Williams v. Santiago

Filing 9

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 8 , signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 2/10/17: 30-Day Deadline. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint - blank form)(Hellings, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL B. WILLIAMS,

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Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. 1:16-cv-01065-MJS (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

v.
(ECF NO. 8)
JESSICA SANTIAGO,
THIRTY DAY DEADLINE
Defendant.

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Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil

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rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On November 1, 2016, the Court

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screened Plaintiff‟s complaint and found it stated no cognizable claims. (ECF No. 7.)

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Plaintiff was granted thirty days to amend. (Id.) His November 22, 2016 first amended

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complaint is before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 8.) He has consented to

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Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 3.) No other party has appeared.

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I.

Screening Requirement

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The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any

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portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if

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the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which

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relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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II.

Pleading Standard

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Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights,

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

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Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

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Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for

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vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

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(1989).

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To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

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(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and

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(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

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law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d

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1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

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the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

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are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

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that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere

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possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are

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accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

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III.

Plaintiff’s Allegations

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Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”). He names Jessica

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Santiago “et al.” as Defendants in the caption of his complaint. He does not explicitly list

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any other Defendants, but his factual allegations include the names “Dr. R. Chand” and

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“Dr. Kim Nguyen.”

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Plaintiff‟s allegations can be summarized essentially as follows: On April 5, 2016,

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after Plaintiff refused to take certain medications because of extreme side effects,

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Defendant Santiago, a former Unit 6 supervisor at CSH, and other individuals, violated

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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by placing Plaintiff‟s access card

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on hold and preventing him from entering and exiting the housing unit without a proper

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hearing. Plaintiff was denied: 1) written notice of the charges against him; 2) 24 hours

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advanced notice of the hearing; 3) a written statement by the fact-finder stating his or her

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reasons for the disciplinary action; 4) the right to call witnesses; and 5) legal assistance

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where Plaintiff may have been illiterate or where the issues presented were legally

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complex. Plaintiff also alleges that on March 31, 2016, Dr. Chand threatened to falsely

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report that Plaintiff was not competent to make his own medical decisions so that Plaintiff

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could be forcibly medicated without a court order. This threat was in retaliation for

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Plaintiff‟s continued refusal to take the medications prescribed by Dr. Kim Nguyen,

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including Plavix (a blood thinner), which caused Plaintiff internal bleeding and a heart

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attack one month prior.

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Plaintiff‟s access card remains on hold, therefore he is unable to enter or leave his
unit without a staff member. He states he is being punished for filing this suit.

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Plaintiff seeks the reversal of the guilty finding at his disciplinary hearing,

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expungement of his disciplinary record, reinstatement of his access card, and punitive

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and compensatory damages. He also seeks the appointment of counsel.

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IV.

Analysis

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Plaintiff‟s first complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. He was advised

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of the pleading standards for his due process and retaliation claims and directed to

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include more facts in his amended complaint. (See ECF No. 7 at 5-8.) Despite this,

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Plaintiff‟s amended complaint simply repeats the conclusory allegations contained within

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his first complaint, recites the elements of each cause of action, and attempts to argue

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why the claims he makes are legally sufficient. Plaintiff also argues that the Court‟s prior

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screening order imposed an improper “heightened” pleading standard for each of his

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claims.

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While Plaintiff is correct that “detailed factual allegations” are not required at the

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pleading stage, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, a complaint still must set forth facts which, taken

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as true, state a plausible claim for which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

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For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff‟s first amended complaint will be dismissed. He

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will, however, be given one final opportunity to amend.

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A.

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The Due Process Clause protects individuals from deprivations of liberty without

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due process of law. U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV. To make a Fourteenth Amendment

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procedural due process claim, a Plaintiff must show: (1) that a life, liberty or property

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interest exists and has been subject to interference by the state; and (2) that the

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procedures attendant upon the deprivation of that interest were constitutionally

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insufficient. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1990). A

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liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, or from an expectation or interest

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created by state laws or policies. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974).

Procedural Due Process

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Civil detainees have a liberty interest in not being punished without due process.

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See Rhoden v. Carona, No. SACV 08-00420 JHN (SS), 2010 WL 4449711, at *21 (C.D.

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Cal. Aug. 24, 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1996) (requiring

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pretrial detainees be afforded a hearing prior to being subjected to disciplinary action));

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see also Cerniglia v. Cty. of Sacramento, No. 2:99-cv-01938-JKS-DAD, 2008 WL

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1787855, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2008) (noting that “[c]ontrolling law in this circuit is

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that due process requires that a pretrial detainee be provided a hearing before being

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subjected to internal disciplinary action” and seeing no reason not to extend that

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principle to civil detainees).

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The Supreme Court has outlined the minimum procedural protections due before

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a detainee may be deprived of a liberty interest effecting major changes in the conditions

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of confinement amounting to punishment. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974);

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see also Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d at 525 (applying Wolff to pretrial detainees);

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Rhoden, 2010 WL 4449711, at *22 (applying Wolff to civil detainees.) They are: (1)

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written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the prisoner

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receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his

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defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and

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reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his

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defense, when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional

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safety or correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is

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illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-71.

