Li v. Contra Costa County et al

Filing 5

ORDER of Dismissal With Leave to Amend. Signed by Judge Edward M. Chen on 6/30/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service). (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/30/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Plaintiff,

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ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND

v.

Docket No. 1

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Case No. 17-cv-01023-EMC

ANDY LI,

I.

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INTRODUCTION

Andy Li, formerly an inmate at the Martinez Detention Facility in Martinez, California,

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filed a pro se civil rights complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint is now

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before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
II.

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BACKGROUND

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In his complaint, Andy Li alleges the following: On November 30, 2016, he was working

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in “intake” at the Martinez Detention Facility and “was physically attacked/ass[au]lted by a newly

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booked violent offender.” (Docket No. 1 at 3.) Nurse Dhanoa, aware of the offender‟s violent

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behavior, pulled that offender out of his single cell safety status “in hopes” that Mr. Li would be

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attacked and was motivated by retaliatory intent. Deputy Ball failed to protect Mr. Li, as deputy

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Ball was not within close distance to prevent attacks on any workers and failed to follow “customs

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to be at hand.” (Id.) Contra Costa County condoned a custom and practice “that deputies are

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suppose[d] to be near and within helping distances to prevent an attack on workers (inmates or

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non-inmates).” (Id.).

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III.

DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner

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seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any

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claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

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seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b).

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The complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement

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need only . . . give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it

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rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks

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omitted). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual

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For the Northern District of California

obligation to provide the „grounds‟ of his „entitle[ment] to relief‟ requires more than labels and

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United States District Court

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allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer

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“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. Pro se complaints

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must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a

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right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

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violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487

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U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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Fourteenth Amendment claim: When a pretrial detainee challenges conditions of his

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confinement, the proper inquiry is whether the conditions amount to punishment in violation of the

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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16

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(1979). Jail officials may be liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to protect a

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pretrial detainee from a risk of harm by other inmates. A deliberate indifference standard applies

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to failure-to-protect claims from both pretrial detainees and prisoners. However, unlike the

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subjective standard that applies to prisoner‟s claim (i.e., the prison official “must both be aware of

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facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he

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must also draw that inference,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 US. 825, 837 (1994)), an objective
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standard applies to a pretrial detainee‟s claim. See Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d

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1060, 1069-71 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017). To state a due

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process claim for deliberate indifference based on a failure to protect a pretrial detainee, a plaintiff

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must allege facts showing these elements:

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(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the
conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) Those
conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious
harm; (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures
to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the
circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk
involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct
obvious; and (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused
the plaintiff's injuries.

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The complaint fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to Mr. Li‟s safety because it

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Id. at 1071.

fails to allege facts that suggest that any Defendant acted with the requisite mental state of

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deliberate indifference. First, the sequence of events is unclear, in that the complaint does not

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explain whether the “violent offender” attacked Mr. Li upon his arrival at the jail (as suggested by

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the allegations that Mr. Li was attacked while “working in intake” and the attacker was “newly

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booked”) or after the “violent offender” had been at the jail for some time and after the “violent

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offender” had attacked two other inmates. If Mr. Li was the first person attacked by the “violent

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offender” in the jail, Mr. Li needs to allege facts showing why reasonable jail officials would have

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been aware of the violent nature of the person, or that he posed a risk to other inmates. Second,

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Mr. Li fails to allege facts supporting his conclusion that nurse Dhanoa was aware of the attacker‟s

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violence when she “pull[ed] him out of single cell safety status,” nor does Mr. Li even explain the

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meaning of the quoted phrase. And Mr. Li fails to allege facts supporting his assertion that nurse

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Dhanoa acted with the hope that the offender would attack Mr. Li. The complaint does not

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sufficiently allege specific facts suggesting that nurse Dhanoa or deputy Bell did not take

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reasonable available measures to abate the risk to an obvious risk to Mr. Li.

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With regard to both nurse Dhanoa and deputy Bell, Mr. Li needs to allege facts showing

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the presence of the each of the elements mentioned in the Castro case block-quoted above. The

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amended complaint needs to explain exactly what happened, needs to provide if possible the name
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of the “violent offender,” and needs to allege facts suggesting that nurse Dhanoa and deputy Bell

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acted with deliberate indifference to a risk to Mr. Li‟s safety.

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Retaliation Claim: “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

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retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

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against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4)

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chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

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advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.

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2005) (footnote omitted).

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The complaint fails to state a claim against nurse Dhanoa for retaliation because facts are

motive. Mr. Li speculates that nurse Dhanoa acted to retaliate against him, but does not allege

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For the Northern District of California

not alleged in support of the conclusory allegation that nurse Dhanoa acted with retaliatory

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United States District Court

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facts showing this to be anything more than speculation. For instance, he does not allege facts

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showing that nurse Dhanoa was aware of his First Amendment activities, and does not allege that

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nurse Dhanoa acted because of Mr. Li‟s First Amendment activity instead of being merely careless

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or making a simple mistake.

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Municipal liability: The complaint lists Contra Costa County as a defendant. There is no

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respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is liable

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simply because he employs a person who has violated a plaintiff's rights. See Monell v. Dep't of

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Social Servs.,436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus,

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the mere fact that an alleged individual wrongdoer may have been employed by Contra Costa

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County would not be a sufficient basis on which to hold the County liable under § 1983.

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Local governments are “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however,

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where official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort, see Monell,436 U.S. at 690. To

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impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must

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show: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was deprived;

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(2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the

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plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional

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violation. See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997).
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For municipal liability, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts regarding the specific nature of the

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alleged policy, custom or practice to allow the defendant to effectively defend itself, and these

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facts must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See AE v. County of Tulare, 666

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F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2012). It is not sufficient to merely allege that a policy, custom or

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practice existed or that individual officers‟ wrongdoing conduct conformed to a policy, custom or

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practice. See id. at 636-38.

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The complaint alleges that Contra Costa County “condoned a custom and practice” “that

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deputies are suppose[d] to be near and within helping distances to prevent and attack on workers

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(inmate or non-inmate).” (Docket No. 1 at 3.) . The allegation does not plead a plausible claim

rather than deliberately indifferent to, a risk to worker safety. Moreover, the complaint suggests

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For the Northern District of California

for municipal liability because the alleged custom and practice would tend to be protective of,

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United States District Court

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that Mr. Li was injured because deputy Bell failed to follow the policy, rather than because he

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followed the policy. Leave to amend is granted so that Mr. Li may attempt to allege the existence

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of municipal liability.
IV.

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CONCLUSION

The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff must file an amended complaint

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that complies with the directions in this order no later than August 4, 2017, and must include the

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caption and civil case number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the

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first page. Plaintiff is cautioned that his amended complaint must be a complete statement of his

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claims. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“For claims

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dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend, we will not require that they be repled in a

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subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal. But for any claims voluntarily

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dismissed, we will consider those claims to be waived if not repled.”) Failure to file the amended

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complaint will result in the dismissal of this action.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 30, 2017
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EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge
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