Johnson v. Coalinga State Prison

Filing 12

ORDER DISMISSING Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and GRANTING Petitioner WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, signed by Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder on 12/1/10: Amended Petition due by 1/6/2011. (Attachments: # 1 2254 Petition Form)(Hellings, J)

(HC) Johnson v. Coalinga State Prison

Doc. 12

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 10 11 12 UNKNOWN, 13 Respondent. 14 15 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 16 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on 17 May 6, 2010, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On 18 November 16, 2010, the petition was transferred to this Court. The Court has conducted a 19 preliminary review of the Petition and for the reasons explained below finds it is without 20 jurisdiction to hear the case. 21 DISCUSSION 22 A. 23 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides in pertinent part: 24 25 26 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a 27 petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the 28 1
Dockets.Justia.com

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DAVID JOHNSON, Petitioner, v.

1:10-cv-02150-SMS (HC) ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND GRANTING PETITIONER LEAVE TO AMEND [Doc. 1]

/

Procedural Grounds for Summary Dismissal

If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.

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respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971). B. Failure to Name Proper Respondent Petitioner has failed to name a Respondent. A petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must name the state officer having custody of him as the respondent to the petition. Rule 2 (a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996); Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). Normally, the person having custody of an incarcerated petitioner is the warden of the prison in which the petitioner is incarcerated because the warden has "day-to-day control over" the petitioner. Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992); see, also, Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions is also appropriate. Ortiz, 81 F.3d at 894; Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360. Where a petitioner is on probation or parole, the proper respondent is his probation or parole officer and the official in charge of the parole or probation agency or state correctional agency. Id. In this case, Petitioner has not named a Respondent. Petitioner's failure to name a proper respondent requires dismissal of his habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction. Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360; Olson v. California Adult Auth., 423 F.2d 1326, 1326 (9th Cir. 1970); see, also, Billiteri v. United States Bd. Of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 948 (2nd Cir. 1976). However, in this case, the Court will give petitioner the opportunity to cure his defect by amending the petition to name a proper respondent. See West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir.1973), vacated in part on other grounds, 510 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.1975) (en banc) (allowing petitioner to amend petition to name proper respondent); Ashley v. State of Washington, 394 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1968) (same). Petitioner is advised that the current warden of Pleasant Valley State Prison is James A. Yates. /// /// 2

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C.

Failure to Exhaust State Remedies A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights "he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 3

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wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating: Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . . In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). In this case, Petitioner fails to state that he has sought relief in the California Supreme Court. Assuming he has not done so, the instant petition is unexhausted and must be dismissed. D. Signature Under Penalty of Perjury Petitioner did not sign the petition. Local Rule 7-131 requires a document submitted to the Court for filing to include an original signature. In addition, Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a petition for writ of habeas corpus to "be signed under penalty of perjury by the petitioner." Rule 2(c), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Accordingly, Petitioner must sign the petition under penalty of perjury. ORDER Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. 2. 3. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED; The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Petitioner a blank § 2254 petition; Petitioner is granted thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order to file an amended petition in compliance with this order; and

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4.

Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed for failure to comply with a court order. Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: icido3 December 1, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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