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On these facts, it is not clear that Plaintiff‟s access card was placed on hold for

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punitive reasons or even as part of a disciplinary or other hearing to which process rights

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attach. Even assuming the deactivation of Plaintiff‟s access card constituted a major

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change in the condition of his confinement amounting to punishment, there are no facts

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from which the Court can determine that this deprivation violated due process. Plaintiff

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provides no details about the hearing in which he was supposedly found guilty of a

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disciplinary violation, such as the identities of those present (he simply writes “Defendant

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Santiago . . . and others”), the role each Defendant played, the procedures afforded prior

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to and during the hearing, or even the charge he was found guilty of. Plaintiff‟s bare

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assertion that he was denied all of the procedural protections outlined in Wolff does not

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state a claim. There is no evidence that Plaintiff wished to present witnesses or required

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assistance due to his illiteracy or other disability. Plaintiff will be given one final

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opportunity to provide more facts about his disciplinary hearing and respond to the

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questions raised above and make it explicit why and how this deprivation was punitive in

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nature.

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B.

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Plaintiff states he was retaliated against for exercising his Fourteenth Amendment

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Retaliation

right to refuse medical treatment.

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Section 1983 provides for a cause of action against officials who retaliate against

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detainees for exercising their constitutionally protected rights. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65

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F.3d 802, 806 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[R]etaliatory actions by prison officials are cognizable

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under § 1983.”) Within the institutional context, a viable claim of retaliation entails five

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basic elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against a

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[detainee] (2) because of (3) that [detainee‟s] protected conduct, and that such action (4)

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chilled the [detainee‟s] exercise of his constitutional rights, and (5) the action did not

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reasonably advance a legitimate [institutional] goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,

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567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d at 1114-15; Silva v. Di

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Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d at 1269.

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The second element focuses on causation and motive. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584

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F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was a

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“„substantial‟ or „motivating‟ factor behind the defendant‟s conduct.”

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Sorrano‟s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Although it can

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be difficult to establish the motive or intent of the defendant, a plaintiff may rely on

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circumstantial evidence. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289 (finding that a prisoner established a

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triable issue of fact regarding prison officials‟ retaliatory motives by raising issues of

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suspect timing, evidence, and statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th

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Id. (quoting

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Cir. 1997); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (“timing can properly be considered as circumstantial

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evidence of retaliatory intent”).

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In terms of the third prerequisite, the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is

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constitutionally protected. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497

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U.S. 261, 278 (1990).

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With respect to the fourth prong, the correct inquiry is to determine whether an

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official‟s acts “could chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the

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protected activity[].” Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir.

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2006); see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000).

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With respect to the fifth prong, a detainee must affirmatively allege that the

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“authorities‟ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the [] institution or was

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not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d at 532.

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Here, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Chand “threatened” to file a report stating Plaintiff

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was incompetent to make his own medical decisions. Dr. Chand did so after Plaintiff

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refused to take medications prescribed by Dr. Nguyen. Plaintiff also alleges that

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Defendant Santiago placed Plaintiff‟s access card on hold after he refused to take his

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medications.

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These allegations are insufficient to state a claim for retaliation. It appears that

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Dr. Chand merely threatened to take steps to forcibly medicate Plaintiff if Plaintiff

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continued to refuse his medications. There is no allegation that Dr. Chand carried out

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this threat or otherwise took any adverse action against Plaintiff.

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As to Santiago, even assuming she disabled Plaintiff‟s access card after he

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refused his medications, it is not alleged that her actions were purely for punitive

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purposes and not in furtherance of a legitimate institutional goal. Finally, Plaintiff‟s

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conclusory allegation that he is being “punished” for filing this lawsuit does not state a

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claim.

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Plaintiff‟s retaliation claim will be dismissed. He will be given a final opportunity to

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amend.

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V.

Appointment of Counsel

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In its prior screening order, the Court advised Plaintiff that he was not entitled to

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the appointment of pro bono counsel. (ECF No. 7 at 3-4.) Plaintiff has presented no

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change in circumstances necessitating the appointment of counsel at this juncture,

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therefore his request will again be denied.

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VI.

Conclusion and Order

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Plaintiff‟s first amended complaint fails to state any cognizable claims. The Court

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will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d

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1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must set forth “sufficient

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factual matter . . . to „state a claim that is plausible on its face.‟” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each

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named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams,

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297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it

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is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th

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Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this screening order and focus hi s efforts on

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curing the deficiencies set forth above.

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Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended

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complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule,

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an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d

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55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no

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longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

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original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be

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sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First

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Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed

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under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P.

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8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a

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right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations

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omitted).

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff‟s first amended complaint (ECF No. 8) is DISMISSED with leave to

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amend;
2. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form and a

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copy of his complaint filed November 22, 2016;
3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file

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a. A second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the

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Court in this order; or

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b. A notice of voluntary dismissal; and

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4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal,

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this action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to comply with a court

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order, failure to prosecute, and failure to state a claim.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

February 10, 2017

/s/

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Michael J. Seng

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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