Valdez v. Larranaga et al

Filing 7

SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 1 , signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 5/10/17: 30-Day Deadline. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint - blank form)(Hellings, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JOSE VALDEZ,

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Plaintiff,
v.

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LISA LARRANGA, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:16-cv-00556-BAM (PC)
SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
(ECF No. 1)

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Plaintiff Jose Valdez (“Plaintiff”), a former Stanislaus County Jail inmate, proceeds pro se and

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in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed a consent to

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Magistrate Judge jurisdiction on May 11, 2016. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on April 20,

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2016, is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.)

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I.

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

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1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or

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malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Screening Requirement and Standard

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s

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allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.

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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted).

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To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient

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factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v.

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United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant

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acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the

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plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572

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F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff’s Allegations

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II.

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Plaintiff’s allegations concern events that transpired while he was detained in the Stanislaus

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County Jail. As defendants, Plaintiff names Lisa Larranaga, a Medical Program Manager, and Adam

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Christianson, Stanislaus County Sheriff. In summary, Plaintiff alleges that he involved in a fight on

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June 5, 2015, and was struck by a Rapid Containment Baton twice, once on the back of his left arm

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and once on his left thumb joint. Plaintiff contends that his left thumb joint was fractured and healed

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improperly. Plaintiff complains that he was denied necessary medical treatment for his injuries by

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various nurses, including LVN Lenette and LVN Francesca. As a result, Plaintiff filed a grievance,

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and was interviewed on September 11, 2015 by RN Nadaline Bergman. Nurse Bergman ordered an x-

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ray and prescribed physical therapy. Plaintiff was x-rayed on September 12, 2015, and received a

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response to his grievance on September 16, 2015. According to the response, the x-ray showed a

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healed fracture at the location of Plaintiff’s concern, which had been missed in the first x-ray, but the

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grievance was denied.
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On September 20, 2015, Plaintiff appealed to Defendant Larranaga, the Medical Program

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Manager. Plaintiff received a denial of his grievance on November 9, 2015. In the interim, on

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October 7, 2015, Nurse Bergman took photos of Plaintiff’s joint for referral to orthopaedic. On

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November 2, 2015, Nurse Bergman informed Plaintiff that orthopaedic was happy with how Plaintiff’s

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joint had healed, but a third x-ray was taken on November 10, 2015. The x-ray technician informed

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Plaintiff that the broken hand had been missed.

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Plaintiff asserts claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and excessive force
in the use of the baton by Deputy Beard.
III.

Discussion

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Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against the two named defendants in this action. As

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Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he will be given leave to amend his complaint to cure the identified

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deficiencies. To assist Plaintiff, he will be provided with the relevant pleading and legal standards that

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appear applicable to his claims.

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A. Supervisory Liability

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Plaintiff names Adam Christianson, Stanislaus County Sheriff, as a defendant in this action.

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However, Plaintiff has not alleged that Sheriff Christianson was personally involved in any

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constitutional deprivation. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Sheriff Christianson (or any other

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defendant) liable based upon their supervisory positions, he may not do so. Liability may not be

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imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory

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of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011,

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1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v.

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Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew

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of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

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1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d

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554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the

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official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional

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rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942
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F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds

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by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970).

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Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Sheriff Christianson participated in or directed any

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violations, knew of any violations and failed to act to prevent them or implemented a deficient policy

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that was the moving force behind any violation. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim

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against Sheriff Christianson in his supervisory capacity.

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B. Grievance Process

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Plaintiff appears to allege that his rights were violated because Defendant Larranaga denied his

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inmate grievance. However, an inmate grievance procedure does not confer any substantive rights and

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actions in reviewing those appeals cannot serve as a basis for liability under section 1983. See

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Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). Further, based on exhibits attached to the

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complaint, it appears that Defendant Larranaga responded to Plaintiff’s grievance in October 2015,

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and informed him that the medical team was reviewing and updating his plan of care and he should

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inform medical if anything changed before that time.

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C. Inadequate Medical Care

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It is not clear from Plaintiff’s complaint if he was a pretrial detainee or convicted inmate

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during the course of events alleged. Assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee

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during the relevant time period, the standard by which his claim of deliberate indifference to a serious

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medical condition is judged is subject to dispute. Guerra v. Sweeny, No. 1:13-cv-01077-AWI BAM

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(PC), 2016 WL 5404407, at *2-4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016) (Ishii, J.). Traditionally, where a pretrial

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detainee alleges inadequate medical care, courts have found that a pretrial detainee’s rights under the

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Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to prisoners’ rights under the Eighth Amendment and have

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applied the same standard. Id. at *2. However, recent decisions by the Supreme Court and Ninth

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Circuit have called into doubt whether the protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment and

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Eighth Amendment are comparable. Id. In Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir.

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2016), the Ninth Circuit set out a new standard, eliminating a subjective intent to punish requirement

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in the context of a pretrial detainee’s failure-to-protect claim. 833 F.3d at 1070. At least one court in

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this district has extended Castro to a pretrial detainee’s claim for inadequate medical care, finding that
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elements of such a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment are as follows: (1) The plaintiff made a

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request for medical care or the need for care was glaringly obvious; (2) The plaintiff had a serious

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medical need; (3) The defendant did not take reasonable steps to obtain or provide medical care, even

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though a reasonable officer (or reasonable medical staff) in the circumstances would have appreciated

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the high degree of risk involved—making the likelihood of harm obvious; and (4) By not taking such

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measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Guerra, 2016 WL 5404407, at *3.

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Although Plaintiff may be able to state a cognizable claim related to allegations of inadequate

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medical care, Plaintiff has not named the proper defendants in this action. As discussed above, neither

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Sheriff Christianson nor Defendant Larranaga was involved in his medical treatment. Plaintiff will be

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given leave to cure this deficiency and to name the proper defendant or defendants.
D. Excessive Force

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A pretrial detainee may state a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth

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Amendment by alleging that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively

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unreasonable. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2472-73 (2015). As with his claim involving

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medical treatment, Plaintiff may be able to state a claim for excessive force, but he has not named the

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proper defendants. Neither Sheriff Christianson nor Defendant Larranaga was involved in Plaintiff

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being struck with a baton. Plaintiff will be given leave to cure this deficiency and to name the proper

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defendant.

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IV.

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Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section

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1983. As Plaintiff is proceeding in pro se, the Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to

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amend his complaint to cure the identified deficiencies. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.

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2000).

Conclusion and Order

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Plaintiff is cautioned that he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated

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claims in his third amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no

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“buckshot” complaints).

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each

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named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights.
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff also must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is

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plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.

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Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint

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must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

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Plaintiff’s complaint, filed April 20, 2016 (ECF No. 1), is dismissed for failure to state

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a claim upon which relief can be granted;
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Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a first

amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and
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If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the

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Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and for failure to obey a

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court order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Barbara

May 10, 2017

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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