Paul Adams et al v. California Correctional Institution et al
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND by Magistrate Judge Kenly Kiya Kato, re Amended Complaint,,, 38 . (SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS) (Attachments: # 1 CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT FORM, # 2 NOTICE OF DISMISSAL) (dts)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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PAUL ADAMS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
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Case No. EDCV 16-1678-AB (KK)
v.
ORDER DISMISSING THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND
CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTION, et al.,
Defendants.
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I.
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INTRODUCTION
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Plaintiffs1 Paul Adams, Phillip L. Dorsey, and Ezequiel Monarrez
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(“Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, have filed a Third
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Amended Complaint (“TAC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)
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alleging defendants Daren Plumlee, Carlos Martinez, Trinidad Rodriguez
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(“Individual Defendants”), California Correctional Institution (“CCI”), and Does
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1-102 (collectively “Defendants”) violated their Eighth and Fourteenth
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1 Plaintiff William J. Bryant will be dismissed in a separate order for failure to file an
application to proceed in forma pauperis or to pay the necessary filing fee. ECF
Docket Nos. (“Dkts.”) 11, 16, 31.
2 While Plaintiffs include Does 1-10 as defendants, they fail to allege any facts or
raise any claims against Does 1-10.
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Amendment rights. As discussed below, the Court dismisses the TAC with leave
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to amend.
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II.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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On July 24, 2016, Plaintiffs constructively filed3 a complaint pursuant to
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Section 1983 against defendants Jeffrey Beard and K. Holland, in both their
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individual and official capacities, CCI, and CDCR. Dkt. 1 at 3. The complaint
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alleged defendant CCI and CDCR exposed inmates to dangerous levels of asbestos
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in violation of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 3, 5, 8.
On August 15, 2016, Plaintiffs constructively filed a Notice of Proposal of
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First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)4 against defendants Jeffrey Beard, K.
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Holland, and Jerry Brown, in their individual and official capacities, CCI, and
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CDCR. Dkt. 18 at 3-4. The FAC alleged (1) prisoners are being exposed to
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airborne asbestos particles; and (2) prisoners are forced to drink and bathe in water
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contaminated by human feces. Id. at 1-48. On November 1, 2016, the Court
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dismissed the FAC with leave to amend. Dkt. 30.
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On January 12, 2017, Plaintiffs constructively filed a Second Amended
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Complaint (“SAC”)5 against defendants CDCR and CCI. Dkts. 36 and 36-1.
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Plaintiffs alleged CCI and CDCR are subjecting Plaintiffs to an environment
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“invested with air born asbestos particles,” thereby demonstrating a deliberate
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indifference to inmates’ health. Id. On March 15, 2017, the Court dismissed the
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SAC with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 37.
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Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se inmate gives prison authorities a
pleading to mail to court, the court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on
the date it is signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010);
Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating the “mailbox rule
applies to § 1983 suits filed by pro se prisoners”).
4 On August 15, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a request for leave to file a FAC as well as a
proposed FAC. Dkt. 14. On August 24, 2016, the Court filed Plaintiffs’ FAC and
denied Plaintiffs’ request for leave as moot. Dkt. 17.
5 The Court refers to the pages of the SAC and TAC as they are numbered on the
Court’s online docket.
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On April 5, 2017, Plaintiffs constructively filed the instant TAC against
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defendant CCI and the Individual Defendants in their individual and official
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capacities6. TAC at 7-8. In the TAC, Plaintiffs raise Eighth and Fourteenth
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Amendment claims against all Defendants. Id. at 11-14.
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III.
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ALLEGATIONS OF THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
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Plaintiffs claim Defendants have exposed Plaintiffs to dangerous levels of
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asbestos and forced them to drink contaminated drinking water. Id. at 11. As a
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result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs allege “mental and emotional injury,” and
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“imminent foreseeable health injuries,” and “long term life threatening injury.”
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Id. at 31.
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A.
