Heredia v. CCI

Filing 20

ORDER DISMISSING 15 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 6/20/2017. Second Amended Complaint due within twenty-one (21) days. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form). (Jessen, A)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

AARON AUGUSTINE HEREDIA,
Plaintiff,

12

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

v.

13
14

Case No. 1:16-cv-00788-JLT (PC)

(Doc. 15)

CCI,
Defendant.

15

21-DAY DEADLINE

16
17

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights when he

18

was attacked by another inmate while he was on the phone. Because he fails to link any of the

19

defendants to his factual allegations, the First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED and Plaintiff

20

is granted one last opportunity to file an amended complaint to address the deficiencies.

21

A.

22

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

Screening Requirement

23

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

24

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

25

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary

26

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C.

27

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

28

///
1

1

B.

2

Plaintiff complains of an incident that occurred at California Correctional Institute

Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

3

(“CCI”) in Tehachapi, California and now names the following defendants: CCI Warden Kim

4

Holland; Associate Warden T. Haak; Captain Dave Crounse; Lieutenant Luis Machado; Sergeant

5

D. Bonnfil; Roger Groves, CDW; Sharon McKay, ERO: Karen Dugan-Berry, LRA: Lieutenant S.

6

Archuleta; CCI Jane Doe; and CCII Jane Doe.

7

Plaintiff alleges that he was using the phone at his assigned time when he was attacked by

8

a “level 4 inmate.” Plaintiff ended up being shot twice by the tower officer with a “block gun”

9

and sprayed with 2 cans of pepper-spray during the incident. Plaintiff alleges that he was taken

10

out of a side door and dragged across the yard where he was kicked and yelled at by “C/O’s.”

11

The C/Os picked him up and pushed him down and put him in the program office cage, stripped

12

naked. Plaintiff was “questioned by staff” and the nurse told Plaintiff that the inmate who

13

attacked him was drunk. Plaintiff was taken to the A Yard SHU that night and could not see at all

14

due to the pepper spray. He also could not use his left leg because of being shot. Plaintiff alleges

15

he was not given medical attention for two days and wore “paper underwear for 15 days, no

16

shower.” Plaintiff alleges he was Level II and if he had been housed in the correct housing the

17

incident would not have happened. Plaintiff alleges that he did not belong on the Level 3 yard

18

and that “Jane Doe custody counselor knew my custody level ‘tags’ were placed on my cell

19

door.” “Jane Doe Case Records Manager CCI knew” Plaintiff was not placed in the correct

20

housing unit. “All other staff” allegedly put Plaintiff’s “life in harms way.” Plaintiff seeks

21

monetary damages and requests the “115 write up” and everything about this incident be removed

22

from his C-File.

23

Plaintiff has not stated any cognizable claims as he fails to link any of the individuals

24

named as defendants to his factual allegations. However, Plaintiff may be able to correct the

25

deficiencies in his pleading. Thus, he is being given the pleading requirements, the legal

26

standards for claims he has identified, and ONE LAST OPPORTUNITY to amend his pleading.

27
28

C.

Pleading Requirements
1.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
2

1

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

2

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

3

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain

4

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a).

5

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and

6

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.

7

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

8

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

9

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

10

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is

11

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual

12

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S.

13

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.

14

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft,

15

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally

16

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

17

However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze

18

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may

19

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit

20

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,

21

268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-

22

Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

23

omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

24

“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the

25

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

26

If he chooses to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff should make it as concise as

27

possible in twenty-five pages or less. He should merely state which of his constitutional rights he

28

feels were violated by each Defendant and its factual basis.
3

1
2

2.

Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. ' 1983) requires that there be an actual connection or link

3

between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by

4

Plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423

5

U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation

6

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

7

participates in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

8

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

9

(9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each

10

named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of

11

Plaintiff=s federal rights.

12

Plaintiff fails to link any individual defendants to any of his factual allegations. Plaintiff

13

must clearly state which individuals he feels are responsible for each violation of his

14

constitutional rights and the factual basis for each of his claims against a specific individual

15

defendant. Plaintiff’s complaint must put each defendant on notice of Plaintiff=s claims against

16

him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).

17
18
19

D.

Legal Standards
1.

Eighth Amendment -- Failure to Protect

"The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined

20

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832,

21

114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Prison officials

22

have a duty "to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates, which has been

23

interpreted to include a duty to protect prisoners." Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714

24

F.3d 1155, 1160 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040

25

(9th Cir. 2005)).

26

To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must "show that the officials acted with

27

deliberate indifference to threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate." Labatad, at 1160 (citing

28

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). This involves both objective
4

1
2

and subjective components.
First, objectively, the alleged deprivation must be "sufficiently serious" and where a

3

failure to prevent harm is alleged, "the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions

4

posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. at 834, quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

5

349, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). Second, subjectively, the prison official must "know of and

6

disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern,

7

45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). A prison official must "be aware of facts from which the

8

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also draw the

9

inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Liability may follow only if a prison

10

official "knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by

11

failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

12

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show that any of the individuals he named as defendants

13

knew that he was in the wrong housing unit, and the factual basis showing their knowledge that

14

he was improperly housed. Plaintiff’s allegations that all of the named defendants knew he had

15

been placed in the wrong housing unit are conclusory and need not be accepted as true. Iqbal,

16

556 U.S. at 678.

17

2.

