Waugh v. Marin County Jail et al

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge Vince Chhabria on 4/28/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(knm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/30/2014)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JEFF WAUGH,

Case No. 14-0507-VC (PR)

Plaintiff,
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United States District Court
Northern District of California

v.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND

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MARIN COUNTY JAIL, ROBERT
DOYLE, Marin County Sheriff,
Defendants.

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Jeff Waugh, an inmate at the Marin County Jail proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights

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complaint against the Marin County Jail and Robert Doyle, Marin County Sheriff, pursuant to 42

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U.S.C. § 1983. Waugh does not indicate if he sues Sheriff Doyle in his individual or official

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capacity. Waugh has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) with a

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completed IFP application, which is granted in a separate order. The Court now addresses the

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claims asserted in Waugh’s complaint.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
A federal court must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a

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governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental entity, to identify any cognizable

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claims and dismiss any that: (1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim upon which

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relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

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relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica

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Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements:

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(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that

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the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v.

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Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the

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plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the

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deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corrections &

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Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir.

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1988). A person deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of Section 1983 if

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act or fails to perform an act which

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he is legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. Leer, 844

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F.2d at 633. But there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983. Lemire, 726 F.3d at

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1074. That is, a supervisor is not liable merely because the supervisor is responsible, in general

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terms, for the actions of another. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v.

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Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). A supervisor may

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be liable only on a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a

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sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional

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violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). It is insufficient for a

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plaintiff to allege generally that supervisors knew about the constitutional violation or that they

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generally created policies and procedures that led to the violation, without alleging “a specific

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policy” or “a specific event” instigated by them that led to the constitutional violation. Hydrick v.

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Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012).

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II.

Waugh’s Allegations

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Waugh alleges he was sentenced to serve six years in Marin County Jail, a facility that was

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constructed to house people for short periods of time. He alleges that his incarceration involves: a

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twenty-three hour per day lockdown schedule; a two-man windowless cell that is 5 x 10 feet;

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meals served through a door slot in the vicinity of the toilet; a small subterranean triangular
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courtyard for recreation; no allowed visits from his two children; inadequate infirmary and

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medical staff; and inadequate educational and rehabilitation programs. Waugh alleges that in May

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2013 the Marin County Board of Supervisors agreed with a Marin Grand Jury Investigation

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Report concluding that the Marin County Jail was “ill-suited for long term commitments.”
Regarding his health, Waugh alleges he has high blood pressure from heart disease and, on

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January 6, 2014, underwent significant colon surgery. He alleges that the surgeon prescribed pain

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medication for him every four hours for post-surgical pain, but that jail medical staff brought his

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medication every seven to ten hours and, as a result, he suffered excruciating pain. Waugh alleges

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that on June 10, 2013, he was informed he had been exposed to an inmate with active tuberculosis.

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He alleges he tested positive for tuberculosis, was placed on heavy antibiotics for six months and,

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United States District Court
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as a result, suffered nausea and weight loss. Waugh further alleges that in September 2013 he

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contracted a staph infection from a transient inmate placed in his cell, that his leg swelled, and that

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jail staff gave him the wrong antibiotics.

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Waugh alleges he suffers from an anxiety disorder that is exacerbated by being locked

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down twenty-three hours per day. He alleges he sought mental health care from Marin County

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Medical staff and was told that “nothing can be done unless [he] initiates a lawsuit.”

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III. Waugh’s Claims

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Waugh makes two basic claims in his complaint. First, he alleges his conditions of

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confinement (such as the alleged 23-hour-per-day lockdown and the alleged inability to see his

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children) are unconstitutional. Second, he alleges jail officials unconstitutionally deprived him of

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proper medical care. He claims this conduct by jail officials violates the Eighth Amendment. He

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also appears to claim this conduct violates equal protection and due process, although his factual

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allegations appear to have no connection with equal protection or due process.

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A. Conditions of Confinement

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The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit

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inhumane ones. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a prisoner receives

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in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth

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Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Eighth Amendment also imposes
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duties on prison officials, who must provide all prisoners with the basic necessities of life such as

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food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832;

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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989); Hoptowit v.

