Tafolla v. Jaquez

Filing 22

ORDER Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Signed by Judge Edward M. Chen on 11/6/2012. emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/6/2012). PLEASE DISREGARD ATTACHMENT # 1. (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/6/2012: # 2 Certificate of Service) (emcsec, COURT STAFF). Modified on 11/6/2012 (emcsec, COURT STAFF).

1
2
3
4
5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7
8

GABRIEL TAFOLLA,

9

Petitioner,

10

v.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

No. C-10-0593 EMC (pr)

JAQUEZ, Warden,

12

Respondent.
___________________________________/

13
14
15

I.

16
17

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief from his state convictions. For the reasons stated
herein, the petition for such relief is DENIED.

18

II.

19

BACKGROUND

In 2005, a Sonoma County Superior Court jury convicted Petitioner of murder and attempted

20

murder, consequent to which he was sentenced to 77 years-to-life in state prison. Petitioner was

21

denied relief on state judicial review. This federal habeas petition followed.

22

Evidence presented at trial shows that in 2005, Petitioner argued with Daniel Camargo-

23

Vierya (Camargo), and Camargo’s friends Jose Tello and Victor Prado, at a taco truck. Petitioner,

24

who was being driven by co-defendant Adan Valdovinos, followed Camargo to his house, where the

25

two sets of men started fighting. Petitioner shot at Camargo and Tello, striking and killing the first,

26

and missing the second.

27

///

28

///

1

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Petitioner claims that (1) the trial court forced him to

2

choose between constitutional rights; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for

3

first degree murder; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for attempted

4

murder; and (4) the use of the CALCRIM No. 220 and No. 222 violated his right to due process.

5
6

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

7

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

8

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

9

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state
court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

12

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

13

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

14

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

15

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

16

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the

17

state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

18

facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable

19

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

20

governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the

21

facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

22

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

23

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

24

be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry

25

should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

26

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Under the “unreasonable determination” clause, a federal habeas court

27

may also grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a

28

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

2

1

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2). The federal court must presume

2

as correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the

3

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In sum, the

4

relevant question under § 2254(d)(2) is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal standards

5

of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the state court findings are supported by the

6

record. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004).

7
8
9

IV.
A.

DISCUSSION

Admission of Gang Evidence
Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to present a defense by predicating the

admission of gang evidence on Petitioner testifying, thereby forcing him to choose between

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

presenting a defense and remaining silent.

12

There is no factual support for this claim. Defense counsel sought to admit evidence that

13

Camacho and Tello belonged to a gang, and both counsel referred to gang involvement in their

14

opening statements. The trial court, in denying admission of such evidence, concluded that defense

15

counsel’s two offers of proof on this point were insufficient, but stated that it would revisit the issue

16

of admission if more evidence came to light. Petitioner bases his claim on the following exchange

17

between defense counsel and the trial judge:

18
19
20
21
22
23

[Counsel said] ‘I would like to inquire that my assumption or my
understanding of the Court’s ruling was that should there be further
offer of proof that the Court might change its ruling. And may I
inquire that as an offer of proof if my client were to testify in this
particular matter as to various items that [ ] might result in the required
offer of proof?’ The court responded, ‘I’d have to say yes to the
question in general terms, sure.’
(Ans., Ex. C at 9.)
Nothing here shows that Petitioner was forced to choose between two constitutional rights.

24

The only plausible reading is that the court indicated its willingness to consider Petitioner’s offer to

25

testify as a factor in making its ruling. It cannot plausibly be read as “If Petitioner does not testify,

26

the evidence will not come in.” Rather, the court’s statement was provisional and nonspecific (“in a

27

general sense”). Moreover, the court was merely responding to the defense counsel’s query, not

28

establishing the court’s own precondition to admission of the evidence. The state appellate court

3

1

concluded similarly. (Ans., Ex. C at 12.) The state appellate court’s factual determination, then,

2

was not objectively unreasonable; nor, then, was its legal conclusion unreasonable. Accordingly, as

3

there is no factual support for Petitioner’s claim, it is DENIED.

4

B.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

5

Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his (A) first degree and (B)

6

attempted murder convictions. A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does

7

not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

8

Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). Nor does a federal habeas court in general

9

question a jury’s credibility determinations, which are entitled to near-total deference. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979). Indeed, if confronted by a record that supports conflicting

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

inferences, a federal habeas court “must presume – even if it does not affirmatively appear in the

12

record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer

13

to that resolution.” Id. Rather, the federal court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the

14

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

15

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting

16

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

17

reasonable doubt, may the writ be granted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. “Sufficiency claims on

18

federal habeas review are subject to a “twice-deferential standard.” Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct.

