Forbes v. Youngblood, et al.
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING 8 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 12/21/2016. Second Amended Complaint due by 1/26/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Complaint Form). (Lundstrom, T)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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ROBERT FORBES,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
DONNEY YOUNGBLOOD, et al.,
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Defendants.
Case No. 1:15-cv-01061-BAM (PC)
SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
(ECF No. 8)
THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE
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I.
Screening Requirement and Standard
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Plaintiff Robert Forbes (“Plaintiff”) is a former state prisoner1 proceeding pro se and in
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forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this action on
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July 10, 2015, at which time he was a pretrial detainee. (ECF No. 1.) On July 13, 2016, Plaintiff
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filed a first amended complaint before the Court screened the original complaint. (ECF No. 8.)
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The Court will now screen the amended complaint.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
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governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §
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1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or
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malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary
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The Court takes judicial notice from another pending action of Plaintiff’s (Case No. 1:16-cv-00707-BAM (PC))
wherein it notes that Plaintiff has been discharged from California Men’s Colony East.
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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); Id. §
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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
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pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
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required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
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1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65
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(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge
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unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009)
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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
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sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
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for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted);
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Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that
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a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of
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satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks
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omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff’s Allegations
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II.
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Plaintiff is suing Kern County Sheriff Donney Youngblood and Virginia Tomlinson, a
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facility nurse at the Kern County Jail (“Defendants”). Plaintiff does not specify whether he is
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suing the Defendants in their individual or official capacities.
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Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants unlawfully denied him medical treatment. Plaintiff
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demands a jury trial. Plaintiff does not make any allegations other than these statements, and
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instead incorporates by reference his original complaint.
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III.
Discussion
a. Amended Complaint
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An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693
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F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “Unless prior approval to the contrary is obtained from
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the Court, every pleading to which an amendment or supplement is permitted . . . shall be retyped
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and filed so that it is complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.”
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Local Rule 220 (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, the Court informs Plaintiff that he cannot amend his complaint by
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referencing a prior pleading, but must instead re-write those allegations in any amended pleading
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which he wishes the Court to consider as a part of his new, amended pleading. The Court will
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grant Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint to comply with these rules.
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a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
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pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required,
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but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
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statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth
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“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
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Ibid. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal
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conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57.
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In Plaintiff’s amended complaint, other than Plaintiff’s statement that the Defendants
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unlawfully denied him medical treatment, he alleges no facts. Also, although the original
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complaint is not before this Court for screening, the Court notes that it contains a few factual
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allegations mixed in with legal conclusions, exhibits which are not explained, and is disjointed
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and confusing.
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If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he must state in plain language what each
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Defendant did or did not do that deprived him of his Constitutional rights. If Plaintiff chooses to
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attach exhibits to his complaint, he must incorporate them by specific references.
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b. Supervisory Liability
Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of
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their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v.
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Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588
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F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “A
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supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional
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deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful
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conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (internal quotation marks
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omitted); accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074–75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915–16. “Under the latter
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theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if
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supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of
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constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at
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977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989)) (internal quotation marks
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omitted). Supervisory officials “cannot be held liable unless they themselves” violated a
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constitutional right. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to impose liability on Defendant Youngblood for his
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supervisory role as the Sheriff of the Kern County Jail, he may not do so. Plaintiff must allege
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facts showing that each Defendant, including Defendant Youngblood, personally participated in a
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constitutional violation, or in the implementation of a constitutionally-deficient policy.
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c. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need – Fourteenth
Amendment
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The standard applicable to a pretrial detainee’s claim for inadequate medical care under
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the Fourteenth Amendment is presently not clear. In the past, such claims were subject to the
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same state of mind requirement as an Eighth Amendment violation, i.e., subjective and deliberate
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indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. See Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591
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F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2010). However, that holding was called into question by the United States
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Supreme Court in a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force case, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.
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Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). Most recently, the Ninth Circuit extended the Kingsley rationale to a
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Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060,
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1070-71 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). In Guerra v. Sweeny, 2016 WL 5404407 (E.D. Cal 2016)
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(Ishii, J.), the court extended Castro to an untreated medical needs case. The court determined
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that the elements of such a claim are: (1) The plaintiff made a request for medical care or the need
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for care was glaringly obvious; (2) The plaintiff had a serious medical need; (3) The defendant
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did not take reasonable steps to obtain or provide medical care, even though a reasonable officer
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(or reasonable medical staff) in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk
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involved—making the likelihood of harm obvious; and (4) By not taking such measures, the
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defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at *3.
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Plaintiff appears to have been a pretrial detainee at Kern County Jail at the relevant times
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in question, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment standard for deliberate indifference to a serious
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medical need applies. Plaintiff’s amended complaint contains no facts to support a claim for
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deliberate indifference to serious medical need. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend his
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complaint to cure this deficiency.
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IV.
Conclusion and Order
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Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state any cognizable claims against Defendants. The
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Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file a second amended complaint curing the
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deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.
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2000). Plaintiff must state what the Defendants did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s
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constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual
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allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly,
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550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Plaintiff also may not change the nature of this suit by adding
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new, unrelated claims in his second amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th
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Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).
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Finally, as explained above, an amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint. Lacey
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v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Therefore, Plaintiff’s second
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amended complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded
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pleading.” Local Rule 220.
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Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that:
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1. The Clerk’s Office shall send to Plaintiff a complaint form;
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2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim for
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relief, with leave to amend;
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3. Within thirty (30) days of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a second amended
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complaint or a statement of voluntary dismissal of this action; and
4. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this order will result in dismissal of this action
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for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to obey a
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court order, and failure to prosecute.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
/s/ Barbara
December 21, 2016
A. McAuliffe
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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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