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ASBESTOS CLAIMS
Plaintiffs claim defendant CCI “violated Plaintiffs rights to a reasonable safe
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and healthy environment at CCI, on Yards I and II, by failing to prevent
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unreasonable exposure to asbestos” and engaging in asbestos “clean up [that] were
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illegal.” Id. at 19, 28. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged, around April or May 2016,
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CCI staff members began construction in Willard Hall housing unit, which
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involved “knocking out an entire wall infested with asbestos material and . . .
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remov[ing] asbestos contaminated floor tiles, without providing warnings to the
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inmate occupants in the building.” Id. at 18. Plaintiffs allege defendant CCI failed
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to “seal off the area of the construction” and instead used fans “which blew all of
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the Particles into the corners of the entire housing unit[,] thus, exposing [Plaintiffs]
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to asbestos directly.” Id. at 19. Ultimately, Plaintiffs claim defendant CCI has
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6 It is unclear whether Plaintiffs intend to sue the Individual Defendants in their
individual capacity only or both their official and individual capacities. While page
8 of the TAC appears to specify the Individual Defendants are being sued in their
individual capacity only, Plaintiffs select both individual and official capacities on
page 3 of the form-complaint. See id. at 3, 8. For purposes of this Order, the Court
will assume Plaintiffs intend to sue the Individual Defendants in both their
individual and official capacities.
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failed to ensure that “asbestos removal and disposal is properly and legally
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performed [and] that asbestos exposure is limited by proper testing.” Id. at 30.
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B.
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CONTAMINATED WATER CLAIMS
Plaintiffs allege the water at CCI is contaminated with lead, arsenic, and
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human feces such that “it poses a health risk to human life.” Id. at 25-27.
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According to Plaintiffs, Inmate Dorsey informed them CCI’s water “had human
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waste in it, among other toxic contaminants such as Arsenic and LED.” Id. at 22.
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Plaintiffs claim Defendants are each responsible for CCI’s water
contamination. As to defendant CCI, Plaintiffs allege defendant CCI is aware of
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the contaminated water because it “warns Employees and Officers to NOT
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HANDLE OR DRINK THE CCI INSTITUTION WATER AT CCI YARDS I
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AND II.” Id. at 25. Plaintiffs allege defendant CCI “hire[s] incompetent
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employees who knowingly represent false reports and fabricat[e] test results” and
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who are not “certified, qualified, and licensed to perform the job.” Id. at 29-30.
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Specifically, Plaintiffs allege defendant CCI hired the Individual Defendants to
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“falsify the records in order to evade the fact that the water [at CCI] is harmful for
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any and all human use, contact, and ingestion.” Id. at 23, 27. Plaintiffs allege
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defendant CCI “cannot afford to Place real Water treatment employees at CCI
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water treatment Plant because the Legal Officials would declare that the water is
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not safe[,] [a]nd that Yards I and II would have to be closed down.” Id. at 23.
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As to the Individual Defendants, Plaintiffs allege they are “jeopardizing
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inmate INHABITANTS health and safety on a daily basis . . . by operating a Water
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Treatment Plant and Waste Water Plant and Plant Ops. . . . [and] preforming such
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practices without proper state certification, licenses, and qualifications . . . in
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violation of State and Federal laws and regulations.” Id. at 9.
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Plaintiffs allege defendant Plumlee, who is a “free staff member/employee
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hired by CCI as a supervisor, Engineer of Plant Ops.” has a “duty to supervise the
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employees at Water and Waste Water Treatment Facilities” for CCI. Id. at 38.
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Plaintiffs claim defendant Plumlee “allowed his subordinates to operate without a
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license and [state] certifications” and failed “to adequately train and supervise his
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employees [Trinidad and Rodriguez].” Id. at 8, 35, 36. Plaintiffs further allege
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defendant Plumlee knows “that high levels of Arsenic[,] lead[,] and human feces
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exists in the water and that [defendant Rodriguez] pollutes the water supply,
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tainting the water for the Plaintiffs and for all inmates on Yards I and II at CCI.”
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Id. at 34.
