Maultsby v. Rios, et al.

Filing 24

ORDER DISMISSING 23 Second Amended Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; Thirty Day Deadline signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck on 11/13/2013. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form)(Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CHATAN MAULTSBY,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
H. A. RIOS, et al.,

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Case No. 1:12-cv-00033-AWI-DLB PC
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND
THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Defendants.

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Plaintiff Chatan Maultsby, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed

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this civil action on January 6, 2012, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

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Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which provides a remedy for violation of civil rights by

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federal actors. On January 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint as a matter of right.

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On February 12, 2013, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint with leave

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to amend. He filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on March 29, 2013. He names United

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States Penitentiary, Atwater, Warden H. A. Rios, Captain S. Keilman, Nurse Keilman and

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Correctional Officer Lt. Morgan as Defendants.

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A.

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LEGAL STANDARD
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

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“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

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claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

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is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

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‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual

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allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

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To state a claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the
deprivation of his rights. Id. at 1949. This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient
to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572
F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this
plausibility standard. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
B.

SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Victorville, California. The

events occurred while Plaintiff was housed at the United States Penitentiary in Atwater, California.
Plaintiff provides considerably less factual information in his SAC than he did in his First
Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s the totality of allegations are as follows:

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Nurse Keilman arbitrarily refused me medical treatment, disregarding my requests.
Captain Keilman lied about supplies are passed out every week. Lt. Morgan fail to pass out
sanitation supplies. Warden H. A. Rios fail to investigate my claim on my tort claim. I
requested that they monitor the video cameras every week. Also check back 9 months to
prove that sanitation supplies don’t get passed out.

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SAC 3.

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C.

ANALYSIS

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1.

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To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must

Eighth Amendment Medical Claim

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show deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th

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Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 295 (1976)) (quotation marks

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omitted). The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) a serious

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medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further

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significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and (2) the defendant’s response

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to the need was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotation marks and citation

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omitted).

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Deliberate indifference is shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain

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or possible medical need, and harm caused by the indifference. Id. (citation and quotation marks

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omitted). Deliberate indifference may be manifested when prison officials deny, delay or

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intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison

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physicians provide medical care. Id. (citation and quotations omitted). Where a prisoner is alleging
a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the
prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Berry v. Bunnell, 39
F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992),
overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
banc).
In the prior screening order, the Court explained that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant
Keilman were too vague. Specifically, the Court told Plaintiff that without additional facts, the
Court could not determine if Plaintiff had a serious medical need or whether Defendant Keilman was
deliberately indifferent to that need.

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Although Plaintiff submitted a SAC, he actually included less facts about the events at issue.

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Plaintiff has offered a legal conclusion as to Defendant Keilman, and without supporting facts, the

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Court cannot analyze the claim.

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Plaintiff will be provided with one more opportunity to amend his complaint. In amending,

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he must provide facts to support his allegations against Defendant Keilman. For example, Plaintiff

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should explain when he asked Defendant Keilman for medical treatment, how many times he asked

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her, and her specific responses to his requests.

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2.

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The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects

Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

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prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of

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confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v.

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Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)) (quotation marks

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omitted). While conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they must

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not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing

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Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, conditions which are devoid of

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legitimate penological purpose or contrary to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society violate the Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks
and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.
Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison
officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.1998). The deliberate indifference
standard involves an objective and a subjective component. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in
objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citation omitted). Second, the
prison official must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.
Thus, “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

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conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and
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disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.

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It appears that Plaintiff is again alleging that Defendant Morgan failed to pass out sanitation

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supplies. In the prior screening order, the Court explained that Plaintiff failed to indicate that the

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alleged denial of sanitation supplies led to unsanitary conditions that were objectively sufficiently

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serious to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff also failed to allege that

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Defendant Morgan “knew of and disregarded” a substantial risk of harm.

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Plaintiff again provides less facts as to Defendant Morgan than he did in his First Amended
Complaint. Without additional facts, the Court cannot properly analyze the claim.

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Plaintiff will be provided with one more opportunity to amend his complaint. In amending,

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he must provide facts relating to Defendant Morgan’s alleged failure to pass out sanitation supplies.

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For example, Plaintiff should explain when he asked Defendant Morgan for supplies, how many

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times he asked, and Defendant Morgan’s responses to his requests.

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3.

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Plaintiff simply alleges that Defendant Keilman “lied about sanitation supplies are passed out

Defendant Captain Keilman

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every week.” SAC 3. Although not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant

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Keilman also violated the Eighth Amendment by lying about the frequency with which sanitation

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supplies are handed out.
Again, however, Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and do not permit proper analysis.
Plaintiff will be provided with one more opportunity to amend his complaint. In amending,
he must provide facts as to why he believes that Defendant Keilman lied about the sanitation
supplies. For example, Plaintiff should explain how Defendant Keilman was involved in his
requests for sanitation supplies and how he responded to Plaintiff’s requests.
4.

Defendant Rios

In the prior screening order, the Court explained that Plaintiff failed to state any facts against
Defendant Rios. The Court further explained that if Plaintiff attempted to amend, he must
demonstrate a link between actions or omissions of Defendant Rios and the violation of his rights;

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there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v.
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Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d

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1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934.

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In the SAC, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Rios failed to investigate his claim that

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sanitation supplies were not passed out. Plaintiff states that he requested that “they” monitor video

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cameras, but this wasn’t done. Again, it is not clear, but it appears that Plaintiff is alleging that

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Defendant Rios also violated the Eight Amendment when he knew about the alleged violations but

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failed to take action.

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Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat

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superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1020-21; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235; Jones,

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297 F.3d at 934. As an administrator, Defendant Rios may only be held liable if they “participated

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in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them,” Taylor v.

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List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir.

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2011).

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While it may be possible for Plaintiff to allege that Defendant Rios, as a supervisor, knew of
the violations and failed to prevent them, he has failed to set forth sufficient factual information to
state a claim.

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Plaintiff will be provided with one more opportunity to amend his complaint. In amending
he must provide facts as to why he believes that Defendant Rios knew about the alleged violation
and his responses to Plaintiff’s complaints.
D.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a claim under section 1983.
The Court will provide Plaintiff with one FINAL opportunity to file an amended complaint,

if he believes in good faith he can cure the deficiencies identified above. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may
not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint.
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what

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each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556

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U.S. at 676-677. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a

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right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

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Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114

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F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and it must be

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“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.

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Therefore, “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an

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amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand,

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644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that

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1.

The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

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2.

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

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which relief may be granted under section 1983;
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Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and
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If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this

action will be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim under section 1983.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Dennis L. Beck

November 13, 2013

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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