Williams v. Batra

Filing 7

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 01/29/2017. Amended Complaint due by 3/6/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form)(Flores, E)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL B. WILLIAMS,

CASE NO. 1:16-cv-01940-MJS (PC)

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND
(ECF No. 1)

SANJEEV BATRA,
Defendant.

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AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN
THIRTY (30) DAYS

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Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil
rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has consented to Magistrate
Judge jurisdiction. No other parties have appeared in the action.

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Plaintiff‟s complaint is before the Court for screening.
I.

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Screening Requirement
The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if
the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
II.

Pleading Standard
Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights,

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for
vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94
(1989).

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To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:
(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and
(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state
law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d
1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere
possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are
accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.
III.

Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”), where the acts giving rise

to his complaint occurred. He names Dr. Sanjeev Batra, in his individual and official
capacities, as the sole defendant.
His allegations may be summarized essentially as follows.
Plaintiff was housed on Unit 6 for nine years. In November 2016, he was
transferred to the Medical Unit, MA2, and was housed there for seven days. On

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December 6, 2016, Plaintiff appeared before the medical team for discharge back to Unit
6. The team approved his discharge and signed a transfer order.

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The following day, however, Plaintiff remained in MA2. According to Plaintiff,
Defendant Batra blocked Plaintiff‟s return to Unit 6 as punishment for Plaintiff having
refused an angiogram the day before.

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As of the date of his complaint, December 28, 2016, Plaintiff remained in MA2.
According to Plaintiff, he is subject to lock-down restrictions in MA2. He believes his
continued placement there is punishment for refusing an angiogram and for bringing this
action. He claims that Batra‟s actions also constitute elder abuse and false
imprisonment.

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He seeks money damages. He also appears to seek declaratory and injunctive
relief.
IV.

Analysis
A.

Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff names Defendant in both his official and individual capacities.
Plaintiff‟s official capacity claim for damages against the Defendant is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985)
(Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages in federal court action against state
remains in effect when state officials are sued for damages in their official capacity). This
claim will be dismissed. It is incapable of being cured through amendment.
However, the Eleventh Amendment “does not bar actions for declaratory or
injunctive relief brought against state officials in their official capacity.” Austin v. State
Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, Plaintiff appears to request
declaratory relief. However, his requested declaratory relief merely requests a
declaration that his rights were violated. Because his claim for damages necessarily
entails a determination on these issues, his separate request for declaratory relief is
subsumed by those claims, and therefore will be dismissed. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408

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F.3d 559, 566 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff also appears to request injunctive relief, in that he requests the reversal of
Defendant‟s opposition to his return to Unit 6. While such relief may be available to
Plaintiff against a Defendant acting in his official capacity, official capacity claims also
must allege that a policy or custom of the governmental entity of which the official is an
agent was the moving force behind the violation. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25
(1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Plaintiff must establish an
affirmative causal link between the policy at issue and the alleged constitutional
violation. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 391-92 (1989); Van Ort
v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d
1470, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiff identifies no policy or custom associated
with the violation.
Plaintiff‟s official capacity claims will be dismissed. Plaintiff will be given leave to
amend.
B.

Retaliation

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails
five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against
an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner‟s protected conduct, and that such action (4)
chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not
reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,
567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Although Plaintiff is not a prisoner, this same standard has been
extended to civil detainees. E.g., Williams v. Madrid, 609 F. App'x 421 (9th Cir. 2015).
The second element of a prisoner retaliation claim focuses on causation and
motive. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must show
that his protected conduct was a “„substantial‟ or „motivating‟ factor behind the defenant‟s
conduct.” Id. (quoting Sorrano‟s Gasco. Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.
1989). Although it can be difficult to establish the motive or intent of the defendant, a

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plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th
Cir. 2003) (finding that a prisoner establishes a triable issue of fact regarding prison
officials‟ retaliatory motives by raising issues of suspect timing, evidence, and
statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997); Pratt v. Rowland, 65
F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (“timing can properly be considered as circumstantial
evidence of retaliatory intent”).

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The third prong can be satisfied by various activities. Filing a grievance is a
protected action under the First Amendment. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d
1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). Pursuing a civil rights litigation similarly is protected under
the First Amendment. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985).

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With respect to the fourth prong, “[it] would be unjust to allow a defendant to
escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined
plaintiff persists in his protected activity . . . .” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty.,
192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). The correct inquiry is to determine whether an
official‟s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First
Amendment activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (citing Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192
F.3d at 1300).

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With respect to the fifth prong, a prisoner must affirmatively show that “the prison
authorities‟ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional
institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo, 778 F.2d at
532.
Plaintiff claims he was retaliated against for refusing an angiogram and for
bringing this action. Plaintiff‟s bringing of this action cannot serve as the basis of his
retaliation claim because it occurred after the alleged retaliation. Thus, the alleged
retaliation could not have been motivated by his bringing the instant action. Plaintiff
does, however, have a constitutional right to refuse medical care, Cruzan by Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (A “competent person has a

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constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.”), and
such refusal preceded Defendant‟s decision to hold Plaintiff in the medical unit.
Nonetheless, the facts alleged do not suggest that Defendant was motivated by
retaliatory animus, rather than legitimate medical concerns. On its face, the decision to
house Plaintiff in the medical unit pending an angiogram has a logical relationship to
Plaintiff‟s health and safety. Absent further facts to suggest otherwise, Plaintiff fails to
state a claim. He will be given leave to amend.
C.

