Walker v. Ahern et al
Filing
38
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND by Hon. William H. Orrick denying 10 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Claim 1 is DISMISSED without leave to amend and with prejudice. Claims 2, 3, 4 and 5 are DISMISSED with leave to amend. On or before October 25, 2014, Walker shall file an amended complaint. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (jmdS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/5/2014)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
VERNON L. WALKER,
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Plaintiff,
Case No. 12-cv-06059-WHO (PR)
12
v.
13
G. J. AHERN, et al.,
14
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
Defendants.
15
16
17
INTRODUCTION
18
In this federal civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro se state
19
prisoner Vernon Walker alleges that his jailors at the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office are
20
liable under federal and state law for failing to move a violent inmate who later attacked
21
Walker. Defendants seek to dismiss the action and to that end now move for judgment on
22
the pleadings. Although the complaint as drafted must be dismissed because it does not
23
state sufficient facts demonstrating what the defendants knew regarding the dangerousness
24
of Walker’s attacker and what Walker told the defendants regarding his own safety
25
concerns, Walker is entitled to amend his complaint to include such facts.1 Accordingly,
26
the complaint is DISMISSED with leave to file an amended complaint on or before
27
1
28
As stated later, there is no federal cause of action under California Administrative Code
Title 15, Section 3391, and that claim is dismissed with prejudice.
1
October 25, 2014 in accordance with this Order. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
2
pleadings is DENIED.
DISCUSSION
3
4
A.
Standard of Review
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). The Court uses
5
the same standards applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v.
7
General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). Federal
8
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss on the ground
9
that there is a “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” A “complaint
10
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
6
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell
12
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
13
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
14
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly,
15
550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in
16
the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the
17
facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1994).
18
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:
19
(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and
20
(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state
21
law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
22
B.
23
Legal Claims
Walker alleges that on September 10, 2011, a fellow inmate (Shaw) attacked him
24
while both were in the custody of the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department. (Compl.
25
¶ 4.) He also alleges that five or six days before the attack, he told sheriff’s deputies
26
Posedel and Tracy that Shaw had to be moved. He does not state exactly what he told the
27
deputies. (Id. ¶ 5.)
28
2
1
Walker alleges that defendants are liable under both state and federal law for failing
2
to protect him from Shaw. His specific claims are that Alameda County Sheriff’s Deputies
3
Posedel and Tracy, and their supervisors, Lieutenant James, Captain Jackson and Sheriff
4
Ahern, (1) failed to follow the guidelines of California Administrative Code Title 15,
5
Section 3391(a);2 (2) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
6
Constitution; (3) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution;
7
(4) violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment of the
8
United States Constitution; and (5) are liable for the intentional infliction of emotional
9
distress.
Claim 1 is DISMISSED without leave to amend. Inmates cannot file a complaint
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
under section 3391. California Administrative Code Title 15, Section 3391(b);
Harris v.
12
Horel, No. C 06–7761 SBA (PR), 2009 WL 909825 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2009).
13
Further, a violation of section 3391, like any violation of a Title 15 regulation, can be
14
addressed only through a citizen’s administrative complaint procedure, not through a court
15
action. Davis v. Kissinger, No. CIV S–04–0878 GEB DAD P., 2009 WL 256574 at *12
16
n.4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2009). In addition, a violation of section 3391 would be a violation
17
of a state law and not a right secured by the United States Constitution or by federal law. It
18
is not cognizable in a section 1983 action. It is violations of rights, not laws, that give rise
19
to section 1983 actions. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282-83 (2002).
Walker also has failed to state a claim under the federal Equal Protection Clause
20
21
(Claim 2). “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no
22
State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’
23
24
25
26
27
28
“Employees shall be alert, courteous, and professional in their dealings with inmates,
parolees, fellow employees, visitors and members of the public. Inmates and parolees
shall be addressed by their proper names, and never by derogatory or slang reference.
Prison numbers shall be used only with names to summon inmates via public address
systems. Employees shall not use indecent, abusive, profane, or otherwise improper
language while on duty. Irresponsible or unethical conduct or conduct reflecting discredit
on themselves or the department, either on or off duty, shall be avoided by all employees.”
2
3
1
which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
2
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v.
3
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). When challenging his treatment with regard to other
4
prisoners, courts have held that in order to present an equal protection claim a prisoner
5
must allege that his treatment is invidiously dissimilar to that received by other inmates.
6
More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1993). Thus, the first step in determining
7
whether the inmate’s equal protection rights were violated is to identify the relevant class
8
of prisoners to which he belongs. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir.
9
2013). Walker fails to identify what class he belongs to and so fails to establish that he
was treated differently than any other similarly situated prisoner in custody with the
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
Alameda County Sheriff’s Department. Accordingly, Walker’s equal protection claim is
12
therefore DISMISSED with leave to amend.