Plaintiffs allege defendant Rodriguez, who is a “free staff member/employee
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hired by CCI as the Waste Water Supervisor, at California Correctional
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Institution,” is responsible for “illegally dump[ing] HSI Mobile Compressor Oil
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into the spray fields . . . which contaminates the drinking water on yards I and II at
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CCI.” Id. at 8, 22.
Lastly, Plaintiffs allege defendant Martinez, who is a “free staff
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member/employee hired by CCI to run the Water Treatment Plant at California
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Correctional Institution” and who is responsible for taking water samples at CCI to
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send them out for testing, is not a certified water operator, “has failed his last two
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water state exams,” and “falsifies water test results.” Id. at 8, 14, 22, 27, 41.
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Plaintiffs allege defendant Martinez “know[s] the water [is] tainted on Yards I and
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II” and that he falsifies test results by taking water samples “from Yards III and IV
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where the water is clean.” Id. at 40. Plaintiffs allege defendants Plumlee and
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Martinez “fabricate the records on a regular basis.” Id. at 23, 42.
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C.
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REQUESTS FOR RELIEF
As a result of their alleged injuries from both the asbestos exposure and
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water contamination, Plaintiffs seek (1) $520,000 in compensatory damages; (2)
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$150,000 in punitive damages; (3) a declaratory judgment defendants violated
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Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and falsified test results regarding air and water
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quality at CCI; and (4) an injunction evacuating and shutting down CCI yards I and
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II, ordering asbestos material removed, and removing the Individual Defendants
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from their government offices. Id. at 15-16. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek to have
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their case designated as a class action.7 Id. at 7.
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IV.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
As Plaintiffs are proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must screen the
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TAC and is required to dismiss the case at any time if it concludes the action is
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frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
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monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
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1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194
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(9th Cir. 1998).
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In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for screening
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purposes, the Court applies the same pleading standard from Rule 8 of the Federal
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Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 8”) as it would when evaluating a motion to
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dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Watison v. Carter,
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668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain a
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“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
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relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim “where there is no
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cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a
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cognizable legal theory.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2007)
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(citation omitted). In considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must
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accept as true all of the material factual allegations in it. Hamilton v. Brown, 630
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F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the court need not accept as true
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“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or
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Plaintiffs, as pro se litigants, are prohibited from bringing their claims as a class
action. See Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962) (“A litigant
appearing in propria persona has no authority to represent anyone other than
himself.”); Axtle v. Cty. of Alameda, No. C 12-6404 YGR (PR), 2013 WL 5979201,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013) (“[P]ro se plaintiffs are not adequate class
representatives able to fairly represent and adequately protect the interests of the
class.”).
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unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th
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Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Although a complaint need not include detailed
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factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
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‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d
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1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
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1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the
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court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
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misconduct alleged.” Cook, 637 F.3d at 1004 (citation omitted).
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
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however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
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pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889-90 (9th Cir.
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2008) (citation omitted). “[W]e have an obligation where the p[laintiff] is pro se,
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particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the
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p[laintiff] the benefit of any doubt.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir.
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2012) (citation omitted).
If the court finds the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a
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claim, the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v.
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Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Leave to amend should be granted
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if it appears possible the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if
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the plaintiffs are pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103,
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1106 (9th Cir. 1995). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear a complaint
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cannot be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend.
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Cato, 70 F.3d at 1107-11; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th
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Cir. 2009).
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V.
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DISCUSSION
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A.
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BARS (1) ALL CLAIMS
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AGAINST DEFENDANT CCI, AND (2) ANY CLAIMS FOR
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MONETARY DAMAGES AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL
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DEFENDANTS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY
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(1)
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“The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits
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APPLICABLE LAW
brought against an unconsenting state.” Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec.
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Co-op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
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v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984)). This
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jurisdictional bar includes “suits naming state agencies and departments as
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defendants,” and it applies whether plaintiffs “seek damages or injunctive relief.”
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Id.; Pennhurst State School, 465 U.S. at 102. “[A]n entity with Eleventh
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Amendment immunity is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.” Howlett
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By & Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d
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332 (1990).
