Stamos, Jr. v. Davey

Filing 20

ORDER GRANTING 12 MOTION TO DISMISS and DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 1/31/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(afmS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/31/2017)

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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JAMES GEORGE STAMOS, Jr., Case No. 8 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 9 10 16-cv-4860-TEH Petitioner, DAVID DAVEY, Dkt. Nos. 12, 19 Respondent. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 Petitioner, James George Stamos Jr., a state prisoner, 14 proceeds with a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 15 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a prison disciplinary decision that 16 resulted in the loss of credits. 17 to dismiss on the grounds that the petition is unexhausted and 18 procedurally barred. 19 the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion. Respondent has filed a motion Petitioner has filed an opposition. For I 20 Petitioner is serving a seven-year prison term. 21 Petition at 22 2. 23 disciplinary hearing and was assessed a 150-day time-credit 24 forfeiture. 25 26 On March 1, 2015, Petitioner was found guilty at a prison Id. at 6. II Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge 27 collaterally in federal habeas proceedings either the fact or 28 length of their confinement are first required to exhaust state 1 judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral 2 proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with 3 a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim 4 they seek to raise in federal court. 5 (c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982). 6 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), In this case, the California Supreme Court denied 7 Petitioner's petition with a citation to In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 8 921, 925-26 (1979). 9 Dexter, the California Supreme Court held that the court will not Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”), Ex. 5. In In re afford a prisoner judicial relief unless he has first exhausted 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 available administrative remedies. 12 California Supreme Court's citation to In re Dexter demonstrates 13 that the court did not reach the merits of Petitioner's claims 14 because he failed to exhaust his available administrative 15 remedies. 16 Cir. 1974) (en banc) (“If the denial of the habeas corpus 17 petition includes a citation of an authority which indicates that 18 the petition was procedurally deficient or if the California 19 Supreme Court so states explicitly, then the available state 20 remedies have not been exhausted as the California Supreme Court 21 has not been given the required fair opportunity to correct the 22 constitutional violation.”). 25 Cal.3d at 925. The See Harris v. Super. Ct., 500 F.2d 1124, 1128 (9th 23 District courts in California have consistently held that if 24 the California Supreme Court denies a petition with a citation to 25 In re Dexter, the prisoner has not exhausted state court remedies 26 as required. 27 (PR), 2014 WL 988986 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014) (granting 28 motion to dismiss petition as unexhausted in light of California See, e.g., Riley v. Grounds, No. C–13–2524 TEH 2 1 Supreme Court's summary denial with a citation to In re Dexter); 2 Turner v. Director of CDC, No. 1:14–cv–00392 LJO JLT, 2014 WL 3 4458885 at *3 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2014) (“[F]or exhaustion 4 purposes, the citation to Dexter alone is sufficient, without the 5 need to review the state petition, to establish that the claims 6 in the first amended petition were never considered on their 7 merits by the state court and, thus, were not „fairly presented‟ 8 within the meaning of AEDPA.”); Dean v. Diaz, No. 1:14–cv–00209 9 SKO HC, 2014 WL 1275706 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014) (“This court has regularly relied on a citation to Dexter to find that a 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 federal petition is unexhausted.”). 12 Petitioner retained the ability to refile his state habeas 13 petition after exhausting his claims through the administrative 14 procedure but he filed this federal petition instead. 15 of the California Supreme Court's citation to In re Dexter, the 16 Court finds that Petitioner has not exhausted his claims. In light 17 III 18 A federal court will not review questions of federal law 19 decided by a state court if the decision also rests on a state 20 law ground that is independent of the federal question and 21 adequate to support the judgment. 22 722, 729-30 (1991). 23 United States Supreme Court, the “independent and adequate state 24 ground” doctrine goes to jurisdiction; in federal habeas cases, 25 in whatever court, it is a matter of comity and federalism. 26 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. In the context of direct review by the Id. In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal 27 claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate 28 state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is 3 1 barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default 2 and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of 3 federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims 4 will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 5 501 U.S. at 750. 6 presented to the state courts, but an independent and adequate 7 state procedural rule exists which bars their review, claims are 8 procedurally barred in federal habeas review. 9 386 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that Washington‟s Coleman, Where petitioner‟s claims were not fairly Casey v. Moore, state procedural rule setting one-year limit on a personal 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 restraint petition which raises a federal claim not raised on 12 direct review precludes federal review of claim that would no 13 longer be timely under that rule). 14 California's administrative exhaustion rule is based solely 15 on state law and is therefore independent of federal law. See 16 Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A 17 state ground is independent only if it is not interwoven with 18 federal law.”); see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a) 19 (prisoners may appeal “any policy, decision, action, condition, 20 or omission by the department or its staff that the inmate or 21 parolee can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon 22 his or her health, safety, or welfare”). 