Johnson v. North Kern State Prison et al

Filing 11

ORDER DISMISSING 1 Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; Amended Complaint due within Thirty Days signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 4/28/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form)(Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CEDRIC CHESTER JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

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Case No. 1:16-cv-01370-DAD-JLT (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

v.
NORTH KERN STATE PRISON, et al.,
Defendants.

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(Doc. 1)
30-DAY DEADLINE

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In this action, Plaintiff alleges that, correctional officers walked out of the dorm and

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allowed 30-35 Crip gang members in, who beat him and another inmate. Because his allegations

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fail to specifically link the officers named as defendants to his factual allegations the Complaint is

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DISMISSED with leave to amend.

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A.

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

Screening Requirement

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary

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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is dismissed on one of these three bases, a strike is imposed

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per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed
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as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and has

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not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in forma

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pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015).

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B.

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Plaintiff complains that in November or December of 2015, “the C/O’s walked out of the

Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

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dorm and allowed” 30-35 Crip gang members to enter, who brutally beat him and another inmate.

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Though Plaintiff names four correctional officers as defendants -- C/O Speakman, C/O Rocha,

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C/O Mrs. K, C/O Jones -- he fails to link any of them to his factual allegations and show the role

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they played in this incident. However, he may be able to correct the deficiencies in his pleading.

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Thus, he is being given the pleading requirements, the standards for deliberate indifference to his

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safety, and leave to file a first amended complaint.

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C.

Pleading Requirements
1.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

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"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

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exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

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U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a).

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"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and

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the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

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cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

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U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

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Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is

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plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual

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allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S.

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Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.

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While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft,
580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally
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and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

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However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze

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v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may

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not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit

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Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,

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268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-

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Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

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“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the

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plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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If he chooses to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff should endeavor to make it as

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concise as possible. He should merely state which of his constitutional rights he feels were

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violated by each Defendant and its factual basis.
2.

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Linkage Requirement

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there be an actual connection or link between the

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actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

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Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

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(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a

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constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

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in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

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causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

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Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named

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defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff=s

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federal rights.

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Plaintiff must clearly state which Defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each violation

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of his constitutional rights and their factual basis as his complaint must put each Defendant on

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notice of Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th

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Cir. 2004).
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3.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff names the North Kern State Prison as a defendant. Plaintiff may not sustain an

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action against a state prison. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing

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suits brought against a state sovereign. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d

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1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122

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(1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993);

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Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars

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suits against state agencies as well as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See

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Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dep=t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir.

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1996); Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991); Taylor v.

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List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a

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state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community

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College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). AThough its language might suggest otherwise,

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the Eleventh Amendment has long been construed to extend to suits brought against a state by its

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own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states.@ Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053 (citations omitted).

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AThe Eleventh Amendment=s jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies and

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departments as defendants, and applies whether the relief is legal or equitable in nature.@ Id.

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(citation omitted). Because the North Kern State Prison is a part of the California Department of

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Corrections, which is a state agency, it is entitled to dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment.

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D.

Claim for Relief
1.

Eighth Amendment -- Failure to Protect

“The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

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confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

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825, 832 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). Prison officials have a duty

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“to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates, which has been interpreted to

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include a duty to protect prisoners.” Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155,

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1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040

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(9th Cir. 2005)).
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To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with

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deliberate indifference to threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate.” Labatad, at 1160 (citing

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Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). This involves both objective

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and subjective components.

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First, objectively, the alleged deprivation must be “sufficiently serious” and where a

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failure to prevent harm is alleged, “the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions

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posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 834, quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

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349 (1981). Second, subjectively, the prison official must “know of and disregard an excessive

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risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th

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Cir. 1995). A prison official must “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

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that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511

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U.S. at 837. Liability may follow only if a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial

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risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”

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Id. at 847.

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Further, the Supreme Court has stated that a remedy for unsafe conditions need not await

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a tragic event; rather, where a risk/injury has yet to occur, the plaintiff's burden would be to prove

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that his future health/safety is unreasonably endangered, “that it is contrary to current standards of

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decency for anyone to be so exposed against his will, and that prison officials are deliberately

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indifferent to his plight.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 33-35.

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The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with

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deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial “risk of serious damage to

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his future health . . . .” Farmer, at 843 (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 35). The Supreme Court has

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explained that “deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence . . . [but]

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something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with the knowledge

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that harm will result.” Id., at 835. The Court defined this “deliberate indifference” standard as

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equal to “recklessness,” in which “a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware.” Id.,

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at 836-37.

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As previously mentioned, Plaintiff fails to link any of the named defendants to his factual
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allegations to proceed on a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Upon amendment, Plaintiff’s

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allegations must show the factual basis upon which each named defendant knew that their actions

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would result in an excessive risk of serious harm to Plaintiff and acted in deliberate indifference

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thereto.

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2. Supervisory Liability
It appears that Plaintiff may have named the Warden of NKSP not because he was
involved in the incident, but merely because he holds a supervisorial position.
Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

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employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

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supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be

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specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,

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589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief

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under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that

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would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged

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deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

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promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of

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constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black,

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885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

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(9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for

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the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In

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a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the

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term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's

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misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; each government official is only liable for his or

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her own misconduct. Id.

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A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the

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elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to

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dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss,

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572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch
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allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather

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because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the

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form of a factual allegation.@ Id. Thus, any allegation that supervisory personnel, such as the

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Warden, is somehow liable solely based on the acts of those under his or her supervision does not

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state a cognizable claim.

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II.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with leave to file a first

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amended complaint within 30 days. If Plaintiff no longer desires to pursue this action, he may

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file a notice of voluntary dismissal. If Plaintiff needs an extension of time to comply with this

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order, Plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later than 30 days from the

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date of service of this order.

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Plaintiff must demonstrate in any first amended complaint how the conditions complained

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of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

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227 (9th Cir. 1980). The first amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

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defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some

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affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo

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v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v.

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Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Plaintiff's first amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and

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plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

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which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v.

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Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be

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[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555

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(2007) (citations omitted).

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Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v.

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Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29,

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2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

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pleading," Local Rule 220.
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The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified

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by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff

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may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his first amended

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complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints).

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Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

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1.

Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

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2.

The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

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3.

Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a first

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amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order or

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a notice of voluntary dismissal; and
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If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for
failure to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

April 28, 2017

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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