Colfin AI-CA 4 LLC v. Jose L Valle et al

Filing 5

MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Percy Anderson: remanding case to Superior Court of California, Fontana Courthouse. Case number UDFS1400150. Case Terminated. Made JS-6 (Attachments: # 1 Transmittal Letter) (rne)

JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

EDCV 14-818 PA (JCGx)

Title

Colfin AI-CA 4, LLC v. Jose Valle, et al.

Present: The Honorable

Date

April 28, 2014

PERCY ANDERSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Paul Songco

Not Reported

N/A

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None

None

Proceedings:

IN CHAMBERS - COURT ORDER

The Court is in receipt of a Notice of Removal filed by defendants Jose Valle and Elizabeth Valle
(“Defendants”) on April 24, 2014. Plaintiff Colfin AI-CA 4, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed its Complaint in San
Bernardino County Superior Court asserting a single cause of action for unlawful detainer. Defendants
assert that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1334 for cases arising
under or related to Title 11 of the United States Code for bankruptcy cases. Defendants also assert that
removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1443, which creates federal removal jurisdiction for actions brought
against people who cannot enforce in state court “any law providing for the equal rights of citizens of the
Untied States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).
Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over matters
authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S.
375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994). A “strong presumption” against removal
jurisdiction exists. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992). In seeking removal, the
defendant bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th
Cir. 1986).
A.

Removal Related to Bankruptcy

Although Defendants’ Notice of Removal does not specifically reference it, their assertion of the
Court’s jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1334, implicates 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), the
bankruptcy removal statute. Section 1452(a) allows a party to “remove any claim or cause of action in a
civil action to the district court for the district where such action is pending” if the district court has
jurisdiction of the claim or cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Section 1334(b) invests district
courts with “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to cases under title 11.” Once a claim is removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a),
the court to which the claim has been removed “may remand such claim or cause of action on any
equitable ground.” 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b). An order remanding an action pursuant to § 1452(b) “is not
reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292 [of Title
28] of by the Supreme Court.” Id. Section 1452(b)’s “‘any equitable ground’ remand standard is an
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JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

EDCV 14-818 PA (JCGx)

Date

Title

April 28, 2014

Colfin AI-CA 4, LLC v. Jose Valle, et al.

unusually broad grant of authority. It subsumes and reaches beyond all of the reasons for remand under
nonbankruptcy removal statutes. . . . At bottom, the question is committed to the sound discretion of the
. . . judge.” McCarthy v. Prince, 230 B.R. 414, 417 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999).
In assessing whether “equitable grounds” exist to remand actions removed under § 1452, courts
have looked to a number of factors:
These factors have included, among other things, judicial economy, comity
and respect for state law decision-making capabilities, the impact that
remand would have upon the orderly administration of the debtor’s
bankruptcy case, the effect of bifurcating claims and parties to an action
and the possibilities of inconsistent results, the predominance of state law
issues and nondebtor parties, and the extent of any prejudice to nondebtor
parties.
In re TIG Ins. Co., 264 B.R. 661, 665-66 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2001); see also McCarthy, 230 B.R. at 418
(“State courts are, by definition, fully competent to resolve disputes governed by state law.”).
Here, Defendants have not provided any support for their contention that this action is subject to
removal under § 1452(a). For instance, the Notice of Removal does not even identify a pending
bankruptcy case in which they are involved. A bare allegation of jurisdiction, without more, is
insufficient to defeat the “strong presumption” against removal. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567. Moreover,
bankruptcy removal jurisdiction is subject to the well-pleaded complaint rule, meaning that the basis for
removal jurisdiction must be evident from the complaint. See, e.g., Tishau Partners v. Miles, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 37948, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2010); Yangming Marine Transport Corp. v. Electri-Flex
Co., 682 F. Supp. 368, 370 (N.D. Ill. 1987). Here, there is nothing from the face of Plaintiff’s unlawful
detainer Complaint to confer bankruptcy removal jurisdiction. As a result, Defendants have not met
their burden to establish the Court’s jurisdiction.
B.