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As to state officials sued in their official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment
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immunizes state officials sued in their official capacity from retrospective claims for
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relief (including monetary damage claims), but does not immunize them from
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claims for prospective relief (such as forward-looking injunctive relief). Kentucky
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v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169–70, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)
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Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974); Ex Parte
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Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1908).
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(2)
ANALYSIS
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Here, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs from raising any claims
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against defendant CCI and from seeking monetary damages against the Individual
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Defendants in their official capacity. As to defendant CCI, because CCI is an
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agency of the state of California, it is protected by the Eleventh Amendment and
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cannot be sued under Section 1983. See Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d
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822, 822–23 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding plaintiff was not entitled to relief under
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Section 1983 against state prison because “state agencies which are but arms of the
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state government are not ‘persons’ for purposes of the Civil Rights Act”); Lett v.
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Brown, No. EDCV 12-1874-JFW (SS), 2013 WL 156560, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15,
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2013) (holding “CCI-Tehachapi, as an agency of the State of California, cannot be
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sued under Section 1983”). As to the claims against the Individual Defendants in
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their official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs from raising claims
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that seek monetary relief. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 169–70 (holding
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the Eleventh Amendment bar “remains in effect when State officials are sued for
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damages in their official capacity”). Thus, Plaintiffs are barred from bringing (1)
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any claims against defendant CCI; and (2) claims for monetary damages against the
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Individual Defendants in their official capacity.
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B.
PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT
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DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT
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RODRIGUEZ IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
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(1)
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Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
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and unusual punishment when they deny humane conditions of confinement with
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deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128
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L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). To state a claim for such an Eighth Amendment violation, an
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inmate must show objective and subjective components. Clement v. Gomez, 298
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F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). The objective component requires an “objectively
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insufficiently humane condition violative of the Eighth Amendment” which poses
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a substantial risk of serious harm. Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir.
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1996). The subjective component requires prison officials acted with the culpable
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mental state, which is “deliberate indifference” to the substantial risk of serious
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harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct.
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285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976).
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A prison official may be found deliberately indifferent in violation of the
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Eighth Amendment if “he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious
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harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”
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Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
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847). “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
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denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of
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and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
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aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
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serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
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837-38; see May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 566 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting plaintiff’s
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claims disciplinary segregation violated the Eighth Amendment because plaintiff
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“failed to allege facts establishing the deprivation of adequate food, drinking water,
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sanitation, or personal hygiene items”). Deliberate indifference requires “more
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than ‘gross negligence’ or even ‘recklessness.’” Hatter v. Dyer, 154 F. Supp. 3d
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940, 944 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
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(2)
ANALYSIS
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Here, Plaintiffs fail to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
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claim against defendant Rodriguez. While Plaintiffs allege defendant Rodriguez is
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“illegally dump[ing] HSI Mobile Compressor Oil into the spray fields . . . which
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contaminates the drinking water on yards I and II at CCI,” they fail to allege
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defendant Rodriguez knew that his actions placed inmates at a “substantial risk of
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serious harm.” TAC at 8, 22; Clem, 566 F.3d at 1182. Without any facts
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indicating defendant Rodriguez “knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
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inmate health or safety,” Plaintiffs’ claim against him in his individual capacity
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necessarily fails. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38.
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C.
PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CLAIM AGAINST THE
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INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
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(1)
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A procedural due process claim requires plaintiffs establish “two distinct
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elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property
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interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections.” Brewster v. Bd. of
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Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998). The failure to follow mandatory
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procedures does not by itself offend the constitution. See Smith v. Noonan, 992
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F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e have held that ‘procedural requirements,
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even if mandatory, do not raise a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest.’”
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(citation omitted)). Rather, there must be allegations that the procedures
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themselves were inadequate to protect a valid liberty interest. See Buckley v.
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Gomez, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 168 F.3d 498 (9th Cir.
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1999).
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(2)
ANALYSIS
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Here, Plaintiffs claim they have a Due Process right “to be informed, and
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adequately noticed,” presumably of the allegedly dangerous conditions at CCI. Id.