19

2152, 2148 (2012) (per curiam). First, relief must be denied if, viewing the evidence in the light

20

most favorable to the prosecution, there was evidence on which “any rational trier of fact could have

21

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443

22

U.S. at 324). “The only question under Jackson is whether [the jury’s] finding was so insupportable

23

as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality.” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2065

24

(2012). Second, a state court decision denying a sufficiency challenge may not be overturned on

25

federal habeas unless the decision was “objectively unreasonable.” Matthews, 132 S. Ct. at 2148

26

(quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011)).

27

///

28

///

4

1

1.

2

In his claim that there was insufficient evidence of first degree murder, Petitioner asserts

First Degree Murder

3

that the gun fired accidentally, and that there was no direct evidence of a plan or preconceived

4

design to kill.

5
6
7
8
9

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12
13
14
15
16
17

The state appellate court found ample evidence to support a first degree murder conviction,
and rejected Petitioner’s claim:
[T]here is abundant evidence to support the inference that [Petitioner]
killed Camargo with premeditation and deliberation. After the
altercation at the taco truck, [Petitioner] armed himself with a loaded
shotgun and went to Camargo’s house with Valdovinos. When they
arrived, Valdovinos encouraged [Petitioner] to get out of the car and to
confront Camargo and Tello. Meanwhile, Valdovinos prepared the car
for a quick escape. Then [Petitioner] confronted the victims. He
pumped a round of ammunition into the shotgun chamber, raised the
gun to his chest, and pointed it at Camargo. From this evidence, a
“jury could infer that defendant ‘considered the possibility of murder
in advance’” and intended to kill Camargo. [Citations removed.] A
reasonable juror could also infer that [Petitioner] had a motive for
killing Camargo: to effect revenge for Camargo’s taunts at the taco
truck. In connection with this motive, the manner of killing supports a
finding of premeditation and deliberation. [Petitioner] placed the end
of the shotgun against Camargo’s stomach. When the gun went off
and hit Camargo in the chest, [Petitioner] answered Camargo’s
question – “what are you going to do, shoot me[?]” – in the
affirmative.
(Ans., Ex. C at 15.)

18

In California, first degree murder is the premeditated and deliberate unlawful killing of

19

another with malice aforethought. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 187 & 189. A premeditated killing under

20

California law is a “killing [that] was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of

21

considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse.” People v. Prince, 40 Cal. 4th 1179,

22

1253 (2007) (citations omitted). The process of premeditation and deliberation “does not require

23

any extended period of time.” People v. Koontz, 27 Cal. 4th 1041, 1080 (2002) (citations omitted).

24

“The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may

25

follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” Id.

26

Planning activity, motive and the manner of the killing are significant, though not the exclusive,

27

factors to consider when determining whether the killing was a result of preexisting reflection.

28

Prince, 40 Cal. 4th at 1253 (citations omitted).

5

1

Under these legal principles, Petitioner’s habeas claim cannot succeed. The record supports

2

the conclusion that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of premeditation and

3

deliberation true beyond a reasonable doubt. As the state appellate court determined, Petitioner

4

followed Camacho to his house after the taco truck altercation, loaded his gun, pointed it at

5

Camacho, and pulled the trigger. This evidence reasonably supports the jury’s determination that

6

there was premeditation and deliberation. Put another way, there is evidence that Petitioner

7

followed Camacho with the plan to kill him as revenge for insults received earlier which in turn

8

shows that the homicide was the product of preexisting reflection. This record shows that the jury’s

9

findings were not so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of rationality, and that they were
not objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim must be DENIED.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

2.

12

Petitioner bases his insufficiency claim on his assertion that claims that the evidence was

Attempted Murder

13

insufficient to support his conviction for the attempted murder of Tello. He asserts that he had no

14

preconceived design to kill Tello and that he shot at him “only as an afterthought, in response to

15

Tello’s shouting.”

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The state appellate court found ample evidence to support an attempted murder conviction,
and rejected Petitioner’s claim:
There was sufficient evidence that [Petitioner] premeditated and
deliberated before attempting to kill Tello. At the taco truck, Tello
challenged [Petitioner and Valdovinos] by yelling, “What the fuck”
and by throwing two bottles at Valdovinos’s car. After the altercation,
[Petitioner] went to Camargo’s house with a loaded shotgun. From
this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that [Petitioner] planned to
kill Tello to punish him for his taunts at the taco truck. There was
additional evidence of premeditation and deliberation once [Petitioner]
realized that Tello witnessed Camargo’s murder. After [Petitioner]
shot Camargo, Tello yelled, “What the fuck did you do?” and in
response, [Petitioner] turned around, pointed the gun at Tello, and shot
at him. Accordingly, the evidence “suggest[ed] rapid but purposeful
planning activity once [Petitioner] realized the potential
consequences” of Tello’s presence at the scene of the murder.
[Citation omitted.] A jury could reasonably infer that [Petitioner] was
motivated to kill Tello to eliminate him as a witness.