Removal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1443

Defendants’ Notice of Removal also references 28 U.S.C. § 1443. A defendant “who is denied
or cannot enforce” his or her civil rights in state court may remove a civil action or criminal prosecution
to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1443. Section 1443(1) was enacted “to remove from state courts
groundless charges not supported by sufficient evidence when these charges are based on race and deny
one his federally protected equal rights as guaranteed by Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” Walker
v. Georgia, 417 F.2d 5, 9 (5th Cir. 1969). Section 1443 provides, in pertinent part, “Any of the
following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the
defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
wherein it is pending: (1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State
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JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

EDCV 14-818 PA (JCGx)

Date

Title

April 28, 2014

Colfin AI-CA 4, LLC v. Jose Valle, et al.

a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons
within the jurisdiction thereof . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).
A petition for removal under § 1443(1) must satisfy the two-part test
articulated by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780,
788-92, 794-804, 86 S. Ct. 1783, 16 L. Ed. 2d 925 (1966) and City of
Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 824-28, 86 S. Ct. 1800, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 944 (1966). “First, the petitioners must assert, as a defense to the
prosecution, rights that are given to them by explicit statutory enactment
protecting equal racial civil rights.” California v. Sandoval, 434 F.2d 635,
636 (9th Cir. 1970) “Second, petitioners must assert that the state courts
will not enforce that right, and that allegation must be supported by
reference to a state statute or a constitutional provision that purports to
command the state courts to ignore the federal rights.” Id.
Patel v. Del Taco, Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2006). Defendants do not allege any facts that
would support removal under § 1443 and therefore Defendants satisfy neither part of the Supreme
Court’s test in Georgia v. Rachel. There are no allegations or any other indication that Defendants have
properly sought to invoke a law that provides “for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States,”
or that they are unable to pursue such a claim or that the state court is unable or unwilling to enforce
such a claim. Nothing in Defendants’ conclusory allegations concerning the asserted deficiencies in
California’s unlawful detainer procedures “command[s] the state courts to ignore” Defendants’ federal
rights. See Patel, 446 F.3d at 998-99. Therefore, the Notice of Removal’s allegations are insufficient to
establish the Court’s jurisdiction under § 1443.
C.

Impermissible Successive Removal

This is the second time that Defendants have filed a Notice of Removal for the same complaint.
Defendants’ first Notice of Removal was filed on March 31, 2014, and was assigned case number ED
CV 14-620 PA (JCGx). The Court remanded that case sua sponte on April 4, 2014, because neither the
complaint nor the Notice of Removal provided adequate support for Defendants’ contentions regarding
removal “related to bankruptcy” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), or to vindicate
federal civil rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1443. The Notice of Removal filed in this action does not allege
any additional facts or legal grounds than did the Notice of Removal filed in case number ED CV 14-620
PA (JCGx).
A successive removal is permissible when made on new grounds arising from subsequent
pleadings or events. See Peabody v. Maud Van Cortland Hill Schroll Trust, 892 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir.
1989); One Sylvan Rd. N. Assocs. v. Lark Int’l, Ltd., 889 F. Supp. 60, 62–63 (D. Conn. 1995) (“A
defendant who fails in an attempt to remove on the initial pleadings can file a second removal petition
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JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

EDCV 14-818 PA (JCGx)

Date

Title

April 28, 2014

Colfin AI-CA 4, LLC v. Jose Valle, et al.

when subsequent pleadings or events reveal a new and different ground for removal.”) (emphasis added).
However, a party cannot remove a case twice based on the same grounds. See Seedman v. U.S. Dist.
Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 837 F.2d 413, 414 (9th Cir. 1988) (“a second removal petition based on the
same grounds does not ‘reinvest’ the court’s jurisdiction”). Indeed, a successive attempt at removal is
justified only when there has been a “substantial change in the nature of the instant case since it was last
in this court.” One Sylvan, 889 F. Supp. at 64.
Here, there has been no change in the nature of the case, and there have not been any subsequent
pleadings or papers which might provide a basis for a successive removal. The current Notice of
Removal does not contain any new and different ground for removal and is not based on a substantial
change in the nature of the case since it was last in this Court. Defendants have now impermissibly
attempted to remove this action twice on the same grounds. Such successive removals are improper and
unjustified. Any further attempts to remove this action may subject Defendants to the imposition of
sanctions.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing that
federal subject matter jurisdiction exists over this action. Because the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, this action is hereby remanded to the San Bernardino County Superior Court, Case No.
UDFS1400150. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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