23 administrative exhaustion rule has also been firmly established 24 and has been regularly followed since 1941 and is therefore 25 adequate to support a judgment. 26 App., 17 Cal.2d 280, 292 (1941) (“the rule is that where an 27 administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be 28 sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted California's See Abelleira v. Dist. Ct. of 4 1 before the courts will act.”); In re Muszalski, 52 Cal. App. 3d 2 500, 503 (1975) (“It is well settled as a general proposition 3 that a litigant will not be afforded relief in the courts unless 4 and until he has exhausted available administrative remedies.”); 5 see also Drake v. Adams, No. 2:07–cv–00577 JKS, 2009 WL 2474826 6 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2009) (“In reviewing California cases 7 in which the issue of exhaustion was decided during the past 10 8 years, the Court was unable to find a single case in which a 9 California appellate court did not deny a petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 be well established and consistently applied.”). 12 Thus, this doctrine appears to Federal courts in California have repeatedly held that if 13 the California Supreme Court denies a petition with a citation to 14 In re Dexter federal habeas review is procedurally barred because 15 California's administrative exhaustion rule is both independent 16 of federal law and adequate to support the state court judgment. 17 See Bartholomew v. Haviland, 467 F. App‟x 729, 730-31 (9th Cir. 18 2012) (petition was procedurally barred for failure to exhaust 19 prison appeals process); see also Riley, 2014 WL 988986 at *4 20 (granting motion to dismiss petition as procedurally barred in 21 light of California Supreme Court summary denial with a citation 22 to In re Dexter); Turner, 2013 WL 4458885 at *6 (petitioner's 23 remaining claims procedurally barred pursuant to California 24 Supreme Court's citation to In re Dexter); 25 1:13–cv–00335 AWI GSA HC, 2013 WL 3773869 at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. July 26 17, 2013) (petitioner's claims procedurally barred after 27 California Supreme Court denied state petition with citation to 28 In re Dexter); Foster v. Cate, No. 1:12–cv–01539 AWI BAM HC, 2013 5 Yeh v. Hamilton, No. 1 WL 1499481 at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2013) (California Supreme 2 Court's citation to In re Dexter is both independent and adequate 3 and therefore respondent is correct that federal habeas review is 4 procedurally barred). Petitioner has not alleged any facts to cast doubt on the 5 6 adequacy or consistent application of California's administrative 7 exhaustion rule. 8 Cir. 2003). 9 finds that Petitioner‟s claims are procedurally defaulted. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th The Court agrees with decisions cited above, and As noted above, the Court may still consider Petitioner's 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 claims if he demonstrates: (1) cause for the default and actual 12 prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of federal law, or 13 (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 14 750. 15 ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some 16 objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's 17 efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule. 18 Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493–94 (1991). Examples of cause include 19 showings “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 20 reasonably available to counsel,” “that some interference by 21 officials made compliance impracticable,” or “of ineffective 22 assistance of counsel.” 23 (1986). 24 25 26 27 28 The existence of cause for a procedural default must McCleskey v. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 Prejudice is difficult to demonstrate: The showing of prejudice required under Wainwright v. Sykes [433 U.S. 72 (1977)]is significantly greater than that necessary under “the more vague inquiry suggested by the words „plain error.‟” Engle [v. Isaac], 456 U.S., at 135, 102 S.Ct., at 1575; [United States v.]Frady, supra, 456 U.S., at 166, 102 S.Ct., at 1593. See also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1736, 52 6 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977). The habeas petitioner must show “not merely that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Frady, supra, at 170, 102 S.Ct., at 1596. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Id. at 493–494 (omission in original). Petitioner argues in his opposition that prison officials 7 interfered with his ability to properly exhaust his 8 administrative remedies. 9 cause, he has failed to demonstrate or even argue prejudice. Even assuming that Petitioner can show Nor does a review of the petition or exhibits for the various filings 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 demonstrate prejudice that would meet the high standard described 12 above. 13 show a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 14 reasons, the claims are procedurally barred and the Court cannot 15 consider the petition. For these same reasons, Petitioner has also failed to For all these IV 16 17 For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, 18 1. 19 20 Respondent‟s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 12) is GRANTED and the petition is DISMISSED. 2. Petitioner‟s request for accommodations (Docket No. 19) 21 is DENIED. 22 relief. 23 3. Petitioner may file a civil rights action if he seeks Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that 24 a reasonable jurist would find this Court‟s denial of his claims 25 debatable or wrong. 26 Consequently, no certificate of appealability is warranted in 27 this case. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 28 7 1 2 3 4 4. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of Respondent and against Petitioner and close the file. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated:1/31/2017 ________________________ THELTON E. HENDERSON United States District Judge 5 6 7 G:\PRO-SE\TEH\HC.16\Stamos4860.mtd.docx 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8

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