Parks v. Chappell et al

Filing 5

ORDER of Dismissal with Leave to Amend. Signed by Judge Edward M. Chen on 2/24/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service). (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/24/2014)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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STEVEN DEAN PARKS,

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No. C-13-4048 EMC (pr)

Plaintiff,

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v.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND

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KEVIN CHAPPELL; et al.,

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Defendant.
________________________________/

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

Steven Dean Parks, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. §

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1915A.

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II.

BACKGROUND

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The complaint alleges the following:

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On September 26, 2012, prison officials conducted a full building search of the building in

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which Mr. Parks was housed at San Quentin State Prison. During the search of the cells on the fifth

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floor of the cell block, prison staff threw some debris off the cell block. That debris included five or

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six milk crates that shattered when they hit the ground on the first floor. Mr. Parks, who was locked

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in his cell on the first floor, was hit in the left hand and eye by some of the pieces from the shattered

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milk crates. He yelled out that he had been struck by debris, and custody staff told him to “shut up,

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man up.” Docket # 1 at 4. He was left in his cell for more than two hours in pain. He filed an

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inmate appeal that he had been refused medical attention.

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The complaint does not indicate the severity of any injuries he suffered. An inmate appeal

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response attached to the complaint states that Mr. Parks was seen in the triage and treatment area on

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the day of the incident “for a bruise on [his] right hand,” was seen by a registered nurse two days

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later, and was seen by a doctor for a follow-up appointment on October 10, 2012. See id. at 9.

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III.

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DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks

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redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). In its review the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

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which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). Pro

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se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699

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(9th Cir. 1990).

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right

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secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the violation was

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committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

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(1988).

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The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison

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officials take reasonable measures for the safety and health of inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

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U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements

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are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official is,

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subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s safety or health. See id. at 834. The complaint

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attempts to plead claims for Mr. Parks being hit by the debris and for the response to Mr. Parks’

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medical needs thereafter. Both claims are subject to Eighth Amendment analysis, and have parallel

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elements.

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A.

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Flying Debris Claim
“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, . . . but neither does it permit

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inhumane ones.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

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“[O]nly those deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ are

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sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.

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294, 298 (1991) (citation omitted); see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see, e.g., Hearns v. Terhune, 413

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F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (allegations of serious health hazards in disciplinary segregation yard for a

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period of nine months, including toilets that did not work, sinks that were rusted and stagnant pools

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of water infested with insects, and a lack of cold water even though the temperature in the prison

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yard exceeded 100 degrees, enough to state a claim of unconstitutional prison conditions); Anderson

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v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (9th Cir.) (temporary placement in safety cell that was

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dirty and smelled bad did not constitute infliction of pain), amended, 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1995);

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Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1988) (allegation that inmate slept without

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mattress for one night is insufficient to state Eighth Amendment violation and no amendment can

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alter that deficiency), judgment vacated on other grounds, 493 U.S. 801 (1989); Holloway v.

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Gunnell, 685 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1982) (no claim stated where prisoner forced to spend two days

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in hot dirty cell with no water for hours).

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The Eighth Amendment “imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of

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confinement and to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. However,

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every injury suffered by an inmate does not necessarily translate into constitutional liability for

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prison officials.” Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1996). In Osolinski, the court

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held that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity against an Eighth Amendment claim

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from a prisoner who suffered second-degree burns on his arm when an oven door fell off its hinges.

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Id. at 939. The oven door had been broken for many months, and maintenance requests for it had

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been submitted for more than six months before the accident. The failure to repair a malfunctioning

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oven door did not create a sufficiently serious deprivation of a human need to satisfy the objective

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prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis. See id. at 937-38. The court noted that it was a single

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defective device and there were no exacerbating circumstances. “In particular, [the prisoner] has not

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pled any conditions which rendered him unable to ‘provide for [his] own safety’ in the sense that

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they precluded him from avoiding the faulty oven door or rendered him unable to perceive its

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defective condition,” Id. at 938. The court also observed that minor safety hazards – e.g., greasy

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staircase, ponding water from a leaking dishwasher, and a slippery kitchen floor – had been found in

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other cases not to violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 938.

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Mr. Parks alleges that he was hit by flying debris when items thrown off a fifth floor balcony

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shattered upon impact at ground level. The debris apparently ricocheted and hit him in his cell. He

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does not allege that debris was thrown at, or dropped directly on, him. Merely throwing debris off a

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balcony does not appear to create a sufficiently serious condition to satisfy the objective prong for

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an Eighth Amendment violation. See Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 938 (citations omitted) (“‘Not every

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deviation from ideally safe conditions amounts to a constitutional violation’”). In his amended

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complaint, Mr. Parks must provide more facts so as to suggest that this course of conduct deprived

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him of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304.

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More importantly, there are no allegations in the complaint suggesting that any defendant

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acted with deliberate indifference in throwing the debris off the fifth floor. Mere negligence, or

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ordinary lack of due care, does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. A

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defendant is deliberately indifferent if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

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health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

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that a substantial risk of serous harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. Mr.

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Parks must allege in his amended complaint facts suggesting that each defendant acted with

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deliberate indifference in the incident.

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B.

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Medical Care Claim
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth

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Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

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1057 (9th Cir. 2004); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

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grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). With

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regard to medical care, a defendant violates the Eighth Amendment only if (1) the medical need is,

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objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the

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inmate’s health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

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Mr. Parks’ complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on the response to his
medical needs. First, the complaint fails to allege any serious medical need. A “serious” medical

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need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the

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“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle v.

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Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104). In his amended complaint, Mr. Parks needs to describe the injuries he

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sustained.

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Second, the complaint fails to allege the required mental state. A defendant is deliberately

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indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk

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by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The defendant must not

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only “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

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harm exists,” but he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If the defendant should have been aware of

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the risk, but was not, then he has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.

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Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “[T]o prevail on a claim

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involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must show that the chosen

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course of treatment ‘was medically unacceptable under the circumstances,’ and was chosen ‘in

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conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health.’” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058

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(citation omitted). Mr. Parks does not identify any defendant for his medical needs claim or allege

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that anyone acted with the required mental state. In his amended complaint, Mr. Parks must allege

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facts showing that what each defendant did or failed to do amounted to deliberate indifference to his

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medical needs. For any situation where he disagrees with the medical care provider’s choice of

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treatment that was provided, he must allege that the chosen course of action “‘was medically

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unacceptable under the circumstances,’ and was chosen ‘in conscious disregard of an excessive risk

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to [his] health.’” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058.

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For both claims in his amended complaint, Mr. Parks must be careful to allege facts showing

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the basis for liability for each defendant. He should not refer to them as a group (e.g., “the

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defendants”); rather, he should identify each involved defendant by name and link each of them to

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his claim by explaining what each involved defendant did or failed to do that caused a violation of

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his rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1988).

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IV.

CONCLUSION

The amended complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted.

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Leave to amend is granted so that Mr. Parks may attempt to allege a violation of his constitutional

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rights. The amended complaint must be filed no later than March 28, 2014, and must include the

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caption and civil case number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the

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first page. Mr. Parks is cautioned that his amended complaint must be a complete statement of his

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claims. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“For claims

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dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend, we will not require that they be repled in a

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subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal. But for any claims voluntarily

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dismissed, we will consider those claims to be waived if not repled.”) Failure to file the amended

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complaint by the deadline will result in the dismissal of the action.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: February 24, 2014

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_________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge

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