Stewart v. Freitas et al

Filing 6

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James on 6/29/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(rmm2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/29/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LEE RANDOLPH STEWART,
Plaintiff,

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STEVE FREITAS, et al.,
Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND

v.

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Case No. 17-cv-01529-MEJ (PR)

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Plaintiff, an inmate at the Sonoma County Jail (“SCJ”), filed this pro se civil rights

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complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a

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separate order. Based upon a review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, it is

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dismissed with leave to amend.
DISCUSSION

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A.

Standard of Review

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Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

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redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

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which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

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Pro se complaints must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir.

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2010).

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the

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claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not

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necessary; the statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

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grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations and internal

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quotations omitted). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations [in order to

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state a claim], . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

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requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

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action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

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speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).

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A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.

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at 570.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

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(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v.

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Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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B.

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Legal Claims
According the complaint, on January 8, 2017, while housed at SCJ, plaintiff refused an

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order to move from a lower bunk to an upper bunk. The order was given by defendant deputy A.

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Marlowe. Plaintiff alleges that he refused to move bunks because he had a disability, which was

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documented. Marlowe proceeded to solicit a mental health worker to analyze plaintiff, which led

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to plaintiff’s transfer to the mental health unit. Plaintiff identifies the mental health worker as

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defendant John Doe.

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Plaintiff filed inmate grievances challenging the housing reclassification. In the decisions

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rejecting his grievances, he was informed that Marlowe was unaware of plaintiff’s lower bunk

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accommodations and was acting under instructions from defendant Sergeant Gallaway, who had

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suggested the mental health intervention based on plaintiff’s behavior after being directed to move

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to an upper bunk.

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1.

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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects

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individuals against governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property without due process of

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law. Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two

Due Process

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sources: the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.

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215, 223-27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests are generally ones pertaining to liberty.

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Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner

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implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See

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Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980)

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(transfer to mental hospital), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (involuntary

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administration of psychotropic drugs)). Deprivations that are less severe or more closely related to

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the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected

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liberty interest, provided that the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See Sandin, 515
U.S. at 477-87. An interest of “real substance” will generally be limited to freedom from restraint

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

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incidents of prison life” or “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence.” Id. at 484, 487.

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Here, plaintiff alleges that he spent six weeks in the mental health unit causing him to miss

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classes, which classes would have allowed him to earn milestone credits towards his sentence.

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Accepting that as true, as the court must at the pleading stage, the complaint alleges sufficient

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facts to show an atypical and significant hardship was imposed on plaintiff. However, the

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complaint does not sufficiently link any defendant to this claim. Specifically, although plaintiff

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alleges that defendants Marlowe and Gallaway ordered a mental health analysis, he does not

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establish that these defendants, or any other defendant(s), were responsible for the decision to

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transfer plaintiff to the mental health unit without due process. Leave to amend will be granted so

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that plaintiff may allege facts, if they exist, showing who made the housing decision. In his

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amended complaint, plaintiff also must identify the procedural protections – such as notice or a

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hearing – not provided to him before he was transferred.

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2.

John Doe Defendant

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The use of “Jane Doe” or “John Doe” to identify a defendant is not favored in the Ninth

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Circuit. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Although the use of a Doe

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defendant designation is acceptable to withstand dismissal of a complaint at the initial review

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stage, using a Doe defendant designation creates its own problem: the person identified as a Doe

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cannot be served with process until he or she is identified by his or her real name. If plaintiff files

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an amended complaint and seeks to include the SCJ mental health worker identified as John Doe

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as a defendant, plaintiff must take steps promptly to discover the full name (i.e., first and last

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name) of John Doe and provide that information to the Court in his amended complaint. The

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burden remains on the plaintiff; the Court cannot undertake to investigate the names and identities

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of unnamed defendants.

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3.

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With respect to defendant Sheriff Freitas, plaintiff appears to have named this individual as

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Defendant Sheriff Freitas

a defendant because of his supervisory role. Plaintiff is advised that a supervisor is not liable
merely because the supervisor is responsible, in general terms, for the actions of another. Taylor

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village,

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723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). A supervisor may be liable only on a showing of

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(1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection

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between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden,

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678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff is given leave to amend to add such allegations, if

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he truthfully can do so.

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4.

Defendants Huddleston and Cooper

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Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants Lieutenant Huddleston and Sergeant Cooper

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mishandled his inmate grievances are dismissed for failure to state a claim under § 1983 because it

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is well established that there is no constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or

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grievance system, see Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855

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F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988), and that a state’s creation of a prison administrative appeal or

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grievance system does not implicate a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, see

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Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495

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(8th Cir. 1993) (same). These allegations are dismissed without leave to amend.
CONCLUSION

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For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows:

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1.

The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. If plaintiff believes he can cure

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the above-mentioned deficiencies in good faith, plaintiff must file an AMENDED COMPLAINT

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within thirty (30) days from the date of this order. The pleading must be simple and concise and

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must include the caption and civil case number used in this order (17-1529 MEJ (PR)) and the

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words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Plaintiff may not incorporate material from

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the prior complaint by reference. Failure to file the amended complaint by the deadline will

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result in the dismissal of the action. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a blank

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civil rights form along with his copy of this order.

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Plaintiff is cautioned that his amended complaint will supersede existing pleadings

and must be a complete statement of his claims, except that he does not need to plead again any

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claim the court has dismissed without leave to amend. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer

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defendants. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992).
In his amended complaint, plaintiff must be careful to allege facts showing the

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basis for liability for each defendant. He should not refer to them as a group (e.g., “the

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defendants”); rather, he should identify each involved defendant by name and link each of them to

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his claim by explaining what each involved defendant did or failed to do that caused a violation of

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his rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

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3.

It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court

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informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed “Notice of

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Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do

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so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 41(b).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 29, 2017

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MARIA-ELENA JAMES
United States Magistrate Judge