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Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when:

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(1) the deprivation of the basic necessities of life is sufficiently serious from an objective

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standpoint, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, and (2) the prison official responsible for the deprivation

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was, at a minimum, deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s constitutional rights, id.
The complaint alleges some deprivations that appear to be objectively serious under the

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first prong of Farmer. However, it is difficult to discern whether Waugh intends to allege that

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officials at the jail have singled him out for the imposition of adverse conditions, or that the jail

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Northern District of California

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has a policy of treating certain inmates (including Waugh) in the manner he describes. For

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example, does Waugh intend to allege that jail officials are punishing him in particular by holding

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him in lockdown for 23 hours per day and not allowing his children to visit, or does he intend to

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allege that all inmates are subject to these practices?

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To the extent Waugh seeks to argue that jail officials have singled him out for adverse

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treatment, the complaint fails to state a claim, because it does not identify a jail official who

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caused his deprivations, much less allege that any such official acted with a sufficiently culpable

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state of mind. For example, although the complaint names Sheriff Doyle as a defendant, it does

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not allege that Sheriff Doyle is responsible for Waugh’s deprivations, much less that the Sheriff

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acted with deliberate indifference.

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To the extent Waugh seeks to argue that Sheriff Doyle or some other official created a

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policy of treating inmates in the manner Waugh alleges he is being treated, the complaint also fails

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to state a claim. To impose municipal liability under Section 1983 for a violation of constitutional

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rights, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [he]

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was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate

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indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind

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the constitutional violation." Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438

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(9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For municipal liability, a plaintiff
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must plead sufficient facts regarding the specific nature of the alleged policy, custom or practice to

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allow the defendant to effectively defend itself, and these facts must plausibly suggest that the

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plaintiff is entitled to relief. AE v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2012). The

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complaint fails to allege that Sheriff Doyle or anyone else created a policy or procedure that

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resulted in the confinement conditions Waugh alleges he is experiencing.

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Accordingly, Waugh’s claim regarding the conditions of his confinement is dismissed,
with leave to amend. Waugh’s amended complaint, if any, should specify whether he alleges that

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jail officials are singling him out for adverse treatment or whether the confinement conditions of

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which he complains are the product of a policy for treatment of inmates at the jail. And in either

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case, Waugh must describe his factual allegations with sufficient specificity to put the County and

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Northern District of California

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the Sheriff on notice about the nature of the violations and the people responsible for them.

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B. Medical Needs
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on the failure to attend to medical

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needs, a prisoner must allege both (1) a serious medical need and (2) deliberate indifference to that

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need by prison officials. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992). Inmates'

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mental health needs are among the medical needs covered by the Eighth Amendment. Doty v.

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County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,

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1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (mental health care requirements analyzed as part of general health care

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requirements). A prison official exhibits deliberate indifference when he knows of and disregards

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a substantial risk of serious harm to inmate health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The prison official

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must not only “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

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serious harm exists,” but he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have

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been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no

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matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Instead, deliberate indifference involves a purposeful act or failure to act. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at

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1060. Deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally

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interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown in the way in which they provide medical

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care. Id. at 1062.
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Liberally construed, Waugh’s allegations about his medical treatment and conditions

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appear sufficient to satisfy Farmer’s objective prong. However, Waugh fails to allege that any

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individual denied, delayed or interfered with his medical treatment with the subjective intent that

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constitutes deliberate indifference. In fact, Waugh does not name one person in connection with

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this claim. Therefore, this claim must be dismissed. Waugh is granted leave to amend to remedy

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this deficiency.
CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

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1. The Eighth Amendment claim regarding the conditions of Waugh’s confinement is
dismissed with leave to amend. Waugh’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding his medical

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Northern District of California

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treatment is dismissed with leave to amend.

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2. To the extent Waugh seeks to make these allegations separately as equal protection or

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due process claims, those claims too are dismissed. Although Waugh shall have leave to amend

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any equal protection or due process claims, the Court is unable to conceive how Waugh’s factual

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allegations – even if filled out with more detail – could give rise to an equal protection or due

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process claim.

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3. Waugh may file an amended complaint remedying the deficiencies noted above within

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twenty-one days from the date of this Order. The amended complaint must include the caption

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and civil case number used in this Order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first

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page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, Waugh must

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include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th

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Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to

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amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal of this action.

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4. It is Waugh’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Waugh must keep the Court

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informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of

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Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so

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may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 41(b).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: April 28, 2014
______________________________________
VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge

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P:\PRO-SE\VC\CR.14\Waugh v Marin Jail 14-507.DLA.docx

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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