Deutsche Bank National Trust Company Americas v. Bradford et al

Filing 17

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND AND DENYING REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS. Signed by Judge Richard Seeborg on 7/26/12. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Certificate of Service)(cl, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/26/2012)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

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DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY
AMERICAS AS TRUSTEE,

No. C 12-01077 RS

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Plaintiff,
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v.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
REMAND AND DENYING REQUEST
FOR SANCTIONS

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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SYLVESTER BRADFORD, and JOHN
ROBINSON,
Defendants.
____________________________________/

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Plaintiff Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas originally filed this unlawful detainer

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action against defendants in the Alameda County Superior Court, seeking to establish its right to

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possess 6600 Brann Street, Oakland, California, following foreclosure proceedings. Defendants

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removed the case to this Court, ostensibly on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff now

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moves to remand the case, over defendants’ opposition. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the

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motion is appropriate for disposition without a hearing, and must be granted for the reasons set forth

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below.

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Under the federal removal statute, a defendant may remove to federal court “any civil action

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brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.”

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28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal is appropriate if a case originally filed in state court presents a

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federal question “arising under” the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. Id. at §

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1331. Caterpillar, Inc v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Whether a case satisfies federal

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question jurisdiction is tested by reference to the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that

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the existence of a federal question is determined by reference to the face of the plaintiff’s complaint.

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Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914); Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, 159
NO. C 12-01077 RS
ORDER

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F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the exercise of federal question jurisdiction is also

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appropriate if “it appears that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary

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element of one of the well-pleaded state claims.” Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Construction

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Laborers Vacation Trust for So. Cal., 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).

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Plaintiff filed its complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §1161, the state’s

that this Court has original jurisdiction over the case due to their demurrer, which asserted that

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plaintiff’s notice to vacate the premises did not comply with The Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure

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Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5220. That is inaccurate. “[T]he plaintiff is ‘the master of his complaint’ and may

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For the Northern District of California

unlawful detainer statute, without reference to federal law. Defendants’ notice of removal asserts

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United States District Court

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‘avoid federal jurisdiction by relying exclusively on state law.’” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582

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F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d

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1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000)). Here, the complaint relies solely on California Code of Civil

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Procedure §1161, and the statute identified by defendants does not provide a “necessary element” of

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plaintiff’s claim for relief. Accordingly, the motion to remand must be granted.

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Plaintiff claims entitlement to sanctions, in the form of attorney’s fees and other just costs, as

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a result of the deficient removal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. An order remanding a removed case to

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state court “may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees,

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incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Supreme Court has cautioned,

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however, that an award of fees is ordinarily appropriate “only where the removing party lacked an

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objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132,

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134 (2005). In determining whether to award attorney’s fees as a result of removal by a pro se

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defendant, courts recognize the lack of legal assistance to be significant. See OneWest Bank, FSB v.

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Mohr, No. C 10-00639, 2010 WL 2721437 at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2010) (declining to award

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attorney’s fees because the defendant filed a notice of removal “without the benefit of legal

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counsel,” even though it would have been “readily apparent” that defendant’s notice of removal

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lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal); HSBC Bank USA, Nat. Ass’n v. Manuel, No. C

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10-01186, 2010 WL 3366410 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2010) (denying attorney’s fees and costs,

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stating that a pro se defendant is entitled to more leeway in his attempt to comply with a removal
NO. C 12-02229 RS
ORDER

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statute); Szanto v. Szanto Revocable Trust of 1991, No. C 10-1364, 2010 WL 2280356 at *2 (N.D.

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Cal. June 7, 2010) (refusing to award attorney’s fees because the pro se litigant’s “lack of

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understanding as to the specialized procedural hurdles involved in removal jurisdiction . . . [was]

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understandable”). Here defendants were not represented by counsel and the Court, within its

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discretion, declines to recognize their efforts as so unreasonable. The request for fees and costs is

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therefore denied.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Dated: 7/26/12
RICHARD SEEBORG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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NO. C 12-02229 RS
ORDER

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