Punitive Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff claims he is being punished for refusing an angiogram.
Certain rights of detainees, like those of convicted prisoners, “may be limited or
retracted if required to „maintain institutional security and preserve internal order and
discipline.‟” Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir. 2008). However,
a civil detainee “cannot be subjected to conditions that „amount to punishment.‟” Jones v.
Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that conditions of confinement
claims brought by civil detainees are evaluated under the “more protective” Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process standard, and that civil detainees are entitled to
less restrictive treatment than criminally convicted prisoners) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)).
Punitive conditions may be shown (1) where the challenged restrictions are
expressly intended to punish; or (2) where the challenged restrictions serve an
alternative non-punitive purposes but are nonetheless excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose, or are employed to achieve objectives that could be accomplished
by alternative and less harsh methods. Id. Legitimate, non-punitive government interests
include ensuring a detainee's presence at trial, maintaining jail security, and effective
management of a detention facility. Id.
As stated above, the facts alleged do not suggest any punitive purpose in
Defendant‟s decision to house Plaintiff on the medical unit pending an angiogram.

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Absent facts to suggest that this decision was illegitimate or excessive, Plaintiff fails to
state a claim regarding unconstitutional punishment. He will be given leave to amend.
D.

Disciplinary Actions

Plaintiff does not indicate that his continued placement in the medical unit is a
result of disciplinary action for violation of institutional rules or regulations. Nonetheless,
the Court will provide Plaintiff with the legal standard applicable to such a claim.
Civil detainees have a liberty interest in not being disciplined without due process.
See Rhoden v. Carona, No. SACV 08-00420 JHN (SS), 2010 WL 4449711, at *21 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 24, 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1996) (requiring
pretrial detainees be afforded a hearing prior to being subjected to disciplinary action));
see also Cerniglia v. Cty. of Sacramento, No. 2:99-cv-01938-JKS-DAD, 2008 WL
1787855, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2008) (noting that “[c]ontrolling law in this circuit is
that due process requires that a pretrial detainee be provided a hearing before being
subjected to internal disciplinary action” and seeing no reason not to extend that
principle to civil detainees).
The Supreme Court has outlined the minimum procedural protections due before
a detainee may be deprived of a liberty interest effecting major changes in the conditions
of confinement amounting to punishment. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974);
see also Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d at 525 (applying Wolff to pretrial detainees);
Rhoden, 2010 WL 4449711, at *22 (applying Wolff to civil detainees.) They are: (1)
written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the prisoner
receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his
defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and
reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his
defense, when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is
illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-71.

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If Plaintiff contends that he was subject to disciplinary action without due process,
he must allege facts to meet the legal standard set forth above. He will be given leave to
amend.
E.

State Law Claims

. The Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in any
civil action in which it has original jurisdiction, if the state law claims form part of the
same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “The district courts may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed
before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
Furthermore, to bring a tort claim under California law, Plaintiff must allege
compliance with the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”). Under the CTCA, a plaintiff
may not maintain an action for damages against a public employee unless he has
presented a written claim to the state Victim Compensation and Government Claims
Board (“VCGCB”) within six months of accrual of the action. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 905,
911.2(a), 945.4 & 950.2; Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477
(9th Cir. 1995). Failure to demonstrate such compliance constitutes a failure to state a
cause of action and will result in the dismissal of state law claims. State of California v.
Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240 (2004).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged no cognizable federal claims and has not pled
compliance with the CTCA. Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction to address
Plaintiff‟s claims. The legal standards applicable to what appear to be his intended
claims and associated pleading defects are provided below. Plaintiff will be given leave
to amend.

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Plaintiff appears to reference the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil
Protection Act (“Act”). See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 15600 et seq. The Act provides for
liability for physical abuse or neglect where the defendant acted with recklessness,
oppression, fraud or malice in the commission of the abuse. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 15657. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate applicability of the Act. He does not allege facts
that he is an “elder” or “dependent adult”, see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 15610.23,
15610.27; that he suffered physical or mental harm or was deprived of necessities to
avoid such harm, see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.07; or that he has standing to
enforce the Act, see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 15600(i)(j), 15656 15657-15657.8.
Plaintiff's conclusory allegations fail to allege a violation of the Act and therefore fail to
state a claim.

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2.

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False Imprisonment

Under California law, false imprisonment is the “„unlawful violation of the personal
liberty of another.‟” Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744, 757, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 842, 937
P.2d 273 (1997)). The elements of false imprisonment are: “(1) the nonconsensual,
intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an
appreciable period of time, however brief.” Easton v. Sutter Coast Hospital, 80 Cal. App.
4th 484, 496 (2000) (citation omitted).

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Elder Abuse

Plaintiff is a detainee committed to the custody of Department of State Hospitals.
Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting a claim that he was confined without lawful
privilege. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for false imprisonment claim.
V.

Conclusion and Order
Plaintiff‟s complaint does not state a cognizable claim for relief. The Court will

grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d
1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must demonstrate that

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the alleged acts resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
677-78. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to „state a claim that is
plausible on its face.‟” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff
must also demonstrate that each named Defendant personally participated in a
deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it
is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th
Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this screening order and focus his efforts on
curing the deficiencies set forth above.
Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended
complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule,
an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d
55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no
longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an
original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be
sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First
Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed
under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations
omitted).
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff‟s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted;
2. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form and a
copy of his complaint, filed December 30, 2016;

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3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a

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first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this

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order or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and
4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal,

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this action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to comply with a court

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order and failure to state a claim.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

January 29, 2017

/s/

Michael J. Seng

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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