaint,

Plaintiff

should

confine

his

18

allegations to those operative facts supporting each of his claims.

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Plaintiff

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Procedure 8(a), all that is required is a “short and plain statement

21

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

22

Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize the standard civil

23

rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of

24

which is attached.

25

identify the nature of each separate legal claim and make clear

26

what specific factual allegations support each of his separate

27

claims.

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concise and to omit irrelevant details.

is

advised

that

pursuant

to

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should

Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to keep his statements

13

It is not necessary for

1

Plaintiff to cite case law, include legal argument, or attach

2

exhibits at this stage of the litigation. Plaintiff is also advised

3

to omit any claims for which he lacks a sufficient factual basis.

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5

Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file

6

a First Amended Complaint or failure to correct the deficiencies

7

described above, will result in a recommendation that this action

8

be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute and obey court

9

orders

pursuant

to

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

41(b).

10

Plaintiff is further advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue

11

this action,

he may

12

Dismissal

in

accordance

13

41(a)(1).

A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff’s

14

convenience.

voluntarily dismiss it by filing a Notice of
with

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

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DATED:

March 13, 2018
/S/
__________
SUZANNE H. SEGAL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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