13
Walker’s claim under California’s Equal Protection Clause (Claim 3) is
14
DISMISSED with leave to amend on the same grounds. In his amended complaint, he
15
must address the deficiencies described above and show that his state equal protection
16
claim is distinct from, and not just a repetition of, his federal equal protection claim.
17
Claim 4 is DISMISSED with leave to amend. The treatment a prisoner receives in
18
prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the
19
Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Amendment
20
imposes duties on prison officials, who must provide all prisoners with basic necessities of
21
life, including personal safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). A prison
22
official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the
23
deprivation alleged must be, objectively serious; and, (2) the prison official must possess a
24
sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 834. Where inmate safety is concerned, the
25
necessary state of mind is “deliberate indifference.” Id. Moreover, to have the necessary
26
state of mind the official must be both aware of the facts from which the inference could
27
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
28
Id. at 837.
4
1
Walker fails to establish that the supervisory defendants Ahren, Jackson and James
2
possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. In his complaint, Walker alleges that
3
Sheriff Ahren was in charge of the detention facility and as such “should at all times have
4
knowledge and information” about the goings on of the facilities. (Compl. at ¶ 3.)
5
Similarly, Walker contends that Captain Jackson and Lieutenant James should have been
6
on notice of any physical or mental deprivations that occurred “within there [sic] watch
7
that day or the following day and investigate and act” upon such information accordingly.
8
(Id.) However, Walker does not allege any facts showing that Ahren, Jackson or James
9
knew of Shaw’s dangerousness or of Walker’s request to move Shaw, much less that
Ahren, Jackson or James drew the inference that failure to move Shaw would result in a
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
substantial risk of serious harm. As such, he fails to establish that Ahren, Jackson and
12
James acted with deliberate indifference and the Eighth Amendment claims against them
13
are DISMISSED with leave to amend.
14
The claims that defendants Posedel and Tracy acted with deliberate indifference are
15
also DISMISSED with leave to amend. Walker claims that prior to the attack on
16
September 10, 2011 he asked Deputies Posedel and Tracy to move Shaw. (Compl. at ¶ 5.)
17
It is unclear from the complaint, however, whether and to what extent Walker described
18
the specific imminent danger he faced to the deputy defendants. Without providing
19
information to establish exactly what knowledge Posedel and Tracy possessed at the time
20
of the incident, it is impossible to analyze whether or not they acted with deliberate
21
indifference.
22
Claim 5, Walker’s tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is also
23
DISMISSED with leave to amend. He has not shown that he has complied with state
24
procedural requirements as to his tort claim. Per California Government Code section
25
945.4, a plaintiff cannot recover damages against a government agency in court for
26
personal injury claims unless that plaintiff has first filed a written claim with that agency
27
“fairly describ[ing] what the entity is alleged to have done.” Stockett v. Ass’n of Cal.
28
Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 34 Cal. 4th 441, 446 (2004). The requirement
5
1
also applies if the plaintiff is seeking to file claims against a governmental employee as
2
long as the claim arises from acts the employee did within the scope of his or her
3
employment. Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2. This state requirement applies in actions, such as
4
the instant one, filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Butler v. Los Angeles County, 617 F. Supp.
5
2d 994, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2008). “Complaints that do not allege facts demonstrating either
6
that a tort claim was timely presented or that compliance with the claims statute is excused
7
are subject to dismissal.” Id. (quoting Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal. 4th 201,
8
209 (Cal. 2007)). In his amended complaint, Walker must show evidence that he has
9
complied with the state requirement, or explain why he is excused from compliance with
10
the requirement.
CONCLUSION
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 10) is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED as forth below:
Claim 1 (his claim under section 3391) is DISMISSED without leave to amend and
15
with prejudice. Claims 2, 3, 4 and 5 (the two equal protection claims, the Eighth
16
Amendment claims, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort claim) are
17
DISMISSED with leave to amend.
18
On or before October 25, 2014, Walker shall file an amended complaint addressing
19
all the deficiencies described above. The amended complaint must include the caption and
20
civil case number used in this order (12-6059 WHO (PR)) and the words FIRST
21
AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely
22
replaces the previous complaints, Walker must include in his amended complaint all the
23
claims he wishes to present and all of the defendants he wishes to sue. See Ferdik v.
24
Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Any claims not raised in the amended
25
complaint will be deemed waived. Walker may not incorporate material from the prior
26
complaint by reference. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this
27
order will result in dismissal of this action without further notice to Walker.
28
It is Walker’s responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the Court
6
1
informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice
2
of Change of Address.” He must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion or ask
3
for an extension of time to do so. Failure to comply may result in the dismissal of this
4
action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
5
The Clerk shall terminate Docket No. 10.
6
IT IS SO ORDERED.
7
Dated: September5, 2014
_________________________
WILLIAM H. ORRICK
United States District Judge
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?