Eighth Amendment -- Medical Care

18

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a

19

prisoner’s] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “A medical need

20

is serious if failure to treat it will result in ‘“significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton

21

infliction of pain.”’” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (quoting Jett v. Penner,

22

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th

23

Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th

24

Cir.1997) (en banc))

25

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must

26

first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

27

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second,

28

the plaintiff must show the defendants’ response to the need was deliberately indifferent.”
5

1

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096

2

(quotation marks omitted)).

3

As to the first prong, indications of a serious medical need “include the existence of an

4

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or

5

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily

6

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060,

7

1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at

8

1122; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff fails to allege what his

9

medical condition was that that he believes constituted a serious medical need.

10

As to the second prong, deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than

11

negligence” and “requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or

12

safety.’ ” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319).

13

Deliberate indifference is shown where a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial

14

risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”

15

Id., at 847. In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a

16

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680

17

F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). “A prisoner need not show his harm was

18

substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the

19

defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin, 974

20

F.2d at 1060.

21

Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060

22

(9th Cir.2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

23

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

24

‘must also draw the inference.’ ” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison

25

official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the

26

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe,

27

Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

28

Plaintiff must first allege facts that show he had a condition which constituted a serious
6

1

medical need. Then he must allege facts to show that each individual defendant he feels acted

2

deliberately indifferent to his condition, knew that he suffered from the condition and

3

intentionally chose action contrary to his medical requirements.

4

3.

Access to Courts

5

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,

6

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Phillips v.

7

Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from

8

the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access

9

claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim).

10
11

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002).
In either instance, “the injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated

12

legal claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Inmates do not enjoy a constitutionally protected right “to

13

transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder

14

derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.” Id. at 355. Rather, the type of legal claim protected is

15

limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions such as those brought

16

under section 1983 to vindicate basic constitutional rights. Id. at 354 (quotations and citations

17

omitted). “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and

18

perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id. at 355 (emphasis in

19

original).

20

To assert a forward-looking access claim, the non-frivolous “underlying cause of action

21

and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice

22

to a defendant.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002). To state such a claim, the

23

plaintiff must describe this “predicate claim . . . well enough to apply the ‘non-frivolous’ test and

24

to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.” Id. It is not

25

enough for Plaintiff merely to conclude that the claim was non-frivolous. The complaint should

26

instead “state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) just

27

as if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement should describe any remedy

28

available under the access claim and presently unique to it.” Id. at 417-418.
7

1

Moreover, when a prisoner asserts that he was denied access to the courts and seeks a

2

remedy for a lost opportunity to present a legal claim, he must show: (1) the loss of a non-

3

frivolous or arguable underlying claim; (2) the official acts that frustrated the litigation; and (3) a

4

remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit.

5

Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413-414,

6

overruled on other grounds, Hust v. Phillips, 555 U.S. 1150, 129 S.Ct. 1036 (2009) (reversed and

7

remanded Phillips v. Hust, on qualified immunity grounds without change or discussion of

8

elements of access to court claims)). Plaintiff fails to state any allegations to even suggest that he

9

has lost an underlying protected claim because of the actions he alleges in this case, let alone link

10
11
12

any such allegations to a specific individual named as a defendant in this action.
4.

Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff was previously informed that supervisory personnel are generally not liable under

13

section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and,

14

therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and

15

the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d

16

858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442

17

U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory

18

liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants

19

either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the

20

violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient

21

that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the

22

constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

23

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may

24

not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory of

25

respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters

26

do not answer for the torts of their servants - the term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id.

27

Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's misconduct is insufficient to establish liability;

28

each government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id.
8

1

A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the

2

elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to

3

dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss,

4

572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch

5

allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather

6

because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the

7

form of a factual allegation.@ Id. Thus, any allegations that supervisory personnel such as a

8

Warden is somehow liable because of the acts of those under his or her supervision does not state

9

a cognizable claim.

10

Despite previously being given these standards for claims against supervisory personnel,

11

Plaintiff fails to state anything other than legal conclusions against any of the supervisory

12

defendants named in this action.

13

E.

14

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed and he is

CONCLUSION

15

granted ONE FINAL OPPORTUNITY to amend his pleading by filing a second amended

16

complaint within 21 days. If Plaintiff needs an extension of time to comply with this order,

17

Plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later than 21 days from the date of

18

service of this order.

19

Plaintiff must demonstrate in any second amended complaint how the conditions

20

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625

21

F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The second amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each

22

named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some

23

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo

24

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v.

25

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

26

Plaintiff's second amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short

27

and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

28

upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v.
9

1

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be

2

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555

3

(2007) (citations omitted).

4

Plaintiff is further reminded that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v.

5

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29,

6

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

7

pleading," Local Rule 220.

8

The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified

9

by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff

10

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his second amended

11

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints).

12

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

13

1.

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

14

2.

The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and

15

3.

Within 21 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a second

16

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order, or

17

a notice of voluntary dismissal.

18

If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to obey a

19

court order and for failure to state a claim.

20
21
22
23

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

June 20, 2017

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

24
25
26
27
28
10