26
27

(Ans., Ex. C at 16–17.)

28

6

1

Under California law, a person commits attempted murder when he (1) makes a direct but

2

ineffective act toward killing another person, and (2) has the specific intent to kill that person.

3

People v. Guerra, 40 Cal. 3d 377, 386 (Cal. 1985).

4

Under these legal principles, Petitioner’s habeas claim cannot succeed. The record supports

act toward killing Tello, and the specific intent, as shown by his premeditation and deliberation, true

7

beyond a reasonable doubt. As the state appellate court determined, Petitioner followed Camacho

8

and Tello to his house after the taco truck altercation, and shot at Tello as revenge for the slights at

9

the taco truck. A rational jury could also conclude that Petitioner wanted to eliminate Tello as a

10

witness. This evidence reasonably supports the jury’s determination that there was premeditation

11
For the Northern District of California

the conclusion that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of a direct but ineffective

6

United States District Court

5

and deliberation. Put another way, there is evidence that Petitioner followed Camacho and Tello

12

with the plan to kill them as revenge for insults received earlier, and had a motive to kill Tello to

13

eliminate him as a witness to the shooting of Camacho, all of which supports a finding of specific

14

intent to kill Tello. This record shows that the jury’s findings were not so insupportable as to fall

15

below the threshold of rationality, and that they were not objectively unreasonable. Accordingly,

16

Petitioner’s claim must be DENIED.

17

C.

18

CALCRIM Nos. 220 and 222
Petitioner claims that the use of CALCRIM No. 220, when read in conjunction with No. 222,

19

prevented the jury from considering a lack of evidence in deciding whether reasonable doubt

20

existed. The state appellate court disposed of this claim on state law grounds.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

CALCRIM No. 220, as read to Petitioner’s jury, is:
The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the defendants is
not evidence that the charge is true. You must not be biased against
the defendants just because they have been arrested, charged with a
crime, or brought to trial. [¶] A defendant in a criminal case is
presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the People
prove each element of a crime and special allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove
something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶]
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an
abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not
eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt. [¶] In deciding whether the People have
proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially

7

1
2

compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout
the entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the defendants guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, they are entitled to an acquittal and you
must find them not guilty.”

3
4

(Ans., Ex. C at 17.) The trial court also delivered CALCRIM No. 222, which defines “[e]vidence”

5

as “the sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and anything else [the

6

trial court] told you to consider as evidence.” (Id.)

7

California courts have routinely rejected as unreasonable Petitioner’s interpretation of the

defendant must adduce evidence that promotes reasonable doubt or that the defendant must persuade

10

the jury of his or her innocence by evidence presented at trial.” People v. Flores, 153 Cal. App. 4th

11
For the Northern District of California

interaction of these instructions: “[n]othing about the instructions given implies to the jury that the

9

United States District Court

8

1088, 1093 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).

12

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a Petitioner must show that the

13

disputed instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

14

process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). The instruction may not be judged in

15

artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial

16

record. Id. In other words, a federal habeas court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of

17

the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456

18

U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)).

19

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. First, the plain language of the

20

instructions clearly conveyed to the jury that if the evidence presented was insufficient to establish

21

an element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, such lack of evidence would require an acquittal.

22

Second, there is nothing in the instruction that relieves the prosecution of its burden to present

23

evidence to prove Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, the other instructions

24

reinforce the appropriate standard of proof and the prosecution’s burden. For example, the jury was

25

clearly instructed that it must presume Petitioner innocent and that this presumption could be

26

overcome only if the evidence proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ans., Vol. 17 at

27

925–26.) If the evidence did not meet this standard, the jury was directed to acquit Petitioner. (Id.)

28

8

1

These instructions render unreasonable any assertion that the disputed instruction prevented

2

the jury from considering a lack of evidence in deciding whether reasonable doubt existed. Jurors

3

are presumed to follow their instructions. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987).

4

Accordingly, this Court must presume that the jurors followed the instructions and applied the

5

proper standard. Accordingly, this claim is DENIED.

6
7

V.

CONCLUSION

The state court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s claim did not result in a decision that was

8

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor did it

9

result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the petition is DENIED.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not “find the district

12

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

13

473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the Court of Appeals.

14

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent, and close the file.

15
16

IT IS SO ORDERED.

17
18

Dated: November 6, 2012

19

_________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

9