Wright v. Muniz

Filing 7

ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. GRANTING 6 MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/12/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RAYMOND WRIGHT,

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Petitioner,

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v.

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W. L. MUNIZ, Warden,

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Respondent.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 16-cv-01038-HSG (PR)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS; DENYING CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY
Re: Dkt. No. 6

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On March 1, 2016, petitioner, a former state prisoner, filed a pro se habeas petition

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challenging the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) calculation

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of his release date. Petitioner was released from custody on May 11, 2015. Ex. 1.1 Respondent

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has filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Petitioner was not in custody at the time the

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petition was filed. Petitioner has not filed an opposition, and the time in which to do so has

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passed.
BACKGROUND

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According to the petition, in September 2011, Petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles

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County Superior Court of possession of cocaine base for sale. Because this was his second strike

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under California’s Three Strikes Law, Petitioner received a sentence of six years, to be served at

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80%.
The petition does not challenge the validity of Petitioner’s conviction or sentence. Rather,

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petitioner contends he was eligible for early release pursuant to an order issued on February 10,

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2014 by the Three-Judge Court in Coleman/Plata v. Brown.

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Any references herein to exhibits are to the exhibits submitted by Respondent in support of the
motion to dismiss.

The Coleman/Plata actions are consolidated civil rights class actions pending in the United

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States District Court for the Eastern District of California.2 The Coleman class action concerns

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the constitutional adequacy of the mental health care provided to CDCR inmates and involves the

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class of seriously mentally ill persons in California prisons. The Plata class action concerns the

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constitutional adequacy of CDCR’s inmate medical health care and involves the class of state

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prisoners with serious medical conditions. The Three-Judge Court presiding over these class

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actions has issued various orders related to prison overcrowding and has required the State of

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California to undertake prison population reduction measures.
Petitioner contends that, pursuant to a February 10, 2014 order issued in the Coleman/

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Plata actions, the CDCR was required to prospectively recalculate his release date so as to give

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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him good time credits at 33.3%. He also contends that the order made him eligible for additional

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“milestone completion credits” for completion of rehabilitative programs. He asserts that the

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February 10, 2014 Coleman/Plata order mandated his release on February 18, 2015, and that the

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delay in his release date violated his constitutional rights.

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DISCUSSION
The federal writ of habeas corpus is only available to persons “in custody” at the time the

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petition is filed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2254(a); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91

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(1989). This requirement is jurisdictional. See De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th

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Cir. 1990). A petitioner who files a habeas petition after he has fully served his sentence and who

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is not subject to court supervision is not “in custody” for purposes of this court’s subject matter

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jurisdiction. See id. When a pro se petitioner files a habeas petition challenging a prior conviction

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that has expired but is being used to enhance a current sentence, the district court should liberally

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construe the petition to be a challenge to the current “sentence, as enhanced by the allegedly

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invalid prior conviction.” Dubrin v. People of California, 720 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013).

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Here, however, Petitioner has made no showing that he is subject to a current sentence that would

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Plata v. Brown, No. C 01-1351 TEH, a class action pending in this District, and Coleman v.
Brown, No. 90-0520 LKK-DAD, a class action pending in the Eastern District. The Plata and
Coleman class actions have been consolidated.
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be enhanced by the allegedly invalid prior sentence. A petitioner is not deemed “in custody”

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merely because of the possibility that future sentences for any subsequent crimes may be enhanced

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by an allegedly invalid prior conviction or sentence. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492. Nor has Petitioner

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shown that he is subject to continuing court supervision based on his 2011 conviction and

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sentence. Because Petitioner is no longer in custody on the 2011 conviction and sentence, he may

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not attack it in a federal habeas proceeding, and the instant petition must be dismissed.

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The petition must also be dismissed on the independent and alternative ground that it is

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now moot. Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution requires the existence of a “case” or

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“controversy” through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. This means that, throughout the
litigation, the plaintiff or petitioner “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v.

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Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). An inmate’s (or a parolee’s) challenge to the

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validity of his conviction satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration

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(or the restrictions imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the

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conviction and redressable by the invalidation of the conviction. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7

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(1998). Once the inmate’s sentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury

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other than the now-ended incarceration or parole—some “collateral consequence” of the

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conviction—must exist if the suit is to be maintained and not considered moot. Id. The rationale

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of Spencer v. Kemna also applies where a petitioner seeks to challenge his sentence rather than his

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conviction. That is, a challenge to a prison sentence becomes moot once the sentence has been

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served unless the petitioner continues to suffer collateral consequences. See United States v.

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Palomba, 182 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, Petitioner has received the redress he seeks

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by way of the instant petition—i.e., he has been released from custody—and there is no showing

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of collateral consequences. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed as moot.
CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons:

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1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition is GRANTED.

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2. Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
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district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

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Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

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3. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment, and close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: 1/12/2017

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HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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