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at 11. However, the right to be informed or adequately noticed of prison conditions
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is not an interest protected by the U.S. Constitution. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545
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U.S. 209, 221, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 162 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2005) (holding “[a] liberty
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interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in
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the word ‘liberty’, or it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state
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law or policies” (internal citations omitted)). Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to
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identify a specific procedure that the Individual Defendants did not follow which
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would have resulted in Plaintiffs’ loss of a valid liberty interest. Brewster, 149 F.3d
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at 982. Further, even assuming Plaintiffs identified a procedure that created a
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protected interest, the Individual Defendants’ failure to comply with such a
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procedure alone does not establish a due process violation. Buckley, 36 F. Supp. 2d
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at 1222 (“A defendant’s negligent or intentional failure to follow proper
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procedures does not constitute a constitutional deprivation.”). Thus, Plaintiffs’
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procedural due process claim is subject to dismissal.
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D.
PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIM AGAINST THE
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INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
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(1)
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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals
APPLICABLE LAW
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against deprivations of life, liberty, or property in such a way that “shocks the
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conscience” or “interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”
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United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697
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(1987); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “To establish a substantive due process
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claim, a plaintiff must, as a threshold matter, show a government deprivation of
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life, liberty, or property.” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th
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Cir. 1998); Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. Sch. Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974)
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(“[T]he absence of any claim by the plaintiff that an interest in liberty or property
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has been impaired is a fatal defect in her substantive due process argument.”).
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(2)
ANALYSIS
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Here, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a protected liberty interest or property
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interest of which they have been deprived. Plaintiffs claim to have a Due Process
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right “to the Proper Function of a governmental office,” which includes the right
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to have the Individual Defendants “perform [their] duties consistent with law, rule,
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regulation, policy, and Constitution State and Federal.” TAC at 10. Plaintiffs,
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however, fail to identify a valid liberty interest protected by the Due Process
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Clause. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221; Nunez, 147 F.3d at 871. Thus, Plaintiffs’
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substantive due process claim is subject to dismissal.
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E.
PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
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EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL
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DEFENDANTS
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(1)
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“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands
APPLICABLE LAW
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that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
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the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should
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be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
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439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
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216, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982)). In order to state a Section 1983
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equal protection claim, plaintiffs must allege they were treated differently from
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others who were similarly situated without a rational basis or discriminated against
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based on their membership in a protected class. See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d
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1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (requirements for Section 1983 equal protection claim
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based on membership in protected class); Gallo v. Burson, 568 F. App’x 516, 517
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(9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court dismissal of inmate’s equal protection
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claim). “Similarly situated” persons are those “who are in all relevant aspects
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alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1992).
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(2)
ANALYSIS
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Here, Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim fails. Plaintiffs claim the Individual
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Defendants’ “refusal to follow the above laws had affirmatively deprived Plaintiffs
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and all prisoners at CCI on yard I and II of Due Process and Equal Protection of the
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laws.” TAC at 11. Here, it is unclear from Plaintiffs’ claims how the Individual
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Defendants are depriving them of equal protection of the laws. Even if Plaintiffs’
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claim had identified unequal treatment, Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims based
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on unequal treatment as inmates fails to state an Equal Protection claim because
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prison inmates, in general, are not a protected class. See Webber v. Crabtree, 158
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F.3d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1998). In making their equal protection allegations,
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Plaintiffs fail to present facts showing the Individual Defendants treated them any
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differently than other “similarly situated” individuals. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Equal
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Protection claim is subject to dismissal.
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F.
THE TAC FAILS TO COMPLY WITH FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
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PROCEDURE 8
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(1)
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Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of
APPLICABLE LAW
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the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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Further, Rule 8(d)(1) provides “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and
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direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). As the Supreme Court has held, Rule 8(a)
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“requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
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See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed.
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2d 929 (2007). Complaints that are “argumentative, prolix, replete with
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redundancy, and largely irrelevant” and that “consist[] largely of immaterial
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background information” are subject to dismissal under Rule 8. See McHenry v.
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Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996).
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(2)
ANALYSIS
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Here, Plaintiffs have stated the following three constitutional claims and
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have done so with sufficient clarity in the TAC: (1) Eighth Amendment deliberate
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indifference claim against the Individual Defendants in their official capacity for
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prospective relief only; (2) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
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against defendant Plumlee in his individual capacity; and (3) Eighth Amendment
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deliberate indifference claim against defendant Martinez in his individual capacity.
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Nevertheless, the TAC is needlessly long, rambling, and confusing and
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includes numerous conclusory allegations and legal jargon. See Dkt. 38. Inclusion
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of unclear facts and unnecessary legal jargon prevents the Court from clearly
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discerning any other potential causes of action. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffs
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wish to raise additional claims other than the three the Court has identified above,
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Plaintiffs must file an amended complaint.
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In amending the complaint, Plaintiffs must state each claim separately and
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identify defendants for each claim. Additionally, for each claim, Plaintiffs should
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clearly, precisely, and briefly identify the legal basis and the facts underlying it. See
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Bautista v. Los Angeles Cty., 216 F.3d 837, 840-41 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs
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should only include facts necessary to state a claim and need not include additional
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case law to support their allegations. Instead, Plaintiffs should clearly state (1) the
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alleged harm; (2) who caused the alleged harm; (3) when the alleged harm was
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committed; and (4) what actions were committed by each alleged wrongdoer
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VI.
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LEAVE TO FILE A FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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For the foregoing reasons, the TAC is subject to dismissal. As the Court is
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unable to determine whether amendment would be futile, leave to amend is
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granted. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per
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curiam). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT within twenty-one (21) days of
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the service date of this Order, Plaintiffs choose one of the following three options:
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1.
Option One: Plaintiffs may proceed on the following claims, which
are not identified as deficient:
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(a) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against the
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Individual Defendants in their official capacity for prospective
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injunctive relief only;
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(b) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
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defendant Plumlee in his individual capacity; and
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(c) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
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defendant Martinez in his individual capacity.
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If Plaintiffs intend to select this option, they must file a statement clearly
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indicating they wish to proceed on these claims only and voluntarily dismiss
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all other claims.
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2.
Option Two: Alternatively, Plaintiffs may file a Fourth Amended
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Complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies discussed above. The Clerk of
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Court is directed to mail Plaintiffs a blank Central District civil rights
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complaint form to use for filing the Fourth Amended Complaint.
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If Plaintiffs choose to file a Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs must
clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “Fourth Amended
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Complaint,” it must bear the docket number assigned to this case, and it must be
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retyped or rewritten in its entirety, preferably on the court-approved form.
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Plaintiffs shall not include new defendants or new allegations that are not
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reasonably related to the claims asserted in the TAC. In addition, the Fourth
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Amended Complaint must be complete without reference to the TAC, or any other
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pleading, attachment, or document.
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An amended complaint supersedes the preceding complaint. Ferdik v.
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Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). After amendment, the Court will
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treat all preceding complaints as nonexistent. Id. Because the Court grants
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Plaintiffs leave to amend as to all their claims raised here, any claim raised in a
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preceding complaint is waived if it is not raised again in the Fourth Amended
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Complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).
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The Court advises Plaintiffs that it generally will not be well-disposed toward
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another dismissal with leave to amend if Plaintiffs file a Fourth Amended
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Complaint that continues to allege insufficient facts to state a claim. “[A] district
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court’s discretion over amendments is especially broad ‘where the court has
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already given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint.’”
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Ismail v. County of Orange, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citations
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omitted); see also Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261.
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Plaintiffs are explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file either the
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statement permitted by Option One or a Fourth Amended Complaint will
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result in this action being dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim,
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prosecute, and/or obey Court orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
5
Procedure 41(b).
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3.
Option Three: Alternatively, Plaintiffs may voluntarily dismiss the
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action without prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). The
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Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiffs a blank Notice of Dismissal Form,
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which the Court encourages Plaintiffs to use.
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Dated: June 28, 2017
HONORABLE KENLY KIYA KATO
United States Magistrate Judge
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